

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



University of Jordan

Yarmouk University

**The Third International Conference
on Bilad al-Sham: Palestine
19-24 April 1980**

**Vol 3
HISTORY OF PALESTINE**

1984

THE JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE AND THE OTTOMANS' POLICY

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As many other minorities the Jews had lived happily in the Ottoman Empire. While many of these minorities had fought against the Ottoman Government in order to create their own independent states, the Jews had to follow a different method of establishing themselves in Palestine. The fact was that the Greeks, the Serbs, the Bulgarians and the Romanians had all been supported by foreign powers in their struggles with the Ottomans, but had also advantage of living together on the lands they fought for whereas the Jews lacked both of these advantages. Therefore, the land where the Jews planned to create a Jewish State had first to be populated or colonized by the Jews; and this was only possible if the Sultan tacitly allowed such an aim. Thus the Jews, and in particular Dr. Theodore Herzl, tried to persuade the Sultan 'Abd al-Hamīd II. The Sultan from the beginning of Zionism, until his deposition from the throne in 1908 continually refused and thus frustrated all the efforts of the Jews to have an independent Jewish State. When this began to be clear, the Jews, as it will be shown, endeavoured to purchase lands illegally from the natives in different parts of Palestine.

Although the Berlin Congress had not directly dealt with the Palestine Question, it nevertheless left an open door to the Jews. According to article 62, the minorities' property and their religious rights were clearly guaranteed.¹ Soon after the Congress in 1879 an English Jew from the Westminster Parliament, Laurence Oliphant approached the Ottoman Government with a long and detailed plan for the creation of an emigration centre in Palestine for European and Turkish Jews². Oliphant was careful to underline that, by this project the Jews would not be the only beneficiaries, but the area would be an outlet for the Europeans' industrial and agricultural investment. However the Jews were to be allowed to establish a Company under the name of Palestine Ottoman Company. This would have the right of buying lands to be colonized by the Jews, in particular in the province of Balkā', i.e., between the Jordan and the Dirb-al-Hajj. The land was to be provided and sold cheaply to the said company by the Ottoman Government. It was proposed that about one million acres (i.e., 455,000 dönüm) be made available. The Company, was to be under the protection of the Sultan and his government. It was, however, to have certain privileges, such as freedom of movement for the Company.³

By the order of the Sultan, a special council was set up to consider the proposals put forward by Oliphant. This was composed of the Ministers of Interior, Justice

and Commerce. (26 Şevval 1296—October 1879). The Council recognised that the Jews all over the world had been hoping to come together one day in Palestine. Permission to establish a company would lay the foundation stone for the creation of a Jewish State. This would create many difficulties in the future for the Sultan's Empire. Needless to say the plan was refused. However, the Council at the same time suggested that Oliphant's plan should not be refused outright to avoid any bitterness against the Sultan on the part of the British government which at that time was not desired. The reason to be given for the refusal was that there was not enough land for such a purpose and also the government was planning to settle Turkish migrants from Rumelia there.⁴

As a result of Tsar Alexander III's Eastern policy,⁵ many Jews found their way to Istanbul. In 1890 and 1891 the Galata streets were crowded by the newcomers, since so many of them had nowhere else to go.⁶ The government sent orders to its governors to discourage the Jews who arrived from Russia from going on to Istanbul. Many of them, however, claimed Ottoman nationality and asked permission to be allowed to stay.⁷ The government was unwilling to have the newcomers. It explained its policy. In a document dated August 1891 (11 Muharrem 1309) which stated that, the Jews had always taken over industry and trade wherever they have gone. Such action by the Jews naturally deprived the natives of their professions. Thus all the countries refused to allow the Jews to emigrate to their states. Therefore there was no reason why the Ottoman government should not follow the same policy. The Jews were to be recommended to emigrate to the United States of America and Arjantine instead of coming to the Ottoman Empire.⁹ The Jews, however, continued to come and the government in November 1891 was informed that the Jews in Jaffa had coined false Akçes.¹⁰ In a council the Jewish case was discussed once more and it was decided that if Jewish emigration was not checked, this would create serious problem. Therefore, a strong measure had to be taken¹¹.

Meanwhile the Jews continued to emigrate to the Holy Land and bought a considerable area. It should be pointed out that all the land transactions were illegal and the government's response was always strong. Here, only a few examples will be given to illustrate the illegal land transactions and the government's policy. The Sultan 'Abd al-Hamīd throughout 1898, 1899, 1901 and onwards issued several firmans by which the Jews were forbidden from buying lands in Palestine. Nonetheless the government made it clear that the Jews as well as the Christians could freely visit the Holy Places without any restrictions.

It should, however, be underlined that Edmond Rothchild, Baron Hersch and some other preeminent European Jews were behind the illegal land transactions in Palestine. They thought, no doubt that, by this method, Palestine would be colonized by the emigrant Jews. In March 1900 (22 Zilkade 1318) the mutaşarrif of Jerusalem, while informing the government of this situation, also complained bit-

terly that the lands were being sold illegally by the natives to the Jews.¹² A document among the State Council Papers (Suray-i Devlet) clearly illustrates the government's attitude. The Director of the Registry of Landed Property, Bekir Sami Efendi was involved with such transactions in Jerusalem.¹³ After a long inquiry the director was found guilty and removed. The government, however, with the idea of preventing the corruption, increased the salary of the director from 900 to 1200 kuruş¹⁴. Another example of the Government attitude was that in May 1903 (9 Safer 1321) the Vali of Aydin who owned a çiftlik (estate) in Haifa was prevented from selling it to a German Jew.¹⁴ Again in August 1903 (19 C. Evvel 1321), in the sancak of Akka, a civil-servant from the Tobacco Monopoly, Feraci Efendi wanted to sell his lands in the villages of Berch, Tell al-Duhan, Melhemiye and Şecere (a total of 50,000 dönüms) to a Belgian Jew.¹⁶ Referring to the Sultan's firmans, the Council of State ruled that no such lands could be sold to the foreign Jews. On several occasions, however, the government made it clear that if land was sold to a native Jew, he was asked to guarantee that he would not sell his hands to another Jews or make use of it for colonization by the Jews. In another case, a certain Ibrahim Sabbag, Abdulgani Beydan Paşa and his son Zeki Bey, George Musa Jersak and Hasan-al-Zamili acting on behalf of Edmond Rothchild and a French Jew, Nathan Narsis, tried to purchase about 40,000 dönüm of lands between Akka and Haifa.¹⁷ When the government was informed of this business its reaction was much stronger than before. It was stated that, if the land transactions were not stopped, there was the risk of the immediate creation of a Jewish state. Thus the officials were instructed that, whoever was involved in such transactions should not only lose his job but also be punished in a very strong manner.¹⁸ It must be said that in spite of all the government's restrictions, the illegal land transactions carried on.

Sultan 'Abd al-Hamīd was well informed about Dr. Herzl and the Zionist movement in Europe and elsewhere, through his embassies.¹⁹ Ambassadors Ali Ferruh Bey in Washington and Ahmet Tevfik in Berlin were particularly active. On 20 April 1898, Ahmet Tevfik Paşa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked Ali Ferruh, whether or not the American Jews were supporting the Zionist movement in Europe. The ambassador was to find out whether the Jews in Izmir had established any relations with the American Jews.²⁰ A few days later Ahmet Tevfik Paşa sent a telegram to London asking if it was true that the Jews had created a fund for a Jewish State in Palestine.²¹ Ali Ferruh while confirming the Izmir Jews were in connection with the United States,²² informed his minister that Baron Hirsch's Society, under the presidency of Jacob Barker, was working for such an end.²³ He also sent a pamphlet published in New York entitled "De Zionist" written by Isaac Mirsky. Ali Ferruh believed that the government should take the necessary steps to rectify the mistakes that their ancestors had committed. He went further by suggesting that the muslims who were forced to leave Eastern Rumelia and who were now jobless in Istanbul should be persuaded to settle in Palestine.²⁴

Meanwhile Mr. Strauss had been appointed as the United States ambassador to the Ottoman Empire.²⁵ Ali Ferruh immediately informed the Foreign Office that Mr. Strauss was an active Zionist who delivered several speeches at Zionist congresses in New York, Philadelphia and Chicago.²⁶ Ferruh Bey said that upon the nomination of Mr. Strauss, the Jews increased their activities and meetings for an independent Jewish State.²⁷ He added that the movement would take a very serious shape in the following years.²⁸ In late 1898 when the German Emperor was about to visit the Holy Places the Foreign Ministry seems to have loosened its restrictions on Jews' visiting Palestine. Meanwhile the number of Jews applying for visas in the Ottoman Embassy in Washington increased.²⁹ Ali Ferruh refused the visas until he had received new instructions. When he received none he suspected a change of policy due to Mr. Strauss' activities and influence in Istanbul. He then directly complained about Ahmet Tevfik Paşa to the Yildiz Palace. He even went so far as to say that all he had done in Washington was sacrificed to the Minister's personal policy.³⁰ Ali Ferruh, who spoke English well, established good relations with the press. He therefore tried to inform the public of his government's attitude vis-à-vis the Jews. In a press conference he declared that "The Sublime Porte" does not desire to sell any part of its Arabian Country and no matter how many millions of gold are offered, this determination will not be altered". He continued by saying that the Zionists must refrain "from creating difficulties for the Turkish Government by attempting to put chimeric ideas into execution". He believed that "the only results which can flow from this attempt will be harm to their peaceable and happy co-religionists in Turkey".³¹

The Ottoman ambassador in Berlin, in a dispatch dated 17 August 1900, while informing the Foreign Minister about Zionism, thought that for the time being it was not a serious movement. He commented that Zionists were only talking in vague terms of their aims. Nonetheless he believed that the movement sooner or later would become serious and would do its best to settle the Jews in Palestine.³² The ambassador regularly informed Istanbul of the movement; and at the time of the Zionist Congress at Basel in August 1905 he seems to have changed his attitude for he warned the government that necessary steps must be taken to prevent the Jewish emigration to Palestine and to stop them buying lands under any guise.³³ The ambassador also obtained a copy of the interview that Dr. Herzl had with the Russian Minister Plehwe where Herzl was told that the Russian government would not have hindered the Jews from going to Palestine.³⁴

It is needless to enter into the details of Dr. Herzl's activities in Istanbul. It is a well-known fact that up until his death in 1904 he traveled there several times to persuade the Sultan to grant a charter for the colonization of Palestine by the Jews. Herzl knew well the financial difficulties of the Ottoman Empire and offered the Sultan his financial assistance to rescue it. Though 'Abd al-Hamid had expressed his sympathy to Herzl, he was not willing to grant the charter.³⁵ In order to show his

sympathy to the Jews, the Sultan even went so far as to send a message to the Zionist Congress then at work at Basel in december 1901.³⁶ Upon this message there were even rumours that the Sultan agreed to grant the charter which Herzl asked for. But in January 1902 the Foreign Minister Ahmet Tevfik Paşa instructed his ambassador in Berlin to deny the rumours that the Sultan had ever agreed to permit the installation of Zionists in Palestine.³⁷ However the Sultan, in order to frustrate Herzl, agreed to grant the charter for emigration anywhere in the Ottoman Empire but Palestine. When Herzl lost his hope in the Sultan, he turned towards England.³⁸

In conclusion it is interesting to note that although the Sultan was hostile to the creation of a Jewish State,³⁹ yet in a private conversation with his personal doctor, Atif Huseyin,⁴⁰ he admitted that in spite of all the difficulties, sooner or later the Zionists would be successful in realizing their dreams as a result of their economic power.

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NOTES

- 1 . Nihat Erim, Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri, (Ankara, 1953), p. 421.
- 2 . Başbakanlık Arşivi (Thereafter cited as B.A.) Yıldız Evrakı. A.AMD 1296.10.23.
- 3 . **Ibid.**
- 4 . **Ibid.**
- 5 . Cf. B.H. Sumner. **Survey of Russian History.** (London, 1966); Leonard Stein, **The Balfour Declaration,** (London, 1961).
- 6 . Yıldız Esas Evrakı, Dahiliye (thereafter cited as Yıldız Dahiliye) 97972.
- 7 . **Ibid.**
- 8 . Yıldız, Dahiliye, 97972.
- 9 . Yıldız, Dahiliye, 97030 and 97972.
- 10 . Yıldız, Dahiliye, 97971.
- 11 . Yıldız, dahiliye, 97972.
- 12 . B.A, Bab-i Ali Evrak Odası (Thereafter cited as BEO) Siyasi Kisim, Karton 2, Dosya 2.
- 13 . B.A. BEO, Siyasi Kisim, Karton 2, Dosya 2, 17 Muharrem 1321
- 14 . **Ibid.**
- 15 . B.A. DEO, Siyasi Kisim, Karton 2, Dosya 2.
- 16 . B.A. Yıldız, Suray-i Devlet.
- 17 . **Ibid.**
- 18 . **Ibid.**
- 19 . I should like to express my thanks to Mr. Çetin Oran for granting me a permission to consult the Foreign Office Documents in Istanbul.
- 20 . Tefvik Paşa to Ali Ferruh, 20 April 1898. Hazine-i Evrakı, No. 332.
- 21 . Tefvik Paşa to Anthapoulos Paşa, No. 48, 25 April 1898, Hazine-i Evrak (Thereafter cited as H.E), 332.
- 22 . Ali Ferruh to Tefvik Paşa, 22 April 1898, H.E., 332; Ali Ferruh to Tahsin Bey, 22 April 1898, B.A., Yıldız Esas Evrak, Kisim 2, Evrak 35-37, Zarf 54, Karton 136 also, Kisim, 2, Evrak, 48-49, Zarf 54, Karton 136.
- 23 . Ali Ferruh to Tefvik Paşa, 27 April 1898, H.E. 332; Ali Ferruh to Tefvik Paşa, 23 April 1898, H.E. 332, Ali Ferruh to Tefvik Paşa 29 April 1898; H.E. 332.
- 24 . **Ibid;** Ali Ferruh to Tahsin Bey, 27 April 1898, B.A. Yıldız Esas Evrak, Kisim 2, Evrak 48, Zarf 54, Karton 136. See also Ali Ferruh to Tefvik Paşa, 12 May 1898, H.E. 332 and Ali Ferruh to Tahsin Bey, 20 May 1898. B.A., Yıldız Esas, Kisim 2, Evrak 48, Zarf 54, Karton 136.
- 25 . Ali Ferruh to Tahsin Bey, 15 June 1898 B.A., Yıldız Esas, Kisim 2, Evrak 85, Zarf 54, Karton 136.
- 26 . **Ibid.**
- 27 . Ali Ferruh to Tahsin Bey, 23 June 1898, B.A., Yıldız Esas, Kisim 2, Evrak 98, Zarf 54, Karton 136.
- 28 . **Ibid.**
- 29 . Ali Ferruh to Tahsin Bey, 24 January 1899, B.A., Yıldız Esas, Kisim 2, Evrak 275, Zarf 54, Karton 136.
- 30 . **Ibid.**
- 31 . Ali Ferruh to Tahsin Bey, 23 June 1898 B.A., Yıldız Esas, Kisim 2, Evrak 98, Zarf 54, Karton 154. Cf. 23 June 1898 H.E. 332. See also, Ali Ferruh to Ahmet Tefvik 5 May 1899, H.E. 332.
- 32 . **Ahmet Tefvik to Ahmet Tefvik Paşa,** 17 August 1900, H.E. 332.
- 33 . Ahmet Tefvik to Ahmet Tefvik Paşa, 31 August 1903, H.E. 332. Cf. 3 April 1901. H.E. 332.
- 34 . Attached to Ahmet Tefvik's letter of 31 August 1903, **op. cit.**

- 35 . Dr. Herzl's memoirs are translated to Turkish as 'Siyonizm ve Turkiye' by Yaşar Kutluay, Istanbul 1967. See also, L. Stein, **The Balfour Declaration**, *op. cit.*
- 36 . Yaşar Kutluay, **Siyonizm ve Türkiye**, *op. cit.* p. 236-240.
- 37 . Ahmet Tevfik Paşa to Ahmet Tevfik, Telegramme, 9 Junray 1902. H.E. 332.
- 38 . See Stein, **The Balfour Declaration**, *op. cit.*; Zionism, Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, No. 162, London, 1920; **Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1939**. Published by The Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, 1939.
- 39 . Ali Vehbi Bey, **Pensées et Souvenirs de l'Ex-Sultan Abdul-Hamid**, pp. 1819, Istanbul, 1931; Abraham Galanté, **Abdul Hamid II et le Sionisme**, Istanbul 1933; E.Z. Koral, **Osmanlı Tarihi**, cilt VIII, pp. 485-486. Ankara, 1962.
- 40 . Afif Hüseyin, Abdülhamid'in Hatırları, manuscript in Türk Tarih Kurumu, Library, Book No. 8, pp. 15-18.

DEUX RÉVOLTES BÉDOUINES EN SYRIE MÉRIDIONALE AU MOYEN AGE

Thierry Bianquis

L'histoire du monde Arabe médiéval est jalonnée par les révoltes bedouines. Les rapports entre sédentaires et nomades dans les zones géographiques semi-arides sont normalement des rapports de complémentarité. Les nomades introduisent dans les circuits économiques des denrées d'origine animale, laitages, viande, cuir, peaux, poils et offrent des services, transport, protection des voies de communication, négoce des denrées lointaines et des esclaves; ils acquièrent auprès des paysans, céréales, fruits séchés et auprès des citadins des objets ayant subi une transformation, étoffes, vêtements, tentes, armes, ustensiles. Les interpénétrations dépassent en général les simples échanges dans les souqs spécialisé; des contacts prolongés existent entre les Bédouins et les paysans notamment quand les troupeaux des nomades paissent dans les champs moissonnés ou lorsqu'à la suite d'un accident climatique quelconque, les Bédouins sont obligés de s'installer sur les franges des terres cultivées. De même des contacts prolongés avec les citadins ont lieu lors du convoi des caravanes de pèlerinage ou quand un détachement de cavalerie bédouine fait campagne aux côtés d'une armée régulière, moins accoutumée à se déplacer dans des espaces désertiques.

Dans les termes économiques de l'échange, les Bédouins sont défavorisés. En effet, ils ne peuvent survivre sans les céréales, les vêtements et les armes que leur fournissent les sédentaires alors que leur apport économique quoique important n'est vital ni pour les paysans, ni pour, ni pour les citadins. Ils compensent cette inégalité par une meilleure adaptation physique et psychologique à la faim et à la soif ainsi qu'à la fatigue. Leur connaissance du milieu naturel, la steppe désertique, est parfaite puisqu'elle représente pour eux un gage de survie. Leur système social protège étroitement l'individu en imposant des lois très rigoureuses de solidarité avec le parent et l'allié et d'hospitalité envers l'étranger. L'échelle des valeurs morales est, elle aussi, au service de la survie du groupe; la maîtrise totale de soi, le refus de l'enracinement, la loyauté envers la tribu, la ruse autorisée à l'égard des groupes humains qui ne font pas partie du cercle protecteur, le mépris individuel de la mort et la magnification de l'exploit physique et du fait d'arme, autant de vertus nécessaires pour perpétuer l'espèce dans un milieu hostile où aucune faiblesse ne peut être tolérée puisque l'homme adulte ne peut se permettre d'être une charge pour ses contribuables.

En situation de faiblesse par rapport au sédentaire parce qu'il est constamment menacé par la faim, le Bédouin compense cette aliénation, tout d'abord par un refus

de la reconnaître, c'est à dire par une exacerbation du sentiment de dignité. Il n'accepte aucune assistance et préfère prendre que recevoir. Quand les termes de l'échange deviennent par trop déséquilibrés et qu'il n'a plus rien à offrir en contrepartie de ce qu'il doit acquérir auprès des sédentaires, il a recours à sa force physique et à sa ruse pour se le procurer quand même et sans s'abaisser. C'est alors la crise qui peut aller de la razzia sur un village jusqu'à la révolte généralisée d'une ou de plusieurs tribus.

Jusqu'ici, à notre connaissance, ce phénomène de la révolte bédouine tel qu'il se manifesta, dès la conquête arabe et jusqu'à l'arrivée en Syrie des nomades turcomans venus d'Asie Centrale, n'a pas été étudié dans son ensemble. Aucune typologie des révoltes n'a été esquissée; les rapprochements entre une recrudescence des soulèvements et une modification brutale des conditions climatiques, économiques ou démographiques, n'ont été tentés que pour expliquer l'opération par laquelle les Fatimides lancèrent contre l'Afrique du Nord les Banū Hilāl et les Banū Sulaym.

C'est pourquoi, l'édition récente de deux textes historiques décrivant d'une façon détaillée deux révoltes survenues en Syrie du Sud et Palestine ont attiré notre attention.

Il s'agit d'une part du tome édité par Shukri Faysal de l'histoire de la ville de Damas, écrite par Ibn 'Asākir. La guerre qui opposa dans l'oasis de Damas les tribus de Qays aux villageois yéménites dans les années 170 de l'hégire est décrite avec une précision des détails étonnantes. Ces combats impliquèrent des groupes tribaux, bédouins et sédentaires, venus du Jourdain et de Palestine, du Ḥawrān et du Jawlān, de la Bika^c et enfin de la région de Ḥoms. Qays était commandé par Abū 'l-Haytham 'Amir b 'Umāra al-Murri, sous le nom duquel Ibn 'Āsākir a placé ce récit. La ville de Damas était habitée en majorité par des Qaysites alors que dans la Ghūṭa, l'oasis qui entourait la ville, la plupart des villages étaient Yéménites. Les tribus Qays du Ḥawrān. et d'une manière générale de Syrie du Sud et de Palestine qui étaient demeurées nomades et qui semblaient se livrer plus à l'élevage et au brigandage qu'à l'agriculture désiraient remettre en cause ce partage. Elles s'unirent pour chasser les villageois yéménites ou du moins pour les vassaliser. A leur tour, les Yéménites qui disposaient du soutien des gouverneurs abbassides de Damas, firent appel à la solidarité de leurs tribus de toute la moitié méridionale de la Syrie. Les combats durèrent plusieurs mois; les Qaysites qui avaient davantage conservé leurs vertus bédouines telles que nous les avons décrites plus haut remportaient régulièrement la victoire lors des diverses rencontres. Mais s'ils parvinrent à accroître leur domination sur l'oasis de Damas, la population de cette ville leur refusa sa solidarité agissante et Abū 'l-Haytham quoique vaincu, mais de plus en plus isolé, se retira, mettant fin ainsi aux combats.

Le second texte que nous avons analysé se trouve dans l'histoire d'Égypte d'al-Musabbiḥī, qu'Ayman Fu'ād Sayyid et moi-même avons éditée au Caire, voici quelques années. Ce récit couvre partiellement l'année 414 et presque totalement l'année 415 de l'hégire. Consacré essentiellement à l'Égypte, il donne également de nombreux faits concernant la Syrie, et particulièrement la Syrie méridionale ou Palestine qui, officiellement relevait de la mouvance de l'Imamat Fatimide, installé au Caire. En fait depuis leurs premières tentatives en Syrie, dans les années 360 de l'Hégire, les Fatimides s'étaient heurtées à une forte opposition et avaient dû, à plusieurs reprises, évacuer partiellement ou totalement cette province. Ils avaient eu à faire à des révoltes urbaines extrêmement violentes notamment à Damas et à Tyr; ils s'étaient également heurtés aux grandes confédérations tribales, 'Uḡayl, Kalb, Kilāb et Ṭayy. Ces derniers, implantés en Palestine, jouissant parfois du soutien byzantin, avaient sous le commandement de la famille Banū Djarrāḥ, représenté le fer de lance de l'opposition aux Fatimides, allant sous le règne d'al-Ḥākim jusqu'à susciter un contre-calife pour essayer d'abattre la dynastie. Mais ils pratiquaient également la vertu bédouine de la dissimulation et de la ruse à l'égard des ennemis du groupe tribal, que nous avons définie plus haut et ne craignaient pas de trahir leurs serments, de changer de camp et de s'offrir au plus offrant. Le récit d'al-Musabbiḥī pour l'année 415 de l'hégire rapporte les épisodes les plus glorieux de cette longue révolte. Les Banū Djarrāḥ mettent la main sur la totalité de la Palestine et occupent la ville de Ramleh, leurs alliés Kalb assiègent Damas et les Kilāb sont à Alep. Ils ont réussi à se trouver des alliés parmi les tribus Qaysites de Haute Égypte et parmi les Banū Ḳurra du Delta et de Libye. La réaction du pouvoir fatimide est incertaine; la guerre que mène pour Le Caire, le général turc al-Dizbirī est coûteuse et risque de rapporter à celui-ci une gloire dangereuse pour le pouvoir central affaibli. Aussi écoute-t-on volontiers les propositions du chef bédouin, Ibn al-Djarrāḥ, qui se déclare prêt à reconnaître une vague vassalité envers les Fatimides si on abandonne aux trois grands groupes bédouins l'administration, la protection et la perception du kharāj dans l'ensemble syro-palestinien. Mais, les citadins de ces régions, bien qu'opposés aux doctrines religieuses des fatimides, sont horrifiés par les exactions bédouines, prennent en main leur auto-défense et coopèrent avec les troupes venues d'Égypte. Dès lors, la tenacité d'al-Dizbirī l'emporte malgré les énormes difficultés de ravitaillement et de financement qu'il rencontre. La reprise en main est très longue et ne s'achèvera que trois ans plus tard à la bataille décisive d'al-Kuḥūāna.

Nous désirons présenter une analyse comparative de ces deux textes décrivant des révoltes en Syrie-Palestine. Il faut tout d'abord chercher sur quelle documentation reposent les deux récits, quels étaient les rapports entre l'auteur ou les auteurs de ces textes et les tribus bédouines, d'une part, et le pouvoir central, abbasside ou fatimide, d'autre part. Dans les récits-mêmes, une analyse de vocabulaire fait ressortir l'occurrence ou la nonoccurrence de termes collectifs désignant les Bédouins

et les opposant aux sédentaires, comme par exemple le terme 'arab. Les niveaux de solidarité, à l'échelon du clan familial, de la tribu, de la confédération de tribus, de Qays contre Yaman, ou de la neutralité de Kuraysh de l'alliance de tribus qaysites et yamanites contre les citadins, c'est à dire de la solidarité nomades contre sédentaires doivent être définis. L'attitude des antagonistes des Bédouins, paysans, citadins, pouvoir central, est variable. Notamment, le pouvoir central évalue le coût financier de la révolte, perte du kharāj, destructions de récoltes, pillage, etc., et le coût de la répression, qu'elle soit directe, intervention de l'armée régulière ou indirecte, soutien d'une contre-révolte tribale. On peut remarquer ainsi qu'à l'époque fatimide, du fait montant des soldes, notamment dans la cavalerie, le coût de la répression dépasse parfois la valeur des dommages causés par les incursions bédouines. On comprend mieux le peu d'empressement que manifeste l'administration fatimide face aux demandes d'aide d'al-Dizbiri.

Mais le problème le plus passionnant est certes celui du choix qu'effectuent les citadins entre le pouvoir central et les tribus. Il existe en Syrie-Palestine médiévale, après le départ des Omayyades et jusqu'à l'arrivée de Nūr al-Dīn, une tradition urbaine d'oppositions au pouvoir central, abbasside ou fatimide. Mais, lors du déchaînement des révoltes bédouines, lentement et à regret, malgré tous les liens de sang qui existent entre bédouins et citadins, ceux-ci finissent par se rallier au pouvoir central. L'ordre, même injuste, semble préférable au désordre.

Enfin, comme nous l'avons dit plus haut, toute étude d'une révolte bédouine doit être replacée dans un cadre écologique et démographique. Il semble qu'on peut établir pour l'époque fatimide une concordance chronologique entre les accès de hausse de prix du liès des crues insuffisantes du Nil et les révoltes bédouines. Il serait nécessaire de remonter cette enquête jusqu'à l'époque abbasside. De même, l'arrivée de nouvelles tribus bédouines, en provenance de la péninsule arabique, dès le IIe siècle de l'hégire et jusqu'au Ve siècle a été évoquée par Suhayl Zakkār et par d'autres auteurs, mais aucune analyse de la mutation démographique intervenue parmi les tribus arabes après la conquête islamique n'a été tentée à notre connaissance.

Cette intervention, fondée sur l'analyse de deux révoltes bédouines qui eurent lieu en Syrie Palestine, à deux siècles et demi de distance, se veut avant tout une série d'interrogations. L'opposition Qays-Yaman du IIe siècle s'est transformée en opposition sédentaires-nomades au Ve siècle; entre temps, une grande mutation sociologique et intellectuelle a eu lieu dans la société arabo-islamique. L'héritage bédouin est devenu une référence et non plus réalité vécue. Il serait nécessaire par des analyses analogues consacrées à des révoltes situées entre celles-ci de placer plus précisément ce tournant idéologique.

D'une manière générale, il serait utile de dresser une grille d'interrogations pertinentes qui pourraient rendre compte d'une manière identique de toutes les révoltes

bédouines pour les quelles nous disposons de récits détaillés. En effet, ces révoltes permettent de connaître l'état économique d'une région à un moment donné, les occupations de ses habitants, les niveaux de solidarité affirmés et les contraintes de solidarité vécues. Elles représentent donc un excellent révélateur des sociétés médiévales et de leur évolution.

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THE PALESTINE REFUGEES AND THE ROLE OF UNRWA

Dr. Amal Al-Farhan

The Palestine refugees and UNRWA are the by-product of the Palestinian Arab-Zionist dispute over Palestine. In 1947, Great Britain announced abandonment of its League of Nations Mandate on Palestine since it was involved in a struggle with Arabs and Jews over Palestine's future. The United Nations became the heir to a situation already out of control.

While the U.N. ordinarily serves only as a forum for mediation, its role in the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Palestine refugee problem is that of an active third party. UNRWA was established to deal with the immediate needs of hundreds of thousands of destitute people.

For over thirty years, the U.N. is still struggling with the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The refugee problem therefore is basically a political one, with economic social and humanitarian aspects, but the Agency has been set up as non-political with a humanitarian mandate. However, the problem is unresolved, and while UNRWA still engages in relief, the situation has changed.

In 1947, the U.N. accepted the responsibility of finding a just solution to the Palestine problem. Therefore, the Palestine refugee problem is the creation of the International Community. For the General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) created the State of Israel and the non-existent Palestine Arab State. Assembly resolution 194 (III) preserved the right of return for Palestine refugees to their homes, carrying the implications of international Israeli acknowledgement for Palestinian Arabs and their state as an entity. G.A. Resolution 194 (III) paragraph II states:

“...that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property... to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation.”

The same resolution established the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) to implement the above paragraph. The CCP, to implement paragraph II of Assembly Resolution, and to obtain further information which would serve as the basis for recommendations for further action by the U.N. Assembly and member states, established under its auspices an Economic Survey Mission—UNESM. However, the CCP did not secure the right of peaceful return for Palestine

refugees. Although it continued its formal efforts for some years, it was eventually restricted to routine functions.

In spite of the fact that Israel's admission to U.N. membership was specified by the implementation of resolution 181 (II) and 194 (III) Israel has insisted that the refugee problem be linked to a territorial settlement in a peace treaty. Subsequently the Palestine refugee problem has been submerged with other issues such as cease-fires and used as an attempt to bring the Arab States and Israel to Conference table. The Palestine refugees were not able to return to their homes because Israel did not admit them, nor have they received compensation for the property they abandoned.

The decision to establish UNRWA was taken a year after the adoption of the General Assembly resolution 194 (III) which, had an important bearing on the evolution of UNRWA's work; paragraph II of the resolution has been annually recalled by the G.A. and sought to assure to the Palestine refugees the choice between repatriation or compensation. The failure to offer such a choice contributed in such large measure to the failure to solve the problem of the refugees.

UNRWA: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH

As its full title indicates, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, UNRWA received a dual mandate from G.A. The original mandate of UNRWA is contained in paragraph 7 of G.A. Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1946:

“(a). To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission.” This mandate was taken:

1. To provide relief based on need; and
2. To carry out a programme of works with a view to assisting in the economic rehabilitation of the Palestine refugees.

UNRWA differs from most, if not all, other U.N. agencies because of its continuing, quasi-governmental, day-to-day executive responsibilities for services normally rendered by national governments. The Agency operates 61 refugee camps spread over five different regions: the East and West Banks of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip. Refugee communities have facilities for relief, health, educational services, as well as environmental sanitation. Of the persons who fall under the established definition of Palestine refugees, there are now 1,803,564 registered with the Agency (See appendix for Statistics).

From its inception UNRWA's major purpose was to provide relief to those former inhabitants of Palestine, who, as a result of the 1948 war became refugees.

UNRWA was expected to provide relief services on a diminishing scale, until all Palestine refugees could be removed from the relief rolls and the task would be within limits that could be handled by the host countries.

The long-range objective of the Final Report of the U.N. Economic Survey mission, which came to be known as the Clapp Commission, was to solve the political refugee problem through economic development, thus it addressed itself to the immediate situation, to the relief needed and the long-term task in assisting the refugees to become self-supporting.

G.A. Resolution 302 (IV) established UNRWA as incorporated by the recommendations of the UNESM. The measures of the First Interim Report of the UNESM, according to its Chairman, Mr. Gordon R. Clapp, in the Forward to the report, were that:

These measures, together with those which the Mission, in a subsequent and final report, will suggest for the greater use by the peoples and governments of the Near East of the still undeveloped riches of their own lands, will not alone bring peace. But if the Palestine refugee be left forgotten and desolate in his misery, peace will recede yet further from these distracted lands”¹

The solution of the problem of poverty and unemployment of the refugees was seen as inseparable from a solution of the problem of poverty and hunger in the Middle East.

Many of the small works projects envisaged in the public works program for the employment of refugees, as noted in Appendix C of the final Report, were the prelude to larger developments of the Middle East. In this development scheme, the refugees were viewed as a reservoir of idle manpower — of greater service to themselves and to the lands giving them asylum, if given the opportunity to work.

The proposals of the Clapp Commission were believed, if translated into action, to be able to lead the way to a fuller development of the resources of the countries of the Middle East. Such developments were considered as essential to stability of the area and could assure and maintain peace.

To abate the emergency by constructive action and to reduce the refugee problem to limits within which the Near Eastern Governments could reasonably be expected to assume any remaining responsibility, “The administration of the relief and public works program for refugees, brought together under the initiative of one agency, can, in the considered judgement of the UNESM, become a contributing factor for peace and economic stability in the Near East.”²

The approach suggested by the Clapp Commission was believed to be an approach that contained promise to the Palestine refugee problem. The proposals which

followed — a series of pilot demonstrations — were supposedly fitting the realities of the situation.

The facts of economic life in the Middle East, so far as they were known in the 1940's, abundantly justify the conclusions of the UNESM experts, that the Middle East suffered from poverty in the extreme. However, the spectacular improvements in road transports across the Syrian desert and the extraordinary expansion of the oil industry in the area of the Arab Gulf in early 1950's were signs that pointed in the opposite direction; but then they were isolated examples that obscured the fact that the standard of living throughout the Middle East was far below Western levels.

On the other hand, taking account of natural resources in the broad sense, the region, undoubtedly, is one of the richest areas of the world. Not only does it contain more than half the world's oil resources, exploitation of which had started only in the late 1940's, but it has large areas of cultivable land, part of which constituted in previous centuries the homelands of large and prosperous populations, while other parts were never seriously developed at all.

The fundamental obstacle to development and redevelopment throughout the area was lack of capital. Capital imports into the area before and since the First World War, were substantial in certain lines, particularly oil and transport, but over the whole field of agriculture and industry it was clear that the major flow had yet to come. Inevitably, this prospect of large-scale economic development of nationals of the Arab States held large by-products in terms of homes and jobs for many Palestine refugees. It was assumed that the Palestinians would settle and integrate, creating a skilled middle-class in the different Arab states and thus forget their national homeland. The Agency was to achieve those economic means for political ends envisaged by the three sponsoring states: France, the U.K. and the U.S. Above that, Britain calculated that the Palestinians even then, with their little education, but on bases of character orientation and what Britain utilizes as historic connections and association during the mandate, were the most equipped because of their experience to serve the future interests of the Allies. The Palestinians were a great asset. The Agency, too, could help in the field of technical assistance as a stimulus and a service. The economic ferment in the area was apparent, and economic renaissance was obviously within the range of reasonable prediction. Technical assistance and economic research and reporting were essential approaches to betterment of living conditions for refugees from Palestine and Nationals of the Arab countries.

But work opportunities were especially scarce in the area in which most of the refugees live — Jordan and Gaza Strip. Therefore the conclusion that work would have permitted progress towards making the mass of the refugees self-supporting and independent of outside support, was unlikely to be achieved since:

- a. Four-fifths of the refugees lived in Gaza and Jordan, both with meagre resources; so that if all the refugees in Lebanon and Syria became self-supporting, the greater part of the problem would remain.
- b. The majority of older generation of refugees were small farmers and farm labourers whose experience was quite unsuited to the skilled jobs that became available, or were likely to become available.
- c. There was, and still is the natural increase in refugee population.

The Agency's basic mandate of relief which includes provisions of providing subsistence by distribution of food, health and education to help sustain the refugee population has continued. When UNRWA assumed responsibility in May, the Agency had more than 950,000 names on its relief rolls. Despite painstaking census efforts, it was not feasible to reduce ration below 860,000 for September 1951. Ever since then this number has been set as a ceiling.³

The purpose of the proposed program of relief and public works projects was principally to transform the programs of direct relief into a dynamic program of works projects. According to the Mission it was four-fold:

"It will halt the demoralizing process of pauperization, outcome of a dole prolonged; the opportunity of work will increase the practical alternatives available to refugees, and thereby encourage a more realistic view of the kind of future they want and the kind they can achieve; a work program properly planned will add to the productive economy of the countries where the refugees are located; the chance to earn a living will reduce the need for relief and bring the costs within the ability of the Near Eastern countries to meet without U.N. assistance."⁴

It was further hoped to diminish the number of persons on relief to the hard core of unemployables, thereby reducing the money cost of relief to proportions manageable by the host governments themselves and allowing the early ending of international relief. The main criteria of the work schemes adopted were that they provided for the employment of refugees; made the maximum contribution towards resettlement, temporary or otherwise; their cost was composed of the maximum amount of wages and the minimum amount for material. The works undertaken had to be complete in themselves, since governments had not the funds to continue or maintain expensive schemes.⁵

The Agency was directed to consult with local governments to find an alternative to camp life, ration lines and dependence on voluntary contributions from the international community.

IN 1952, the UNRWA Advisory Commission, which did not include representatives of the Host Governments at that time, recommended a three year plan for reintegration and relief.

The principles and procedures of the plan were presented to the G.A. at its Sixth Session by the Director and the Advisory Commission in their joint report made early in October 1951. Late in January 1952, the Assembly unanimously recorded its approval.⁶ Resolution 513 (IV) as finally adopted again repeated the fundamental premise that the Agency should not become involved in the negotiation of outstanding issues between Arab Governments and Israel.

G.A. Resolution 513 (IV) of 26 January 1952 endorsed:

Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph II of Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement, the program recommended by the UNRWA for the relief and reintegration of Palestine refugees, which envisages the expenditure of 50 million for relief and 200 million for reintegration over and above such contributions as may be made by local governments, to be carried out over a period of approximately three years starting as of 1 July 1951.”

G.A. Resolution 513 (VI) had as its goal the gradual reduction of the cost of relief and the eventual elimination of relief through rehabilitation measures. The date set for the attainment of that goal was about 30 June 1954. This brought the Agency up against the strong political currents and crosscurrents flowing in the area. The prospects for reintegration were dim, and no substantial progress was made. The Agency’s mandate was extended for one more year by action of the G.A.⁷ and later, in its Ninth Session, the G.A. extended the Agency’s mandate for a period of five years ending 30 June 1960.⁸ This decision was to give UNRWA the opportunity to organize its work more efficiently and economically and accomplish its tasks: the long-term task of assisting refugees to become self-supporting and the temporary task of providing subsistence, medical care and shelter for the refugees.

Progress towards the goal set forth by the G.A., of rendering the Palestine refugees self-supporting, was necessarily slow because of many obstacles; among these are the absence of a solution to the Palestine problem along the lines of G.A. resolutions regarding repatriation and compensation and the meagerness of physical resources made available for the Agency.

The Assembly passed resolution 1018 (XI) on 28 February 1957:

“**Noting** that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph II of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (IV) for the reintegration of refugees and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern.”

The Assembly also directed:

“The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to pursue its programme for the relief rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the limitation imposed upon it by the extent of the contributions for the fiscal year;”

IN 1960, defeat of any prospects for reintegration was accepted. The G.A. Resolution 1456 (XIV), 9 December 1959, constituted an epitaph of reintegration and at the same time a text for the future mandate of the Agency.

G.A. Resolution 1456 (XIV):

“**Noting with deep regret...** that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,”

“1. **Decides** to extend the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a period of three years with a review at the end of two years;”

“6. **Directs** the Agency to continue its programmes of relief for the refugees and, in so far as is financially possible, expand its programmes of self-support and vocational training.”

The mandate, has been taken by the Agency to mean the maintenance of the programme of relief, health and education and training. The Agency's mandate has been renewed periodically for three years at a time. Every subsequent resolution has:

- i. noted with deep regret that repatriation or compensation has not been effected;
- ii. directed attention to the Agency's critical financial state;
- iii. returned thanks to the Commissioner-General and his staff for the “essential services” provided for the Palestine refugees.

UNRWA will by the end of April 1980, have completed three decades of services to the Palestine refugees. Though UNRWA legitimately takes pride in its achievements, notably the preservation of the health of the refugees despite the deplorable living conditions of those in camps, and in the development of an educational system, however the perpetuation of refugee status is no occasion for celebration. The perpetuation of what had originally been seen as an enterprise of limited duration reflects the nature of the political framework in which the problem of the Palestine refugees is embedded, the unique involvement of the U.N. in both

issues, their importance to the international community and the failure to implement U.N. resolutions that might have facilitated a solution to them.

An effective review and appraisal can be made only if there is a clear understanding of the human factor which conditions the Agency's work. Above all the problem posed by the Palestine refugees is concerned with human suffering, with the memories and frustrations of hundreds of thousands of individual human beings. It is not simply an economic problem susceptible to economic solutions.

The substantial accomplishments of the Agency to date should therefore be measured primarily in human terms: what has UNRWA been able to do to help the refugees to live? The lack of accomplishment in some fields should also be viewed in the light of the psychological reactions which are derived from the suffering, memories and frustration of these refugees.

SOCIAL ASPECTS

The UNESM warned against facile optimism about a solution to the refugees' problem through economic development and resettlement projects; what the UNESM did not warn against was the political, social, and emotional obstacles. The Palestine problem is at the heart of the Middle East dispute between the Arab States and Israel, and is the prime source of instability in the whole area. Thus, the Palestine problem is not merely the Palestinians' problems, but an over all Arab problem. It is deeply embedded in the national psyche.

The refugee problem is at the core of the Palestine question, which is one of the most explosive political issues in the host countries, as well as in the Middle East. No political leader can take a position on it which does not have the consent of the Palestinians. No Arab State can by itself agree to a settlement to which the Palestinians do not subscribe.

The Host Governments have borne a heavy burden heavier than is generally realized. They have provided land, water and police protection for camps, as well as contributing materially towards the education of refugee youth. In addition, they have carried a burden no less real or costly, even though less tangible, in the form of the complex political and social problems that stem from the presence of refugees within their boundaries.

In considering the question of the refugees with the host Governments, the following factors should be borne in mind:

- a. The refugees constitute a high proportion of the total population of the host countries; in Gaza, refugees make up about 70 percent of the entire population of the Strip; in Jordan, 36 percent of the people are refugees; in Lebanon, the percentage is much smaller (almost 7 percent), but still substantial. Only in Syria is the proportion reasonably small, 2.3 percent.

- b. The economics of the host countries have been subjected to serious strains by the influx of such large numbers of people. The strain is felt not only by the taxing of existing limited public services and resources, but by Governments' financing of some services for the refugees, other than those financed by the Agency.
- c. The Agency, by conducting very extensive operational service in various fields of nutrition, health, education and vocational training, all have been matters of direct concern to the host Governments.

These factors give the Agency's operations an importance in the life of the host countries that is unusual for an international organization. It follows that actions taken by the Agency are bound to affect actions and policies of the host Governments and vice versa. This interrelationship between Governments and Agency have of course existed from the time UNRWA commenced its operations — then believed to be short-term. It was, however, relatively easy to make accommodations when it was hoped that the refugee problem was only a temporary one. But as the years have passed and no solution to the problem has been found, this interrelationship has been subject to increasing strains on both sides. One source of strain is due to the fact that the refugee problem is approached by the Agency, under its mandate, from the sole point of view of relief and rehabilitation, whereas the problem represents for the Arab Governments a burning political issue, as well as an economic burden.

Under the circumstances, some of the Governments of the host countries have tended to want to control or to impose restrictions on the Agency's actions or interfere in some aspects of the Agency's work. Misunderstandings and differences of opinion rise as to the nature and extent of UNRWA's responsibilities.

However, where the Agency did not find it possible to provide the additional rations or the shelter or education or other services demanded, it is often publicly accused by refugees, and at times by others, of failing to meet its responsibilities and of following policies inimical to the interests of the refugees. The heart of this problem lies in the realm of politics and, in effect, in the unresolved Palestine question itself. The refugees, who live frustrating lives, often in insecure areas, and who see little visible hope for the future, bring constant pressure on the host Governments to improve their material and political situation. They and the Governments openly regard the United Nations as responsible for their plight, and the consequent tendency is to deflect pressure to UNRWA.

The continued deferment of the hope of the Palestine refugees for return and the failure to achieve progress in the implementation of para. 11 of G.A. resolution 194 (III); the fact that the refugees regard themselves not simply as refugees, but as temporary wards of the international community which they hold responsible for the upheaval which resulted in their having to leave their homes, and UNRWA's ra-

tions as their entitlement and a recognition of their position; the persisting effects of 1967 hostilities, including military occupation with its manifold implications and the maintenance of high political tension in the area; the continuing displacement, the growing decisive impact of the policies and activities of the various fedayin movements on the situation in some host countries and on the attitudes of the refugees in all of them.

However, what is to be realized is that UNRWA has become, by virtue of its existence and scope of its activities a de facto element of stability in some of the host countries.

The services that UNRWA provides to the refugees are essential to the refugees and have become part of the social and economic fabric of the host countries, and, in the continued absence of a political solution, are an important element of stability in the whole region. The services provided, as they have evolved, are not of the nature of a dole for the permanently destitute. On the contrary, they are directed towards establishing and maintaining levels of health, education and relief for a large part of the people that help to make them productive and socially useful human beings who contribute to society rather than impose a burden on it.

The program of education and training, carried out by UNRWA with the cooperation of UNESCO, has been the most constructive assistance that the U.N. has been able to give to the Palestine refugees. It also makes a valuable contribution to the economic and social progress in the whole region. The Agency provided for the life of the refugees and gave them the opportunity to develop their innate ability into a mobile urban population easily marketed in all Arab States and certainly highly skilled when compared with other sectors of Arab population. This developmental role—the development of human resources—which UNRWA has been involved in is an unintended consequence, a situation that can be implied rather than intentional. There can be no doubt of the importance the Palestine refugees attach to Agency services or about the serious consequence their collapse would cause. In particular, the education programme which absorbs more than half of the Agency's budget and caters for more than a quarter of a million children. UNRWA's educational programme certainly cannot be treated as if it were merely one of a number of self-liquidating or short-term projects of the U.N. system, that can be terminated with only minor inconvenience.

POLITICAL ASPECTS

Throughout UNRWA's existence, politics has prevailed over economics, as is inevitable in a situation resulting from political causes. The inherent weaknesses in UNRWA's political foundation are evident. Despite the partition resolution which provided for an Arab State, the U.N.'s subsequent approach to the refugee problems has not actually provided for any kind of a Palestine entity. UNRWA is a Western conception, a U.S. - U.K. joint venture not to solve a basic problem but to mask actual responsibilities. The U.N. was chosen for this framework. In the circumstances the U.N.G.A. set up an Agency to get rid of the problem without providing the power to seek a solution. That is why UNRWA's constituent resolutions are loosely termed and vaguely drawn.

And since the whole issue is political, no member of the U.N. wanted to identify with UNRWA: all wanted it for political reasons. The Special Political committee has provided very little or insufficient guidance for the operations of the Agency and seldom examines or assesses UNRWA's programmes; its time, instead, is taken up with vituperative exchanges between the Arab and Israeli representatives over the past and future of Palestine. Inconsistency in the UNRWA's Advisory Commission Policy is obvious, particularly U.S. and U.K., which are committed to the survival and development of a Jewish.

Israel and have followed a passive attitude towards Palestinian aspirations to return. Particularly so is American inconsistency with respect to the Palestinians, for, on the one hand, the U.S. supports the annual G.A. resolutions calling for repatriation or resettlement of the refugees and makes contributions which are over one third of the sum needed by UNRWA for the refugee health, welfare and training, and, on the other hand, the U.S. hesitates to take any measures to implement the resolution in a manner satisfactory to the Palestinians.

Generally, the U.S. has urged that they be settled with compensation. The Palestinians have insisted that the choice must be up to them. However, resettlement has been refused since it would nullify Palestinian claims to their homeland and negate the Arab case against Israel. Moreover, resettlement with compensation imposes political hardships on the Arab states which had to absorb the refugees, for some have the difficulty in fulfilling the needs of their own citizens.

Meanwhile, international commitments to the refugees by the world community remain unfulfilled, neither repatriation nor resettlement satisfied the two sides in the conflict; and no other means have been found to alter the situation.

UNRWA was founded on the basis that it would give welfare to individual families. Its purpose was to restore individual refugee families to economic viability in the belief that exile would then be accepted to them. Its ultimate significance

which was to dissipate the refugee problem and resettle the refugees in the countries of refuge was a major unexpressed element. But UNRWA could not solve the refugee problem. The problem has persisted because its solution demands an approach from the stand-point of the Palestine people and not merely in terms of the welfare of individual refugee families. Meanwhile the Agency has been caught in the stalemate created on the one hand by Israel's refusal to repatriate the Palestine refugees and on the other hand by the Palestinian refusal to be settled in the host countries even with compensation.

Though UNRWA's programmes, particularly education and training, contributed indirectly to the marked economic expansion in the N.E. and emancipated many Palestinian individuals, education has not eroded the essentially political nature of the refugee problem. More likely it has enhanced Palestinian consciousness.

The irony is evident. An agency set up to solve the Arab refugee problem through promotion of individual welfare has been overshadowed by the political character of the problem and evidently now points to the solution of the creation of a Palestinian entity. The Palestinians have been recovered from their state of shock of 1948 and the defeat of 1967. They are no longer what they were at the time of the initial exodus. The Palestinians have transformed into a self-conscious, assertive community; an adversary group—a positive progressive challenge to human rights decisive to struggle for independence against injustice. The PLO is the quasi-government of the Palestinian people — a de facto government. The Palestine National Council, the Palestinians' Parliament in exile is composed of the representatives of the various Palestinian unions together with the various guerrilla organizations. However, the Palestine Problem has retained its purely political character.

HUMAN ASPECTS

The human aspects of the problem are the most difficult because they are the least reconcilable. They are also the most important because they have a direct bearing on all other aspects of the conflict. After the 1948 war, the Palestinians were uprooted from their normal rhythm of life and suddenly found themselves refugees in the surrounding countries, with the daily problems of survival — finding food, work or shelter — that arose directly from the fact that they were Palestinians exiled by the Israelis from their homeland. Palestinians lived among other Palestinians in exile. They identified themselves as Palestinians with a common historical and contemporary experience and with a deep attachment to their land. They possessed a high level of national consciousness but without national and political institutions to embody it. Palestinian aspirations for the future on both the political and personal levels crystallized into a single goal that had universal support — that of return.

The prevailing sentiment was the longing to return to their homes. The sentiment continued to dominate the attitude of the refugees and it was a serious mistake to

underestimate its strength. This feeling has not diminished over the years, and its strength has certainly been underestimated. The great mass of refugees believe that a grave injustice has been done to them and express a desire to return to their homeland. The demand for repatriation springs from the natural longing of the people for their homes. Consequently, they have not accepted the supposition that it was in their interests and their children to participate in and to welcome rehabilitation projects in spite of the Agency's assurance that it would not prejudice their right to return.

The refugees as a whole continued collectively to resist large-scale development projects, which appeared to them to involve permanent resettlement and carried any serious political implications. Their cost, size and consequent permanence raised in the minds of the refugees and others, the fear that to accept settlement would be tantamount to giving up the hope of repatriation.

Although they have been sheltered in their host countries, and in the notable instance of Jordan have been offered full citizenship, the refugees are a people apart, lacking, for the most part, status, and security. Many cling to their only evidence of nationality — a worn, dogeared Palestine passport issued in Mandate days by a government that no longer legally exists. In Lebanon they cannot be issued working permits and by law cannot hold jobs; in Egypt, they cannot receive Agency relief and assistance unless they are physically located in the 5 by 25 mile Gaza strip; in Syria, although they are permitted to work when they can find jobs, they have not been offered citizenship; in Jordan, although possessing the full rights of Jordanians, they remained for the first decade concentrated in large numbers in areas of such meagre economic opportunities that only an insignificant number have managed to become self-supporting.

It is easy to understand why the Palestinian desire to return to their former homes has made impossible any large-scale progress in the Agency's long-term task of bringing about the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East. However, it is not so immediately understood why it has become more difficult and frustrating for the Agency to carry out its short-term relief task. The difficulties have their roots in the attitude of the refugees, and to some extent of the host Governments, towards the Agency.

The refugees hold the United Nations largely responsible for their plight; the Agency is the symbol of the United Nations and thus regard UNRWA's relief as a debt owed to them by the world at large. They consider that the relief services are insufficient. The fact that the Agency's funds are extremely limited and in spite of the fact that efforts have been made by the Agency, within the limitation of available funds, to provide increasingly better services is seldom understood and in any event it is not accepted as a consideration.

The bitterness of the refugees developed into, and has been in certain cases, an open resistance towards the Agency. The attitude of the refugees is a fact with consequences for the Agency.

PALESTINIAN: ARAB IDENTITY

The Palestine Question up to 1967 was treated at the international level as a "refugee problem", with little attention to it as a Palestine Arab Identity.

The decade 1968-1978 saw a fundamental transformation in the treatment of the Palestine question. From being viewed as a refugee problem, it has now emerged as an important issue, involving the fundamental rights of the Palestine people to return to their homeland and to national self-determination.

In 1969, the General Assembly specifically and formally recognized the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, declaring that the Assembly,⁹

"Recognizing that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, gravely concerned that the denial of their rights has been aggravated by the reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary detention, curfews, destruction acts against the refugees and other inhabitants of the occupied territories",

"Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine."

In 1970, the General Assembly, reasserting its previous demands for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, for the observance of the right of return of the refugees, and for the cessation of violation of human rights, went on to acknowledge the central position of the Palestine issue in the Middle East.¹⁰ Resolutions in similar terms were passed in 1971 and 1972.¹¹

The Middle East Ramadan War (October 1973) was followed by an advance in the status of PLO when, in October 1974, the Conference of Arab Heads of State and Governments held at Rabat passed a resolution endorsing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination on its own homeland, and recognizing the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The acceptance of this resolution by Jordan was of particular significance since from 1948 to 1967 Jordan had administered the West Bank. The resolution stated that the Conference¹²

"Affirms the right of the Palestinian people to set up an independent national authority under the leadership of the PLO. --The Arab countries are resolved to support such an authority once it is established."

"Declares its support for the PLO in exercising its national and inter-

national responsibilities within the framework of Arab commitments.”

In September 1974, a large number of states joined to propose that the item “The Question of Palestine” be included as a separate item in the G.A. agenda. On the recommendation of the Assembly’s General Committee the Palestine Question reappeared on the Assembly’s agenda for the first time since 1952.

In November 1974, the Palestinian rights received full recognition in the United Nation by the General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX).

The G.A.:¹³

“1 . Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:

- (a) The right to self-determination without external interference;
- (b) The right to national independence and sovereignty.”

The Assembly simultaneously conferred on the PLO the status of observer in the Assembly and in other international conferences held under U.N. auspices.¹⁴

The Palestine Question is now at a stage where the inherent and inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of a Palestine entity is receiving steadily widening attention and recognition as are the original factors that led to the creation of the Palestine problem and the underlying issues. The G.A. resolution 31 / 20 of 24 November 1976 pertaining to the “right of return”:

“Phase one involves the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced as a result of the war of June 1967.

- i. The security council should request the immediate implementation of its resolution 237 (1967) and that such implementation should not be related to any other condition;
- ii. The resources of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and/or of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, suitably financed and mandated, may be employed to assist in the solution of any logistical problems involved in the resettlement of those returning to their homes. These agencies could also assist, in co-operation with the host countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the identification of displaced Palestinians.”

The second phase deals with the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967.”

The transformation in the political role of the Palestine refugee community, and the acceptance of the host governments of the representative negotiating role for Palestine politicomilitary organization makes a change in the Agency's environment. Previously the Agency's existence was determined by three factors: the extent of its financial support, its relations with the Arab host governments and its adjustments to the Palestine refugee needs.

The future of the Agency depends on one factor: the Palestine movement. This is due to the fact that the financing of the Agency particularly by the U.S. is most likely to continue U.S.: for the U.S. must consider the area-wide support to the Palestine cause and secondly the U.S. has much vested interest in the area from which it is unlikely to withdraw the Palestine Problem is a core issue that the U.S. would have to consider at the internals well as in its foreign policy.

UNRWA has not yet outlived its usefulness, nor dismantling could be contemplated as an organization providing services which are still essential to the refugees, and which in the continued absence of a political solution, are an important element of stability in the whole region.

UNRWA would have to assume a new rationale. The Agency's new role would have to sustain the Palestinians' independence for a national home—a pure function of financial and technical assistance. The situation requires reassessment and reorientation of the Agency's responsibilities in order to ensure their continuing relevance to the needs of the Palestinians and the Agency's ability to respond adequately, in accordance with U.N. resolutions, to the requirements of a new situation and the Agency's viability. In the interval, while a solution is being evolved, UNRWA's principal role, of rendering basic relief services to the refugees remains. No shift in this emphasis can be foreseen unless and until significant changes have taken place — changes which offer the refugees a permanent home and suitable employment, which gives the Palestinians the feeling that a wrong has been set right. The periodic extension of UNRWA's mandate has been to provide time in which such a solution can take place. Until this takes place, UNRWA can gradually be of further assistance by bringing its services in harmony with the forces, mostly external to UNRWA, which will be shaping the future of the Near East.

In 1917, there existed a Palestinian entity with the attributes of a nation. Palestine was among the entities that the League of Nations recognized as 'provisionally independent nations'.

The Balfour declaration forms the centrality of the Zionist-Israeli juridical claim over Palestine and the Zionist Organization's sustained effort to establish a Jewish State in Palestine. It is hardly remembered that the British Imperial War Cabinet had no authority to dispose of the land; it was certainly a violation of the Palestinians' Rights.

There is fundamental ambiguity in the Balfour declaration, and in the U.N.'s attitude starting with the Partition resolution and the U.S.'s policies and attitude towards the Palestinians and the Arab nation. Above all the Zionist ambiguity towards the creation of a Palestinian entity which could be no more a threat than the existence of Palestinians anywhere in the world.

In such circumstances, UNRWA can not solve the problem. It is beyond its reach and outside its competence. But it is to its credit that, despite lack of sufficient political and financial support, it has managed to act, practically on its own, as a relatively effective caretaker of the refugees, seen as individuals, if not as a group.

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NOTES

- 1 . Official Records of the General Assembly. **Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East.** (28 December 1949) Document No. (A/AC. 25/6, Parts I and II). Ap. 1A, p. 15
- 2 . **Ibid.**, P.2.
- 3 . Official Records of the General Assembly. **Report of The Director pf UNRWA. 1950.** Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19, Document No. (A/1451/Rev. 1) p.6.
- 4 . Final Report of the UNESM. (A/AC. 25/6. Ap.A.1, p.17.
- 5 . Official Records of the General Assembly. **Report of The Director of UNRWA 1951.** Sixth Session, Supplement No. 16 and 16A. Document No. (A/1905 and Add.1), p.6. Para. 45.
- 6 . Official Records of the General Assembly. **Draft Resolution A/AC. 53/SR.** Seventh Session, pp. 401-406. 26 January 1952.
- 7 . General Assembly Resolution 720 (VIII), 27 November 1953.
- 8 . General Assembly Resolution 818 (IX), 4 December 1954.
- 9 . General Assembly Resolution 2535B (XXIV), 10 December 1969.
10. General Assembly Resolution 2672C (XXV), 8 December 1970.
11. General Assembly Resolution 2792E (XXVI), 6 December 1971; & 2963D (XXVII), 13 December 1972.
12. Rabat Confernce, 15-25 march 1974.
13. General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIV), 22 November 1974.
14. General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIV), 22 November 1974.

Table A

Total registered refugee population according to category of registration^a

As at 30 June	Members of families registered for rations "R" category ^b				"S" category ^c		"N" category ^d		Grand Total
	1 Eligible for all services including full-rations ^e	2 Eligible for all services including half-rations ^e	3 Infants and children registered for services only	4 Other members of R families eligible for services only	5 Registered for all services but not rations	6 Registered for limited services only and no rations	7		
1950	(N.A.)	(N.A.)	(N.A.)	—	—	—	—	960 021 ^f	
1951	826 459	51 034	2 174	—	—	—	24 455	904 122 ^f	
1952	805 593	58 733	18 347	—	—	—	32 738	915 411 ^f	
1953	772 166	64 817	34 765	—	—	—	45 013	916 761	
1954	820 486	17 340	49 232	—	—	—	54 793	941 851	
1955	828 531	17 228	60 227	—	—	—	63 403	969 389	
1956	830 266	16 987	75 026	—	—	—	74 059	996 338	
1957	830 611	16 733	86 212	18 203	4 462	—	62 980	1 019 201	
1958	836 781	16 577	110 600	19 776	5 901	—	63 713	1 053 348	
1959	843 739	16 350	130 092	21 548	6 977	—	68 922	1 087 628	
1960	849 634	16 202	150 170	22 639	8 792	—	73 452	1 120 899	
1961	854 268	15 998	169 730	23 947	9 515	—	77 566	1 151 024	
1962	862 083	15 805	176 772	20 004	9 027	—	91 069	1 174 760	
1963	866 369	15 705	197 914	21 195	10 420	—	98 567	1 210 170	
1964	863 284	15 617	226 494	23 369	13 168	—	104 653	1 246 585	
1965	859 048	15 546	251 131	29 387	18 589	—	107 122	1 280 823	
1966	845 730	13 392	284 025	39 485	24 367	—	108 750	1 317 749	
1967	845 790	15 328	312 649	39 997	25 331	—	106 991	1 346 085	
1968	824 366	14 704	316 166	60 219	26 900	—	121 939	1 364 294	
1969	806 356	13 466	326 185	73 738	27 315	—	148 004	1 395 074	
1970	804 576	13 602	342 009	77 735	27 238	—	160 039	1 425 219	
1971	821 338	9 688	352 143	91 442	25 686	—	184 453	1 506 640	
1972	821 749	9 521	375 224	90 007	26 683	—	166 867	1 468 161	
1973	820 279	9 418	394 449	90 072	25 077	—	201 399	1 540 694	
1974	820 746	9 320	420 267	98 827	26 329	—	208 155	1 583 664	
1975	818 844	9 061	459 197	96 416	27 851	—	221 338	1 632 707	
1976	819 115	8 999	484 673	93 944	28 243	—	233 231	1 668 205	
1977	821 785	9 022	510 706	89 571	29 124	—	246 278	1 706 486	
1978	822 381	9 093	545 189	85 863	32 623	—	262 120	1 757 269	
1979	823 785	9 081	578 064 ^g	81 684	35 451	—	275 499	1 803 564	

(Footnotes on following page)

(Footnotes to table A)

- a) These statistics are based on the Agency's registration, which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as unreported deaths and births, false or duplicate registrations or absences from the area of UNRWA operations.
- b) The "R" category (columns 1 to 4) comprises registered families with some or all members eligible for all Agency assistance, including basic rations.
- c) The "S" category (column 5) comprises refugees whose income is above that of "R" category refugees, but below that of "N" category refugees, and who are eligible for general education, health services and some other UNRWA assistance, but not for basic rations. In Gaza, however, for technical reasons, there is no "S" category and "N" category refugees enjoy "S" category eligibility.
- d) "N" category (column 6) comprises the following, subject to what is said about Gaza refugees in footnote c above and footnote a to table 9:
 - (i) Refugees who and members of families whose absence from the area or the level of whose reported income disqualifies all family members from basic rations, general education and health services; or
 - (ii) Refugees who have themselves received or whose families have received assistance enabling them to become self-supporting.
- e) Before 1954, half rations were issued to bedouins and infants, as well as to frontier villagers in Jordan. Since then, bedouins have been regarded as eligible to receive full rations and infants have also been eligible for full rations after their first anniversary if the ration ceiling permits. Half rations are issued only to frontier villagers on the West Bank (9, 081). Frontier villagers displaced to east Jordan as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 (3,335) are issued with full rations under the normal programme and are therefore included in the figure of full ration recipients (column 1). Also included in column 1 are Gaza Poor (832) and Jerusalem Poor (337).
- f) This grand total included refugees receiving relief in Israel who were the responsibility of UNRWA through 30 June 1952.
- g) The total of 578, 064 comprises:
 - (i) 17, 553 infants under the age of one year who are eligible for services but not for rations;
 - (ii) 522, 673 children registered for services (CRS) aged one year and over (some of whom are now adults) who are not receiving rations because of ration ceilings; and
 - (iii) 37, 838 displaced children registered for services (CRS) who receive rations donated by the Government of Jordan on an emergency and temporary basis.

Table B
Distribution by place of registration of total registered refugee population and of camp population

	Total registered population	Number of camps			Number of persons officially registered ^a in established camps	Number of persons actually living in camps	
		Established	Emergency	Emergency		Established ^b	Emergency ^c
Jordan (east)	699 553	4	6	77 035	92 048	132 890	
West Bank	317 614	20	—	79 990	82 565	—	
Gaza Strip	363 006	8	—	200 762	202 941	—	
Lebanon	219 561	13	—	99 585	103 661	—	
Syrian Arab Republic	203 830	6	4	33 749	38 610	20 809	
Total	1 803 564	51	10	491 121	519 724	153 699	
						673 423	

- a) Persons officially registered in these camps are refugees registered with UNRWA who are shown in UNRWA records as living in camps, irrespective of their category of registration (RSN), although some may have moved to villages, towns or cities in other parts of the country and their removal has yet to be reported to the Agency. The figures do not include refugees in camps who are not given shelter by UNRWA but benefit from sanitation services.
- b) Of the 519, 724 persons actually living in these camps, 511, 880 are UNRWA-registered refugees and their unregistered dependents. The balance of 7,844 are not UNRWA-registered refugees and are thus not eligible for UNRWA assistance.
- c) Persons actually living in these camps comprise 116, 076 UNRWA-registered refugees and 37, 623 other persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 hostilities or subsequent fighting in the Jordan valley in early 1968.

Table C
Number of elementary and preparatory pupils in UNRWA schools

Year	Jordan			West Bank			Caza			Labanon			Syrian Arab Republic			Grand Total				
	Elem.	Prep.	Sec.	Total	Elem.	Prep.	Total	Elem.	Prep.	Total	Elem.	Prep.	Total	Elem.	Prep.	Total	Elem.	Prep.	Total	
1951	16 345	—	—	16 345	—	—	—	19 543	61	19 604	4 564	—	4 564	2 599	—	2 599	43 051	61	—	43 112
1952	15 882	—	—	15 882	—	—	—	22 551	164	22 715	6 291	—	6 291	2 895	—	2 895	47 619	164	—	47 783
1953	30 118	87	—	30 205	—	—	—	25 702	675	26 377	9 332	86	9 418	5 410	166	5 576	70 562	1 014	—	71 576
1954	39 188	790	22	40 000	—	—	—	31 107	1 781	32 888	11 695	384	12 079	8 758	864	9 622	90 748	3 819	22	94 589
1955	42 144	1 612	82	43 838	—	—	—	34 016	3 339	37 355	12 567	620	13 187	9 700	671	10 371	98 427	6 242	82	104 751
1956	43 649	2 862	200	46 711	—	—	—	35 087	4 937	40 024	12 983	948	13 931	10 288	936	11 224	102 007	9 683	200	111 890
1957	42 431	4 274	334	47 039	—	—	—	34 876	6 410	41 286	13 155	1 003	14 158	11 042	1 180	12 222	101 504	12 867	334	114 705
1958	41 600	5 357	495	47 452	—	—	—	35 164	7 495	42 658	13 936	996	14 932	11 332	1 562	12 894	102 031	15 410	495	117 936
1959	39 519	6 714	578	46 811	—	—	—	34 806	8 244	43 050	14 881	1 325	16 206	12 256	1 916	14 172	101 462	18 199	578	120 239
1960	36 223	6 898	612	43 733	—	—	—	36 633	8 481	45 114	15 422	1 668	17 090	13 354	2 592	15 946	103 632	19 639	612	123 883
1961	38 309	7 437	598	46 344	—	—	—	36 591	9 841	46 432	16 292	2 159	18 451	13 685	3 589	17 274	104 877	23 026	598	128 501
1962	41 000	8 384	875	50 259	—	—	—	37 885	10 641	48 526	17 124	2 670	19 800	14 430	4 122	18 552	100 439	25 823	875	137 137
1963	45 531	8 492	—	54 023	—	—	—	38 470	12 797	51 267	17 411	2 680	20 091	15 618	4 459	20 077	117 030	28 428	—	145 458
1964	50 220	8 868	—	59 088	—	—	—	38 905	13 627	52 532	18 041	3 491	21 532	16 463	4 945	21 409	123 629	30 932	—	154 561
1965	55 713	9 623	—	65 336	—	—	—	41 164	15 032	56 196	19 836	3 710	23 546	17 631	5 284	22 915	134 344	33 649	—	167 993
1966	60 802	11 113	—	71 915	—	—	—	40 757	15 644	56 409	19 547	3 648	23 195	18 720	5 740	24 460	139 826	36 145	—	175 971
1967	65 849	12 838	—	78 687	—	—	—	41 362	16 710	58 072	20 744	3 451	24 195	19 564	6 449	26 013	147 519	39 448	—	186 967
1968	45 593	9 048	—	54 636 ^b	18 957	4 587	23 544	35 395	12 358	47 753	21 312	5 168	26 480	20 197	6 981	27 178	141 454	38 137	—	179 591
1969	53 357	10 939	—	64 296 ^b	20 411	5 582	25 993	38 351	15 251	53 602	22 426	6 046	28 472	21 088	7 471	28 559	155 633	45 289	—	200 922
1970	60 334	13 830	—	74 164 ^b	21 733	6 386	28 119	41 051	16 372	57 423	23 791	6 267	30 058	21 702	7 912	29 614	168 611	50 767	—	219 378
1971	62 488	15 367	—	77 855 ^b	22 540	6 822	29 362	43 085	16 956	60 041	25 587	1 866	32 773	23 024	8 748	31 772	176 724	55 079	—	231 803
1972	69 190	17 489	—	86 679 ^b	23 227	7 708	29 935	45 109	15 676	60 785	27 133	7 207	34 340	24 392	8 947	33 339	189 051	56 027	—	245 078
1973	74 038	19 276	—	93 314 ^b	24 007	6 380	30 387	47 906	14 443	62 349	28 187	5 307	35 694	25 318	8 922	34 240	199 456	56 528	—	255 984
1974	78 177	21 192	—	99 369 ^b	24 820	6 499	31 319	51 116	13 490	64 606	28 494	6 639	37 133	26 594	9 303	35 897	209 201	59 123	—	268 324
1975	80 942	23 593	—	104 535 ^b	25 248	6 964	32 212	51 265	14 632	65 897	26 996	8 349	35 345	27 337	9 980	37 317	211 788	63 518	—	275 306
1976	83 219	26 998	—	110 217 ^b	25 455	7 874	33 329	51 476	16 816	68 292	28 155	9 635	37 790	28 448	10 817	39 265	216 753	72 140	—	288 893
1977	85 868	29 060	—	114 928 ^b	25 855	8 774	34 629	51 077	18 929	70 006	26 943	9 771	36 714	29 106	11 010	40 116	218 649	77 544	—	296 393
1978	87 908	31 775	—	119 603 ^b	26 258	9 488	35 746	51 562	20 259	71 821	27 491	10 295	37 786	30 282	11 650	41 932	223 501	83 467	—	306 968
1979 ^a	91 153	32 930	—	124 083 ^b	26 922	9 943	36 935	51 108	19 666	70 774	26 709	9 757	36 466	30 959	11 867	42 826	226 921	84 163	—	311 084

a) Including non-eligible children attending UNRWA schools, who now number 42, 508 of whom 10,087 are registered children in the Gaza Strip, where all refugee children have always been regarded in practice as eligible for education service. Non-eligible may mean either non-eligible refugee children or non-refugee children. It is relevant that in the Syrian Arab Republic some refugee pupils attend government elementary and preparatory schools and those who proceed to secondary education attend government schools, in both cases free of charge; that in Gaza some teachers are provided by the Gaza Education Department for Agency schools and refugee children who proceed to secondary education attend government schools, free of charge and that in Lebanon it has not proved feasible to collect fees from the small number of non-eligible refugee children and no arrangements have been made with the Government for offsetting the small number of non-refugee children in Agency schools.

b) Figure for east Jordan only.

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE IN ST. ANTONY'S COLLEGE, OXFORD

Derek Hopwood

In 1798 the British government induced the Imām of Muscat to enter into an agreement of alliance. This act may be taken as the beginning of a British political influence in the Middle East which was to last in one form or another until 1971. During that period many hundreds of British soldiers, diplomats, civil servants, teachers and others served in the Middle East. At the height of imperial power there was a British presence (excluding diplomatic representatives) in 14 of the present 22 member states of the Arab League. The Britons worked and played, lived, loved and died in the area and left behind them many traces.

There remain universities and schools, dams, railways, bridges, churches and cathedrals, and the more intangible influences of education, manners, methods of administration and memories in men's minds. The British were admired for their sense of justice, fair play and incorruptibility, and sometimes trusted and emulated. They were also disliked for their importation of foreign customs and for establishing or supporting régimes which were seen to deny the Arabs full independence.

The working of the imperial system in the Middle East was difficult from the start and could only have been maintained by force or the threat of it. Although some rulers and politicians welcomed British support it is probably true to say that nowhere in the Arab world did more than a small minority actively prefer their British overlords to local rulers. In some areas the British ensured a temporary lull from political and tribal feuding and were therefore accepted, yet such quarrels usually remained just below the surface. But as Christian intruders the British were considered by many others as a threat to Islam and therefore to be resisted.

In the imperialist atmosphere of late nineteenth century England and in the euphoria of victory after the first World War the British Empire was thought to be in the natural order of things. Victorian feelings of superiority were combined with the Protestant and public school ideals of probity and service. Native peoples might have to be conquered and colonized, but they should also be morally regenerated, rescued from corrupt societies and religions. The moral imperative sometimes obscured the political and economic motives. The men who actually worked on the ground were drawn to the Middle East by a similar mixture of motives. They ranged from the avowed missionary to the merchant and trader and the great proconsuls of

Empire. All kinds of men were represented and they were thought by one who served amongst them to include 'Freaks, heroes, playboys, poets, students and average good fellows'.¹ The statesmen and diplomats attempted to pursue official (in some cases their own) policies; the businessmen, usually private, wanted to make profits for themselves or their company; the technologists, doctors and teachers devoted their talents to the service of the country in which they worked; the soldiers and policemen obeyed orders and did their duty, often to the ire of the local population; the travellers and jouranalists reported on what they saw; the missionaries ministered, and converted, not Muslims or Jews, but Arab Christians from one sect to another. Few questioned their right to do what they did.

During their stay in the Middle East many of these men and women wrote papers whcih can throw light on aspects of their work not absent in official reports. Of great interset are the diaries and letters of those who were not required to report officially at all on their duties. They are the immediate impressions of those closely concerned with events and as such are sidelights on history. When the British Empire was nearing its close it was believed that numbers of men and women who had served abroad had accumulated papers of one kind or another. On retirement these papers were consigned to trunks and attics and there was always the risk of loss or damage or of neglect by unconcerned heirs. The Middle East Centre of St. Antony's College, Oxford, began in 1961 to save as many as possible of these papers and to date has amassed a substantial collection.² Reading through this material and also meeting some of its authors one gets the general impression of well-intentioned, dedicated men—not the ogres of anti-imperialist propaganda—who gave their lives to service overseas and who enjoyed their work. They seemed to have been reasonably happy and contented with their achievements. They were not, with some exceptions, men who formulated policy but they were responsible for executing it, sometimes against their better judgement. The documents provide an overall picture form the inside of the life, work and attitudes of the British in the Middle East, those given the epithet 'imperialist'.

These men participated in or witnessed most of the significant events in the history of Anglo-Arab relations, including the Arab revolt, the siege of Khartoum, the discovery of oil, the Palestine rising, the Suez War, the *démarche* with King Farouk. Their reports range from Lampson's diary of his encounter with Farouk to a local doctor's eye witness account of the Palestinian revolt in Hebron, and they are a vivid picture of what 'Empire' was in the Middle East: putting down revolts, feuds and riots; imprisoning local leaders; attendace at parades and parties in Embassies or Residences; the introduction of agricultural and engineering schemes; the refoming of tax and economic systems; the administration of large areas single handed; the execution of small, dedicated jobs in offices, clinics, schools and hospitals. Some of the more famous governed countries, led movements or died as martyrs—Cromer, Samuel, Lampson, Lawrence, Gordon. They took to the Middle

East notions of justice, efficiency morality and the concept of a mission. Most had been educated at public schools or military academies, the Imperial Service College, Haileybury, Eton, the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, Repton, Wellington... (the few who went to grammar or local schools—Bullard, Gorst, Lawrence—stand out as exceptions). The public school virtues of honour, manliness, cleanliness, service, patriotism and playing the game were those they treasured. Gamal Abd al-Nasser once paid an ironic tribute to the years of British service in the Middle East.

During the Suez War Haykal, the editor of *Al-Ahram*, reported that "Nasser still found it very difficult to believe that the British and French were going to intervene, but the ultimatum reeked of hypocrisy and double dealing...

'This is all a lie,' he said. 'How can they lie? Is Eden a liar?'

He could not believe it because one of the legends of the Middle East was that a British gentleman never lied".³ India was the jewel in the crown of the Empire. No country in the Middle East had the same importance. In fact only Aden was officially an imperial possession—the other countries drifted into the British orbit in a variety of ways, by treaty, occupation, mandate, or condominium. However, Egypt certainly bore the greatest importance and Palestine caused the greatest heartache. The British were usually clear about what they were trying to do in their imperial possessions—in Palestine a lot of confused men were torn by conflicting loyalties and aims—some influenced by sympathy for Zionist aspirations, others guiltily aware that promises given to the Arabs were being broken in Palestine. So many people worked in Palestine from High Commissioner to local policeman that collecting and locating documents has been a mammoth undertaking. This has been mainly achieved by the Anglo-Palestinian Archives Committee of the British Academy whose aim was "to locate and list briefly the unpublished papers and records of those individuals and organisations whose base was in Britain, that had involvement or interest in events in Palestine during the first half of this century. The individuals include British colonial administrators in Palestine and civil servants, diplomatic representatives, military officers, cabinet ministers and politicians, political lobbyists in Britain, prominent members of the Anglo-Jewish community, journalists, writers and publicists. The organisations include official bodies such as the appropriate departments of the British government, pro-Zionist and pro-Arab groups, associations of Anglo-Jewry, the political parties in Britain, the major newspapers, foreign affairs pressure groups and some Christian and other bodies which were concerned with the Holy Land. The survey has dealt with the British branches of many organisations which were based in Palestine and elsewhere outside Britain and with some people who were not British but who spent a significant period in Britain working for pro-Zionist or pro-Arab groups".

The results of this undertaking have been published as **Britain and Palestine 1914-1948: Archival sources for the history of the British Mandate** (compiled by

Philip Jones), Oxford University Press, 1979. This is a listing of collections of those private papers which have survived and is invaluable for all those interested in the history of Palestine. It will be kept up to date in the Oxford Middle East Centre. The project did not itself attempt to collect papers but if offers were made the papers were directed to the Middle East Centre and a number of other institutions.

Those arriving in Oxford were added to the already substantial collection on Palestine. Some 50 named individuals have deposited papers, ranging from the last High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham, to Miss M. Wilson, a teacher of English in Bir Zeit school. The Jerusalem and East Mission has also deposited its substantial archives in St. Antony's. Together these documents build up a fascinating picture of many aspects of life during a difficult and frustrating period. Often the memoirs of minor officials offer as interesting a view as the more public papers of the top men.

The papers of the six High Commissioners have had mixed fortunes. Plumer declared that he had none and Wauchope ordered his to be destroyed. Samuel's largely in the Israel State Archives with some copies in Oxford. The papers of the other three have been preserved safely. Sir John Chancellor gave his to the Rhodes House Library in Oxford which had initiated its own Colonial Records Project, doing for the former British Empire what St. Antony's had done for the Middle East. MacMichael's papers are mainly kept by Durham University Sudan Archive as he spent over twenty years in the Sudan Political Service, but copies of all his Palestine material are held in Oxford.

Cunningham's papers are unique to Oxford and are obviously essential for the history of the last days of the Mandate. Some sensitive material is still closed to researchers, but the majority was opened in January 1979. Cunningham had to preside over what has been termed the "finale with chaos" of the British Mandate and did so with dignity in a situation that would have been beyond lesser men. His papers occasionally show the limits that his exasperation reached especially with regard to the terrorist activities of the Irgun and Stern Gang. He felt vulnerable to criticism that he had been 'soft' on the terrorists. He flatly denied that "in some malignant manner the Civil Government stood in front of the soldiers and prevented them from looking after themselves from the terrorists." "No bigger nonsense could have been talked," he said. "The soldiers have never at any time been restricted from taking any action they wished against the terrorists while they were being attacked. They were always permitted to use the full force of weapons against the terrorists. The only trouble was that the attacks were cunning and sometimes brutal and dastardly. I have always been clear that if the soldiers had been in a position during attacks to inflict more casualties on the terrorists, terrorism would have died more quickly." "We never at any time had the co-operation which I considered necessary from the Jewish Agency. They condemned it, but that was as far as it

went." He particularly resented Field Marshall Montgomery's attempts to make the army more active." From (the) wider point of view it seemed... that the main effect of his intervention was to bedevil (the problem) stil further". "I had continual trouble with Montgomery, who became C.I.G.S. after I had been in Palestine a bit. He was always trying to persuade the British Government that I was preventing the soldiers from doing their job.. . He never appreciated that dealing with Jewish terrorists hidden by the whole population, was a very different matter to the previous activities of the Arab, which was his only experience." This bickering obviously did not help a soldier who was honestly trying to do a difficult job. He presided over the scuttling of an enterprise in practice begun in 1917.

The other private papers are those of men who, like Cunningham but lower down the scale, were honestly trying to carry out policies thought up in London. They had little influence on the formation of policy and indeed for various reasons were often opposed to it. They were the soldiers, policemen and local administrators and commissioners. The army and police probably faced the worst task, continuously putting down disturbances and having to forestall anti-British activities and inter-communal trouble. In many ways it was a negative role with none of the satisfaction deriving from administering development or educational projects. Sir Charles Tegart served as police advisor in Palestine during 1937-39 and his papers contain material on police activity and liaison with the army. He came from the Indian Police service to Palestine in order to try to contain the Arab rising. His diaries give a vivid day to day picture of the troubles the British experienced in coping with a movement which had its roots in the whole of the population.

To the British the Arab fighters were brigands and terrorists cowing an otherwise loyal population. Yet Arab constables were torn between their natural loyalty to their own people and a lesser loyalty towards the government they served. As Tegart wrote in his diary in December 1937: "In Urban area, police were good till 1936 then lack of efficiency was apparent. They are now improving as regards Palestinian ranks.

"Loyal service to Government is generally taken as disloyal to the people. He himself (the Mayor of Haifa) heard two Palestinian constables on patrol duty talking to each other recently about their comrade who had followed up and attacked the assassin recently in Haifa and was wounded. The comment was: "Wasn't he mad to follow up the assassin, I would not have done it if I had 20 revolvers." In other area support for the rising was strong. Tegart reported on the situation in Irbid.

"Peake Pasha, (commander of the Arab Legion) provided Trans-Jordan is quiet, is not at all interested in Palestinian troubles.

Not long ago, at a meeting, Mackereth (British Consul in Damascus bowled him out (a cricketing term!) over Sidi Bey, District Officer of Irbid, who is actively help-

ing the rebels. Peake refused to believe any such thing when Mackereth produced an authentic intercepted letter establishing the point”.

Tegart was near the top of an administration attempting to deal with the unrest in Palestine. Many other less important people have left accounts of their life in difficult circumstances. Richard Adamson was in the Military Police in 1920 and was involved in the Easter riots in Jerusalem. He was soon in the thick of trouble and had to fire to prevent trouble. He has left a rather simple policeman's report on the affair which shows vividly the clash of custom and manner and its sad outcome.

“Martial law was at once proclaimed and the Military Police took over. I was sent to the Jaffa Gate and together with four Indian Police we had to search everyone passing through the Gate entering or leaving the OLD city into the NEW city. The Arab had placed great confidence upon the prevailing custom of the untouchability of his Women-Folk, but the situation was too serious to respect this custom and although many ugly scenes occurred we searched EVERYONE. The wisdom of this was proved, when, from a huge total of weapons discovered more than three-quarters were taken from the Women (the most vicious weapon was a three foot long curved serrated dagger, which is now on view in the Royal Military Police Museum. CHICHESTER, Hants. People found with arms and ammunition etc. were tried by a Military Court set up each night, they were usually fined 100 Piastres (£1). The second night of the curfew one of the Indian Police challenged a person he saw approaching the Gate, receiving no reply he fired and we found he had killed an old Arab Woman. In the morning when the news leaked out, as it was bound to, demonstrations took place against us—the police—an attempt was made to rush the Jaffa Gate and I had to give orders to fire over their heads, this dispersed the first attack, but several more were made during the day and night, each attack being dispersed by revolver fire”.

This ordinary policeman saw force as a solution to the Palestine problem. “Had drastic measures been taken at the time perhaps the troubles of a later period might never have come to pass.. Lord Allenby was never advised of the TRUE situation, he was a wise and great leader and his wisdom could have solved the problem once and for all had he been kept informed of what was happening”.

Captain C.D. Brunton of Military Intelligence, who later helped to raise the Arab Legion, was sent by Allenby to investigate the causes of the disturbances in Jaffa in 1921. He laid the blame on “a deliberate attempt on the part of Bolshevik Jews to cause trouble”. Like other British officials he feared that Jewish immigrants were trying to introduce Russian Communism into Palestine.

“It seems particularly certain that the Russian Soviet Government has had agents directly working in this country for some time. To sum up the Arab population of Palestine has become irritated to such an extent that an outbreak has seemed to

close observers inevitable sooner or later.

.... On the morning of May 1st a moderate Socialist May Day demonstration was permitted by the authorities to take place at Tel-Aviv the Jewish quarter of Jaffa. An unauthorised demonstration by some 50 communists carrying a red flag after trying to force some Jewish workmen to down tools came into conflict with the moderates and were eventually forced out of Tel-Aviv, into the mixed Moslem and Jewish quarter of the Menahieh to the West. There the police attempted to disperse the Boishevists and a conflict ensued. The Moslem inhabitants rushed to help the police against the Jews and a general disturbance occurred which spread within an hour to the South end of the Town. Moslems and Christians rushed to join their comrades and the wildest rumours of Jewish attacks on Arabs helped to excite the rage of the Arabs. The state of the dead and wounded has proved that the Arabs were mainly armed with sticks while the Jews had revolvers". His report on Jaffa concluded; "If (British policy) is not modified the outbreaks of today may become a revolution tomorrow".

As is well enough known the policy was not modified and the next outbreak of violence was caused by the incident at the wall of the Haram area in Jerusalem. The British were somewhat bewildered by the intense emotions engendered by stones of religious significance. Violent reactions followed for several months. Sir John Chancellor, the High Commissioner, was caught in the wind of extreme emotions. Two revealing passages in the Luke papers show his dilemma. (Luke was Chief Secretary). In September 1929 Chancellor wrote rather ruefully to the Colonial Secretary quoting Arab opinions of him: "His Excellency described the Arabs as ruthless and bloodthirsty evil-doers; H.E. visited Jews in the Jewish Hospital and wounded Arabs..." He comments: "This extract may be of interest in the quarters from which apprehension was expressed... that officers of this Government would be one-sided in character and anti-Semitic in tendency".

The same month Chancellor had a meeting with Colonel Kisch of the Jewish Agency, a rather bristly character who complained that "the demands of Justice were not met by treating Jews and Arab alike when they were accused of being in possession of arms. "The Jews had carried arms in self-defence only, while the Arabs had carried them for purposes of wanton aggression". Jews were accused of being in possession of arms, Arabs only of being found in possession of loot. Sir John replied "that Arabs were complaining of an exactly opposite bias".

The way in which the British Empire was run is revealed in private papers, a way often rather amateurish, sometimes amusing. Jerome Farrell was Director of Education in Palestine and a 'Special'—a part-time police man—who left a good account of the beginning of the 1929 disturbances. In August he was working in his office when noise and shouting were heard. The trouble was starting. Firing commenced and as matters worsened Farrell reported for duty as a special. Other

residents of Jerusalem were enlisted, mostly those who had fought in the first World War. Surprisingly, even school boys and visitors took part.

“The Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, with about forty of his young men, was then on holiday tour of the Holy Land and saw the beginning of the riots at noon on the Friday. He paraded his party and called for volunteers. All but one or two responded. (The abstainers were conscientious pacifists. Only a young and healthy English crank could volunteer to save Jews from massacre by doing clerical work, as did one ordinand who was wearing the Amalgamation blazer of my own College. I reported him in writing to the Master of the College). He then marched them up to the police barracks. This welcome reinforcement, which could not have been reckoned upon, almost doubled the number of special constables enrolled in the first hours of the troubles. But the utility of the Wycliffites was not merely in their numbers; they were young and nearly all had been trained to arms in their school or University O.T.Cs. Of the other specials the majority had seen war service but lacked the fire of youth”.

“Some of the English school boys were employed to patrol the suburb where most of the British families lived, a dull duty; but one Reptonian, aged sixteen, was allowed by an indulgent father to go everywhere and see everything. He had come straight from camp on Salisbury Plain and wore his O.T.C. uniform. As he was of sturdy physique and a good shot, the police put no obstacle in his way. After the riots were over he was reported to the Commandant of Police by a Jewish resident in Tell Piouth for brutal language or behaviour, but he had then returned to school in England so that no disciplinary action could be taken in Palestine. The complainant was advised to write to the Headmaster of Repton. The Jews were always very quick or reasonable in obeying police orders, and being by nature sensitive, resented the rough language which they sometimes provoked. Indeed it was said of them that they preferred to be killed courteously than be protected discourteously”.

The loss of life was quite severe during the year, with both sides guilty and even with individual cases of killing in error. Farrell reports one tragic instance: “When the troops first marched towards Colonia, about five miles down hill from Jerusalem, they were approaching a place where there was known to have been very recent trouble. Subsequent inquiries, as already stated, failed to trace its origin. The population was mixed, Arabs and Jews, and among the latter were armed specials whose credentials, perhaps, had not been closely examined. All were in a very nervous state. Seeing the troops approach, an old Arab, who had been employed during the Turkish regime in the British Consulate, sent out his servant on to the road to wave a toy Union-Jack in welcome. He waved the flag and the soldiers at once shot him dead as an enemy signaller”.

There was relative calm in Palestine from 1930 until 1936 when the Arab uprising began. Quite a number of the papers in the archives have accounts of the period in

addition to Tegart who saw things from the top. Two eyewitness documents may be quoted to give a flavour of the material. Miss H.M. Wilson was an English teacher at Bir Zeit school—the first venture of its kind in Palestine; a Christian Arab foundation, connected neither with the Government nor with any missionary society. She kept a fascinating diary of the school year 1938-9 and the problems encountered during the uprising. In it she describes life in Bir Zeit, searches by the British Army, visits by groups of guerillas, the rivalry between the Husainīs and Nashāshībīs, and allegations of corruption and ill-treatment by the British. She had a certain sympathy for the Arab fighters and describes well the irony of her situation. “There was humour, too, in the consciousness of belonging to both sides; teaching Arabs in a national school under Arab management, meeting armed rebels in the village (at a time when the possession of arms was punishable by death) and being offered, though declining, their escort down to the main road on Friday afternoons, and then on the main road accepting a lift into Jerusalem with British troops who would give a month’s pay for the chance of a shot at those same rebels”.

Relations between the villagers of Bir Zeit and the British Army were also ambiguous. At times they seemed to fear the guerillas, but they resented the often insensitive behaviour of the troops. There were “in houses signs of partial burning and wanton destruction; mattresses partly burnt, also olives, oil upset, maize half burnt and trodden into the ground. Some rooms looked as if lighted paper or matches had been thrown about. The people were not specially indignant, taking it rather as part of life’s general unpleasantness. “Turkish soldiers before 1918,” they said, “English soldiers now. All soldiers are alike”. The troops themselves sometimes abused their powers, stealing form or beating the detainees. Miss Wilson drew this conclusion from meeting and listening to British soldiers.

“Driving with the troops in this way and listening to their talk, I came to realise what probably accounted for such bad behaviour as there really was on the part of our men in villages, when due allowance has been made for rumour and exaggeration. The men were bored stiff. At lonely military outposts such as kilo 41, and even at Ramallah, there was no cinema, no recreation, and going to search a village was their one excitement. Soldiers are traditionally careless of other people’s property; the stories of their treatment of requisitioned houses in England bears this out: so what can be expected when they find themselves in a distant country among people who, they are told, are the ‘enemy’? I remember one occasion when the troops were giving me a lift from Ramallah to ‘Ain Sinia, and while sitting in the foremost lorry of the procession, waiting in Ramallah’s main street, I heard a sergeant further down the line instructing the men on what they were to do when they reached their destination. They were to cordon the village, and then proceed to drive the people out of their houses on to the hillside. I shall never forget the ferocity he put into that word ‘drive.’” The two suspected guerillas had been imprisoned in the ‘well’ in Ramallah, a basement storey of a house used as a crowded and insanitary prison.

The soldiers were rough yet on occasions not inconsiderate. The two had later been released and “seemed to be in high spirits and laughed as they recalled scrambling up and down that ladder and how the food used to be thrown down and hit them on the head. They added that that same morning they had met some of the soldiers who had been guarding them, on the road. These soldiers had hailed them cheerfully and offered them cigarettes and a ride in their lorry. This had impressed the two of them very much.”

Obviously though the Palestinians’ basic sympathy was for the fighters and would help each other against the common enemy. Miss Wilson met and talked to a high ranking British officer who explained some of the problems faced in fighting a whole people. “He went on to talk about safety on the roads and how hard it was to keep military movements from leaking out. A battalion set out recently to search a certain village for arms. It was all supposed to have been kept a dead secret. When they arrived they found chalked on the wall of the first house, “Welcome the 2nd Battalion the—Regiment!”

Some British residents in Palestine were greatly concerned with any instances of army misbehaviour during the uprising. Dr. E.D. Forster was doctor at St. Luke’s Hospital in Hebron in the 1930s and also kept a detailed and interesting diary of events 1936-40. Dealing with casualties he had first hand evidence of what had occurred during fighting, curfews and searches and arrests. For example, on the night of Friday 19th August 1938 after an Arab raid on Hebron the British immediately imposed a 24 hour curfew and instituted a search. Dr. Forster believed that not everyone could have known of the imposition and consequently a number of Palestinians were injured or killed.

“From the small hours of Saturday morning, I received at this Hospital a series of casualties inflicted by the British, presumably on curfew breakers. A great number of broken crowns were treated during the day at the P.H.D. and at this hospital. These were either inflicted by “brigands” the night before, or by the British engaged with conducting the search. Of those who were treated by us, each declared that he had been beaten by an Inklesi in the morning, and not by a brigand in the night. All declare they were shot in daylight, Saturday morning—the “battle” ending, as far as the town was concerned by midnight Friday-Saturday, as I have said—and all convinced they were shot by the English.

“It would be difficult to argue that these casualties, were inflicted on dangerous enemies or their allies. It will be seen that of those whom I saw in life, two were old men, three were children, and the only “shāb”, if his story be true, was shot from a distance, inside his own house. The corpse brought up as above mentioned, was later indentified as a deaf and dumb man, seventy years of age. The body was certainly that of an old man.”

“Less tragic in effect, but equally so as an index of the criminal futility of such retaliatory proceedings, was the looting and wanton destruction of shops in the market, during that ‘morning after’ that seemed to me so very much worse than the ‘night before’.”

“I have recorded these impressions with a minimum of comment. I have the greatest sympathy with individual members of the Forces and the Police, subjected to great strain and provocation for months on end. But I bitterly deplore as much the folly as the immorality of such in discriminate retaliation. It is interesting in this connection to record the sigh of relief that went round Hebron yesterday when the burning by hooligans of the Government Boys’ School was followed by no reprisals. Even as a result of this very negative blessing, there was a reaction in favour of the English.”

Dr. Forster’s report details many occurrences during the period and his diary is essential material for a history of the uprising. It would seem that he like several other observers was concerned with cases of alleged British brutality towards prisoners. Miss Wilson had mentioned reports of brutality and several members of the Jerusalem and East Mission had worked actively to have cases of alleged brutality investigated. The archives of this latter body (J.E.M.) are very extensive and cover much more than the strictly ‘missionary’ matters. For Palestine there are reports on education, health, politics, the national movement, terrorist attacks, the various Commissions, and the Palestinian refugees. Material dates from the 19th century until the 1970s. The J.E.M. clearly felt it had a particular mission to expose British shortcomings in a sympathetic manner. One complete file contains letters and reports from 1936-8 detailing incidents and complaints of ill treatment. The Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem wrote in February 1938 to the Archbishop of Canterbury:

“I and those of our clergy whom I have specially consulted confidentially are alarmed at various factors which are increasing the despair and disorder in the Holy Land. We are greatly troubled by the acts of terrorism which have accompanied the attempt by Government to put down the wicked brigandage and murders. Against these acts of terrorism for which the Government is morally responsible either Archdeacon Stewart or I, and in fact other members of the Christian Church, have protested for one year and nine months. Responsible high officials, who are admittedly in an unenviable position at this time, have said in conversation to two of our clergy that the only way to deal with the situation now is to make the villagers more afraid of the Government than they are of the “terrorists.” It is this attitude of overcoming evil by permitting more evil to be done which is most distressing. The evidence from the result of the searches of the villages of Beit Iksâ and Iksîm, which is attached, cannot be gainsaid.”

He then detailed several occurrences. The matter was taken up by the National Council for Civil Liberties, by General Haining, C-in-C of British Forces in Palestine, by the Colonial Secretary, Ormsby-Gore. Haining wrote that "I realise that the conditions prevailing in this country, whereby the Arab population, when it is not actively hostile, is terrorised into estrangement from its European friends, is distressing to the latter, who see, in some cases, years of patient work for friendship nullified: and, in other cases, where business is concerned, see their livelihood in danger. But this is not the fault of the Army, whose function is, in most difficult circumstances, and in face of an attitude of disapproval and worse on the part of their own countrymen, to carry out one of the hardest tasks which soldiers can be called on to perform. The effective work carried out by the Army, in such circumstances, is the real reason for the propaganda against it."

Ormsby-Gore likewise rather dismissively replied that: "You will realise, I am sure, that at a time when the administration of Palestine is being conducted in an atmosphere of hostile anti-British propaganda, I am reluctant to burden the Palestine Authorities with the investigation of every reckless and unsupported charge against the British Police and Military Forces, and I hope that you will accept my assurance that the last thing I should wish would be to burke investigation of any genuine charge of cruelty or misconduct, and I feel sure that this is the view of the General Officer Commanding in Palestine, to whom no doubt you will communicate any authentic cases which come to your knowledge."

Numerous other papers deal with the situation in Palestine from 1936 to 1939 which cannot be mentioned here. Other important events and topics covered are education, health, railways, Anglo-American Committee, administration, prisons, the capture of Jerusalem, and the final British withdrawal in 1948. The first five months of that year were, even for Palestine a period of exceptional bitterness, tension and violence. The papers of some ten collections deal with the period, including the J.E.M. which has a mass of papers containing fascinating details of the daily problems encountered and of the fighting and destruction which took place. No history of the period could be considered complete without consulting these documents.

Sir Henry Gurney, the last Chief Secretary, has left an interesting personal diary of the final days written at the time, full of bitterness, anger and despair. He expresses well the hopeless feelings of British officials seeing division and rivalry mounting and the years of work destroyed. Nevertheless, work was executed amid the bullets and bombs, the British stiff upper lip much in evidence, even on leaving.

“28th April

Got up 5.45 and went to see the convoy off from the King David at 6.30. About 100 British, including many heads of Departments. It was quite a bit of history, though it didn't look like it. Air passengers in old mackintoshes are not a stirring sight. But this party represented the main body of the Government leaving Jerusalem, the Holy City, in the early light of a grey morning: policemen in blue in their green armoured cars: the parting of many friends and the finish, in some cases, of a life's work. The Press and the photographers missed it, and it all went off soberly and quietly, with handshakes and some rather studiously casual waves, hiding all kinds of thoughts and emotions. None of us would have had it otherwise; every sign of sentiment had been magnificently dulled.” Gurney himself was famous for his imperturbability. As Sir John Fletcher-Cooke (an undersecretary of Finance) writes: “I well remember... discussing Gurney with Mrs. Golda Meir and the question of his imperturbability cropped up. “Yes—she said, that was why we hated him. No one in that position had any right to be unruffled. He ought to have been pacing his room day and night, trying to find a solution to the Jewish problem. It was our objective to ruffle people but we could not make any impression on him.” He also had the ability to see the less serious side of things, a quality I find very attractive in many British officials.

“A mukhtār of an Arab village near Gaza was responsible for a good story recently. A British military convoy was attacked by Arabs near his village, who mistook them for Jews. The mukhtār, on learning of their error, was most apologetic and invited the whole military party to breakfast and added: “Please bring some ammunition with you, as we have wasted about 200 rounds on you.”

Gurney has much to say on the various notorious incidents of the last days. He gives a very clear picture of the mood of the Arabs in the towns, being subjected to daily Jewish attacks and therefore leaving in their thousands. Wild rumours of massacres flew around and only increased the desire to flee.

“All sorts of alarmist stories are now flying about Damascus and Amman, and we can scarcely keep up with the job of telegraphing all round the world that Safad is not threatened with another Deir Yassin Massacre, that Beersheba is not cut off, that all the Arab villages in the Huleh are not being attacked, and that it is not unsafe for Arabs to return to Haifa.”

“The Stern Group has now ‘declared war’ on the British Army. We don't take any notice of this, beyond remembering that the Jewish Agency, by virtue of the recent Haganah-I.Z.L. agreement, are now held responsible for the actions of the I.Z.L.” He believed that Haifa and Jaffa had been evacuated unnecessarily but under the constant threat of violence. One could also disagree with his belief that the Jews did not want the Arabs to leave.

“The High Commissioner has been to Haifa today, and seen things for himself. Armed Jews are walking about the Arab parts of the town with sten guns and the like, while hundreds of the peaceful Arab inhabitants are sitting with their belongings in the rain in the port area, waiting for evacuation. The Jews do not want them to evacuate, and do not see that they will not come back so long as there are armed Jews in their quarters. The Haganah and the Jewish civil leaders seem not to have worked this out.”

“Tiberias has now gone the same way as Haifa: Arab evacuation following Jewish attack following Arab attack. The Arabs have now lost all confidence in their military leadership and look more and more to Amir Abdallah to rescue them.”

“It was reported this afternoon that the Jews had blown up the Jisr Majami bridge over the Jordan south of the Sea of Galilee; the situation in Acre, where we have 300 Arab prisoners and criminal lunatics with only a few British in charge, has been exacerbated by the arrival of refugees from Haifa; the food position at Nablus had also become critical on account of more of these refugees, who are spreading the wildest and most untrue stories of events in Haifa.”

“Fuller (District Commissioner of Lydda) came up from Jaffa and confirmed that of the original Arab population of 50,000 there were now only some 15,000 left in the town and more were still going. The Mayor and remaining councillors had announced their intention of leaving before the 15th May. The evacuation is largely to Gaza and the cost of the hire of a lorry for the 40-mile trip is £150. Of the 300 municipal police we had worked had to establish, only 22 remain. The I.Z.L. mortar attack was indiscriminately aimed at civilian targets and was designed to create panic among the population. Nearly all shops are closed and the streets deserted. The town is in fact dead. Fuller told me that his office staff now consisted of one messenger boy only.”

Gurney was bitterly critical of the intervention of the Arab Liberation Army and the trouble it caused.

“Ninety per cent. of the population of Jaffa have just run away, and only some 5,000 now remain. Yesterday the municipal engineer locked the door of the water supply pumping station, and walked off. The Army have taken it on. The Mayor has gone, without even saying good bye, and the remnants of the Liberation Army are looting and robbing. This is what the Palestine Arabs get from the assistance provided by the Arab States. Perhaps our warnings to the States not to indulge in much premature military action were not always strong enough. True it is that this ill-organized and stupid intervention, in defiance of all our protests, has cost the Palestine Arabs dearly, and one could almost say that it is all over bar the shouting and the re-opening of the Jewish road to Jerusalem.”

But parts of the Haganah, the Irgun and Stern group were deliberately trying to

spread terror and panic with the intention of clearing areas of Palestine of its Arab population. The massacre of Deir Yasin was openly announced on 9th April.

“Yesterday the Irgun and Stern staged a press conference to which some American correspondents went, in spite of its being illegal to have such contact with these people. The spokesmen claimed to have killed 200 Arabs in Deir Yassin, a village on the road of about 700 Arabs; including 100 women and children. Certainly about 150 Arab women were brought into Jerusalem and dumped in the street of the Prophets. This boasting of the killing of women and children is typical of the ruthlessness and degradation of these people.”

Moreover, the Jews refused to co-operate with the British, causing further confusion and continued to attack British personnel and targets. One bad example was: “This morning a party of armed Jews entered Pardess Hanna Camp and shot and killed the C.O. and seven soldiers. Sheer murder of innocent people who are trying to help them, and it is a little hard to have to go on hearing such things for purely political reasons that have no substance.”

At the local level, W.V. Fuller, the District Commissioner of Lydda, has left a brief diary of his attempt to save Jaffa from being a battleground and therefore from being depopulated, by stating that it should be an undefended town. As is known, this did not happen and Fuller gives his reasons very frankly.

“After the bombardment of Jaffa the morale of the civil population cracked completely. Though the Arabs knew that we would protect them until the 15th May they were terrified at the thought of their treatment by the Jews after that date. Their leaders fled: only one of the eleven Municipal Councillors remained and only one of the twenty members of the National Committee stayed behind. Of the 80,000 Arabs in the town only 4,000 remained and some of these stayed in Jaffa only because they were too poor to leave. All firms, shops, banks and Government offices were completely deserted and closed down.”

“ When the Jewish attack on Jaffa first started I called Capt. Ben Gurion (Junior) to my office and requested him to stop it. He told me that the attack was being carried out by the Irgun, “mad people” who would not accept the authority of the Hagana or the Jewish Agency. He regretted that there was nothing he could do.

Later when the Army were coming in to separate the two sides an Army shell fell on a bus load of Jewish troops killing them all—or so I heard. Capt. Ben Gurion contacted me immediately and suggested a “ceasefire”. I said that I would welcome it but added that I understood that he could not stop the Irgun. However, if he could guarantee a ceasefire, I would do my utmost to get the Arabs to accept. He assured me that he could arrange it on the Jewish side.

The most logical conclusion is that the Irgun in the latter period were used by the Jewish Agency to commit acts of aggression, or even terrorism, which the Agency could then disclaim. Alternatively, as may well have been the case in Jaffa, they organized such acts themselves knowing that they could blame the Irgun for them.”

In this paper I have tried to give examples of the interesting material to be found in the Oxford archives. The examples are largely personal points of view and experiences of those closely involved and thus give an immediacy and intimacy to the history of the mandate period.

NOTES

- 1 . Graves, R.M., unpublished ms. **The Story of the Levant Consular Service**, introduction, p.5. All the unpublished documents referred to are in the St. Antony's Middle East Private Papers archive. This archive uses unpublished material.
- 2 . A handlist of the collection has been published by Diana Grimwood-Jones in **Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies** Vol. 5 no. 2. The card catalogue had been published by Mansell information.

IRAQ AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION 1921-1941.

Abbas Kelidar

An examination of Iraqi historiography would indicate that the modern state of Iraq, set up in 1921, showed little interest and no enthusiasm for the Arab predicament in Palestine until the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in 1936. Although the leaders of the pan-Arab movement in Iraq were aware of the implicit dangers of British policy and Jewish immigration to the social fabric and political identity of an Arab country, they were too concerned with the more pressing problem of their own liberation from the mandatory system. It is not surprising therefore to find that the Balfour Declaration of 1917 passed almost unnoticed, and that the opposition to the demographic change occurring in Palestine was practically confined to that country. Between 1921 and 1941 Iraq had 31 different cabinets, none of which mentioned Palestine by name in their policy statement. The closest they came to it was by the occasional reference to strengthen the ties between the neighbouring Arab countries.¹ The explanation for this obvious official reticence must be sought in the dominance which the mandatory power, Britain, held over the political process coupled by the earnest wish of the Iraqi leaders not to antagonize Britain in their quest for the independence of their country. There is a noticeable correlation that the closer the date of independence drew, formally completed in 1932, the more active and concerned the country became about the fate of Palestine.

King Faysal was determined after his traumatic experience in Syria to control and harness all the disruptive social and political forces to achieve the independence of Iraq. Independent Iraq was seen as the example to be emulated, the bastion of Arab liberation and unity. Thus 1932 marked a turning point for Iraq as the vanguard of the Arab independence movement. Though official reaction to the events in Palestine remained constrained the same could not be said for popular agitation. Pan-Arabist groups and organizations were in constant touch with the leaders of the national movement in Palestine to marshal support and offer assistance to their cause. The importance of these groups was clearly manifested in February 1928 when Sir Alfred Mond (later Lord Melchett), the distinguished British supporter of Zionism, was met by violent demonstrations while on a private visit to Baghdad. "His arrival," states a confidential report to the British Foreign Office, "was made the occasion for a sudden angry and riotous anti-Zionist demonstration, and the press poured out impassioned articles denouncing the Balfour Declaration, the Zionists and all their works."² Subsequent outbursts by the Iraqi public corresponded closely to developments in Palestine; and the document points out that

on this occasion no event of special significance had taken place to excite popular feelings, and suggests that it might have had more to do with the British attitude to the independence question for Iraq. Whatever the cause of the disturbance it showed the depth of the latent sentiment which existed in Iraq for Palestine which proved to be rather easy to trigger off. The demonstration precipitated a ministerial crisis as disciplinary action was taken against the students and teachers who organized it.³

The disturbance which accompanied the visit of Mond to Iraq focussed public attention on, and marked the beginning of a more sustained and closer interest in the Zionist threat to Palestine. Following the clashes of 1929 in Palestine a committee of protest, the first of many, was organized under the leadership of Haj Sa'īd Thābit, and sponsored by Yāsīn al-Hāshimī. Under the direction of this committee a number of public meetings were held to declare their support for the Palestine Arabs, and condemn the Zionist effort to inhabit the land as a preliminary step to the establishment of the Jewish national home. Radical nationalist groupings were so mobilised that clashes with the security forces took place, and letters of protest were dispatched to the High Commissioner in Baghdad, to the British Government in London, and the League of Nations in Geneva. The agitation was not confined to Baghdad. It quickly spread to other towns and cities like Mosul and Basra, where public processions were also held. King Faysal had to intervene to put a halt to the movement as it began to jeopardize Iraq's relation with Britain, and threaten the security of the large and prosperous Jewish community of Iraq.⁴ Al-Hāshimī discreetly withdrew his support from the committee until he became prime minister in 1936 when a more direct British pressure had to be exerted on his government to desist from assisting the Arab revolt in Palestine.

In 1930 Iraqi affairs predominated once again as negotiations with Britain about independence were underway. Palestine, however, remained close to the hearts and minds of Iraq's pan-Arabist leaders. When Ḥāj Amin al-Ḥusaynī, the Mufti of Jerusalem, renewed his invitation for a Muslim congress to be held in Palestine, delegates from Iraq and 22 other countries agreed to participate. The congress was convened in December 1931, attended by an eight-man delegation headed by Ḥāj Sa'īd Thābit and included Shaykh Muhammad Kāshif al-Ghitā', the Shī'ī religious leader. The result of the congress was inconclusive, but it served to highlight the campaign to stem the tide of Jewish immigration which began to gather pace after the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany. In Iraq the Palestine Defence Committee was reformed, only to become a permanent feature of Iraqi politics, and a useful instrument to mobilize support and aid to the Arabs of Palestine. Once Iraq became an independent state King Faysal began to stress the importance of the Palestine question as an important factor in determining the nature of Britain's relation not only with Iraq but the whole Arab and Muslim world. What the King of Iraq told the British Foreign Secretary on his official visit to London became a cardinal standard for the conduct of Iraq's approach to the Palestine question. All subsequent

governments after Faysal's inopportune death observed and followed it irrespective of their ideological orientations.

In his talks with the British government Faysal expressed his alarm at the rapid increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine. He also indicated his strong objections to the penetration of Jewish settlement into Transjordan. He forewarned that if the wave of immigration was not checked large scale fighting between Arabs and Jews was bound to break out. Such a war in Palestine would entail serious consequences on Iraq's cordial relation with Britain, and would adversely affect British interests in the region as a whole. In order to maintain Arab goodwill towards Britain Faysal proposed a four-point programme to facilitate the resolution of the British dilemma in Palestine. The proposals called on the British government to impose a limit on Jewish immigration and prohibit the sale and lease of land to Jews east of the river Jordan, to set up representative government and relieve the economic hardship of Transjordan. He had no doubt that these measures would contain the Zionist threat and satisfy the Arabs.⁵

In his quest for the unification of the Arab countries, an ideal which Faysal never abandoned despite his preoccupation with the politics of Iraq, a solution to the Jewish national home in Palestine was envisaged. The problem of reconciling the Arabs to Zionism was to be resolved by the establishment of an Arab federation that would include all the countries of the Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent, where a small and privileged Jewish enclave could be accommodated. This was taken to be the basic idea behind the so-called Faysal-Weizmann understanding of 1919.⁶ The scheme would have secured three of the fundamental objectives of the pan-Arabist movement, namely: unity, independence, and the guarantee of Arab numerical superiority in Palestine. These ideas continued to be advocated by Faysal's foremost disciple in Iraq, Nūrī al-Sa'īd, particularly when he became involved with the Palestine question between 1936-1939. Nūrī gave public expression to these notions in his famous blue paper of 1943 entitled 'The Independence of the Arabs and their Unity.'⁷ The publication of the paper at the time precipitated moves that led to the establishment of the Arab League.

The death of Faysal in 1933, and the changing political climate in Europe marked the rapid radicalization of Arab and Iraqi politics. Political leaders like Nūrī al-Sa'īd continued to uphold and adhere to Faysal's original policies, but others were not so prepared. From the mid 1930s the Pan-Arabists began to inject into their movement an ideological stance that did not confine their objectives to the Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent region but extended to include the whole of the Arabic speaking world. Palestine became just one element of a more general problem of national liberation. In Iraq the influence of Faysal was too great to be completely overlooked, and for as long as the country was under the direction of the Faysal school of politicians, they continued to see Palestine as a special problem for the Arabs.

Throughout the 1930s Iraq employed every means at her disposal to exert pressure on Britain to impose a limit on Jewish immigration into Palestine. The primary aim was to prevent the reduction of the Arabs of Palestine into "an impotent minority under the sway of an alien people whose intellectual and financial resources were far superior to their own."⁸ This was certainly the view of Yāsīn al-Hāshimī when prime minister in 1936. Al- Hāshimī became the leading exponent of a tough approach to the mounting tide of immigration into Palestine. However, the public posturing of al-Hāshimī was amenable to British pressure and sanctions as it was with all other Iraqi prime ministers. The position of a constrained prime minister faced with a well-organized popular campaign for radical action only served to enhance the existing gulf between official and non-official reaction to developments in Palestine. This was made worse by direct appeals to the Iraqi government for help as the Palestine Arabs launched their rebellion against the British mandatory system.

The British ambassador in Baghdad did his utmost not to allow popular sentiment influence the position and attitude of the al-Hāshimī cabinet. Various Iraqi governments resorted to a subterfuge approach to the question of Palestine to avoid British displeasure. Despite the constraints public agitation continued. From time to time it was vented by reprisals against the Jewish community of Baghdad culminating in the murder of a prominent member of the community, and several bomb-throwing incidents. These moves were symptomatic of the latent strength of popular feelings, and proved rather ominous in view of subsequent developments to unsettle the Jewish community in Iraq.⁹

In 1936 the Palestine Defence committee was reformed and renamed the Palestine Defence League under the chairmanship of Nājī al-Suwaydī, a former prime minister who led the Iraqi delegation to the Blūdān conference a year later. Al-Muthannā club founded in 1935 by Dr. Sā'ib Shawkat became a most active centre in fostering pan-Arab ideals. It gathered many enthusiasts, especially the Palestinian and Syrian teachers working in Iraq. They organized meetings and lectures, passed resolutions and drew up memoranda, and sent petitions and letters of protest to various governments soliciting aid and support. The two organizations co-operated closely to disseminate news about Palestine as well as anti-British and anti-French propaganda. Contributions were collected, and funds set up to help the Arabs of Palestine by both groups whose activities were supplemented by frequent visits from representatives of the Higher Arab Committee (HAC) to Baghdad. The work of these organizations prompted a deputation of senators and deputies to visit the British Embassy in Baghdad on a number of occasions and in view of the raging struggle in Palestine, to express their grave concern and the possible repercussions on Iraq's relation with Britain.¹⁰

Yasin al-Hāshimī, who projected himself as a great pan-Arabist and conceived of Iraq as a possible Prussia in the struggle for Arab unity and independence, fell

under considerable pressure to offer more than moral support for the Palestine Arabs. He warned the British ambassador in Baghdad that his government might not find it possible to ignore the mounting public clamour to assist the revolt in Palestine. He emphasised that Iraq wanted to maintain its cordial relation with Britain, but this had been rendered difficult by British support for increased Jewish immigration. However, both the government and the embassy were aware of the activities of Fawzī al-Ḳāwāḳjī, a Syrian nationalist who had served as an instructor in the Iraqi army. al-Ḳāwāḳjī resigned his commission in 1936 to take charge of a voluntary army made up of a hundred Iraqis, Syrians and Palestinians, and prepare it for battle in Palestine. There is little doubt that both Yāsīn and his brother Tāhā who was commander in chief of the Iraqi army were privy to al-Ḳāwāḳjī's plans drawn up in collaboration with representatives of the HAC.¹¹

In his memoirs al-Ḳāwāḳjī claims that al-Hāshimī agreed to the grant of military and logistical aid to be transferred to his volunteer army.¹² However when Mr. C. H. Bateman of the British embassy in Baghdad saw the prime minister on the matter, it became clear that he was aware of the preparations but insisted that his government had in fact stopped the Syrian officer. Bateman writes: "The Prime Minister was clearly well informed about Fauzi's plans and told me that two lorries with men and rifles, which had actually set out, had been stopped and returned back by the police. He undertook to keep a sharp eye open for any further movements of this kind."¹³ Al-Ḳāwāḳjī on the other hand states that his mission was a success though he soon had difficulties with his volunteers as he could no longer pay them.¹⁴ He returned to Iraq only to be detained by the government of Ḥikmat Sulaymān. He was released by the government of Jamīl al-Midfa'ī in 1937 but kept under strict surveillance and was not allowed to leave Iraq when Ibn Sa'ūd betrayed his plan for a rebellion in Trans-Jordan to the British. Later al-Ḳāwāḳjī found his way to Germany as a casualty of the Anglo-Iraqi war of 1941.¹⁵

Moreover al-Hāshimī was prepared to go further in his co-operation with the British effort to end the uprising in Palestine by offering Iraq's good offices in the mediation not only between the Arabs and the British mandatory authorities but between the Arabs and the Zionist organizations also. He dispatched his foreign minister, Nūrī al-Sa'īd to London and Jerusalem in the search for common ground in the conflict, following repeated appeals by the HAC to the Arab Heads of State. The initial joint Iraqi-Saudi intervention proved abortive because the demand to end Jewish immigration into Palestine was rejected by the British government who made any talks about immigration conditional on the restoration of law and order. Since the British government decided to appoint a Royal Commission to investigate the situation in Palestine al-Hāshimī was commended for his constructive attitude and was called upon to continue to exercise his moderating influence on the Arab leadership.¹⁶

The British rebuff notwithstanding, Nūrī decided to continue his effort of mediation. He threw himself in the contentious politics of the Palestine question with zeal and some relish. Nūrī was as much of a pan-Arabist as al-Hāshimī, and in the post-Fayṣal politics of Iraq success in the Arab independence movement would have consolidated the reputation and standing of the Iraqi leader concerned not only in his own country but farther afield as well. The Iraqi foreign minister was prepared to go a long way to achieve a positive result for his mission. While in London he had a meeting with Dr. Chaim Weizmann and called on the Zionist movement to impose a voluntary suspension on immigration. He also revived Fayṣal's original plan for an Arab confederation where the Jewish national home could be accommodated.¹⁷ Nūrī, no doubt, was motivated by both ideological and geopolitical considerations to maintain Arab numerical superiority and protect Iraq's vital economic interests. A union of the fertile crescent countries would have made Iraq its most powerful component, a force to be reckoned with in the region. Moreover, Nūrī would have been proclaimed as the champion of the Arab liberation movement. It is not surprising therefore that these proposals were turned down by both the British government and the Jewish Agency. Both insisted that the violence prevailing in Palestine must be terminated before any meaningful talks could take place.¹⁸

Nūrī's failure in London in June of 1936 did not dampen his fervour to obtain a settlement of the Palestine question. In August he left Baghdad for Palestine with the blessings of both the British as well as that of the Iraqi government. In Jerusalem Nūrī had a long and apparently fruitful meeting with the Mufti and other members of the HAC whom he urged to end the strike, and to co-operate with the British Royal Commission; thus effectively ending the Arab rebellion against the mandatory administration and its policies. It seems the HAC was prepared to do so upon a British undertaking that the legitimate demands of the Palestine Arabs would be fulfilled. These demands did not preclude questions of general policy which Britain perceived to be her prerogative as the mandatory power. The British government could not condone such a permanent role for Iraq in the administration of Palestine. The Jewish Agency as well as Iraq's erstwhile Arab rival, Saudi Arabia, expressed strong objections too.¹⁹ The British government resolved in the end to put down the Palestinian uprising by force. The violence that ensued as a result of this policy led the HAC to renew their frantic appeals to Arab governments for help.²⁰ The response of the Arab states particularly that of Iraq and Saudi Arabia was the exertion of greater effort to end the strike. When the HAC agreed to do so the way was open to call off the boycott imposed by the Arabs on their co-operation with the Royal Commission.

Towards the end of 1936 the ideological orientation of Iraq underwent a perceptible change. A salient feature in the Iraqi political leadership was a division between the pan-Arabist school on the one hand, and what could be called Iraqi nationalists on the other.²¹ The politics of Iraq up until the coup of 1936 was

dominated by the pan-Arabists. The coup d'état carried out by General Bakr Ṣidqī, a Kurd, organized by Ḥikmat Sulaymān, a Turcoman, and ably supported by Ja'far Abu al-Timman, a Shi'ī, all of whom lay greater emphasis on a more particularist approach to the development of Iraq. They recognized that Iraqi society was so fragmented that only the evolution of a nation state on the Kemalist line in Turkey would render a united country. Iraq was to refrain from becoming so readily embroiled in Arab politics. Ḥikmat for instance saw no reason why Iraq should be busying itself with the affairs of the Arab states when it had much to do at home.²² Bakr Ṣidqī was even more forthright. He was reported to say: "I keenly sympathize with the Arab cause. I however feel compelled first to establish my own country on a firm footing. How can we endeavour to establish an all-Arabic empire before we have first ensured for each component section of such an empire a good, strong, and independent government."²³ All this meant that the cabinet of Hikmat Sulaymān that took office on 29th October 1936 until 17th August 1937 was bound to look after the more pressing problems of social and economic reform at home and withdraw from the Arab political arena.

However even the innerward-looking administration of Ḥikmat could not accept the partition plan advocated by the report of the Royal Commission of 1937. The pan-Arabists mounted a campaign not only against Ḥikmat and his isolationist policy but against the partition proposals aided and abetted by the German-supported anti-British propaganda in various political circles.²⁴ Under pressure the cabinet of Ḥikmat cracked up in June when four of his ministers resigned. Public agitation continued. The Palestine Defence League organized public meetings, demonstrations, and flag days to protest about British policy in Palestine. The government attempted to contain the movement especialluy when physical attacks and a number of bombs were thrown on Jewish establishments in Baghdad in retaliation against similar incidents occurring in Palestine. Eventually the cabinet had to succumb to public clamour for a firm stand and express its rejection of the partition plan in no uncertain terms. Ḥikmat was practically forced to issue a statement rejecting the partition proposals and called on the British government to maintain the unity and the independence of Palestine. In an almost last ditch stand to save his government from falling Ḥikmat proposed the setting up of a comprehensive Arab union which included Egypt rather than confined to the countries of the fertile crescent.²⁵ Within a few weeks the cabinet of Ḥikmat Sulaymān was ousted by another coup in August 1937; and the partition plan was abandoned by the British government.

The ouster of Hikmat re-introduced Nūrī to the political scene. By this time Iraqi politics became so factionalised that any combination of the contending political forces in the land could affect a change of cabinet. Nūrī was the focus of many of these conspiratorial groupings. His geopolitical concepts reinforced his ideological orientation as he was convinced that Iraq's political destiny lay in leading the Arab

countries to unity and independence. The government of Jamīl al-Midfa'ī which succeeded that of Hikmat encouraged Nūrī to take an active interest in Arab politics mainly because it wanted him out of the country.²⁶ In the meantime Nūrī was inclined to ride the crest of the wave of popular protest. He wanted to utilize and manipulate the discontent to serve Iraq's interest in regional politics, as well as his own standing at home. In Iraq he courted the friendship of the pan-Arabist officers. Abroad he moved closer to Britain but he was not prepared to countenance the partition proposals for Palestine.²⁷ In the Arab world Nūrī was conscious of the Saudi opposition to Iraqi claims to Arab leadership, especially to a Hashimite led federation of the fertile crescent countries. He also resented King Ghāzī's apparent co-operation with the Bakr Šidqī coup which resulted in the death of his brother-in-law, and political ally, General Ja'far al-'Askarī. All these factors led Nūrī to contemplate collaboration with Ibn Su'ūd in his renewed campaign for an Arab union after his return to Baghdad in 1937.²⁸ Toward the end of 1937 and in his personal capacity as an Arab leader Nūrī launched a private initiative by visiting the exiled leader of the HAC, Hāj Amin al-Ḥusaynī and other Arab leaders in Syria and Lebanon as well as Saudi Arabia.

The purpose was to draw up a plan which could provide for a better understanding between Arabs on the one hand and the British authorities and the Arabs on the other. Nothing came out of Nūrī's sojourn except his undoubted conviction that violence was futile in the resolution of the Palestine question.²⁹

The failure of Nūrī on behalf of Iraq did not diminish either the Iraqi leader's or that of his country's standing in the eyes of other Arabs as the advocate of Arab independence and unity. Nūrī, with the mounting threat of war in Europe, hoped to exchange Arab support and sympathy for the Axis Powers with British backing for the Jews in Palestine. His known admiration for Britian put him in good stead to mediate between the two sides. Thus with Nūrī playing a leading role in the conspiratorial politics of Iraq between 1937-1941, he remained closely involved with the development of the Palestine question and the British search for a solution. The appointment of Malcolm MacDonald as Colonial Secretary co-incided with Nūrī emerging as prime minister in Baghdad, and the Iraqi leader was engaged in earnest consultation in MacDonald's effort to resolve the Palestinian impasse. MacDonald mooted out the idea of a round table conference in London, to which not only Arabs and Jews from Palestine would be invited but representatives of the Arab states and world Jewry. Iraq welcomed the Arabization of the Palestine question and the formal recognition by the mandatory power of it, particularly as Arab good will had to be safeguarded. Arab participation became an essential feature of the round table conference, and of the Palestine question in general. In the conference Iraq wanted to consolidate its own position and that of its supporters among the Palestinian political leadership, and called for the participation of the HAC, outlawed since 1936, and that there should be an all-inclusive delegation of

Palestinian opinion. This really meant that while Iraq wanted the supporters of the Mufti to take part they should not be taken as the only interested party in view of dynastic and regional political rivalry in the Arab world.³⁰

In February 1939 the round table conference was convened in London. It proved inconclusive. Nūrī led the Iraqi delegation at the outset only to give way to Tawfīk al-Suwaydī. Both men played a crucial part in attempting to bridge the wide gulf separating the conflicting parties but to no avail. The conference was doomed before it started since Arab demands and Zionist objectives could not be reconciled. The British government abandoned the conference only to issue the White Paper of May 1939. At a meeting of Arab delegates to consider the provisions of the White Paper, Tawfīk al-Suwaydī considered it favourable to the Arabs but he would not urge its acceptance leaving the ultimate decision to the Palestine delegation which eventually rejected it under Egyptian pressure.³¹

The arrival of Hāj'Amīn al-Ḥusaynī in Baghdad in October 1939 increased British fears about the political alignment of the country in view of the pan-Arabist campaign against the cause of the Allies in the war, and the increased contact between these nationalist groupings and the representatives of Nazi Germany. The Mufti apart, Fawzī al-Ḳawaḳji was busy raising a force to lead a rebellion in Syria. The group of officers known as the 'golden square' had already dominated Iraqi politics and established an alliance with the Mufti and al-Ḳawaḳjī.³² Nūrī, however, remained convinced that neither the Palestinians nor the Syrian nationalist leaders were able to mount a violent campaign or sustain it if they did.³³ In Iraq the Mufti was less concerned with Palestinian affairs than those of Iraq and its relation with Britain. He wanted to conclude an alliance with the Axis powers which would guarantee the end of Zionist claims in Palestine. He set up a secret political organization to consolidate his position and further his influence on the Iraqi political process. The party was headed by the Mufti himself and included among its leading members Rashīd 'Alī al-Gaylānī, Nāji Shawkat, Yūnis al-Sab'āwī 'Alī Maḥmūd al-Shaykh 'Alī, Ṣalāh al-Dīn al-Sabbāgh and the other officers of the 'golden square'.³⁴ It was this group that dominated the national defence cabinet of al-Gaylānī in April 1941. The alarm felt by Britain about Axis hegemony over this administration caused the Anglo-Iraqi crisis of May 1941 which ended in the second British occupation of Baghdad. The high expectations of the ultra-nationalist party of the Mufti in Iraq were sadly disappointed.

NOTES.

- 1 . See 'Abd al-Razzāk al-Ḥasani, *al-'Usūl al-Rasmiyya Li Tārīkh al-Wizārat al-'Irāqīyya*, Ṣayda, 1964, pp. 9-171.
- 2 . See Bateman to Eden, FO 371/20024, Baghdad, 31st August 1936, which includes a confidential report by Captain V. Holt, the Oriental Secretary at the British Embassy in Baghdad on "Repercussions in Iraq of the Creating of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine."
- 3 . See 'Abd al-Razzāk al-Ḥasani, *Tārīkh al-Wizārat al-'Irāqīyya*, Ṣayda, 1965, I, 149-156.
- 4 . Bateman to Eden, *op. cit.*
- 5 . *Ibid.* See also FO 371/20016, Note from Sir Francis Humphrys to the FO, 15th July 1933.
- 6 . *Ibid.*
- 7 . See General Nūrī al-Sa'īd *al-Kitāb al-Azraḡ, Istiḡlāl al-'Arab wa Waḥdatuhum*, Government Press, Baghdad, 1943.
- 8 . Bateman to Eden, *op. cit.*, also Bateman to Sir Arthur G. Wauchope, HC for Palestine, FO 371/20016 (400/226/36), Baghdad, 25th August 1936.
- 9 . See E. Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies*, and his *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, London, 1970 and 1974. See also Sylvia Haim, "Aspects of Jewish Life in Baghdad under the Monarchy", in *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, May 1976, pp. 188-208.
10. Bateman to Eden, *op. cit.* See also Muḥammad Maḥdī Kubba, *Mudhakkirat fī Samīm al-Aḥdāth*, Beirut, 1965, pp. 54-60.
11. Fawzi al-Ḳāwaḡji, *Filasṡin fī Mudhakkirat Fawzi al-Ḳā 1936-1948*. edited by Khayriyya, Beirut, 1975, II, 14.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Bateman to Wauchope. *op. cit.*
14. al-Ḳāwaḡji, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-55.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.
16. Bateman to Wauchope, *op. cit.*
17. FO 371/20016 (E 3466) 12th June 1936. See also FO 371/20796 (E 6729) 15th November 1937, and FO 371/21846, from H. Hindle James to the FO., Cairo 7th January 1938.
18. See FO 371/20796, *op. cit.*
19. See Y. Taggar, "The Iraqi Reaction to the Partition Plan for Palestine 1937", in *The Palestinians and the Middle East: Studies in their History, Sociology, and Politics*, edited by Gabriel Ben-Dor, Haifa, 1978, pp. 195-213.
20. See Y. Porath, *The Palestine Arab National Movement 1929-1939. From Riots to Rebellion*, London 1977, II, 234-236
21. See A. Shikara "Faisal's Ambitions of Leadership in the Fertile Crescent: Aspiration and Constraints", in Abbas Kelidar (editor) *The Integration of Modern Iraq*, London, 1979, pp. 32-45.
22. Clark Kerr to Rendel, CO. 733/314/75528/44, 7th November 1936.
23. See FO. 371/20015, 29th November 1937.
24. See FO. 371/23202, On the influence of German activities in Iraq, 1939.
25. See A. Shikara, *Iraqi Politics 1921-1941, The Interaction between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Southampton) 1980, pp. 139-140.
26. See FO. 371/21856, 1937.
27. See FO. 371/20796, No. 443/ E 6729, 15th November 1937.
28. *Ibid.*

29. See **Mudhakkirat Ṭaha al-Hāshimī 1919-1943**, edited by Khaldūn al-Ḥuṣārī, Beirut, 1967, pp. 312-313.
30. Porath, **op. cit.** pp. 278-279.
31. See Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, **Mudhakkirati, Niṣf Ḳarn min Tarikh al-‘Irāq wa al-Ḳaḍiyya al-‘Arabiyya**, Beirut, 1969, pp. 327-329.
32. al-Ḳāwāqji, **op. cit.** pp. 71-85. See also **Mudhakkirat Ṭaha al-Hāshimī**, *op. cit.*, p.278.
33. al-Hashimi, **op. cit.** p.225.
34. See Najī Shawkat, **Sira wa Dhikrayāt, Thamanin ‘Āman 1894-1974**, Beirut, 1975, pp. 433-434.

THE STATUS OF THE MUSLIMS UNDER EUROPEAN RULE: THE EVICTION OF THE CERKES FROM THE CAUCASIA AND THE BALKANS AND THEIR SETTLEMENT IN SYRIA

Kemal H. Karpat

1. Introduction: Cerkess Migration in the Context of the Islamic History.

The migration and the settlement of the Cherkess (henceforth Cerkes or Circassians) in Syria or Bilād al-Shām during the second half of the 19th century may appear at first as a minor transfer of population both in terms of the number of people involved and in the surface of the settlement area.¹ Indeed, put in purely technical terms, the migration of the Cerkes involves their transfer from their ancestral lands in the Caucasus to certain areas in western Syria, either directly or indirectly via the Balkans and / or Anatolia. Thus, when regarded in an objective fashion, the Cerkes migration and settlement in Syria or, to be more specific, in the Bilād al-Shām, may appear as just one of the many population movements which have dotted the history of mankind since immemorial times. In reality the Cerkes immigration was part of the general Muslim retreat from the most advanced positions in West and North Europe back towards the heartland of Islam in the Middle East. The frontiers of Islam in Europe began to recede slowly, first in Sicily in the eleventh century and then in Spain, where the empire shrank rapidly after the Muslim defeat at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 and the fall of the Kingdom of Valencia to King James of Aragon in 1381. It must be mentioned that the fall of Valencia, followed shortly by Murcia and finally, in 1492, by Granada, was accompanied by the forced exodus of millions of Muslims and Jews. Most of the former settled in North Africa and played important military and cultural roles in the history of North Africa and the Middle East in general. One must stress the point that migration or **hijret** or **hijra**, voluntary or forced, has always played a key role in the history of the Muslim peoples, during both periods of expansion and flourishing and periods of defeat, disarray and retreat. It suffices to mention that the fundamental event in Islamic history, the **hijra** of the Prophet in 622 A.D., was an act of migration, as was the expansion of the Arabs to the North, East and West chiefly in the seventh through the ninth centuries and of the Turks westward in the tenth through the sixteenth centuries. Migration is uniquely and intimately related to the history of Islam. Consequently the migrants, or the **muhajirin**, have been repeatedly singled out in the Qur'ān, (2:215, 3:104, 24:22 etc.) as truthful people suffering for the cause of Islam and deserving of help and respect from their coreligionists.²

The Ottoman policy towards Muslim migrants, including the Cerkes, in the nineteenth century cannot be understood without due attention to the above Qur'ānic commandments. The Arabs and Turks among the Muslim peoples displayed a relatively high degree of demographic mobility which resulted often in their settlement in the newly conquered areas and the establishment of Islam there. This occurred without any massive organized dislocation of the conquered peoples. But during the periods of weakness and defeat, the Muslims living on the fringes of the Islamic world were treated as "new arrivals" and "intruders" regardless of their ethnic and linguistic origin and length of stay in their lands. Subsequently they were evicted from their ancestral homes in order to allow the rival religious groups to constitute political states from which Muslims were eliminated or in which they were reduced to the status of tolerated minorities. Indeed, the migration of the Cerkes, along with other Muslim groups such as the Khabartai, Çeçen, Daghistanis, and others who were forced out from the Caucasus regardless of the fact that they were the original inhabitants, proves that the "intruder" theory had no real basis and was used as an expedient pretext by the European powers to undermine and destroy the Muslim communities wherever they existed, whatever their historical background, language and ethnic affiliation. The migration of the Cerkes was part of the general dislocation inflicted in the nineteenth century upon the Muslims of Russia, especially of the Crimea and the Caucasus and of the Balkans, as the consequence of Russia's expansion southward and the establishment of national states in southeast Europe. The migration started first as forced eviction and then gradually acquired a quasi-voluntary character as Muslims reacted to the restriction imposed by the conquerors upon their cultural and civil rights. Many other Muslims left in order to live under the authority of Islamic governments. The first to leave were the elites such as the **ulema**, landowners and merchants. Those left behind remained leaderless and were unable to oppose the discriminatory policies or work out satisfactory accommodation with the ruling Christian powers as to preserve and develop further their cultural heritage. In sum, the Cerkes migration must be regarded both as the result of outside physical pressure and as the consequence of Cerkes' own determination to preserve and perpetuate their cultural and religious identity and integrity by moving to countries in which the Muslim rule prevailed.

2. The Demographic-Cultural Effects of Ottoman Expansion in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

The Cerkes' migration from the Caucasus and their eventual settlement in territories under Ottoman rule, inclusive of Syria, was, as mentioned, part of the vast ethno-cultural and demographic change produced by the Russian advance first into the Caucasus in the period from 1800 to 1859 and then into the Balkans in 1877/78³. The ethno-religious nature of the changes, which eliminated most of the Muslim presence in East Europe and the Caucasus, can be understood and evaluated only by

taking into consideration the ethnic and linguistic composition of the Muslim communities in the area as shaped by the Ottoman presence there in the fourteenth through the twentieth centuries.

The bulk of the Ottoman European territories in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were located in the area south of the Danube known as the Balkans; the name itself is of Turkish origin meaning “forest” or “mountain”. The Balkans, especially the northeast, was still inhabited at this time by the remnants of the Turkic or Turanic groups which had migrated across the steppes north of the Black and Caspian Seas in the fourth through the twelfth century. These included the Huns, Peceneks, Cumans, Uz (Oguz) Karakalpaks, and others, some of whom were Muslims. Some of these migrants preceded the Bulgars, who belonged to the same Turkic group⁴ but were assimilated linguistically by their Slav subjects and converted to Orthodox Christianity. A large group of Seljuki Muslims arrived in what is today northeastern Bulgaria about 1263 or 1264. Most of these were converted to Christianity by the Orthodox Church in Constantinople but preserved their language—Turkish—and thus added a new stratum to the existing Turkic population to the area. (The descendants of the Seljuki Turks are known today as Gagauses. They were allowed to retain their newly acquired Orthodox Christian faith throughout Ottoman rule.) Consequently, the Muslim Ottomans advancing into the Balkans in the fourteenth century found there a variety of Turkic groups which were ethnically, linguistically, and to some extent religiously, akin to them. After the firm establishment of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, chiefly after 1361, the Muslims from Western Anatolia were settled in mass there. This was followed by the forced settlement in the area of the Turkmen and Yuruk tribes and other unruly groups. The Muslims settled on the outskirts of the existing cities by forming their own **mahalle** (town quarter), or established new towns without a massive dislocation of the existing population. By the middle of the sixteenth century, the north eastern section of the Balkan peninsula had become predominantly Muslim; but the Orthodox Christians continued to maintain a strong cultural and religious presence there, thanks to the privilege or religious and cultural autonomy granted to them by the Ottoman government under **millet** system. The population in the Western and North Western and North Western parts of the Balkans, including large areas in the Rhodope and Pindus mountains, became Muslim through conversion chiefly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Thus, a substantial part of the Albanians (the descendants of the ancient Illyrians) and the Slavic speaking Bosnians and a large number of Bulgarian and Greek speaking peoples, as well as some of the Latin Vlahs, accepted Islam. They accepted the new religion collectively and voluntarily for reasons too complex to be dealt with here. Suffice it to mention that Ottoman rule brought cultural and social liberation to them Orthodox Christians, for it offered the absolute religious freedom and ended the efforts of Rome to convert them to Catholicism. Moreover, the Ottomans eliminated the last vestiges of Catholic and

Byzantine domination over the Balkan peasantry by replacing the existing feudal land tenure system with a public form of operation.

The Ottoman administration allowed all the groups, those converted to Islam or those who retained their original faith, the right to preserve their ethnic and linguistic characteristics. Thus, the Albanians, or Shiptari, continued to use their ancient Illyrian language, and the Muslim Bosnians (Bosnak) spoke Serbo-Croatian while the Muslim Greeks and the Latin Vlachs (Ulah or the Wallacks) spoke their own languages. The Turks, who formed the largest single Muslim group, spoke Turkish. Thus, the Muslim peoples of the Balkans, who were among the original settlers of the area, continued to maintain their linguistic and ethnic ties with their Christian brethren, but socially and culturally they evolved into distinctively different communities in accordance with the social, ethnical and economic norms of Islam. Interestingly enough, practically all the Muslims in the Balkans were often referred to by Europeans as "Turks" since "Turk" in Europe became synonymous with "Muslim" as "Saracen" was synonymous with "Arab" or "Muslim" in the seventh through the ninth centuries.

3. The Cerkes and the Beginning of Migration.

The Islamisation of the Cerkes in the Caucasus was similar to that of the Muslims in the Balkans. The Cerkes were part of the original population of the Caucasus and spoke a variety of Paleocaucasian dialects, that is, the original language of the area. They lived in a variety of traditional tribal groups under the leadership of their own chieftains. A substantial part of the Cerkes became Muslim, chiefly after the Ottoman rule was established in the western part of Caucasus beginning in the sixteenth century. The conversion of the Cerkes to Islam seems to have occurred mainly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a result of the activities of the Nogai preachers from the northwest and as a by-product of the Muridite movement in Daghistan.

Muridism was in a way the precursor of the popular mass movements in modern Islam. It preached a doctrine of social equality as well as of liberty and resistance to foreign occupation, for it envisaged the abolition of the Muslim villagers' obligations towards their landlords and elders and opposed by arms the Russian expansion into the ancestral lands. The revolt which began under the Murid leader Kazi Mulla in 1830 was revived by his son, Imam Sheik Shamil, in 1845, and continued on until 1859. Encouraged by Shamil's successes, as well as by the solidarity developing among the Caucasian people against Russian occupation, additional Cerkes groups converted to Islam, for Islam appeared to them now as a doctrine of independence and national survival. Finally, in 1837, the Cerkes beys, that is, tribal chiefs, although lukewarm to Shamil's egalitarian social doctrine which they regarded as a threat to their feudal customs, rebelled. By 1840 the Cerkes "beys" and other

leaders had gathered an army of 12,000 people, and they began to attack the Russian-held towns along the Black Sea coast. Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the revolts of Sheik Shamil and of the Cerkés had created among disparate Muslim tribes and auls (villages) of the Cerkés and other Caucasian Muslims a unity in certain ideals born chiefly of their social and political consciousness as Muslims.

During the Crimean war of 1853-56, the Russian government realized that the revolts of the Cerkés and Sheik Shamil posed a far greater menace to its lines of communication in the Caucasus and to its Black Sea strongholds than originally anticipated. As long as the Caucasus was not pacified the Russian advance southward into the heartland of the Middle East would be stalled indefinitely. Consequently, immediately after the end of the Crimean war the Russian government decided to squash permanently the Muslim uprisings in the Caucasus by committing large human and economic resources to the task. Sheik Shamil's forces, long deprived of arms and ammunition once their lines of communication to the Ottoman were cut, were forced to cease the resistance in 1859. The Sheik was received in Moscow with due honors by the Czar, who wanted to mollify this fierce rebel. The Sheik died twelve years later in Mecca during the Haj. The Russian army which had operated against Sheik Shamil was now free to move against the Cerkés forces in Western and Central Caucasus. In two years their resistance was largely broken. The Russians decided consequently to "pacify" and "civilize" the Cerkés lands in such a way as to remove forever the danger of revolt, resistance, or collaboration with the Ottoman state. The Russian forces advanced onto Cerkés strongholds deep in the mountains, liquidating entire communities especially those which refused to surrender. The Cerkés who surrendered, ceased to fight, or particularly those located in strategic areas, were given the choice of three alternatives: they could settle in the Kuban valley in the north or accept service in the Czar's army or convert to Christianity. The overwhelming majority refused to accept any of these conditions and decided to migrate to settle in the Ottoman lands. Already in the 1850s small groups of Cerkés, along with other Muslims from Russia, had migrated and settled in the Ottoman state. A precedent for migration was thus established.⁴ The Ottoman government welcomed the Cerkés because the Sultan, as the Caliph, considered it to be his duty to offer shelter to any Muslim seeking refuge.⁵ Moreover, having in mind its own population scarcity, the government felt that the settlement of the Cerkés on its territory would increase the size of the Muslim population in Rumili (i.e., the Balkans) and Anatolia and provide excellent fighting men for the army. The exodus of the Cerkés from Caucasus began late in 1862 and reached a peak in 1864 continuing sporadically thereafter until the end of the decade. It must be mentioned that both the early Cerkés migration (in 1856) and the second one beginning in 1862 were regulated through an agreement signed by the Sultan and Russia; but the size of migration exceeded by far the agreement.⁶ According to the existing Russian, Ottoman, and European statistics, the total number of Cerkés who

migrated during this first exodus of 1862-70 varies between 1.2 and 2 million people. A substantial number traveled by sea to Ottoman shores, while others traveled overland, crossing the mountains into Eastern Anatolia. It is estimated that approximately 500,000 Cerkes died while out at sea or at the ports of arrival such as Samsun and Trabzon (Trebizond) in Anatolia, and Varna and K stenge in the Balkans just to cite the main landing sites. Nevertheless, approximately one million Cerkes survived the hardships of travel and disease and were settled chiefly in Rumili and Anatolia.

The Cerkes in Rumili were settled primarily, but not exclusively, in the strategic areas on the Serbian-Ottoman border and along the Danube all the way to Dobruja in order to provide a defensive line against the Serbians and the Russians. The figure for the total number of Cerkes settled in Rumili varies according to the observers' viewpoint. In any case the number of Cerkes in Rumili amounted to more than 400,000 people.⁷

The migration and settlement of the Cerkes in Rumili was not accomplished without a series of tensions and conflicts between the newcomers and the old inhabitants due to differences in background, occupation and social organization—all too complex to be dealt with in detail here. Some of the Cerkes were inclined to distrust the Christians, especially the Slavic population, considering them pro-Russian and treating them harshly, while others adopted themselves quickly to the new conditions. The initial tensions had begun to subside, as the Cerkes started to adapt to new conditions of life, when the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877/78 erupted and dislocated the Cerkes anew. The war was started by the Czar chiefly in order to force removal of the restrictive clauses imposed on Russia by the Paris treaty of 1856 and to enhance the Russian influence in the Balkans by establishing there a Bulgarian autonomous state and by gaining Serbia's independence. It must be mentioned that, ideologically speaking, the war was a most virulent expression of Russia's pan-Orthodox and pan-Slavic policy, materialized in the Balkans at the expense of the Muslim population. Russian army commanders described the war as a crusade to "liberate" the Orthodox Christians,⁸ but also to clear the territory of the future state of Bulgaria of all the Muslims. Consequently the Muslim population living in towns and villages located on the path of the Russian army advancing through Bulgaria southward towards Istanbul and in Eastern Rumili on the Ottoman border was subjected to massacre and forced to flee. The armed Bulgarian bands continued to kill and expel the Muslims even after all resistance to Russian troops had ceased and the Muslim population had surrendered their arms in response to promises of security. These events have been fully recorded in the reports of the British consular agents stationed in the Balkans and are presently available in the British Foreign Office of Documents. These reports, coming from a dozen or so different agents, indicate that approximately 200,000 Muslim were killed in the war of 1877/78, and about one million were forced to leave their homes in

Bulgaria and Serbia. Some were allowed to return to their homes after the conclusion of the Berlin peace treaty in 1878 and thus perpetuate in Bulgaria the existence of a strong but dispirited and leaderless Muslim community, which is still subject to continuous persecution, intimidation and efforts at conversion and assimilation.

The war of 1877/78 which eliminated the Muslim rule in most of the Balkans put an end also to the special relationships between the Orthodox Christian and the Muslim which had prevailed during the rule of the Byzantines and the Ottomans. Indeed, the intolerant and expansionist policy of the Catholic Church carried out chiefly by Venice and the Austro-Hungarian empire against the Orthodox Christians and then the Muslims in the Balkans had created a relatively harmonious **modus vivendi** between the two religious groups which reinforced the idea of religious tolerance and freedom embodied in the **millet** system. After Russia launched her Orthodox-Christian crusade against the Muslims in the Balkans and the Caucasus and destroyed the **modus vivendi**, the Muslims of the Balkans had to choose between their Islamic identity and ethnic and linguistic affiliations. The bulk of the Muslim population wanted both to remain Muslim and to continue to live in their ancestral lands, as they did not consider that their religious and linguistic-ethnic attachments were mutually exclusive. This materialized at first in a stiff opposition to occupation. The Pomak (Bulgarian speaking Muslims in the Rhodope Mountains) fought the Russian army and Bulgarian bands for several months and most of them succeeded in retaining a foothold in their ancestral home (now divided between Bulgaria and Greece). The Serbo-Croatian-speaking Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina for three months in 1878 opposed by arms the well equipped Austrian army, which attempted to occupy the land in accordance with the Berlin Treaty of 1878. The Albanians, united in the league of Prizerin (1878-81), opposed by arms the occupation of their towns by Montenegro. All these Muslim resistance movements embodied certain political and social tendencies, as well as demands for local autonomy which cannot be treated in detail here. Suffice it to mention that the resistance movements in the Balkans were part of a burgeoning political mobilization in the Muslim world against colonialism and imperialism. This mobilization gained a new momentum because of the violence committed against the innocent Muslims in the war of 1877/78. It must be repeated also that this widespread political activity and resistance against colonialism among the Muslims was carried out on behalf of Islam and, consequently, it was branded by Europeans as "Muslim fanaticism." The Russians concurred. A Russian newspaper of the time attributed the emigration of the Cerkas to the "inexplicable fanaticism which emerged all of a sudden in all the Muslim East. The excitement continues until today and manifests itself from time to time in the Caucasus as in other Muslim countries. The current uprising in Tunisia and Algeria must be related by necessity to the same cause."⁹ Another journal reported that the failure to grant permission to all the 1500

Muslims from the Caucasus who applied for passports to go to Haj (only 80 were given permission) caused considerable apprehension among the Cerkes that the Russian government contemplated their forced conversion and compelled them to migrate.¹⁰ Even today, many non-Muslim observers continue to attribute the Muslim resistance to foreign occupation in 1878 or their emigration to Ottoman lands to "religious fanaticism" or to the Pan-Islamist propaganda of Sultan Abdulhamid II¹¹. The truth is that the Sultan was not the author of Pan-Islamism. He was forced by the enormous pressure coming from the Muslim masses to enunciate a new, unifying ideology and to provide leadership in order to defend the nation's cultural integrity and to achieve the political independence of the Muslims. In sum, therefore, the Cerkes' migrations from the Caucasus in the period from 1862 to 1870 and, subsequently, from the Balkans to 1877-80, belong in a larger historical and political context, that is, in the context of the rising of the consciousness of Muslims and of their determination to resist colonialism and imperialism and to maintain their cultural and political integrity.

4. The Second Phase of Caucasian Migration: 1878-1910-

The Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78 forced, as mentioned, large groups of people to leave their homes in Serbia and Bulgaria. The first to flee were the Cerkes whose virulent animosity towards the Russians incited the latter to respond in kind. (It was reported that both the Cerkes and the Russians executed any prisoners taken from the other side.) The Cerkes military units fought against the Russian army, and an expeditionary force under General Kondukov landed on the West coast of the Black Sea with the purpose of liberating Circassia.

A large part of the Rumilian Cerkes crossed by land into the Thrace and Anatolia. Those located along the Aegean Sea and Macedonia gathered at Salonica and other ports hoping to escape by sea from the approaching Russian army. For instance, the 400 Cerkes families who had lived for thirteen years in the village of Catterina (Tihova village of Caraferia) asked the British consul in Salonica to provide them with a ship to transport them to safer places.¹² Within a few months in 1878 most of the Cerkes in the Balkans had fled their villages and towns, thus ending their presence in most parts of Europe.

The Russian advance into the Caucasus and the occupation and eventual annexation of Batum, Kars and Ardahan provinces in 1877/78 triggered a new wave of Cerkes emigration. The Muslim population of these areas, as well as many others from the North Caucasus, began to migrate further south into the Ottoman lands. The new Muslim immigrants, in addition to the Cerkes, included also Georgian (Gürcü) Muslims and Lazes from the Batum area. The British consular agent reported that some 6,193 Laz families or about 32,000 people had migrated from Batum and had been settled in the vilayet (provincie) of Trabzon.¹³ The Cerkes

poured into the Ottoman state. As late as 1883, the number of Cerkes who were still in Istanbul waiting to be settled inland was so large as to create apprehension in government circles. Some were still living in quickly constructed dwellings in Üsküdar (the Asiatic shore of Istanbul) while others were dispatched to various localities inland, lest they create disturbances or join their kin in the vilayet of Biga where a large contingent of Cerkes had gathered.¹⁴

The British Acting-Vice-Consul at Kertch reported in 1884, that:

“between 50,000 and 60,000 Circassians are expected to emigrate during the present year from the north-western districts of the Caucasus to Turkey. The emigration of the Circassians would appear to have been going on for the past two years, and it is expected that the number of emigrants will be very large. Their reasons for leaving the country are to avoid compulsory military service, as also, because being Mahomedans they are unwilling to remain under Russian rule.”¹⁵

After the term of option to nationality given by Russia to the population of the newly conquered territories in the Caucasus expired in 1888, and the Sultan adopted a policy of favoring Muslim immigration (to be discussed later), there was a substantial increase in the number of Muslim Caucasians emigrants, including the Cerkes.¹⁶ For instance, a newspaper in Istanbul reported in 1891 that the total number of immigrants from the Caucasus arriving in four different vessels within one month (4 November to 2 December 1891) was 9,345. It was “expected that a very much larger number is prepared to leave the Caucasus and may be expected to arrive in the early weeks of spring.”¹⁷

The migration of the Cerkes and other Caucasians into the Ottoman state and their settlement in various vilayets, including Bilād al-Shām, was further increased after 1897 by a new wave of Muslim migrations from the island of Crete, which was occupied by Greece. Muslim immigration into the Middle East from the former Ottoman territories continued into the twentieth century. For instance, as late as 1903, the Prime Minister (Sadrazam) Ferit Pasha informed the Sultan that 372 families from the Kuban, more than 250 from Karabay and 233 Kabartai, a total of more than 855 families or about 5000 Caucasian Muslims, asked to be accepted as immigrants. (These had sold their land and properties but apparently could not take proceeds with them since the Ottoman government had to provide for their maintenance.) The immigrants continued to arrive, usually in Istanbul where they stayed until sent to the settlement areas. During their stay in the city the immigrants were supported by the central government at great expense for the treasury. For instance, the Premier reported in 1906 that the initial funds allocated to meet the living expenses of the Muslim immigrants from Russia had been exhausted far ahead of the schedule and that the new arrivals were now threatened by famine.¹⁸ It must be mentioned also that the government and the press did their best to arouse the feeling of Muslim solidarity among the established population in order to provide

the necessary help and care for the newcomers. The overwhelming majority of the immigrants were Muslims, but among them were also many Jews and Christians (the old Believers, Russian-speaking German Catholics and Protestants) who preferred the Sultan's rule to that of the Orthodox Christian governments. These non-Muslim were settled along with the Muslims; the Old Believers for instance were settled around lake Manias in Western Anatolia and were Known as **Kazaks**.

5. The Ottoman Immigration Policies and Administration

It is essential to repeat and emphasize the fact that the Cerkes migration and settlement in the Ottoman lands, including the Bilād al-Shām, Anatolia and even North Africa, cannot be separated from the migration and settlement of other Muslims. The Ottoman government, and especially Abdulhamid II, made special efforts to treat uniformly all incoming Muslim immigrants regardless of their different ethnic origins and languages. The Ottoman Immigration Administration epitomized the attitude of the Ottoman government, and especially of the Sultan, towards the immigrants. A brief summary of the evolution of this administration provides excellent insights into the political thinking of the Sultan and his entourage, on immigration and settlement policies. These policies supply in fact the demographic perspective which affected the government's Islamist policies after 1877/78.

The Ottoman government had delegated originally all immigration matters to the **Idare-i Umumiye-i Muhacirun Komisyonu** (General Commission for the Administration of Immigration) established in 1860 under the chairmanship of Sadik Pasha. Eventually, after the flow of immigration began to ebb in the early 1870's the Commission was abolished and its duties given to the **Muhacirun Idaresi** (Immigrants Administration) attached to the Dahiliye Nezareti (Interior Ministry). But in 1877, as the flow of immigrants from the Balkans and from the Caucasus resumed, the Sultan ordered "the establishment of a special commission composed of capable and respected people under the chairmanship of Sadik Pasha in order to deal with the settlement of the population which is immigrating from the invaded places... and other localities in the realm, as well as with the Cerkes from the Sohum [Sukumi-Sochi on the Black Sea coast] and its vicinity who are arriving in Trabzon and the neighboring ports."¹⁹ Moreover, the Sultan stated that since the majority of the arriving immigrants were "destitute and in need of charity and mercy and had taken refuge here because of the enemy's aggression on their lands, it was essential for the entire population of Istanbul to fulfill their [Islamic] obligations of hospitality and protection as already evident in the willingness of everybody to aid the immigrants."²⁰ Consequently it was proposed, and the Sultan approved, the establishment of a **Iane Komisyonu** (Charity Commission) composed of ten members whose main purpose was to collect aid and distribute it to Muslim and Christian immigrants arriving in Istanbul. The Charity Commission was to

distribute food, provide health care and find employment for the immigrants named in the lists provided by the Immigration Commission.

About ten years later in 1887, the Ottoman government under direct instructions from the Sultan after considerable debate—a total of thirty-nine meetings were held—made a basic decision concerning the immigration of Muslims from the Balkans and Caucasus. During the debate one group composed of bureaucrats claimed that the Ottoman long range interests would be served better if the Muslim population remained in their native lands though ruled by a non-Muslim authority. Another group contended that the immigration of Muslims would increase the Ottoman manpower, augment the number of potential soldiers, and contribute to the rise of national income, and concurrently weaken the enemy by depriving it of population and income. However, the chief argument in favor of free immigration was the classical Islamic principle that any Muslim who did not want to live under non-Muslim rule should be allowed to immigrate and settle on Muslim lands and be accepted and cared for.²¹ The proposal which carried the day was prepared by Cemalettin effendi, the head of the Muslim Community of Eastern Rumelia. The Seyhulislam's office sent Cemalettin effendi's original proposal with a supporting letter directly to Sultan Abdulhamid.²² In essence the religious offices argued that the life of the Muslims under foreign rule in Rumili and elsewhere had become in essence the religious offices argued that the life of the Muslims under foreign rule in Rumili and elsewhere had become in essence the religious offices argued that the life of the Muslims under foreign rule in Rumili and elsewhere had become in essence the religious offices argued that the life of the Muslims under foreign rule in Rumili and elsewhere had become difficult, that their religious and cultural rights were continuously violated and, consequently, they should be allowed to immigrate. They proposed to the Sultan to urge these Muslims to immigrate not only in order to save themselves but also to strengthen the Ottoman human resources in such a way as to withstand Europe's future attacks upon the Muslim Middle East. (It is interesting to note that these migrants provided, along with the established population of Anatolia, the manpower which opposed and eventually defeated the invading forces of Greece during the War of Liberation in 1919-22. Afterwards, the Republican government of Ataturk, following the example of Abdulhamid II, appealed once more to the remaining Muslims in the Balkans to immigrate to Turkey in order to replenish the country's human resources exhausted in the series of disastrous wars in 1912-1922.)

In order to meet the expenses of the immigrants, it was decreed that all government offices, with the exception of some military departments, should attempt to save 2 percent from their budget to be used for the settlement of the newcomers. The conferences decided also to establish under the "chairmanship of his highness the

Caliph" a High Immigration Commission whose members were to be appointed by the Sultan.²³ This Immigration Commission was to function alongside the existing one which had been established under the chairmanship of Sadik Pasha. It is significant that the proposal refers to Sultan Abdulhmid II by using for the first time his title as "Caliph" and the customary one as Sultan. Each vilayet in turn was to establish its own local Immigration Committee to deal with the settlement of the immigrants.

The tone of the correspondence between the Palace and various ministries expressed at this time a high degree of Islamic political consciousness which was markedly lacking in the correspondence prior to 1877. Indeed, prior to 1877 the Ottoman administration treated the arriving Muslim immigrants as a routine administrative problem. After 1877/78, this apathy towards the incoming immigrants disappeared under the weight of hundreds of thousands of starving persons as well as the pressure of a rapidly developing press which expressed the popular feelings shared by a large body of Muslims.

The immigration policy initiated by the Ottoman government after 1887 had distinctive ideological and political goals. It encouraged Muslim immigrants and consequently the rate of arrival increased. It was estimated, very conservatively, that more than one million immigrants had arrived and settled in the Ottoman lands between 1877 and 1890, and that one million more were expected to arrive soon because the situation of the Muslims in Russia, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece was constantly deteriorating. In order to accommodate the newcomers it was decided in 1893 to establish a new General Immigration Commission consisting of thirteen departments to deal with all of the problems involved in the settlement of the migrants.²⁴ It is interesting to note that a chief cause of the alarm which induced the Ottoman government to encourage Muslim immigration from Russia and the Balkans was the fear that the Muslims under foreign rule might be conscripted into the army and forced to fight against their Muslim brethren (as already done by Russia). The Cerkes, by migrating had precluded the possibility of being forced to kill their coreligionists. In light of this situation it is easy to understand why the Sultan was very dismayed when he learned that some immigrants had returned to their home countries because they had suffered great deprivations and been met with hostility by the local population or had been mistreated by government officials. In order to deal with the difficult problems caused by immigration, the Sultan decided to revive the old **Muhacirin Komisyonu Alisi** (High Immigration Commission) by involving in it technocrats drawn from various ministries who could provide paractial solutions rather than, as was often the case, ideological palliatives to immigration and settlement problems.

Shortly afterwards the by-laws of the Commission were drafted, and its name was changed to **Muhacirin-i Islamiye Komisyon-u Alisi** (High Islmaic Immigration

Commission. This Commission functioned under the chairmanship of the Sultan and superseded the authority of all other existing bodies. Its chief purpose was to set policy governing the movement of all Muslims from the Balkans and Russia, beginning from their place of origin to the place of settlement in Anatolia, Syria and Iraq. In fact, the Commission proposed to deal with all the problems encountered by the migrants in their country of origin, such as aiding them to secure the necessary travel documents and the permission to sell their properties and take the proceeds with them, and helping them to arrange transportation to the place of destination. As far as the settlement policy itself was concerned, the Commission proposed first to locate suitable sites possessing cultivable lands in all the Ottoman vilayets including Syria, Baghdad, Basra, as well as Bengazi and Tripoli in North Africa. Then it proposed to build houses for the migrants and to provide for their maintenance until they became self supporting in the shortest possible time. Finally, it issued directives to the officials in the vilayets to do their best to facilitate the immigrant's adjustment to their new homes and the development of harmonious relations with the established population.²⁶

6. The Settlement of Immigrants in Syria: Policies and Ideology.

The Ottoman settlement policy did not pursue ethnic or national objectives. All immigrants were treated as Muslims and settled as such. Consequently, it is literally impossible to study the settlement of the Cerkes in Syria in isolation from the other Muslim settlers. The Ottoman sources refer to the immigrants chiefly by place of origin and only occasionally by their ethnic names. Therefore it is impossible to define the exact size, or pinpoint the settlement place, of any immigrant ethnic group. The British consular reports identify the immigrants in accordance with their ethnic or linguistic affiliation, but these are by far less comprehensive and accurate than the Ottoman sources. The Cerkes settlement in Syria will be studied, taking into account these limitations; but before beginning it is essential to indicate Syria's place in relation to other settlement regions.

One can distinguish five settlement areas in the Ottoman state: Eastern Thrace, Western Anatolia, South Eastern Anatolia, Syria and Iraq, and North Africa (Rumili, that is, the Balkans, had as indicated earlier, been chosen as the second important area for heavy Cerkes and Crimean settlement from 1853 to 1876. After the loss of most of Rumili in 1878, the Cerkes had to be resettled in Anatolia and Syria).

Syria was not regarded as suitable for intensive settlement because the land was scarce and the unruly Bedouin, Turkmen and Kurdish tribes made life precarious in the countryside.²⁷ Nevertheless, a number of Muslim immigrants had already settled in the Syrian provinces even before 1878. It is known that two Cerkes colonies were established in the Kuneitra area as early as 1872. However, the loss of the Balkans

and the influx of a large number of Muslim refugees first from that area, and then from Crete in 1897, made Syria also, by necessity, a settlement area. The Ottoman settlement policy in Syria has at least two important features which had emerged gradually after 1878 and had in fact become part of the overall Ottoman immigration policies. This policy aimed first at strengthening the Islamic presence in Anatolia and Syria and at developing strong bonds of solidarity between the immigrants and the old established population by downplaying ethnic and linguistic differences. Such a policy had also the practical effect of facilitating the adaptation of the immigrants to their new social environment.

The initial Ottoman attitude towards immigration, as mentioned, consisted of an *ad hoc* response to the demographic dislocation created by rebellions and wars in light of Islamic principles and precedents for according shelter and protection to immigrants. However, after 1878, and especially after 1885, the Ottoman immigration policy became also an instrument in the hands of the government for defending and promoting an Islamist policy. The settlement policy implemented after 1895 in Syria and Halab provinces had the objective of increasing the number of the Muslims in some key areas as well as of strengthening the Sultan's authority there, as shall be indicated later. However, the Ottoman government, though following an Islamist policy, was cautious enough to avoid, to the extent possible, the concentration of a single Muslim ethnic group in one area, not only because few areas possessed sufficient arable land in one place to accommodate a large group but also in order to prevent the political organization of any ethnic group in a single unit. The Cerkes appeared as a potentially dangerous group because of their deep loyalty to their tribal chiefs and disregard for the central government's organized authority. In fact, most of them wore arms as the symbol of honor and bravery. Consequently the government found it advisable to disperse the larger Cerkes tribes by settling them in different areas and depriving them of their traditional leadership. Some Cerkes communal and tribal leaders were given army positions, while many leading and wealthy families were allowed to settle in cities. Thus divided, the Cerkes, especially the warlike groups, were prevented from organizing themselves into armed bands and from attacking the established population, as they had done occasionally in Rumili and Anatolia.

Some Cerkes were incorporated into the local troops or militias under the command of Ottoman officers. Moreover, the Ottoman government wanted to use the Cerkes to check the nomadic Arabic, Turkmen and Kurdish tribes which threatened the sedentary rural population and the smaller towns on the edge of the desert and posed a danger to the Hejaz Railway. Furthermore, the Ottoman government wanted to implement, through the help of the Cerkes, an economic policy of its own. Many tribes used large areas of excellent tillable fields for grazing and thus prevented the expanding rural population from making a more economical use of these fertile lands. The Cerkes were to form armed colonies and to be interposed between the

settled sedentary and the nomadic populations, thus permitting the sedentary groups including their own colonists, to bring these lands under cultivation.

The number of the Muslim immigrants in general, and of the Cerkes in particular, arriving in Syria can be determined in a tentative manner on the basis of the available data. The Ottoman authorities reported that in March 1878 there were some 180,000 Muslim refugees, mostly Cerkes, crowded in Istanbul waiting to be shipped to settlement areas. In addition, 50,000 had already left the city. Several months later, in January of 1879, the Immigration Commission calculated on the basis of the information supplied by the local administration that fourteen vilayets, exclusive of Istanbul, had received so far a total of 478,958 immigrants. Of this total, 10,545 people were located in the province of Ḥalab and 28,825 in Bilād al-Shām.²⁸

According to another communication emanating from the Sadaret (the Premier's office), the total number of refugees who had come to Istanbul alone, from the beginning of the hostilities in mid-1877 to 25 September 1879, was 387,804. Of these, 26,713 people were sent to Syria, 15,709 to Ḥalab, and the rest to other provinces.²⁹ The discrepancy between the figures given by the two authorities can be easily explained by the fact that many immigrants traveled without informing the government or refused to go where they were sent. Nevertheless the figures given by the Immigration Commission and the Premier's Office are close enough to each other to show that the provinces of Shām and Ḥalab had received about 10 percent of the refugees who arrived in 1878-79. It was reported in August of 1879 that about 200,000 refugees were still waiting in Istanbul, Varna and Salonica to be transported to the settlement areas. It was planned to settle additional 10,000 families or 50,000 people in Halab, and 5,000 families or 25,000 people, mostly from Russia and the Caucasus (Cerkes, Tatar, Nogai, etc.) in Syria.³⁰ At this date a special official, namely Ziya Bey (former official in charge for the reparation of sacred buildings in Jerusalem) was appointed as settlement official for the vilayet of Shām and Sadi Efendi was appointed for Halab. The officials were paid 6,000 kuruş salary (elsewhere the salary for such officials ranged between 5,000 and 3,000 kuruş) while their secretaries (**katip**) earned a mere 1,750 kuruş.³¹

The immigrations continued after 1879. The periodic reports issued by the Immigration Commission refer to additional immigrants sent to Syria after 1879. However, the figures given in these reports are incomplete because they refer chiefly to immigrants handled by the authorities in Istanbul, and consequently do not take always into consideration those who landed in other parts or crossed into Ottoman domains by land or moved on their own from their original vilayet of settlement to other places without informing the authorities. Anyway, the High Islamic Commission of Immigration reported that between 13 April 1899 and 13 March 1900 (that is, in a period of eleven months) some 21,257 new immigrants arrived in Istanbul

from Bulgaria (these included 64 Bulgarian and 7 Romanian Jews and 77 Kazaks, i.e., orthodox Russians or Old Believers), Bosnia, Romania, Montenegro, Tessaly and Russia. The report did not mention some 87,000 Muslim Cretans who landed at Izmir and other Aegean ports. Many of these new arrivals were sent to Syria.³² Others were sent to the administrative district (**mutasarriflik**) of Beirut: a report indicates that by 1892 some 2,542 immigrants were settled in this latter area.³³ It must be mentioned that among the immigrants settled in Syria, there were also several hundred Algerians who had emigrated in protest against the French occupation of their homeland. For instance, some 150 Algerians were settled in the villages of Kefersebt, Shiare and Avm around Acre in areas inhabited earlier by the "magribi" immigrants, and were given land from the **miri** (state) properties.

The bulk of the Cerkes settled in the province of Syria after 1878, and then again after 1888. Most of those who settled there in 1878 or immediately afterwards came from Bulgaria. Nevertheless, two Cerkes colonies had already been established there in 1872: one near Homs, the other at Kuneitra, each one containing 300 to 400 people. These two early colonies consisted at the beginning of twice as many people but the difficulties involved in adjusting to the climate, rivalries with the local population and especially the clashes with Druze, Turkoman and Bedouin tribes had greatly reduced their number. In February 1878 a group of 1,000 Cerkes landed at Beirut with the purpose of going to the Dumair area north-east of Damascus, while another 1,500 landed in Acre with the intention of settling in the Nablus areas, while another 2,000 people landed at Tripoli (Trablusham). Later in March more refugees (it is not clear whether they all were Cerkes) arrived, 5,000 in Tripoli and some 1,500 in Latakia. The latter were to be sent to Gebele, but they refused to go and settled in Latakia, causing the authorities considerable difficulty. A Cerkes group was sent to the **mutasarriflik** of Belka (Moab) to the plains inhabited by the tribes of the Beni-Saka, Sirhan, Beni-Khalid, Adnan, Beni-Hassan and others, and armed clashes between the Cerkes and the tribesmen soon followed³⁴. The Cerkes continued to arrive in the vilayet of Syria throughout the summer of 1878. A British consular agent reported that in July of 1878, 482 Cerkes arrived in Acre on an Ottoman boat (Cassed-Kerim, sic) and another 1,200 on the Austro-Hungarian steamer SS Tirnavo. The first group were the survivors of the tragedy which befell the "Sphinx" while transporting over 2,000 Cerkes refugees from the Balkans to Syria. In order to maximize the profits (some boats were chartered by the Ottoman government while others transported the refugees for a fee) the captain loaded the "Sphinx" above its capacity. The refugees were placed in unsanitary conditions in every available space, including the holds of the boat used for the transport of merchandise and cattle. The boat caught fire and more than two-thirds of the Cerkes on board perished. Later, in August of 1878, another 1,200 Cerkes arrived in Beirut from Salonica and Istanbul; they expected to be settled in the Hama and Homs areas.

The flow of Cerkes refugees into the Bilād al-Shām continued in a variety of forms to the end of the century, and then in 1905-06, as a consequence of Ottoman government's policy of actively encouraging Muslim migration, the flow increased. Hundreds of Cerkes families, this time coming mostly from the north Caucasus, moved into Ottoman lands and were settled in the vilayets of Syria and Aleppo; it was reported that in 1906 a new group of 1,450 Cerkes arrived in the Aleppo province. Moreover, small groups of Cerkes established originally in the vilayets of Sivas, and even Trabzon and elsewhere, moved to the Bilād al-Shām to join their kin and relatives. The British consular reports support the contention of Ottoman sources. An interesting British report on the **Immigrations of Russian Moslem Refugees** claimed that in some "thirty years, from 1873 to 1906, thousands of these people were imported into the vilayet of Damascus. Figures show that since 1873 upwards of 30,500 Russian immigrants have been settled in this vilayet alone."³⁶ The same report states further that:

"at the moment there are Caucasians lately arrived, who are being kept at Homs at Government expense pending the building of villages for their settlement, and about 1,500 more are expected to arrive in a few days. Round Beyrout the numbers are much smaller, the settlements up to now amounting to about 3,500 souls; but this year more have been introduced, and during the last few weeks 500 new arrivals have taken place, and preparations are being made for the settlement of a further number, who are stated to amount to about 1,500 persons, now on their way to the port of Tripoli."³⁶

As to the causes of the migration, the British consular aide reported that:

"The Circassian and other tribes, who are fastened in between a Christian and a Moslem Power in the Caucasus, tend continually to put themselves under Moslem rule, and to avoid the distasteful military service in a Christian army. The Ottoman government, on the other hand, encourages this tendency to the utmost of their power, and see in these strong and hardy mountain races a strong Moslem element that, judiciously spread about and settled amongst Arabs, Kurds and Armenians may be counted on as loyal and unlikely to allow the Christian to become active or powerful in any districts where the two may come into contact."³⁷

In other words, the Ottoman government settled the Caucasians in Syria in order to assure there the numerical preponderance of the Muslims against any future territorial claims by non-Muslims while the Ottomans were consolidating their own authority. Indeed, thanks to this influx of Muslims, the vilayets of Beirut, Damascus and Halab and the **mutasarriflik** of Mount Lebanon strengthened further the predominantly Muslim character of their population. According to a British

consular report issued in 1911, the population of these areas—except for Jerusalem—consisted of 2,893,000 people of whom 1,864,800 were Muslims and the remaining 1,028,200 were non-Muslims divided into a variety of groups.³⁸ (The report from which these figures are quoted lists the “Muslims” in one single group and refers separately to the Druzes [131,800], Nuṣayrīs [119,700] and Ismā‘īlīs [9,000], giving the impression that these were not Muslims. In this study the figures for Muslims have been adjusted to include these three groups too.)

One may conclude tentatively, on the basis of the immigration figures given by the Ottoman and British records, that the total number of Muslims who immigrated into Syria in 1878-1906 was about 100,000. Of these at least 36,000 or 38,000 can be considered to have been Cerkes. However, the high rate of mortality among them greatly reduced their number soon after arrival in the area of settlement.

The major area of Cerkes settlement comprised chiefly the lands beginning around Amman and extending northward more or less along the Hejaz railway. Important settlement sites existed also in the east and west sides of the road, both well into the mountains and plains as the case may be. Settlements were established also in Palestine; those included the villages of Reyhaniya and Kafarkhama, which are now in Israel.

The Ottoman government developed after 1878 a rather simple but practical settlement policy. The Muhacirin Komisyonu issued the basic instructions to the settlement commissions and officials established in each vilayet. The **muhajir** according to these instructions were to be given land from **miri** properties or from properties purchased by the government from private individuals for distribution to the immigrants. Some individuals donated land for settlement of the immigrants free of charge. Until the completion of their houses the **muhajir** were to be distributed among the population of the established villages and supported by them: each ten families were to support one immigrant family. The migrants were prohibited from leaving their assigned localities. The chief duty of the **iskan** (settlement) official was to implement the above decisions.

The government spent considerable amounts of money to settle the immigrants. For instance, a report by the Ottoman authorities indicated that there were at Hashniye in the Kaza of Kuneitra in 1901 some 62 Cerkes families (**hane**) consisting of 266 people (192 grown-ups and 74 children) who had received a total of 6,870 kuruş per month as living allowance, plus 1,500 kuruş per family for the purchase of beasts and seeds. In total, the Cerkes in Kuneitra cost the Treasury roughly 175,440 kuruş per year.³⁹ Moreover 50,000 kuruş was allocated to the immigrants in Vadi al-Ajam for the construction of houses as well as the purchase of draft animals. A report issued in January of 1907 stated that all the Cerkes settled in Kuneitra at Hashniye had received the lands allocated to them.

It is important to note that the settlement of the Muslims, and especially of the Cerkes, received the Sultan's personal attention as evidenced by his insistent demand for periodic reports on the part of the High Islamic Commission for Immigration. For instance, in a report the Commission stated that "it regards the realization of His Majesty's desire to see the Muslim migrants settled without causing them suffering an obligation of loyalty and service and consequently it is spending continuous effort and energy for this purpose."⁴⁰ In another report dealing with the settlement of the migrants in Syria the Commission reported specifically that:

"the Commission took as its guide the order issued by His Majesty to the effect of accepting all the Muslim people who have sought refuge or are planning to seek refuge in the country and settling them as rapidly as possible. Consequently, the Commission has attempted to see to it that the immigrants who have arrived a few years ago and have been living in poor conditions and those who are planning to arrive be given sufficient land in the vilayet of assignment along with draft animals, seeds, as well as their daily allowance until the first harvest... However the 10 million kuruş allocated this year for the settlement of the immigrants, as well as the additional 2 million kuruş requested by the Commission have been exhausted and consequently the remaining immigrants continue to be kept in guest houses. It is true that the construction season has ended in some places where the immigrants are found but in other places, such as Syria... construction can be carried out even in the winter because of the suitable climate. Here houses can be built and assigned to the immigrants, and after providing for their needs they can begin work in agriculture. For this there is need for additional 20,000 lira..."⁴¹

It must be repeated that the High Islamic Commission as well as other bodies dealt chiefly with immigrants who were destitute and needed government assistance. It did not deal with the immigrants who had sufficient funds or had relatives willing to support them. Many of these came on their own, often traveling as foreigners with passports issued by authorities in their country of origin. For instance, of a total of 5,066 immigrants who entered the vilayet of Adana from 1897 to 1906, some 1,372 people had sufficient means to support themselves, and presumably were not included in later statistics. Moreover, an important number of immigrants often left their original place of settlement and moved, despite the government's prohibition, to other areas where their kind and relatives had settled. This was particularly true with regard to the Cerkes who had maintained strong tribal ties.

The non-Muslims, notably the Christians, met the settlement of the Cerkes and other Muslim refugees in the vilayets of Syria with considerable apprehension, fearful that the newcomers uprooted from their native homes by Christian govern-

ments (Russia, Bulgaria, Greece) might wreak their vengeance on them. Actually the Christians' fear of the Cerkes was generated by a variety of exaggerated rumors which had preceded their arrival. The Cerkes while living in the Balkans were accused of being unruly, of attacking the Bulgarian Christians and of engaging in a variety of lawless actions ranging from the abduction of young women to robbery and murder.⁴² The fact is that most of these reports were grossly distorted by the local Christian population in order to attract the attention of the European powers and exploit their partisan sympathies. As expected, the landing of the Cerkes in the Syrian ports produced a flood of rumors. It was reported that the Cerkes had brought with them to Beirut a number of abducted Bulgarian women but an inquiry by the authorities showed that the "abducted women" consisted of a single female who "had voluntarily followed a Circassian named Ismail, with whom she was living, and that it was her intention to embrace Islamism."⁴³ Yet, she was separated by force from her common law husband so as to allow the Orthodox clergy to dissuade her from converting to Islam; but ten days had elapsed without a change of opinion on her part. In another case it was reported from Tripoli that the Cekres had taken prisoner a Christian shopkeeper who claimed that he had been attacked and robbed while counting money in his shop. The British vice-consul who investigated the incident reported that the accuser had a bad reputation, and that on the day of the alleged attack he was drunk and had taken "liberties" with the Cerkes women, an act totally opposed to the Cerkes code of family honor.⁴⁴

The behavior of the Cerkes and its causes is best expressed in a confidential report by A.H. Layard, the British ambassador in Istanbul, sent to the Marquis of Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary. The sociological and historical importance of this report warrants reading it in its entirety.⁴⁵ Based on talks held with the Cerkes chiefs, Layard's report explains that the enormous hardship inflicted on the Cerkes by forced eviction from their homeland, the disintegration of their social organization and the continuous travel from one part of the Ottoman state to the other in conditions of dire poverty and ill health had compelled some of them to a variety of lawless actions.

The truth was that the Cerkes, accustomed to the mountain climate of the Caucasus, were forced to live in the warm and humid climate of the Mediterranean and were decimated by epidemics of all kinds and brought to the brink of starvation by the breakdown of their organizational system and by lack of proper care. In order to survive some were forced to steal, while others settled in the countryside had to fight unfriendly neighbors such as the nomadic Bedouin tribes, Kurds and Turkmen who resented the intrusion of these outsiders upon their grazing lands. In some cases the Ottoman government used its regular military forces to defend the Cerkes, while in other cases the Cerkes enrolled in the local military units took advantage of their position to molest their enemies. In a short time the Cerkes in Syria learned the political game of tribal warfare and allied themselves with their

neighbors against the common enemy.⁴⁶ However, gradually as the Cerkes along with other immigrants received land and entered into their houses built by the government they settled to a normal sedentary way of life. The religious-cultural factors which had precipitated their exodus from their original homes in the Caucasus were instrumental in facilitating their adjustment to the new socio-cultural environment in Syria.

The final situation of the Cerkes in the vilayet of Syria is best summed up in a British consular report issued in 1906. Most of the Cerkes immigrants according to the report were now peasants “employed in agricultural work on miri or Crown lands, with the exception of a few who are directly employed on lands belonging to the Civil List.... In other parts of Syria there are large and flourishing [Cerkes] communities, a few being scattered a considerable way south along the line of the Hedjaz Railway. In many of these districts the Circassians have transformed barren tracts into well-cultivated and prosperous lands.... Thus in Syria and Mesopotamia a strong Circassian element has gradually come into force which may become an important political factor.”⁴⁷

NOTES

- 1 . This study is dedicated chiefly to the study of the Muslim and especially the Cherkes (henceforth Cerkes) settlement in the vilayet of Syria, or Sham which in 1877 comprised the following districts: Sham-i Sherif, Hama, Trablussham (Tripoli), Hauran, Akka, Balḳā' and the **mutassar-rifliks** of Beirut, Jerusalem and Mount Liban. The vilayet of Ḥalab (Aleppo) comprised Maras, Urfa and Zor. In 1899, a fourth sanjak, that of Antioch was formed to include the kazas of Antioch, Jissr-Shogi, Suwaydā' and Alexandretta. All references to the vilayets of Syria (or Sham) or Ḥalab are inclusive of the territories of the mentioned districts. We shall make no attempt in this paper to allocate these territories to the political entities erected on this area since the turn of the century. This study deals chiefly with the vilayet of Syria. The vilayet of Ḥalab is occasionally mentioned.
- 2 . Aziz Ahmad, "The Shrinking Frontiers of Islam" **IJMES** 7 (1967), pp. 145-159.
- 3 . It must be mentioned that a number of Cerkes settlements were established in the vilayet of Aleppo and Dyarbakir before 1878. The colony at Rās al-'Ayn in the Aleppo vilayet comprised 4-5000 families or about 25,000 people. However, by 1879, disease, desertion as well as conflicts with the neighboring villages had reduced the population of Ras al-'Ayn to 500 families. The Cerkes settlers kept contact with their kin and often left their settlement to join their relatives in other areas. Later the Cerkes were settled between Raḳḳa and Surondj near Nahr al-Bellek, a small stream. These were Kabartai Cerkes known as a very industrious and peaceful group. The Cerkes settlement in the provinces of Ḥalab. Dyarbakir and Adana will not be studied in this paper but will be treated extensively elsewhere.
- 4 . For an extensive discussion of these migrations see Miron Constantinescu and Stefan Pascu (eds.) **Relations Between the Autochthonous Populations and the Migratory Populations on the Territory of Romania**, Bucureşti, 1975.
- 5 . There is a relatively good bibliography on this first Cerkes migration. See M. Pinson, **Demographic Warfare: An Aspect of Ottoman and Russian Policies**. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge 1970, also his "Ottoman Colonization of the Circassians in Rumili After the Crimean War" **Etudes Balkaniques**, 3, 1927, pp. 71-85. Peter Brock "The Fall of Circassia: A Study of Private Diplomacy," **English Historical Review** 71 (1966) 401-27.
- 6 . The Porte had a special agreement with Russia concerning the immigration of some Cerkes tribes in 1856, but not a general one covering the migration of all the Russian Muslims. By 1860, Loris Melikov negotiated a new agreement concerning the migration of some 40,000 to 50,000 Muslims from Russia. In order to accommodate the expected immigrants the Porte created the **Idare-i Umumiye Muhacirun Komisyonu** (General Administrative Commission of Migration) in 1860. By 1880, the Russians claimed the agreement of 1860 was a general one, that is, it obliged the Ottoman government to accept all the Muslims from Russia including the evicted ones or those who wanted to emigrate. See documents, **Ottoman Foreign Ministry** (henceforth OFM) (Idare) 687, 60852/216, 21 December 1862, and 177, 6513/139, 8, 21 december 1862.
- 7 . The Europeans were as usual rather misinformed about the number of Cerkes established in Europe. Ravenstein who had the pretensions of being the best informed and impartial observer placed their number to 98,000 in Asia and only to 28,000 in Europe. E.G. Ravenstein, "The Populations of Russia and Turkey", **Journal of the Royal Statistical Society**, 40 (1877) p. 454. Boutet placed the number of the Cerkes in Europe to 144,000 while Kiepert claimed that in 1876 alone their numbers amounted to 200,000 souls. P. Boutet, **La Population de la Turquie**, vol. I Paris 1877, p. 40. H. Kiepert, **Ethnographischer Ubersichts Karte des europaischen Orients-Das dslan**, 20, 1876, p. 394. Pinson places the number of Cerkes in Rumili in 1864 to about 250,000 people. Pinson "Ottoman Colonization..." p. 75.

- 8 . See Barbara Jelavich "Russia and the April Uprising" *Southeastern Europe* 4, part 2, 1977, p. 232.
- 9 . **Invalide Russe**, 22 May (3 June) 1864.
- 10 . **Journal de Saint Petersburg** 24 September (6 October) 1864.
- 11 . A contemporary misinformed Bulgarian historian after referring perfunctorily to "Muslim fanaticism" wrote about the spirit prevailing in 1878 as follows: "Journals in Istanbul engaged in a campaign against China, appealed for aid for the Muslims of Indonesia against the Dutch and demanded the formation of an anti-European crusade as the proof of their solidarity with the Muslims of Algeria, Tunisia and India." Bozidar Samardziev "Traits Dominants de la Politique D'Abdulhamid II Relative an Probleme Des Nationalités (1876-1885)" *Etudes Bulkaniques*, 4 (1972) p. 73.
- 12 . **British Foreign Office Archives** (henceforth FO) 424, vol. 72, p. 101 (Memorial from Circassian Chiefs of Catterina) 17 May 1878.
- 13 . FO 424/ 2/79. Report by Alfred Billiotti. 6 August 1881.
- 14 . **Başvekalet Arşivi** (henceforth BA) Irade: Dahiliye, 71553 of 12 Muharrem 1301 (13 November 1883), 71261 and 71268 of 9 Zilkade 1300 (11 September 1883).
- 15 . FO 424/vol. 145/84.
- 16 . FO 424/vol. 141 p. 34 Perry to Granville (14 May 1884).
- 17 . **Levant Herald**, 11 February 1891.
- 18 . See correspondence between the Palace Secretariat (Maybeyn-i Humayun) and Sadaret (Prime Minister's Office or the Porte) **B A**. Irade, Dahiliye, 29 M 324-31 and 11B 1-21/7 of 23 Şevval 1323 (20 December 1905) and 16 Cemazilahir 1321 (8 September 1403).
- 19 . BA. Irade-Dahiliye, 61522 of 3, Saban 1294 (13 August 1877).
- 20 . BA-Irade, Dahiliye, 61326, 17 Rejep 1294 (28 July 1877).
- 21 . BA-Yildiz collection, Sadaret Hususi Maruzati (henceforth SHM) Private Opinion of the Porte, 26 R304, 738 of 26 Rebiulahir 1304, (22 January 1887) and enclosures.
- 22 . **Ibid.** enclosure No. 3. The introductory paragraph of the letter reads: "The Muslim population of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumili unable to support the customary poressures and attacks which have become worse recently has submitted continuously petitions asking to be allowed to immigrate to other vilayets of the [realm]. Even if these people acquired assurance of protection for their lives and properties, they say that they cannot live as Muslims under Bulgarian rule. Consequently we as Muslims have a sacred duty to take into consideration the requests of our brethern."
- 23 . **Ibid.**
- 24 . BA-Yildiz collection, SHM, 18, C 311 No. 1765 of 18 Djemazielevvel 130 (17 November 1893).
- 25 . BA, Irade-Dahiliye, 1868, 3B 1315 No. 38 of 2 Rejep 1315 (27 November 1897).
- 26 . See a series of instructions in BA, Irade-Dahiliye 33/9242/ No. 819 of 23 Şevval 1323 (20 December 1905) and the enclosures.
- 27 . The available land was reported by each Vilayet in accordance with directives issued earlier.
- 28 . BA-Sadaret Evraki (Porte documents) A, VRK, SD, MHC 1302-7-1 of 26 Muharrem 1296 (20 January 1879).
- 29 . BA, Yildiz collection SHM, 8, L296/99 of 8 Şevval 1296 (25 September 1879).
- 30 . BA, Irade, Meclisi Mahsus 2789, 2 Saban 1295, (1 August 1879).
- 31 . **Ibid.**
- 32 . BA, Yildiz collection-Günlük maruzat (Daily communication) 4Za 1317, No. 1354/1921 of 4 Zilhijje 1317 (4 April 1900).
- 33 . BA, Yildiz collection SHM 8L 296/99 and 292/310/3036 of 27 Zilhijje 1310 (13 July 1893).
- 34 . FO. 424, vol 68, p. 242 (Jao to Derby) 4 March 1878.
- 35 . FO. 424, vol. 73 p. 67 (Balanche to Elridge and Finz to Elridge) 11 and 17 July 1878.
- 36 . FO. 424, vol. 210, p. 27 (enclosure 28) report by G.A. Lloyd, honorary attache at the British Embassy (O'Connor to Grey) 16 April 1906.

37. **Ibid.**
 38. See FO. 424, Vol. 229 p. 71 (enclosure 96) Confidential report by Cumberbatch, British consul general in Beirut to Louther) 6 November 1911. The number of non-Muslims in Syria, Haleb and Beirut reported by the British were as follows:

Latine	10.300	Syrian Jacobites	45,600
Maronites	308.300	Orthodox Nestorians	15,300
United Greeks	140.400	Orthodox Greeks	228,100
United Syrians	45.600	Gregorian Armenians	23,100
United Armenians	18.900	Protestant Armenians	20,900
United Chaldeans	17.800	Jews	50,500
		Foreigners	13,900

39. This information is derived from BA, Irade, Dahiliye, 12 C 319 No. 20 and 28B 319 No. 28 of 15 Djemaziyelevvel 1319 (20 August 1901) and 14 Rejeb 1319 (27 October 1901) and BA, Yildiz collection, Günlük-Maruzat, 24 Za 324 No. 1216/11078 of 24 Zilkade 1324 (1 January 1907).
 40. See report 38 of the Commission, BA, Yildiz Collection-Günlük Maruzt 11 c. 324 No. 1083/6176 of 11 Djemaziyelahir 1324 (2 August 1906).
 41. Request by the Islamic Commission addressed to the Palace—BA, Yildiz collection—GHM—7Za 324 No. 1202/10527 of 7 Zilkade 1324 (22 December 1906).
 42. For instance the British Foreign Office being informed that the Ottoman government intended to settle some Cerkes refugees in the vilayet of Hakkari which had a large Armenian population, discounted the report but still instructed its field officers that “the evil results which attend the introduction of Circassian immigrants in districts inhabited by Christians are sufficiently well known from past experience, and if any further trustworthy information should reach you to the effect that this measure is seriously contemplated in the Hekkiari districts, it will be right that you should make representation to the Porte earnestly depreciating any such proceeding.” FO, 424, vol 181, p. 73 (Kimberley to Currie) London (29 January 1895).
 43. FO, 424, vol. 68, p. 146 (Eldridge to Derby) Beirut. 28 February 1878.
 44. FO, 424, vol. 73, p. 67 (Blanche to Eldridge) Tripoli, 17 July 1878.
 45. The original report reproduced below reads as follows:

My Lord,

Therapia, May 10, 1878.

I received a visit yesterday from Shakir Pasha, the son of Sefer Bey, the well-known Circassian Chief who lived many years in Turkey as the representative of his country upon its cession to Russia, and whom the Porte under Russian pressure exiled to Adrianople. Shakir Pasha, who is in the Turkish military service, has great influence over the Circassians. His object in calling upon me, he said, was to inform me that, in the event of a war between England and Russia, they were ready to enroll themselves under the British flag, and that Her Majesty's Government might, at any moment, raise a considerable force from them. I thanked the Pasha for his communication, but I held out no encouragement to him to hope that Her Majesty's Government would, under any circumstances, avail themselves of the services of his countrymen.

I had an interesting conversation with the Pasha about the Circassians in Turkey. I pointed out to him the bad reputation that they had earned for themselves by their lawless habits, and by the excesses that they had committed during the war. I asked him whether they had borne the same character when in their own country before they were driven from it by the Russians, and, if not, why they had changed in this respect since their migration to Turkey.

Shakir Pasha replied that the Circassians, when in their own country, had acknowledged the authority and were under the control of their tribal Cheifs, who were able to maintain order and to enforce obedience. Such being the case, misdeeds such as they had committed since their expulsion were prevented and repressed. After they came to Turkey they were placed under the

Turkish authorities, like the rest of the inhabitants of the Empire, and the Chiefs, not being recognized by the Porte and being no longer able to exercise any jurisdiction over them, they were under no restraint and fell into bad habits, especially into that of robbing their neighbours' cattle—a practice prevalent among mountain tribes. The Turkish officials and police were frequently too indifferent or too weak to check or prevent them. He thought that the the best way of putting an end to this state of things for the future was for the Turkish Government to give more authority to the Chiefs, and to make them responsible for the conduct of those who belonged to their respective tribes. If this were done, and the Porte maintained a proper police in the districts in which the Circassians were placed, they would soon become peaceable and orderly subjects of the Sultan.

They were now anxious to be settled, to build villages and to raise, by cultivating the soil, what they required for their subsistence. The Russians had again driven them from their houses. The Porte was no doubt doing its best to find lands for them in Asia; but Shakir Pasha complained that a large number of them had been sent to Syria and Mesopotamian, where the climate from the great heat was not suitable to them, and that as they had been shipped off indiscriminately, and in great haste, families had been divided, husbands being sent to one part of Turkey and their wives to another, and parents being separated from their children. He begged me to use my influence with the Porte to induce it to take steps to bring them, if possible, together again and to settle the Cirassians in provinces in which the climate was more congenial to them than that of Arabistan.

Shakir Pasha maintained that the charges brought against the Circassians during the war were very much exaggerated. Although, he admitted, it could not be denied that they had availed themselves of the anarchy which had been caused by the Russian invasion to rob and plunder, they had not been guilty of all the crimes attributed to them. They had to bear the blame for everything. If they had not spared the Russians, it was because they could never forget that it was Russia who had pitilessly massacred their wives and their children, had deprived them of their property and their lands, and had driven them into hopeless exile. Every Circassian who had been captured during the war by the Russians had been summarily put to death. Under these circumstances was it surprising that they should look upon a Russian as an enemy to whom no mercy should be shown?

I promised Shakir Pasha to speak to the Prime Minister in behalf of the Circassian refugees. The Circassians, with all their faults, are worthy of pity. They were deprived of their country and compelled to seek refuge in Turkey, where they were hospitably received, and where lands were given to them. In this migration their losses from disease and famine were great. They still retained their tribal habits and looked more to their chiefs than to the Turkish authorities. Had they been ruled with a strong hand they would probably soon have settled down into quiet and useful colonists; but whilst their chiefs were no longer allowed to exercise control over them the lax local administration under which they lived encouraged them to indulge in their natural propensity for lifting their neighbours' cattle. They could still be turned to good account by the Porte. There is no want of waste lands in Asia Minor upon which they could be settled, and with proper training and discipline they would furnish, in the opinion of English military men who have seen them in the field, a considerable body of excellent irregular cavalry, of which the Turkish army is greatly in need. If it were not for the excessive heat of the climate, to which, however, they might in time become accustomed, they might be settled upon the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris as military colonies to keep in check the marauding Bedouin Arabs, who have hitherto prevented the cultivation of the rich lands watered by those great rivers.

I have, &c

(Signed) A.H. LAYARD

FO. 424, vol. 70, pp. 359-60 Confidential report 585/600, (Layard to Salisbury) 10 May 1870.

46. The best example is the disturbance which occurred in Ḥauran in the Fall of 1895 and lasted for several months. It started with acts of brigandage by some Druzes operating outside the control of their chiefs in the districts of Wadi al-'Ajam, Rasheya and Ḥaşbeya. Eventually an attack was mounted against Ḥauran and Majd al-Shams. The attack was denounced by Nessih Bey Jumplat, the Druze Chief and by religious leaders but it continued to expand by involving the Cerkes. Eventually a major clash between the Druzes on one side and the Cerkes, the Bedouin and Kurdish gendarmes on the other occurred, first in the village of Hina and, then, at Manşura, a village near Kuneitra where some 400 people mostly Druze were killed. Later the victorious coalition of the Cerkes Bedouins and Kurds attacked and looted Majd al-Shams and other places inhabited by the Druzes and brought about the intervention of the Ottoman authorities. See a series of reports by British consular officials from Beirut, Istanbul, and Damascus—FO, vol. 184, pp. 291-2, 411-2 (Meshaka to Hay Herbert, Herbert to Salisbury, Hay to Currie and enclosures) 6 November 1895 to 7 February 1896).
47. FO, 424, vol. 210, pp. 27-8 (O'Connor to Grey) enclosure No. 28, 16 April 1906.

THE QUESTION OF ZIONISM IN THE ARAB PRESS: 1908 - 1914.*

Rashid Khalidi

It would nowadays be difficult to analyse the Palestine question in isolation from its broader Arab context. Indeed, it is increasingly accepted both within and beyond the confines of the Arab world that this question is central to any comprehensive understanding of modern Arab political realities. There is much less awareness, however, of the significance of this interrelationship since the earliest stages of Arab opposition to Zionism, i.e. in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Details of this process are hard to document before 1908. But in that year the Ottoman Constitution was reinstated, resulting in the freeing of the press and of party political activity. Thereafter, the extent of the interaction between Palestinian opposition to Zionism and that of political forces in the other Arab provinces of the Empire, as well as in Cairo and Istanbul, became readily apparent.

As the author of this paper has pointed out elsewhere¹, the historian finds a wealth of source material for this period in the rich and varied Arabic-language press which flourished in the region after 1908. Because Zionism has received extensive coverage in the press since then, we can assess the extent of Arab interest in it, both inside and outside Palestine, as well as the nature of the interaction mentioned above, via a study of the daily press.

Such a study reveals that an awareness of the facts about Zionism was beginning to be reflected in the daily press at a very early stage, generally by 1900. This was followed by a mounting concern about the potential dangers posed by the Zionist movement to the Arab population of Palestine, and ultimately to surrounding regions. Although this trend is most noticeable in the papers published in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa, it is also visible in the newspapers of Cairo and Beirut, already by this time the two leading publishing centres of the Arab world. The attention devoted by the latter to the Zionist issue is sufficient to make it clear that concern about it was a regional, and not simply a local, phenomenon.

* Research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the A.U.B. Arts & Sciences Research Committee. I would like to express my thanks to this body, and to Miss Muna Nsouli for her devoted research assistance, as well as to the staff of the Jafet Library.

Remarks on Methodology and Data:

Before proceeding, the methods used in this study, and the nature of the data, must be explained. The initial intention was to survey papers from all parts of **Bilād al-Shām**, as well as Cairo and Istanbul, for the entire seven years of the Ottoman constitutional period. Unfortunately, practical difficulties intervened, and besides the Beirut and Cairo press, it was impossible to secure more than a limited number of issues of a few Tripoli, Aleppo and Damascus papers (see attached tables for details). This was especially regrettable in the case of a number of Damascus papers which were known for their intense interest in the Zionist question.

In the end, a total of fourteen newspapers and two periodicals were surveyed, of which eight contained sufficient material, and were available for enough years, to be useful for purposes of comparison. The eight include the leading Palestinian paper to focus on Zionism, **al-Karmil**, edited by Najib Nassar in Haifa (available for four years--see tables); the two leading Cairo dailies, **al-Ahrām**, edited by Dawūd Barakāt, and owned by Selīm and Bishāra Taḡla (7 years), and **al-Muḳaṭṭam**, owned by Ya'kūb Ṣarrūf, Fāris Nimr and Iskandar Makārius, (7 years); and five Beirut papers; **al-Mufīd**, edited by 'Abd al-Ghanī al-'Uraisī and Fu'ād Hantas² (3 years); **al-Ittiḥād al-'Uthmani**, edited by Shaykh Aḥmad Ḥasan Ṭabbara (7 years); **Lisan al-Ḥāl**, owned by Khalīl Sarkīs (7 years); **al-Ḥakīka**, edited by Kamal 'Abbas and owned by his father, Shaykh Aḥmad 'Abbās al-Azhari (4 years); **al-Ikbāl**, edited by 'Abd al-Bāsīt al-'Unsi (4 years). All were dailies except the latter two, which appeared bi-weekly and weekly respectively, and **al-Karmil**, which was bi-weekly³.

About 9,000 numbers of these eight journals were surveyed for the purposes of this paper, yielding a total of over 450 articles on Zionism (492 articles were found in all 16 sources). As can be seen from the accompanying tables, the greatest interest in the Zionist issue appeared during the years 1911-13, when over 320 of these articles were published, notwithstanding the distraction of attention first to the Libyan and then to the Balkan wars in which the Ottoman Empire was involved. The year 1911, during which over 200 articles were published in these eight papers, in many ways marked the high point in the controversy over Zionism. Afterwards, although interest continued, it appears that the editors and contributors to most of these publications had made up their minds about the Zionist movement -- in almost every case opposing it strongly. What followed were occasional further warnings about its danger and reports on its activities.

It became apparent at an early stage of the research that the reaction of the newspapers surveyed and of their readers to the Zionist movement was a strongly negative one. The only exception to this trend was **al-Muḳaṭṭam**. Their correspondent in Palestine, Nisīm Malūl, was an Ottoman Jew who worked also for the Zionist Office in Jaffa, and whose press reports for it are cited in Mandel's **The Arabs and Zionism before World War I**⁴.

Even in the columns of **al-Mukattam**, however, there were a number of writers who opposed Zionism, and who were supported by letters from anti-Zionist readers. As for the other seven papers, they published an occasional article by a European or Ottoman Zionist leader, usually with the purpose of informing their readers of the latest ramifications of Zionist policies and activities.

To test the extent of a paper's opposition to Zionism, articles on the subject were classified according to three categories: pro-Zionist, anti-Zionist, and other, the latter including pieces of an informative nature. Although these classifications are far from rigid, and are by no means precise (e.g., apparently "pro-Zionist" articles in a strongly anti-Zionist paper were often merely reprints of material by Zionists published for the information of the readers), a rough picture of the intensity of a paper's position on the Zionist issue could be obtained. Together with the information on the frequency of appearance of articles on Zionism in these papers, this data, summarized in the appended tables, gives the broad outlines of the importance of the Zionist question in the Arab press during this period, as it is reflected in the eight papers we have intensively surveyed, and the eight others.

The following two sections of this paper will include an analysis of the position of these eight papers on the Zionist issue, placing each individual newspaper into the broader context of the growth of Arab opposition to Zionism; and in conclusion a brief description of some of the main themes and trends which emerged in the discussion of Zionism in the press during this period.

Individual Newspapers and the Zionist Question:

al-Karmil: Of all the newspapers surveyed in the research for this paper, by far the most outspoken in its opposition to Zionism was **al-Karmil**. First published in 1909, it became soon afterwards the primary vehicle of the extensive campaign against the Zionist movement which developed in the Syrian press, coming to a peak in 1911. During that year, **al-Karmil** carried 73 articles on Zionism, or an average of one in virtually every one of its almost 100 issues. In the total of 330 issues surveyed, 134 articles on Zionism were printed, including 45 editorials or leading articles.

Najīb Naṣṣār did not depend on sheer volume to convince his readers of the danger to Palestine represented by the Zionist movement. In addition to his own persuasive editorials (a number of which were reprinted in other Syrian papers), he re-ran articles from **al-Muḩaṭṭm**, **al-Mufid**, **al-Ittiḩād al-'Uthmānī** and other Beirut and Cairo papers, as well as the Damascus paper **al-Muḩtabas** and **al-ḩadāra** of Istanbul, and **Falaṣṭīn**, started in 1911 in Jaffa -- the latter three newspapers also being strong opponents of Zionism.

Not content with his own and other editors' arguments against the Zionist movement, Naṣṣār covered in detail the activities of the Zionist colonization movement in Palestine, and of its parent organizations abroad. As a result, other

anti-Zionist papers came to depend on **al-Karmil** for much of their information on these activities⁶. At the same time, the owner-editor of **al-Karmil** attempted to give his readers extensive background information on the history, objectives and significance of the Zionist movement, for this purpose publishing condensed translations of an article on Zionism from the **Encyclopedia Judaica**. This 16-part series, published from March until June 1911, was eventually issued in book form by Naṣṣār, under the title **al-Šihyūniyya**⁷. It concluded by describing the efforts of Herzl on behalf of Zionism, provoking the observation by Naṣṣār to his readers that what Palestine needed in opposing Zionism was "sincere leaders like Herzl who will forget their private interests in favour of the public good." Naṣṣār went on:

We have many men like Herzl; all they lack is a realization of their own abilities, and the courage to take the first step. Let such men appear, and not hesitate, and we are ready⁸.

As has been noted by other authors, Naṣṣār's opposition to Zionism was linked to a strong feeling of patriotic devotion to Palestine. In an editorial in August 1913, for example, he commented on the recent Zionist Congress, calling for a simultaneous conference to be held in Nablus "while others are meeting to take over our country and our farms"⁹. This and many similar instances of local patriotism were matched by Naṣṣār's parallel devotion to Arab nationalism in its broader pan-Arab sense. This was linked in his case and that of many other Arab nationalists of this period to what they perceived as the bias of the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.) in favour of Zionism¹⁰.

Thus Naṣṣār, whose paper in 1909 reflected a positive approach to the C.U.P., and a wariness which had not yet developed into outright hostility towards Zionism, by 1911 had become a fervent opponent of the ruling party and supporter of the Ottoman opposition with which most Arab nationalists were by this stage affiliated¹¹. Such a development in the overall political line taken by **al-Karmil** appears to have followed closely, and probably to have been influenced by, Naṣṣār's increasingly uncompromising opposition to Zionism. In this respect, Najīb Naṣṣār's evolution is representative of that of numerous other Arab political and intellectual figures during this period.

Al-Mufid: The newspaper which perhaps came closest to the fervour of **al-Karmil** in its stand on Zionism was **al-Mufid**. As unofficial mouthpiece of the Arab nationalist secret society **al-Fatāṭ**¹², it had an influence greater than might at first appear, over a region which stretched far beyond the borders of the Beirut vilayet. Although it was only available for three years, it is clear that **al-Mufid** was, after **al-Karmil**, the most persistent and determined opponent of Zionism among the papers surveyed. This is borne out by the relatively large number of articles it carried on the subject -- 71; 52 of them in 1911 alone -- and by the fact that 22 editorials were devoted to it, most of them also in 1911. For a period of nine months during

the latter year, **al-Mufīd** carried almost one article on Zionism every three days, many of them violently opposing the sale of state lands to foreigners or their agents, who were feared to be working for the Zionist movement¹³.

Together with **al-Karmil** (the two papers frequently reprinted one another's editorials and news reports)¹⁴, **al-Mufīd** laid great emphasis on the importance of protecting the indigenous Palestinian peasantry from being expelled from its ancestral farm-land to make way for the colonists from Europe¹⁵. And like the Haifa paper, it was scathing in its condemnation of those Arab landlords who sold their land to the Zionists. Its greatest ire, however, was reserved for the C.U.P.-dominated government, which was seen as being at best lax in its enforcement of laws hindering Zionist immigration and land-purchase, and at worst as being in complicity with the Zionists, a charge which came to be widely believed. Soon after the C.U.P. government's fall in 1912. **al-Mufīd** wrote: "...all we said about the Zionist question was totally ignored while the Unionists held power over the nation and accomodated the Zionists. Then we raised cry after cry with no response. Now things have changed and the new government should pay attention to what the previous one ignored. The people of the country emigrate to America, while the Zionists immigrate into our country: one day, if things go on like this, the Arab in his own country will become worse off than an orphan at the tables of the stingy"¹⁶

Perhaps the greatest significance of **al-Mufīd's** opposition to Zionism lies in its linking of the Arab nationalism which it championed with resistance to this alien colonizing movement. The fiery editorials of its young owner-editors, together with the many articles written for it by older leaders of the Arab movement such as Shukrī al-'Asālī and Rafīk al-'Azm, undoubtedly had a potent effect on the paper's reader.

Al-Muḩaṩṩam and al-Ahrām:

Although neither paper carried as many articles on Zionism as the two we have just discussed, -- and in relative terms carried far fewer--both **al-Ahrām** and **al-Muḩaṩṩam** played a central role in the controversy over Zionism in the Arabic press during the constitutional period. This was because these two Cairo dailies had a readership and prestige which was far greater than that of the papers published in Syria, most of them newly founded after the 1908 Revolution. Established in 1876 and 1889 respectively, and with press runs of over 5000 copies each¹⁷, their prestige derived both from their age and from the fact that during the censorship of the 'Abd al-ḩamīd period, they had remained free to write about the political events of the day without hindrance. Even after the Revolution and the growth of a vigorous local press in the cities of Syria, both papers retained an extensive readership there, and remained very influential. In addition to these factors, the identification of **al-Ahrām** with French Middle East policy, and of **al-Muḩaṩṩam** with that of Britain,

made them all the more necessary reading for the politically aware in a region which was exposed to the ambitions of both powers.

While the two newspapers published a similar number of articles on Zionism during these seven years -- 65 in **al-Muḩaṩṩam** and 63 in **al-Ahrām** -- there were major differences in their treatment of this issue, and indeed in their general political line. The most noticeable difference was the tendency of **al-Muḩaṩṩam**, particularly pronounced at the beginning of our period and less so at the end, to justify and show sympathy for the Zionist movement. As has already been explained, this was largely the effect of the articles written for the paper by Niṣim Malūl in Jaffa. In addition to Malūl, **al-Muḩaṩṩam** had a number of correspondents -- many of them apparently Egyptian Jews committed to Zionism such as a certain Jacques Levy of Tanṩa -- who wrote regularly to the paper in support of Zionism and in answer to articles opposing it which had appeared in **al-Muḩaṩṩam** and other papers¹⁸.

But even **al-Muḩaṩṩam** appears to have been affected by the trend in the rest of the region insofar as Zionism was concerned, for beginning in 1909 and 1910, and growing more numerous in the years which followed, articles appeared which strongly opposed the Zionist movement, several of them by Palestinians. At the same time, the editorial line of the paper vis-a-vis the C.U.P. underwent a gradual transformation from support to opposition, with a corresponding increase in sympathy for Arab nationalism and the growing demands for reforms and decentralization in the Syrian provinces of the Empire.

Beginning in 1911, **al-Muḩaṩṩam** developed into a forum for a heated dialogue between several of its pro-Zionist contributors and a number of prominent Arab writers and political figures such as Rafiq al-'Azm and Shakīb 'Arslān¹⁹. It also received articles from Dr. Shiblī Shmayyil and 'Īsā al-'Īsā, coeditor of **Falaṩīn**, supporting the opponents of Zionism in this on-going controversy. Ironically, some of the strongest and most coherent arguments against Zionism in the pre-World War I period can be found in the pages of **al-Muḩaṩṩam** from 1911 until 1914, in the context of these varied responses to the claims made by Malūl and other Zionist sympathizers in their own articles in the paper.

Among the most notable examples are an article by Shakīb 'Arslān in January 1912 in which he pours scorn on the claim of Malūl in an earlier article that ruin will befall Palestine if Zionist colonization is halted. The Zionists, he went on, are benefiting from the country far more than it is benefiting from them, and Malūl is guilty of gross exaggeration²⁰. An article in 1914 by Muḩammad 'Abd al-Raḩmān al-'Alamī alludes to another side of the problem, pointing out that the Zionists are only able to buy up land in Palestine because of the dereliction of its duty by the local government, which he points out is made up of rich men willing to sacrifice the whole of Palestine for their own personal benefit²¹. A third article by Shiblī Shmayyil a few days later emphatically stressed that the Zionists were outsiders and aliens ('**duḩhalā' ghurabā'**) engaged in stealing the land from its rightful owners.

He added that while opposing Zionism, the Arabs must learn from it, competing with it in developing the land and in cultural work²². Other articles by ‘Alamī and ‘Īsā al-‘Īsā in May 1914 show that at least the Palestinian opponents of Zionism were well acquainted with the objectives of the Zionist movement as defined by its leaders. The former cites the resolutions of the Basle Congress of the movement, as well as a declaration by Max Nordau regarding Zionist ambitions in Palestine, while the latter quotes not only the resolutions of the Basle Congress, and the words of Nordau regarding the undesirability of integration with the local population of Palestine, but also a statement by Ussishkin in direct contradiction to the conciliatory tone of articles by Zionist writers in **al-Muḩaṩṩam**²³.

Thus, even in the columns of the only major Arabic-language paper to show any sympathy for the Zionist cause, the reader of the day could find compelling arguments refuting those adduced by the Zionists to prove the harmlessness of their enterprise in Palestine. In spite of the numerous articles by Malūl and others, it is hard to avoid the impression that by 1914 the anti-Zionists were getting the best of the argument, even in **al-Muḩaṩṩam**.

al-Ahrām's editorial line, on the other hand, was anti-Zionist, with occasional pro-Zionist articles, usually from readers reacting to editorials or to articles from its correspondents. This newspaper appears to have been the first during our period to raise the question of Zionism, with two articles in December 1908. The ominous title "The Ambitions of the Zionists in Palestine", reported a speech by a Zionist leader in Cairo in which the speaker expressed the hope that 2 million Jews would settle in Palestine²⁴. The second article, a week later, stated that the Zionists did not want to establish a separate government for themselves in Palestine, but only desired to live in equality with its inhabitants. **al-Ahrām**'s editors commented warily on these declarations, saying that Zionist immigrants would be welcome only on condition that they abandoned their foreign citizenship and became loyal Ottoman citizens. They added that concentration of the immigrants in one area was also unacceptable²⁵. Both of these were in fact old objections by the local Palestinian population to the Zionist colonization movement, and continued to be central themes of the opposition to Zionism during the Constitutional era. The far-sightedness of the editors of **al-Ahrām** can be deduced from their response in July 1909 to a letter from Jacques Tanṩāwī (presumably the same Jacques Levy who wrote repeatedly to **al-Ahrām** and **al-Muḩaṩṩam**), who protested that the Zionists were loyal Ottoman patriots. Their answer—that any Jew was welcome to settle in the Empire, as long as there did not develop a concentration of colonists in one region, for that "might lead them to aspire to establish a state within a state, even if that was not part of their plans on the day they immigrated" —sounds strangely prophetic in view of the events of the past 71 years²⁶.

It is of interest that although the press of **Bilād al-Shām** appears to have begun to take the Zionist issue seriously in 1909 — spearheaded by **al-Karmil** — more articles

were carried during this year in both **al-Ahrām** and **al-Muḩaṩṩam** than in any of the other papers surveyed for this study. It indeed seems that these two prestigious Cairo newspapers, with their wide circulation, played an important vanguard role in awakening readers throughout the Arab world to the earliest stages of a problem which had played such a central part in its political life since then.

Seen in this light, even the pro-Zionist articles carried in these papers played a positive function in terms of Arab opposition to Zionism. Such articles seem to have provoked and aroused Arab readers, particularly those in Palestine, who could see with their own eyes what the Zionists were in fact doing. At the same time, they could compare the soothing arguments of pro-Zionist writers in the two papers who sought to assure them as to the benign nature of Zionist intentions, with the blunt and disturbing words of Zionist leaders before European and Zionist audiences. Although this was a different function from that of the Syrian papers we have surveyed, it was in many ways more important, for the heated dialogues in these two papers are on the whole more convincing rebuttals of Zionist arguments than many of the diatribes in the pages of the Syrian press.

Lisān al-Hāl: All of the remaining four papers surveyed were published in Beirut, and all were anti-Zionist in their editorial line, although all printed an occasional pro-Zionist article. There are, however, two major differences which separate **Lisān al-Hāl** from the other three — **al-Ittiḩād al-‘Uṩmani**, **al-ḩakīka** and **al-Iḩbal**. These are, first, that it was a strong supporter of the C.U.P., and, secondly, that its editor was a Christian. It might be added that **Lisān al-Hāl** was the oldest of the four papers, having been founded in 1877, and also probably had the largest circulation of any Beirut daily.

Mention of the religion of the owner of this paper requires some explanation, for the owners or editors of three of the four papers we have discussed (**al-Karmil**, **al-Ahrām** and **al-Muḩaṩṩam**) were also Christian, but no reference has been made to this fact. The point has been raised here because of a serious misconception to be found in Mandel's book, cited above, regarding the relation between the religious affiliation of a newspaper's owners or editors, and its pro- or anti-Zionist editorial line. Basing himself on the monitoring of the Arab press by the Zionist Office in Jaffa, which was begun in 1911 by Nisīm Malūl, and specifically on an analysis of the Beirut and Damascus press in the first half of 1912, Mandel concludes that "in Beirut and Damascus, a newspaper's stand in respect of Zionism was as much a function of its editor's religion as of his politics"²⁷.

He claims that anti-CUP papers— "almost invariably edited by Muslims"²⁸—were anti-Zionist as well as anti-Christian, while papers edited by Christians were generally pro-C.U.P. and either friendly or neutral towards the Zionists: "In other words, Muslim editors in Beirut and Damascus tended to be averse to everything that was non-Muslim and non-Arab"²⁹. Leaving aside the casual bigotry of the last

statement—whose falseness can be proven via a perusal of **al-Mufdīd** or **al-Ittihād al-Uthmānī**, with their many articles by Christian writers, and in the case of the former, al-'Uraisi's outspoken admiration for European culture³⁰ — Mandel would appear to be wrong in his assessment. Whatever conclusion Malūl and the Zionist Office in Jaffa may have come to, and for whatever reason, it is clear from the abundant evidence available that pro-CUP papers edited by Christians were frequently as outspoken in their opposition to Zionism as anti-CUP ones edited by Muslims.

While it is true that as far as our limited sample of the press goes, no final conclusion can be reached (none of the eight papers surveyed in full was published in Damascus; of the Beirut papers only one was edited by a Christian; and of the other eight papers, none published a significant number of articles on Zionism) Mandel himself has not utilized any Beirut or Damascus daily newspaper, and his Zionist sources seem in this case to have done him a disservice. For not only was **Lisān al-Hāī** — edited by a Christian — firmly anti-Zionist, publishing nine articles against Zionism and only three in favour; but three other Syrian papers edited by Christians which were also checked for purpose of this study showed no pro-Zionist bias, and if anything tended to be anti-Zionist. Of these, one was a Beirut paper, **al-Bark**, edited by Bishārā al-Khūrī, seven years of which were checked; another a Tripoli bi-weekly, **al-Hawādeth**, edited by Luṭfallah Khilāṭ, only two years of which were available over the period 1911-1913; and the third was the Aleppo paper **al-Sha'b**, owned and edited by Leon Shewqatly and Fathallah Kastūn, two years of which were available, from 1909-1911.

While al-Khūrī's paper was pro-C.U.P., the latter two opposed the Unionists, with the first supporting the reform and decentralization movement, and the second openly espousing an Arab nationalist line. As for their position on Zionism, it is clear that none of them was favourable to it even from the limited number of issues available to us. A 1910 article in **al-Sha'b**, for example, warns against a large-scale project to develop state lands in Palestine which, it was feared, was backed by Zionist and other foreign interests. The article pointed out that the British had originally gained control over India via a commercial company which developed a privileged position for itself in the country³¹. Yet another article in the same paper, written by Rafīq al-'Aẓm and reprinted in February 1911 from the Istanbul paper **al-Ḥaḍarā**, warned against Zionist colonization of Palestine for fear that the country would be lost to the settlers. It emphasized the poor state of the Muslim and Christian villages in the country when compared with the Jewish settlements³². A third article, printed four days later, reported the speech of an Aleppo deputy in the Ottoman Palestine, Nāfi' al-Jābirī, who strongly opposed the land-development project in Palestine mentioned above, for similar reasons³³. The other two papers similarly show no pro-Zionist bias.

As for **Lisān al-Ḥāl**, perhaps the most important pro-C.U.P. organ in the Arab provinces, it contains little to bear out Mandel's contention, based on Malūl's reports, that the Christian-edited pro-C.U.P. press was necessarily any less anti-Zionist than the Muslim-edited anti-C.U.P. papers. A 1911 article in **Lisān al-Ḥāl** reported a speech by the opposition leader Isma'īl Bey in the Ottoman Chamber warning that the objective of the Zionists is the establishment of a separate government³⁴. A further article a few months later by Jubrān Maṭar, writing from Palestine, described the progress of Zionist colonization, and concluded by declaring: "If we observe all this heady activity, and we realize the great extent of the accumulated power it represents, don't we begin to wonder whether Palestine will soon belong to them?"³⁵

Another article, written in 1914 by 'Abd al-Ra'ūf Khayyāl of Gaza, declared that the blame for what is happening in Palestine should be shouldered by the citizens themselves, and not ascribed to the Zionists or the government. They should act instead of talking and writing, imitate the industriousness of the Zionists and work to oppose the movement taking over Palestine. He went on to warn the nation to beware: "Otherwise you will become the foreigners, and the foreigners will become the citizens."³⁶

From this brief review of only a few papers edited by Christians, it should be clear that Mandel's sweeping generalizations rest on limited and misleading evidence, and are in the main incorrect. There was little correlation between an editor's religion and his position on Zionism, and only somewhat more between his stand vis-a-vis the C.U.P. and the latter, although in general anti-C.U.P. papers were strongly anti-Zionist, pro-C.U.P. papers slightly less so. Moreover, there is no apparent reason why their religion should affect editors so much in Beirut and Damascus, and so little in Cairo and Haifa.

Madel admits that both **Falaṣṭīn** and **al-Karmil**, as well as **al-Ahrām**, all edited by Christians, were anti-Zionist, but explains this by saying that this was the result of special factors³⁷. In fact, papers in Palestine were virtually all anti-Zionist, but so in almost every case were papers outside Palestine, whether in other parts of Syria, or in Cairo or Istanbul. The key to this general trend does not appear to be religion, at least on the basis of the data so far available, only a far more extensive survey using the primary sources themselves, and covering all the important papers throughout Syria, as well as in Cairo and Istanbul, for the entire period could settle the question conclusively. But the evidence cited above would seem to rule out religion as the determining factor insofar as a newspaper's stand on Zionism was concerned.

al-Ittihad al-'Uthmānī, al-Hakīka and al-Ikbāl:

It remains for us to conclude our discussion of the last three of the eight newspapers which were the main focus of this study. Of the three, **al-Ittihad al-'Uthmānī** was both the most influential and the most intense in its concentration

on the Zionist issue. Shaykh Aḥmad Ḥasan Ṭabbāra, its editor-owner, like ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-‘Uraīsī, was an important political figure in this own right. He too played a prominent role in the First Arab Congress held in Paris in June 1913, and with al-‘Uraisi, was hanged by the Turks for his Arab nationalist activities. He was in addition one of the leaders of the Beirut Reform Society which was established in 1913, and after his paper was sclosed by the Ottoman censor in May 1913, he changed its name to **al-Isḫāḥ**, which it remained for the next seven months.

Like **al-Mufīd**, **al-Ittiḥād al-‘Uthmānī** printed a large number of articles on Zionism by correspondents and contributors from various parts of the Arabic-speaking world, including Egypt, various parts of Palestine, Istanbul, Damascus and towns like Marjī‘yūn. It in addition reprinted articles on the subject from other papers, notably **al-Karmil** and **Falaṣṭīn**, printing three from the former and one from the latter over a period of three years³⁸. Najīb Naṣṣār was able to reach a wide audience as a result of the reprinting of his articles in the Beirut and Damascus press, in itself an indication that his influence spread far beyond the frontiers of Palestine. Thus three of his articles were also published in **al-Mufīd** during the three years for which issues are available³⁹, and one in **al-Hakīka**⁴⁰. In one of the articles printed in **al-Ittiḥād al-‘Uthmānī** in 1910, Naṣṣār warned that the objective of the Zionist is to take over Palestine, a dream cherished by the Jews since Roman times. He went on to remind his readers of the danger of apparently innocent projects for commerical development in Palestine, which in fact conceal activities of the Zionist organizations⁴¹.

In another, printed in both **al-Ittiḥād al-‘Uthmānī** and **al-Mufīd** in February 1911 (and apparently written specially for the two papers) Naṣṣār responded to the claims by a defender of the Zionist movement, Suleiman Effendi Yellin, that it means no harm to the people of Palestine, and is only a humanitarian movement to relieve the suffering of oppressed Jews, while the settlers in the Zionist colonies are all Ottoman subjects. Naṣṣār’s response was that a true humanitarian movement would not cause hardship to the people of the country so as to relieve the oppression of others. He added:

Suleimān effendi says that the farmers in these colonies are all Ottoman subjects, and we believe him, since most of them have Ottoman identity papers in their hands and foreign passports in their suitcases... How many of them remained Ottoman when they were called up for military service?⁴²

Naṣṣār concluded by affirming that there is no objection to Jewish immigration to the country *per se*, as long as the immigrants avoid segregation from the local population, treat them well, and become loyal Ottoman citizens. In such a case no Ottoman citizen would oppose them, nor would anyone fear their immigration into the Ottoman territories.

Another leader of the anti-Zionist movement in the Syrian provinces was Shukrī al-‘Asalī, elected to the Ottoman Parliament in 1911 as a representative of Damascus after he had failed to prevent the sale of land to the Zionists in Galilee in his capacity as district commissioner (**Ka’imākām**) of Nazareth. Al-‘Asalī went on to become one of the leaders of the Arab opposition to the C.U.P., and was finally hanged in 1916 for his prominent role in the Arab nationalist movement⁴³. Al-‘Asalī actively used the pages of the Syrian and Istanbul press to support his opposition to Zionist land purchases, writing under the pseudonym of “Salāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī” while he was still a government official in 1910, and under his own name afterwards. We thus find al-‘Asalī’s articles in the Istanbul paper **al-Ḥaḍāra**⁴⁴, edited by Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī, another prominent Arab nationalist; in the Damascus paper **al-Muḵtabas**⁴⁵; in **al-Karmil** (3)⁴⁶; **al-Mufīd** (2)⁴⁷; **al-Ittiḥād al-‘Uthmānī** (2)⁴⁸; **al-Ḥaḳīqa** (2)⁴⁹; and **al-Iḳbāl** (1)⁵⁰.

One of al-‘Asalī’s most widely-published pieces was one which appeared in **al-Ittiḥād al-‘Uthmānī** in February 1911 (as well as in **al-Mufīd** and **al-Ḥaḳīqa**)⁵¹ about the plot of land recently purchased by the Zionists, and whose transfer al-‘Asalī had unsuccessfully tried to block a few weeks earlier. Al-‘Asalī described the ruins of an old fortress on the land dating back to the Crusader era, which he said had been captured by Salāḥ al-Dīn (whence al-‘Asalī’s pseudonym in his earlier articles). The article described in detail the negotiations whereby the Zionists, together with the original owner of the land, Eliās Sursuḳ of Beirut, had removed the peasant inhabitants of the land—a 9000 dunum plot in the Marj Ibn ‘Amir region not far from the Haifa branch of the Hijaz Railway—and then attempted to have the transfer officially registered by al-‘Asalī. He included a summary of the texts of several official communications which passed between him and the **valī**, wherein the latter took the side of the Zionists, and al-‘Asalī did his utmost to block completion of the transaction. Emptying this land of its original peasant tenants, and their replacement with foreigners is treason, al-‘Asalī concluded, and something which he refused to have any part in facilitating.

Aside from the emotive connotations of Salāḥ al-Dīn’s connection with the side (which al-‘Asalī supports with a quotation from Ibn al-Athīr) and of the proximity of the Hijaz Railway to Mecca and Medina, the article strongly impresses its readers with the power, wealth and persistence of the Zionists, the venality of the Arab landlords willing to sell their land to them, and the complicity of the authorities, or at least their dereliction of duty. It is no surprise therefore that it should have been so widely reprinted, or that the **valī** of Beirut should have seen the need to reply in the columns of the same newspapers, setting off a controversy which went on for weeks⁵². Nor is it surprising that al-‘Asalī should have campaigned in the 1911 by-election in Damascus on a platform pledging him to oppose Zionism, or that in the Chamber after his election he became one of the most outspoken opponents of Zionism⁵³.

Although all three papers-**al-Ittihad al-'Uthmani**, **al-Hakika**, and **al-Ikbal**-were strongly anti-Zionist, all carried an occasional pro-Zionist piece, usually a letter to the editor or an article reprinted from another journal followed by editorial comment. Nisim Malul, for example, sent five letters to **al-Hakika** in 1911, provoking the response of other readers critical of Zionism⁵⁴. Similarly, in 1913, at the time of the First Arab Congress, **al-Ittihad al-'Uthmani** briefly changed its line, calling for a more understanding attitude to the Zionists⁵⁵. This shift was apparently motivated by hopes of an agreement with the C.U.P. in the summer of 1913 before and after the Congress, which would have provided for a measure of decentralization and local self-government, and thus would have enabled the local population to regulate and reduce the potential danger of Zionist immigration. At the same time, contacts had begun in Cairo between Arab nationalists and Zionists with a view to exploring the possible grounds for agreement between the two sides. As a result of these two sets of developments, the anti-Zionist tone of the majority of the Syrian and Cairo press lessened in the late spring and early summer of 1913. Soon afterwards, however, things changed, after the hopes for an Arab-Turkish entente faded, and after a shift by the Zionist Executive which, in the words of Mandel, "judged it inappropriate for Hochberg (the Zionist envoy) to make a secret entente with the Arab nationalists"⁵⁶. Thus in late 1913, **al-Ittihad al-'Uthmani** (now under the title **al-Islah**) carried further articles warning against the situation developing in Palestine. 'Isa al-'Isa is quoted in one article reprinted from **Falastin** in November as asking what will be the result "if the Zionists arrive in Palestine on every boat and the citizens emigrate on every other?"⁵⁷. Another article ten days later ended with the warning that Zionist immigration, with its attendant expulsion of the indigenous peasant population from their lands, posed a serious threat to the country both from the economic and political angles⁵⁸.

Major Themes and Trends in the Arab Press:

In the course of our survey of the treatment of the Zionist question in the Arab press, based mainly on an investigation of the eight newspapers we have just finished discussing, a number of major themes emerged. The first is strong opposition to the laxity of the Ottoman central authorities in restraining the Zionist movement, a stand linked to an intense feeling that local needs, desires and wishes were being ignored. We have here, in the varied forms in which it emerged before 1914, the embryo of the Arab demand for self-determination, a demand which in the case of the Palestinian people has still not been achieved.

Among other important themes are opposition to unrestricted Zionist immigration and land-purchase, resentment at the self-imposed segregation of the immigrants, and their failure to become loyal citizens of the country they settled in. Looming behind all of these concerns is the fear, expressed in literally dozens of articles, that the Arabs in Palestine would one day be reduced to a minority, and

become strangers in their own land. This it was feared, would be the result of the Zionists' achievement of their objective (frequently denied by their spokesmen, but perceived by most Arab writers and leaders at this time) of winning exclusive sovereignty over Palestine. If anything, this is one of the most striking conclusions to emerge from this study: by 1914 most editors and writers in the papers examined were fully aware that the seemingly innocuous activities of the Zionist movement were directed at dispossession of the Arabs and the ultimate establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

The first newspapers to devote great attention to this issue, as we have seen, were those of Cairo, followed closely by **al-Karmil** (whose first two articles on the subject were reprinted from **al-Muqattam** with critical comment by Naṣṣār)⁵⁹. Thereupon the initiative seems to have passed to the Palestinian and Beirut press, to minute investigation and scathing criticism. The Tripoli and Balkan wars, as well as the CUP's occasional repression of the press, temporarily caused a lull from late 1911 to 1912 in attention to Zionism, but by 1913 the press was once again focusing on the matter. Although faint hopes of agreement with the C.U.P. and the Zionists in 1913 caused some shifts in this general trend, by the end of the year the same resolute tone of concern was widespread in the press, to continue until the outbreak of World War I.

Thus in the newspapers of Palestine, of Beirut, and of Cairo, we can discern in the Constitutional period the beginnings of a vivid awareness of the significance and implications of the Zionist movement. The reader of the hundreds of articles on this subject cannot fail to be impressed, not only by the prescience, but also by the continuing validity, of the arguments presented by many of their authors.

NOTES

- 1 . "Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraisi and al-Mufid: The Press and Arab Nationalism before 1914", paper presented to a seminar on "Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890-1939: Unexplored Dimensions", A.U.B., 29-31 May 1979, and currently in press with proceedings of the seminar.
- 2 . For more on al-'Uraisi and al-Mufid, see *ibid*.
- 3 . The remaining eight periodicals are referred to selectively in the text and are included in the appended tables.
- 4 . N. Mandel, **The Arabs and Zionism before World War I**, Berkeley Cal., 1976. Although Malul is mentioned in different capacities in the text, it is only in the "Note on Sources" on p. 237 that he is referred to as the author of the press reports on which Mandel largely based his book. See also Y. Porath, **The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement 1919-1929**, London, 1974, p. 30 for another reference to Malul.
- 5 . For further details regarding distribution of articles on Zionism by year, pro- and anti-Zionist articles, number of issues surveyed, etc. for each newspaper, see appended tables.
- 6 . For examples see below, p 102.
- 7 . N. Naṣṣār, **al-Ṣihyūniyya: tariḫuha, gharāḫuha, aḥammīyyatuha**, Haifa, 1911. The series ran in **al-Karmil** beginning with issue No. 133, 31/3/ 1911, and ending with No. 149,2/6/1911.
- 8 . **al-Karmil**, no. 149,2/6/1911.
- 9 . **al-Karmil**, no. 358, 15/8/1913, "The Zionist Congress".
- 10 . See e.g., **al-Karmil**, no. 297, 10/1/1913, editorial entitled "The Arab Question". See "Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraisi", *op. cit.*, for more details on the connection between Arab nationalism and anti-Zionism.
- 11 . Mandel, *op. cit.*, wrongly claims (e.g. on p. 130) that **al-Karmil** was pro-C.U.P.
- 12 . S. Musā, **al-Ḥaraka al-'Arabīyya**, Beirut, 1970, p. 130.
- 13 . A large proportion of these articles and others in the Arab press in 1911 dealt with a proposal by Dr. Najīb Aṣfar to buy up Ottoman state lands, a project which, it was feared, was backed by the Zionists.
- 14 . See page 102 below for details. Articles by Naṣṣār were printed in **al-Mufid** in nos. 608, 5/2/1911; 1383, 23/9/1913; and 1425, 16/11/1913. Articles from **al-Mufid** were printed in **al-Karmil** in nos. 122, 7/2/1911; and 334, 20/5/1913.
- 15 . See e.g. articles by Shukri al-'Asali in nos. 619, 18/2/1911 and 620, 19/2/1911, which are discussed in detail below, pp. 103-104
- 16 . No.1153, 18/12/1912, p.3.
- 17 . Circulation figures for this period are hard to obtain and unreliable. These are from an article by al-'Uraisi written from Paris -- **al-Mufid** no. 912, 19/2/1912 -- in which he also gives the circulation of **al-Mu'ayyad** as 14,000 and that of **al-Jarida** as 2000. A despatch to the Zionist Executive from the Zionist Office in Jaffa, cited in Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-6, gives the circulation of the Beirut papers **Lisān al-Ḥāl** and **al-Naṣīr** as 10-12,000 and 6-8000 copies respectively. For more on the press in general see F. de Tarazi, **Tārīḫ al-Ṣaḫāfa al-'arabīyya**, 4 vols., Beirut, 1913-1933, especially vol.4.
- 18 . According to Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 149, n. 2, this was the pseudonym of Robert Ghāzī, an Egyptian Jew. Five articles or letters by him appeared in **al-Ahrām** and three in **al-Muḫaṭṭam**. A number of other pro-Zionist articles in the two papers are signed with what appear to be other pseudonyms, perhaps used by Ghāzī or Malul. Malul himself wrote 12 articles for **al-Muḫaṭṭam** and 3 for **al-Ahrām** under his own name and six more for the former and one more for the latter under the name "Nisim Ben Sahl".
- 19 . al-'Azm, who was the President of the **Ḥizb al-lamarkaziyya al-'idariyya al-'Uthmaniyya**-- the Ottoman Administrative Decentralization Party based in Egypt -- and a major figure in the pre-

war nationalist movement, wrote four articles for **al-Muḳaṭṭam** (in nos. 6679, 17/3/1911; 7616, 14/4/1914; 7654, 29/5/1914; and 7655, 30/5/1914), and one for **al-Ahrām** (no. 10027, 8/3/1911). Arslān wrote two, in nos. 6929, 15/1/1912; and 6939, 26/1/1912. The former is discussed briefly below.

20. **al-Muḳaṭṭam**, no. 6929, 15/1/1912.
21. **al-Muḳaṭṭam**, no. 7626, 27/4/1914.
22. **al-Muḳaṭṭam**, no. 7630, 1/5/1914.
23. **al-Muḳaṭṭam**, nos. 7648, 22/5/1914; and 7655, 30/5/1914.
24. **al-Ahrām**, no. 9339, 3/12/1908.
25. **al-Ahrām**, no. 9345, 11/12/1908.
26. **al-Ahrām**, no. 9517, 7/7/1909.
27. Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. Mandel's sweeping comments about "Muslim editors in Beirut and Damascus" are surprising to anyone who has read the press of the period, which is remarkable for its relative lack of sectarian prejudice. See, e.g., the numerous articles by Christians such as Rafīq Rizk Sallūm in **al-Mufid**. This point, and al-'Uraisi's attitude towards Europe, are discussed in "Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraisi", *op. cit.*
31. **al-Sha'b**, no. 187, 29/12 1910. This article, signed by 'Izzat al-Jundi, is the second of a two-part series, but the preceding issue of the paper is unavailable.
32. **al-Sha'b**, no. 195, 14/2/1911.
33. **al-Sha'b**, no. 197, 18/2/1911.
34. **Lisān al-Ḥāl**, no. 6581, 10/3/1911.
35. **Lisān al-Ḥāl**, no. 6733, 9/9/1911.
36. **Lisān al-Ḥāl**, no. 7535, 1/5/1914.
37. Mandel *op. cit.*, pp. 129-133, esp. p. 133.
38. **al-Ittihad al-'Uthmānī**, nos. 679, 10/12/1911; 1548, 8/11/1913; and 1550, 14/11/1913 (the latter the article from **Falaṣṭin**).
39. **al-Mufid**, nos. 608, 5/2/1911; 1383, 23/9/1913; and 1425, 16/11/1913.
40. **al-Ḥaḳīka**, no. 370, 14/8/1911.
41. **al-Ittihad al-'Uthmānī**, no. 679, 10/12/1910.
42. **al-Ittihad al-'Uthmānī**, no. 724, 6/2/1911; and **al-Mufid**, no. 608, 5/2/1911.
43. For more on al-'Asali, see chs. IV-VI of the author's **British Policy in Syria and Palestine, 1906-1914**, London, 1980. See also Mandel, *op. cit.*
44. Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
46. **al-Karmil**, nos. 118, 20/1/1911; 126, 24/2/1911; and 168, 15/8/1911.
47. **al-Mufid**, nos. 619 and 620, 18/2/1911 and 19/2/1911.
48. **al-Ittihad al-'Uthmānī**, nos. 689, 28/12/1910; and 735, 18/2/1911.
49. **al-Ḥaḳīka**, nos. 521 and 322, 20/2/1911 and 23/2/1911.
50. **al-Iḳbal**, no. 376, 19/11/1910.
51. It appeared in two parts in the latter two (see notes 47 and 49 above, and in no. 735 of the former (see note 48 above).
52. See the *vall*'s reply in **al-Ittihad al-'Uthmānī**, no 737, 21/2/1911. Most Beirut papers carried the same letter by Nūr al-Din Bey.
53. See **British Policy**, *op. cit.*, ch. IV.
54. **al-Ḥaḳīka**, nos. 275, 29/8/1910; 283, 26/9/1910; 287, 17/10/1910; 295, 14/11/1910; and 298, 24/11/1910.
55. See, e.g., the pro-Zionist article in **al-Ittihad al-'Uthmānī**, no. 1422, 10/6/1913, by Rizq Allah

Arkaṣh, a leader of the Beirut Reform Society and delegate to the First Arab Congress in Paris.

56. Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 162.
 57. **al-Ittiḥād al-‘Uthmānī**, no. 1550, 14/11/1913.
 58. **al-Ittiḥād al-‘Uthmānī**, no. 1558, 24/11/1913.
 59. **al-Karmil**, nos. 30 and 31, 10/7/1909 and 17/7/1909 (**al-Karmil** was a weekly for the first year of publication). The articles are reprinted from **al-Muḩaṭṭam**, nos. 6152, 10/6/1909; and 6155, 13/6/1909.

No.1 Papers Surveyed; Frequency of Appearance of Articles on Zionism

Newspapers	Years	Numbers Surveyed	Articles on Zionism	Frequency	Editorials on Zionism
al-Karmil	4	330	134	.406	45
al-Mufid	3	844	71	.084	22
al-Muḩaṭṭam	7	2131	65	.030	10
al-Ahram	7	2148	63	.029	4
al-Ittiḥād al-‘Uthmānī	7	1779	59	.033	9
al-ḩaḩīḩa	2	314	34	.108	5
Lisan al-ḩāl	7	2045	16	.007	6
al-Iḩbāl	5	242	12 (454)	.049	1
al-Hilāl	3	72	10	—	—
al-Ṣafa	2	213	7	—	3
al-Manār	2	72	6	—	—
al-Sha‘b	2	246	5	—	0
al-Jaridah	2	1620	5	—	3
al-Barḩ	3	287	3	—	0
al-ḩawadith	1	669	1	—	0
al-Mu‘ayyad	1	59	1 (492)	—	0

N.B. All these papers were consulted in the A.U.B's Jafet Library, which has extensive holdings of Arabic periodical material from this and other periods.

**No.2 Articles on Zionism: Breakdown by Year;
Proportion of Articles For And Against**

	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	Total	Pro	Anti	Other	Proportion
al-Karmil		9		73	21	31		134	6	93	35	1:15.5
al-Mufid				52	4	15		71	4	48	19	1:12
al-Mukat tam	0	13	5	15	13	5	14	65	35	16	14	2.2:1
al-Ahram	2	15	11	14	1	15	5	63	15	22	26	1:1.5
al-Ittihād al- 'Uthmani	0	1	17	23	1	16	1	59	4	36	19	1:9
al-Hakika			17	17	0	0		34	6	24	4	1:4
Lisan al-'Hal	0	0	3	7	0	3	3	16	3	9	4	1:3
al-Ik'abāl	0	3	5	4	0			12	1	10	1	1:10
al-Hilāl		0	0	1	0	5	4	10	0	1	9	
al-Safa				1	0	6	0	7	0	2	5	
al-Manār		0	0	3	0	0	3	6	0	5	1	
al-Sha'b		0	3	2			5	5	0	3		
al-Jarida		1	0	4	0	0	0	5	1	2	2	
al-Bark	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	3	0	0	3	
al-Hawadith				0	1	0		1	0	1	0	
al-Mu'ayyad		1						1	0	1	0	
	2	43	61	217	41	97	31	492	75	273	144	

**No. 3 Breakdown of Articles For and Against
Zionism by Year**

NEWSPAPER	Year	PRO-	ANTI-	OTHER	TOTAL
al-Karmil	1909	3	3	3	9
	1911		51	22	73
	1912	2	16	3	21
	1913	1	23	7	31
					<u>134</u>
al-Mufid	1911	4	31	17	52
	1912		4		4
	1913		13	2	15
					<u>71</u>
al-Mukattam	1908	11	2		13
	1909	3	1	1	5
	1910		7	2	15
	1911	5	6	2	13
	1912	2	2	6	10
	1913		2	3	5
	1914	7	5	2	14
					<u>65</u>
al-Abram	1908	4	1	1	6
	1909	4	8	3	15
	1910	5	2	4	11
	1911	4	4	6	14
	1912		4	1	5
	1913	2	4	9	15
	1914		3	2	5
				<u>63</u>	

NEWSPAPER	YEAR	PRO-	ANTI-	OTHER	TOTAL
al-Ittihad al-'Uthmani	1908				1
	1909			1	17
	1910		11	6	23
	1911	1	17	5	1
	1912			1	16
	1913	3	8	5	1
	1914			1	
					59
					17
					17
				34	
Lisan al-Hal	1909				3
	1910	5	11	1	7
	1911	1	13	3	0
	1912				3
	1913				3
	1914				3
					16
					3
					5
					4
				12	
al-Ikbal	1908				3
	1909		3		5
	1910	1	3	1	4
	1911		4		
					12

THE DECLINE OF LOCAL POWER IN PALESTINE AFTER 1856: THE CASE OF 'AḲĪL AGHĀ

Alexander Schoelch

One of the main aspects of the political, social and economic transformation of Palestine in the 19th century was decline of local power centres, the deprivation of local lords of their power positions and the incorporation of many of them into the new centralized administrative set-up created by the Tanzimat policy. This policy of de-localization of authority reached its height during the decade which followed the Crimean War, The local lords in the provinces in general, and the shaykhs in the Palestinian mountains in particular, were reckoned among the most serious obstacles in the way of centrally conceived and executed reforms. The **Hatt-i Hümayun** of 1856, and the new administrative and sociopolitical order of the Empire which was to result from it, could only be implemented and enforced by an effective and resolute central government. The necessity of an unbroken administrative and above all military control of the provinces manifested itself to the Porte during the Syrian crisis of 1860. One of the most important aims of Ottoman policy in Syria after 1860 was, therefore, to undermine the influence of the established local families and to break their socio-political power¹.

In Palestine as elsewhere, this policy had to be pursued on the basis of military force to be effective. If the governors still had to resort to the policy of **divide et impera** during the decade following the Crimean War, if they still had to act with a stick in one hand and a carrot in the other, this was due to the fact that they still had only limited military forces at their disposal. In principle, however, they could be sure of European benevolence and consular support for their policy of establishing 'law and order', of 'pacifying' Palestine—if they did not anyhow act under foreign pressure. The consuls, at least those of the Western Powers, had received orders to side unreservedly with the representatives of the central administration in all local conflicts.

This double pressure from outside constitutes the external framework in which the case taken up in this paper has to be seen. Before analysing the rise and fall of 'AḲĪl Aghā, however, the internal framework, i.e. the structure of local power by the middle of the 19th century, has to be described.

* * *

After the Ottoman conquest, Palestine was at first administratively fully integrated into the Empire; it was in particular covered with **timars** and **zi'amets**. When the **timar** system declined parallel to the decentralization of the Empire beginning in the late 16th century (with remnants of this system lasting in Palestine, however, well into the 19th century), and when the governors' capacity to control the Palestinian mountains waned, the system of the 'rule of the shaykhs' emerged. Many of the new local lords whose clans immigrated from the South and the East during the 17th and early 18th centuries were of tribal origin.


From their seats, which were often strongholds, the shaykhs controlled 'their' districts; they appropriated the surplus produced by the peasants part of which they handed over to the Ottoman governors as taxes during the **daura**. They also administered justice on the basis of customary local norms and principles. They competed with each other for supremacy and fought for the socio-political and economic control of the districts. Nevertheless, the Ottoman governors remained direct points of reference for all local lords with regard to their fiscal obligations and their military duties. The shaykhs in particular contributed to the protection of the **hajj** with their retinues and with bodies of armed peasants. If they were no longer holders of **timars**, they fulfilled their duties in their capacity as district chiefs appointed by the Ottoman **vali**. Normally, the position of shaykh was transmitted within the clan. If a **vali** was successful in depriving a shaykh of his position, more often than not another member of the clan was ready to be appointed in his place. Locally, the power of the shaykhs rested on group solidarity and on the affiliation of the peasants of their districts with their clans².

This 'rule of the shaykhs' lasted until the 1860s, if we discount the disruptions caused by the Egyptian occupation (1831-1840). By mid-century, the most important clans who provided local lords, were the following³: In the Jabal al-Khalil, the 'Amr of Dūra and the 'Azza of Bayt Jibrin; in the Jerusalem mountains, the Lahhām of Bayt 'Aṭāb in the 'Arkūb district, the Abu Ghush of Qaryat al-'Inab in Banī Mālik, the Simḥān of Ra's Karkar in Banī Ḥārith al-Shimāliyya, the Barāghitha of Dīr Ghassāna in Banī Zayd. In the Jabal Nāblus there were the Al al-Ḥajj Muḥammad in the district of Mashāriq Nāblus; the Qāsim al-Aḥmad and the Rayyān in Bilād al-Jamā'in; the Jayūsī in Banī Ṣa'b; the Barkāwī in Wādī al-Sha'ir; the Jarrār in the districts of al-Ḥāritha al-Kibliyya (or Mashāriq al-Jarrār), of al-Ḥāritha al-Shimāliyya and in the Sha'rāwiyyatān, their main seats being Ṣanūr and Jaba^c, the 'Abd al-Hādī of 'Arrāba in the Sha'rāwiyyatān, Sha'rāwiyyat al-Gharbiyya and Sha'rāwiyya al-Sharqiyya.

In this context, the Tūqān and Nimr families of Nablus have also to be mentioned; with regard to them, however, Darwaza stresses the fact that they were not local lords of the same quality as those mentioned above, as they were lacking a strong 'aṣabiyya; rather, they were members of the government apparatus, their basis of

power being in the first place their position in the Ottoman military and 'civil' administration⁴.

These were the families of shaykhs who set the tone in the Palestinian mountains. The other districts and their shaykhs, especially those in the eastern parts of the Nablus and Jerusalem mountains (see map), could be called satellites. There were no families powerful enough to 'rule' them 'independently' over a longer period; they rather affiliated themselves with the more important lords, or were under their control.



In northern Palestine, however, by the middle of the 19th century there were no longer power centres or local lords to be compared with those of the central mountains. The local power factor there, i.e. 'Aḳīl 'Aghā, was of a different nature.

In the early 18th century, the influential local families of the Jabal Ṣafad had been the Nāfi' who resided in the castle of the town of Ṣafad, and the Ḥusayn whose seat was the castle of Jiddīn⁵. But they were overshadowed and pushed into the background by Zāhir al-'Umar and Jazzār Pasha. In the 19th century, we hear nothing more of local lords in the Jabal Ṣafad attracting the attention of both Ottomans and Europeans like those in the southern mountains.

In lower Galilee and on the coast, the Māḏī had been the dominant local family during the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries⁶. Their influence had extended over Nazareth and its surroundings, the Marj Ibn 'Āmir, Ḥaifā, the coast south of the Carmel and the western slopes of the Jabal Nāblus. The period from the end of Jazzār's rule up to the Egyptian occupation had been their heyday. Mas'ūd al-Māḏī had also erected an imposing house in 'Akkā, and on the eve of the Egyptian invasion he had been governor in Gaza⁷. But the position of the Māḏī was considerably undermined during the Egyptian rule, and they were not able to rebuild it after this had come to an end.

Thus in northern Palestine and on the coast, the local power centres had been absorbed into the orbit of power of Zāhir al-'Umar and Jazzār Pasha or they had been shaken irparably by the Egyptian rule, while those of the central Palestinian mountains remained basically intact or could be reconstituted after the Egyptian withdrawal. This difference had, of course, something to do with the geograppical location; the Nablus, Jerusalem and Hebron mountains were less accessible and farther away from the reach of any centralizing power than northern Palestine and the coast.

However, in the period between the **Hatt-i Serif** and the **Hatt-i Hūmayun**, or between the re-establishment of Ottoman rule and the end of the Crimean war, the Ottoman government did not yet have the resources and the policy to get Palestine administratively under its direct control. Thus a kind of power vacuum existed in the 1840s and 1850s north of the Jabal Nāblus which was filled by 'Aḳīl 'Aghā. His rise and fall will now be described.

* * *

'Aḳīl (or 'Aḳīla)⁸ was a Bedouin of the Hanādī tribe. In 1814, his father Mūs-ā al-Ḥāsī had moved from Egyptain territory to the Gaza area, where he died in 1830. Like his father, 'Aḳīl and his men took service with various masters, among them Ibrāhīm Pasha. In 1843, 'Aḳīl became chief of a body of irregulars in northern Palestine. In a local struggle for influence among the Latins of Nazareth (1845) he

took side against the *ka'imakam* of 'Akkā; in the course of this conflict he left Nazareth with his men and joined the Banī Ṣakhr east of the Jordan.

The beginning of his military and political influence, i.e. of his local power position in Galilee, can be dated at 1847⁹, when he was recalled and entrusted with the command of 75 *başibozuk*. Their sphere of activity was lower Galilee from Ḥaifā and 'Akkā in the west to the Ghūr Baysān and Tiberias in the east with Nazareth in the centre. 'Aḳīl chose the Zaydānī castle of 'Ibillīn as his seat, an ideal strategic location, about equidistant from 'Akkā, Ḥaifā and Nazareth.

In the early 18th century, together with Shafā 'amr and Tamra, 'Ibillīn had watched over the most important cotton growing area in the district of 'Akkā. Zāhir al-'Umar had assigned this village to his brother Yūsuf who had established there a sizable mosque from the minaret of which one could get a clear view of the coastal plain of 'Akkā, of the Carmel and of the Nazareth area. He had also surrounded 'Ibillīn with a wall and towers. In the time of 'Aḳīl, the village had between 600 and 800 inhabitants, mainly Muslim and Greek-Orthodox Christians¹⁰.

But 'Ibillīn did not become the permanent 'residency' of 'Aḳīl 'Aghā. Not least for reasons of safety from the Ottoman provincial governors in cases of conflict, he erected his camp at changing places in Galilee, and he was also at home in Nazareth¹¹. The stronghold of 'Ibillīn, however, symbolized his claim to power. It was there that he negotiated the protective agreement with Lynch, the commander of the American expedition to the Dead Sea, in 1848 which made 'Aḳīl for the first time known in the United States and in Europe¹². In 1863, during his conflict with the Ottoman authorities (see below), he refused to comply with the request to come to 'Akkā; instead, he suggested to his opponents that they negotiate with him in the castle of 'Ibillīn. And it was there where he was buried after his death in 1870¹³. One of 'Aḳīl's grandsons is still living in 'Ibillīn up to this day¹⁴.

'Ibillīn and the memories of Zāhir al-'Umar's rule still alive in Galilee at that time, certainly did not fail to impress 'Aḳīl 'Aghā. Had not Bedouin families who had immigrated into northern Palestine already seized power in this area on two occasions and maintained their positions vis-à-vis the Ottomans for decades: the house of Ṭurābāy¹⁵ in the 17th and the Zayādina¹⁶ in the 18th century? And had the Mādī not also been of Bedouin origin? Lynch believed that 'Aḳīl did have corresponding ambitions. He suspected that the *başibozuk* commander nourished the dream of shaking off the Ottoman yoke at the head of a confederation of Bedouin tribes, and that he wished to ascertain whether there was a possibility of getting outside support¹⁷.

But one is entitled to doubt that under different conditions 'Aḳīl would really have become a second Zāhir al-'Umar as Oppenheim thought¹⁸. Whereas already Zāhir al-'Umar's father had become sedentary, 'Aḳīl would not hear of such a step.

Landed property and agricultural production, commerce and urban life meant nothing to him. When this question was once raised, 'Aḳīl answered by asking a counter-question: "Would you have me disgrace myself, and till the ground like a fellow?"¹⁹. He also did not endeavour to build up positions of authority or wealth in the towns of the *liva*. It is true, a relative of 'Aḳīl for some time stood at the head of the administration in Tiberias²⁰, and his brother Ṣālīḥ²¹ exercised considerable influence in the district of Ḥaifā; but 'Aḳīl based his power completely on his tribesmen and on alliances with other Bedouin tribes west and east of the Jordan.

In one respect, however, 'Aḳīl had grasped the possibilities of the time; he was on the look out for European allies for the preservation and strengthening of his position. Especially after 1860, he posed as an ally of France cherishing the illusion of active French support. He once boasted to the British Consul Finn: "I am a Frenchman!"²². And through the French Consul in Beirut he had sent a tiger as a present to 'his' Emperor²³. In the early 1860s, new rumours about his political ambitions were circulated. He was said to seek every opportunity of showing other Bedouin chiefs "that the land is their own, that the Turks keep them out of their right, and that they may win it from these conquerors again. .. Some fancy that the end which he may have in view is to form a confederacy of Arab tribes under the protectorate of France"²⁴. But in the end, he had to assert his claims of power vis-à-vis the Ottoman administration on his own—and was a loser despite his connection with France.

The influence, even power, which 'Aḳīl 'Aghā acquired in Galilee after 1847 increasingly aroused the Ottoman governors' suspicions. In 1852 he was sent across the Jordan against the rebellious Druze, probably with the intention of getting rid of him. If this was the aim of the provincial authorities, the manoeuvre failed. 'Aḳīl returned a victor from the battlefield and threatened to become more powerful than before. The Ottoman authorities, therefore, fell back upon well-tried methods: 'Aḳīl was lured into a trap, accused of being an accomplice of the Druze rebels and imprisoned in the fortress of Widin on the Danube.

After a year, however, 'Aḳīl managed to escape and to return to Syria. It is said that he was helped in this by a Christian bishop, something he never forgot²⁵. He first remained in the Aleppo area. When his brother Ṣālīḥ got word of his return, he joined up with him with 500 horsemen whom he was about to lead into the war against Russia. In a country that was stripped of nearly all troops because of the war, 'Aḳīl now had a considerable force at his disposal. As in 1847, therefore, the authorities preferred entrusting him with an official function rather than having to reckon with him as a rebel. Thus in 1854, 'Aḳīl was reinstated as commander of the *başıbozuk* in the *liva* of 'Akkā²⁶. About this time, the European consuls began to court him directly. In 1854, Finn sent him a letter admonishing him "to avoid oppression" of Christians and Jews in Galilee, and the French consul general in

Beirut, de Lesseps, paid a visit to 'Aḳīl in Ḥaifā. The French were mainly concerned about the safety of the Latin convents in Nazareth and on the Carmel, the British about the well-being of their Jewish protégés in Ṣafad and Tiberias and of the Protestants of Nazareth²⁷.

After the Crimean War which the Empire could weather due to the support of the Western Powers, the authorities could again think of subduing 'Aḳīl. Irregular units of Kurds under the command of Muḥammad Sa'īd, a son of the well-known Kurdish chief Ṣamdīn Aghā, were called out against 'Aḳīl. They camped on his territory in the district of Tiberias, and Ḥasan Aghā, a brother of Muḥammad Sa'īd, was entrusted with the administration of the district. Already in the spring of 1856, 'Aḳīl had repelled inroads on his territory by the 'Abd al-Hādīs in a sanguinary skirmish²⁸; he now also accepted this new challenge. On March 30, 1857, he faced the Kurds with his irregulars and with Bedouin allies on the Crusader battlefield of Ḥaṭṭīn²⁹. 'Aḳīl was victorious. About 150 dead remained on the battlefield, among them Ḥasan Aghā. 'Aḳīl's position in northern Palestine was now stronger than ever before. He seemed to be the actual ruler of Galilee, and he attached much importance to furnishing proof of his power to Europeans and their local protégés³⁰.

His most spectacular engagement in this respect was the protection he offered to the Christians and Jews of Galilee during the crisis of 1860, and in particular the obligation to protect the Christians of Nazareth which he undertook. Yet we are fully justified in doubting that they really stood in need of his protection, as in this context not the general protection from Bedouin incursions and similar dangers was meant, but the protection of Christians from Muslims. In Palestine, however, public peace and order was in no way disturbed during the Lebanese civil war and the Damascus massacre of 1860; no Christian was harmed.

Nevertheless, because of the vicinity of the scenes of conflict, members of religious minorities in northern Palestine were in a state of unrest, even seized with panic. Christian and Jewish families fled from the interior of the country to the coastal towns, some retreated from there to Alexandria or Athens. Here and there, their anxiety seems to have been played on. There were reports of intimidation of Christians and Jews in 'Akkā and Ṣafad: A placard was pinned to the portal of the Greek-Catholic church in 'Akkā offending the Christians. The Jews of Ṣafad were ready to accept the 'protection' of the Shaykh al-Shabāb and his followers; the Chief Rabbi organized a banquet for forty Muslim youths of the town³¹. Local oral tradition has preserved other instances of danger to Christians in Galilee and 'Akkā which are said to have been averted mainly by 'Aḳīl³².

The Christians of Nazareth were also in a state of unrest. In their name, Ṭannūs Ka'wār, a Greek-Orthodox, went to 'Aḳīl 'Aghā in order to make sure that no danger was threatening from 'Aḳīl himself and to win him over as protector. Ka'wār also hinted to him that Europe would take revenge if any Christian blood were shed.

‘Aḳīl promised to take the Nazarenes under his protection. In addition, the British consul in Jerusalem, Finn, sent word to ‘Aḳīl that he would shortly be happy to have protected Christians and Jews when he heard how murderers fared³³.

In a way, the Nazarenes seem to have been particularly vulnerable. The town had no walls and it lay outside the areas of local authority to the south of the Marj Ibn ‘Amīr. It was certainly no coincidence that it was in 1854 that the inhabitants of the town, three quarters of them Christians, made their ‘contrat social’ which has recently been analysed in detail³⁴, as a communal protective and defensive alliance. This was at a time when Palestine was not only stripped of regular troops, but when also ‘Aḳīl’ Aghā was deprived of his post (1853-1854).

This interconfessional covenant of 1854 obviously had not been forgotten during the 1860 crisis. When the town appeared to be threatened by an attack of the Banī Ṣakhr in July 1860, the inhabitants themselves, Christians and Muslims hand in hand, prepared the defense of Nazareth⁴⁵. (Fortunately, the apprehended Bedouin assault turned out to be a false alarm.) And if we can trust oral tradition, there is evidence that Ka‘wār’s approach to ‘Aḳīl was severely criticized by the Muslims of the town. In 1968, an old man from Bi’r al-Maksūr told an anthropologist, how a Fāhūm (which was the leading Muslim family of the town) is said to have tried to prevent Ṭannūs Ka‘wār from seeing ‘Aḳīl: “Oh, Tanūs, why are you going to Agiili? you, why? you heard a dog barking and you go. God knows where he (Agiili) comes from. Don’t you think that if he attacks any Christian, any little Christian, that he is attacking my lafi (turban) on my head. I will leave every family in this country; I’ll collect all the Muslims against him. Why are you going to give him a present? When you hear a dog barking, do you answer? Isn’t that a shame. And where are you from? You are from Nazareth and we are from Nazareth. If I am safe, you are safe”³⁶.

Apart from the fact that the ‘protection’ of religious minorities was a profitable business for ‘Aḳīl³⁷, he allowed himself to be admired by Europe after 1860, and he tried to make use of the attribute of “rescuer of the Christians”³⁸ in order to strengthen his position. In France it was initially believed that a second ‘Abd al-Ḳādir had been found in Syria, the more so since ‘Aḳīl was widely considered to be of Algerian descent. Napoleon III had ‘Aḳīl decorated with the medal of the Legion of Honour on board a French warship anchored in the bay of Ḥaifā, and he had him presented magnificent weapons and luxurious garments³⁹. In 1862, the Prince of Wales paid a visit to ‘Aḳīl and also made him presents⁴⁰.

But ‘Aḳīl could as little as ‘Abd al-Ḳādir hope for effective French support for far-reaching political ambitions. He was soon to experience how little French ‘protection’ could help him. The decisive turn of events, and with it the end of his position of power in northern Palestine, came in the years 1863 and 1864⁴¹. The new Muḥāfiẓ of ‘Akkā Ḥasan Effendi, was no longer content with the control of the

town of 'Akkā, leaving the interior of the *liva* to 'Aḳīl. ('Aḳīl on his side had not dared to enter 'Akkā since his escape from exile in 1854; instead, he had a permanent personal representative to the authorities in the town). Furthermore, the rather dubious position of 'Aḳīl as a special protégé of the French consuls was a thorn in the side of the Ottoman authorities. Against payment, 'Aḳīl undertook to protect merchants pilgrims, travellers, monasteries, Christians and Jews in general; the peasants, however, were exposed to the requisitions of 'Aḳīl's followers and to the encroachments of his lieutenants, in particular of his brother Ṣālīḥ. The Muḥāfiẓ complained to the Müşir in Beirut that the *başıbozuk* wrought as much havoc as the Bedouins from whom they were supposed to be protecting the population of the *liva*. But 'Aḳīl either could or would not always repel the Bedouins. It is reported, for instance, that when staying in Nazareth in September 1858, he remained inactive while fighting was going on between various tribes in the Marj Ibn 'A' mir⁴².

In summer 1863, Bedouins from across the Jordan raided the Tiberias area causing great damage. 'Aḳīl could not prevail against them, but he remembered the striking success the Ottoman authorities had had in the Palestinian mountains with a weapon not at his disposal, i.e. with fieldpieces. The battle of Ḥaṭṭīn in 1857 still had been largely fought with spears and swords! 'Aḳīl now demanded regular soldiers and field gums from Ḥassam Effendi Aregular force of 2000 men from 'Akkā and Damascus was indeed concentrated near Tiberias; alone the news of the approaching and dreaded field artillery caused the Bedouins to retreat.

But 'Aḳīl quickly understood that this operation was also directed against himself. He saw not only his position, but himself in danger and submitted his resignation in Beirut. He hoped that it would not be accepted and that his position vis-à-vis the Muḥāfiẓ of 'Akkā would thus be strengthened. He sent a delegation of Jews from Tiberias to the Müşir who petitioned for his confirmation in office⁴³; above all, he had the French consuls in Ḥaifā and Beirut on his side. But Ḳabūlī Pasha, the Müşir, accepted his resignation. He shared the ideas and plans of the Muḥāfiẓ of 'Akkā, who wanted to make Galilee safe and to protect the area from Bedouin incursions by posting regular troops in the interior of the country and on the Jordan where forts were to be erected. 'Aḳīl was to be made dispensable.

Two factors, however, prevented this policy from succeeding in 1863. The first was the ruthless action, accompanied by atrocities, of the authorities of 'Akkā against the Bedouins which antagonized also the more or less peaceful tribes settled in the *liva*. Having been robbed of their cattle and their other belongings, they hardly and another alternative than to make common cause with tribes from east of the Jordan with whom they now fell upon peasant villages. Troops under the leadership of 'Aḳīl's brother Ṣālīḥ advanced up to Nazareth; 'Aḳīl himself had retreated to the Gaza area. The second factor was the recruitment campaign which had just been started in Palestine. Many of those liable to military service in the

district and town of Tiberias did not hasten to the Ottoman banners, but preferred to join the Bedouins.

Furthermore, as the season of exportation of the Hauran grain and of the Palestinian cotton was now beginning, the merchants and consuls everywhere in the country pressed the authorities to put an end to the prevailing disorder as they feared great financial losses. At the head of military reinforcements, Ḳabūlī Pasha therefore again proceeded to northern Palestine where he had already stayed in August, while the Serasker set out from Damascus for central and southern Palestine with a cavalry unit. Thus in October 1863, peace and quiet prevailed in Galilee. Yet Ḳabūlī Pasha began to have doubts about Ḥasan Effendi's policy and about the permanent availability of large military forces to control the area. Apart from that he was under the pressure of the French consuls who had been joined by the British consul in Ḥaifā, Sandwith, to reinstate 'Aḳīl in order to put a quick end to the disorders. Late in 1863, Ḳabūlī took this step⁴⁴, probably firmly determined to get finally rid of 'Aḳīl as soon as possible.

The execution of this intention, however, devolved upon Ḳabūlī's successor, Khū rshīd Pasha, who continued the anti-Bedouin policy even more energetically. He planned, for instance, to erect four forts armed with guns in eastern Galilee. 'Aḳīl knew what was in store for him. He asked Sandwith to mediate between him and the Mūsīr. But in spite of this, 'Aḳīl was dismissed by the end of 1864. Two hundred Kurds arrived in Tiberias to protect the district from Bedouins. Strong military forces from Beirut and 'Akkā were concentrated in Galilee. 'Aḳīl just managed to escape across the Jordan. His role had definitely come to an end, a local power factor in northern Palestine had finally been eliminated.

After his expulsion, 'Aḳīl made his way to Egypt. Through the good offices of the Egyptian ruler and of 'Abd al-Ḳādir he was allowed to return to northern Palestine in 1866⁴⁵; but he could not regain his former position of power and influence, and he no longer had ambitions of this kind. The Porte granted him the bread of charity until his death in 1870⁴⁶. Late in 1869, during the visit of the Austrian Emperor to Palestine, he had once more received a European decoration, the "Goldenes Verdienstkreuz mit der Krone" of the Habsburg Empire⁴⁷.

For nearly two decades, 'Aḳīl had been a decisive power factor in Galilee. When he returned to northern Palestine in 1866, a new chapter in the history of the country had been opened. Henceforth, the development of the area was shaped by other forces: The most fertile part of the area which had formerly been controlled by 'Aḳīl, became the property of businessmen from Beirut and Ḥaifā in 1869 and 1872. The lion's share of this land was secured by Sursuḳ who established an extremely profitable enterprise which changed the face of the Marj Ibn 'Amir⁴⁸.

We may assume that 'Aḳīl's aim had been the building up of a relatively autonomous power position in northern Palestine. In his time, Galilee was perhaps the only area of Palestine where such an attempt had chances of success. The

Nablus, Jerusalem and Hebron mountains were 'occupied'. The plains and hills of lower Galilee, however, seemed to have waited for a new master since the downfall of Jazār Pasha. But 'Aḳīl had not nearly the stature of his predecessors as local 'ruler' of northern Palestine. He failed because of his unwillingness to change his way of life and because the general line of Ottoman and European policies in the Eastern Mediterranean ran counter to his ambitions. In addition, any hope for effective outside support was an illusion.

'Aḳīl failed because a non-Bedouin life was beyond his imagination. He had not the slightest intention to 'immobilize' himself by adopting an urban, let alone peasant way of life. He thus stood in the way of the Porte which was determined to establish a 'modern' administration controlled from the centre. 'Aḳīl could not be integrated into the new structures as a basic component of the policy of the government was the repression of nomadic life and the pushing forward of the frontier of settlement. This was period of peasant **reconquista** under the control of townsmen.

But this was not a development which 'Aḳīl could catch up with in order to profit from it, or which he could resist. On the one hand, he was no longer equal to the increasing deployment of the means of power of the state on both sides of the Jordan; on the other hand, the Ottoman anti-Bedouin policy made him dispensable. And he could never count on sustained European support to uphold his position.

It would be difficult to point out significant achievements of 'Aḳīl in the field of the socio-economic development of Palestine where he spent nearly all his life, or of the well-being of the population of 'his' territory. Nowhere were the **başibozuk** known as benefactors of the peasants. Despite this fact, both in contemporary sources and in written and oral tradition, his role is judged rather positively. The written accounts, however, are from the pen of Nazarene clerics and European consuls; they were biased in favour of 'Aḳīl because of his role as 'protector of the Christians'. Until this day this seems to be the image of 'Aḳīl among the Christians of Galilee⁴⁹. In oral tradition, the fact that 'Aḳīl, an Arab, had tried to defy the Ottoman government and had been successful in this time after time during nearly two decades, also may have played a part.

* * *

Though 'Aḳīl was a special case among the local lords of Palestine, his fall was part of the overall process of decline of local power centres in Palestine in the 1850s and 1860s which was forced by Ottoman policy and European penetration and pressure. French and English attitudes towards the local lords, however, were ambivalent. On the one hand, the consuls supported the Ottoman endeavours to destroy local power, and they themselves pressed the governors to subdue the shaykhs of the mountains and to establish 'law and order'.

Some governors even sought consular approval of and applause for their efforts hoping that they would report favourably to Constantinople. Thus in summer 1855, Kāmil Pasha invited the consular corps of Jerusalem to take part in a **promenade**

militaire to the Jabal al-Khalīl. In the presence of the ‘representatives of Europe’ the village of Idnā, to which ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Amr, a refractory local lord, had retreated, was cannonaded with four field guns, looted and destroyed⁵⁰. And when in spring 1859 ‘Arrāba, where the ‘Abd al-Hāds had entrenched themselves, was taken with the aid of two field guns and perversely razed to the ground by masons summoned for that purpose, the British consul Finn reported with appreciation that since 1840 the Ottoman administration had not taken such a vigorous step in Palestine⁵¹.

On the other hand, however, local lords were courted and even supported against Ottoman governors in order to promote immediate European interests or rather the interests of European protégés in the country. The inconsistency of such a policy was clearly perceived in an internal memorandum of the French Foreign Ministry in January 1863. Especially since the Crimean War, it was argued, sympathy for the Christians of the East dominated French attitudes towards Oriental affairs; this was in keeping with an old-established tradition. At the same time, however, an early collapse of the Ottoman Empire had to be prevented. Of course, these two approaches were inconsistent; but the inconsequence of policy itself, it was said, had also become a tradition⁵².

The same contradictoriness characterized the policy of English representatives in Palestine because of their role as self-appointed ‘protectors’ of local minorities. Towards the end of the 1870s when European interests in Palestine began to become more direct, it was already deplored that the destruction of local power centres had been supported at all by England. Conder, who headed the Survey of Western Palestine and who was well-known in England, painted the vision of a Palestinian counterpart to Mount Lebanon—Palestine under the rule of old-established families and under British protection: “The policy of the Turk had been directed to the breaking up of all the native power of Syria. The ancient families have been ruined or degraded;... and quietness and peace reign in the land because a sturdy race, who within the present century were practically their own masters, have been cowed and ruined so that there is no longer any spirit left in them”. But they should again govern the country: “There are not wanting men who are honoured and respected by the people, though reduced to poverty and impotence by the Turks. Such is the pious and respected Bek of the Tokān family at Nāblus, such are the Sheikhs of the Beni Jarrār, of the Jeyūsī, the Lehḥām, and other old families, the survivors in Galilee of the proud race of Zāhir al-‘Umar and many others”. Under the supervision and guarantee of the European powers (i.e. of England) they were to be prepared to govern themselves. Why? It was England’s mission to establish “a strong native State between the (Suez) Canal and the northern danger”⁵³.

This was an early vision of the British Mandate. However, the collaborating forces on which British rule in Palestine was based in the 20th century were not to be the “respected” Beys and Sheykhs and the “survivors of the proud race” of Zāhir al-‘Umar whom Conder had had in mind.

NOTES

In this paper, I am presenting some results of a study on the socio-economic development of Palestine during the period 1856-1882 on which I have been working in the context of a research project of the Institute of Islamic Studies of the Free University of Berlin, and which was financed by the Volkswagen Foundation.

In the notes, the following abbreviations are used:

MAE	= Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris;
F.O.78	= Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office, Series 78;
HHStA	= Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (Austrian State Archives).

- 1 . Cf. Butrus Abu-Manneh, **Some Aspects of Ottoman Rule in Syria in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: Reforms, Islam, and Caliphate**, D. Phill. Thesis, Oxford 1971, p. 148.
- 2 . On the administration and the structure of local power in Ottoman Palestine until the middle of the 19th century see R.A.S. Macalister and E.W.G. Masterman, 'A History of the Doings of the Fellahin during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century', **Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statements**, 1905 and 1906; 'Umar al-Şalih al-Barghuthi wa-Khalil Ṭawṭāḥ, **Tārīkh Filasṭīn**, Jerusalem 1923; Mrs. Finn, **Palestine Peasant-ry** London 1923; Muḥammad 'Izzat Darwaza, **Al-'arab wa-l-'urūba**, vol.2, Damascus 1960; Iḥsan al-Nimr, **Tārīkh Jabal Nablus wa-l-Balka**', 4 vols., Nablus 1961-1975; Miriam Hoexter, 'The Role of the Qays and Yaman Factions in Local Political Divisions', **Asian and African Studies**, 9 (1973); Amnon Cohen, **Palestine in the 18th Century**, Jerusalem 1973; M. Abir, 'Local Leadership and Early Reforms in Palestine, 1800-1834', in Moshe Ma'oz (ed.), **Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period**, Jerusalem 1975; Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth and Kamāl Abdulfattāḥ, **Historical Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the Late 16th Century**, Erlangen 1977.
- 3 . See James Finn, **Stirring Times**, London 1878, vol.1, chap. IX, and the works by Macalister and Masterman, Barghūthi and Ṭawṭāḥ, Nimr, and Darwaza quoted in the preceding note.
- 4 . Darwaza, **op. cit.**, vol.2, pp. 163-165, 171, 188, 205.
- 5 . Darwaza, **op. cit.**, vol. 2, p. 334; Maḥmūd al-'Ābidi, **Şafad fī al-tārīkh**, Amman 1977, pp. 72 and 78; Tawfiḳ Mu'ammar, **Zāhir-'Umar**, Nazareth 1979, pp. 57-59.
- 6 . Cf. Darwaza, **op. cit.**, vol. 2, pp. 335-343.
- 7 . It seems, however, that he was not very popular there. The kāḍī of the town is reported to have said of him that he was as thirsty as the sand of the desert, and that the wealth of the country flowed into his coffers as the water of the rivers flows into the sea: Darwaza, **op. cit.**, vol. 2, p. 342.
- 8 . Most information on him contained in historical studies indirectly comes from one main source: a history of 'Aḳil found among the papers of the Nazarene clergyman Miḳhā'il Ḳa'wār which forms the basis of the relevant paragraphs of As'ad Maṣṣūr's history of Nazareth: **Tārīkh al-Nāṣira**, Cairo 1924, pp. 73-80 and 91-93. See also Finn, **Stirring Times**, vol. 1, pp. 414-432; Macalister and Masterman, **op. cit.**, part V, 1906, pp. 221-225 and 286-291 (this account is probably based on the same manuscript as that by Maṣṣūr); 'Ārif al-'Ārif, **Tārīkh Ghazza**, Jerusalem 1943, pp. 187-188; Max Freither von Oppenheim, **Die Beduinen**, vol. 2, Leipzig 1943, pp. 30-32; Moshe Ma'oz **Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861**, Oxford 1968, pp. 138-140; Walter P. Zenner, 'Aqiili Agha: The Strongman in the Ethnic Relations of the Ottoman Galilee', **Comparative Studies in Society and History**, 14 (1972), pp. 169-188 (I have not found out, however, what 'Aḳil's role had to do with 'ethnic relations...); Nāji Ḥabīb Makhkhul, **'Akka wa-ḳurāḥā min aḳdam al-azmina ila al-waḳt al-ḥādīr**, 'Akka 1979, pt. 2, pp. 15-17. The

- following account is also primarily based on Maṣṣūr; therefore only additional sources will be quoted, above all the contemporary reports of the European consuls.
- 9 . Cf. W.F. Lynch, **Narrative of the United States' Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea**, Philadelphia 1858, p. 71. 'Aḳīl escorted this expedition. His personality and his role in 1848 were closely observed and described in detail by Lynch, though with a tendency to romanticize. Perhaps unconsciously, Lynch made of 'Aḳīl whom he calls "a magnificent savage" (p. 68), a dignified and noble Indian chief.
 10. Cf. Edward Robinson, **Biblical Researches in Palestine and the Adjacent Regions**, Jerusalem 1970 (reprint), vol. III, pp. 103-105 and 110; Victor Guérin, **Description Géographique, Historique et Archéologique de la Palestine**, Amsterdam 1969 (reprint), vol. VI, pp. 420-421; C.R. Conder and H.H. Kitchener, **The Survey of Western Palestine**, Jerusalem 1970 (reprint), vol. I, pp. 269-270; Cohen, **op. cit.**, p. 12 and p. 85, note 25; Makhkhūl, **op. cit.**, pt. 2, pp. 11-15; Mu'ammar, **op. cit.**, pp. 291-292.
 11. The dreaded Bedouin chief in Nazareth of whom La Princesse de Belgiojoso (**Asie Mineure et Syrie**, Paris 1861, pp. 253-255) tells a fitting story, certainly was 'Aḳīl 'Aghā.
 12. Lynch, **op. cit.**, pp. 77-80.
 13. Maṣṣūr, **op. cit.**, pp. 78 and 80.
 14. Makhkhūl, **op. cit.**, pt. 2, p. 17.
 15. Cf. Alex Carmel, **Geschichte Haifas in der türkischen Zeit 1516-1918**, Wiesbaden 1975, pp. 18-19; Moshe Sharon, 'The Political Role of the Bedouins in Palestine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in Ma'oz (ed.), **Studies on Palestine...**, pp. 26-30.
 16. See the recent works by Cohen (**op. cit.**) and Mu'ammar (**op. cit.**).
 17. Lynch, **op. cit.**, p. 238.
 18. Oppenheim, **op. cit.**, p.32.
 19. Lynch, **op. cit.**, p. 117.
 20. Lynch, **op. cit.**, p. 89; in 1863, a brother-in-law of 'Aḳīl was found as governor of Hebron: F. de Saulcy, **Voyage en Terre Sainte**, Paris 1865, vol. 1, p. 159.
 21. Avisit to the camp of Ṣāliḥ 'Aghā ' is described in J. Lewis Farley, **Two Years in Syria**, London 1858, pp. 317-326.
 22. James Finn, **Byeways in Palestine**, London 1868, p. 81; Finn, **Stirring Times**, vol. 1, p. 425.
 23. W.M. Thomson, **The Land and the Book**, London 1894, pp. 444-445.
 24. William Hepworth Dixon, **The Holy Land**, London 1865, vol. 1, p. 184.
 25. Finn, **Stirring Times**, Vol. 1, p. 427 (Greek bishop); Macalister and Masterman, **op. cit.**, 1906, p. 288 (Latin Patriarch).
 26. **F.O.78/ 1032** (Jerusalem, 27 July, 1854)—hence not in 1855, as Maṣṣūr says (**op. cit.**, p. 75).
 27. Finn, **Stirring Times**, vol. 1, pp. 421-427 and 430-432.
 28. **F.O.78/ 1217** (Jerusalem, 2 May, 1856).
 29. Detailed reports on this event are to be found in **HHStA**, Konsulatsarchiv Jerusalem, Faszikel 39: Korrespondenzen 1857 ('Akkā-Ḥaifā, 3 and 10 April, 1857 - in Italian); **F.O.78/ 1294** (Jerusalem, 8 April, 1857). Macalister and Masterman (**op. cit.**, 1906, pp. 289 and 291) erroneously give the date as 30 March, 1858.
 30. See e.g. **F.O.78/ 1521** (Nazareth, 10 August, 1860); S.A.R. le Cte. de Paris, **Damas et le Liban**, London 1861, pp. 35-38.
 31. **Archives of the British Consulate in Jerusalem** (kept in the Israel State Archives), J 22/15 ('Akkā, 22 June, 11 August, and 31 August, 1860); **F.O.78/ 1521** (Jerusalem, 31 August, 1860); Macalister and Masterman, **op. cit.**, 1906, p. 289.
 32. Makhkhūl, **op. cit.**, pt. 1, p. 59 (facsimile of a letter) and pt. 2, p. 16.
 33. **F.O.78/ 1521** (Nazareth, 10 August, 1860).
 34. Fritz Steppat, 'Ein "Contrat Social" in einer palastinischen Stadt 1854', **Die Welt des Islams**, XV (1974), pp. 233-246.

35. Maṣṣūr, *op. cit.*, p. 93; see also **F.O.78/ 1521** (Jerusalem, 19 June, 1860).
36. Zenner, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
37. See e.g. **F.O.78/ 1521** (Jerusalem, 2 August, 1860); **F.O.78/ 1588** (Jerusalem, 2 July, 1861).
38. See e.g. **Das Heilige Land**, IV (1860), pp. 97 and 137 and V (1861), p. 46; Titus Tobler, **Nazareth in Palastina**, Berlin 1868, p. 98; Guérin, *op. cit.*, vol. VI, p. 102.
39. **F.O.78/ 1588** (Jaffa, 12 April, 1861; Jerusalem, 2 July, 1861); Tobler, *op. cit.*, p. 98; Gaston Le Hardy, **Histoire de Nazareth et de Ses Sanctuaires**, Paris 1905, pp. 227-229; Makhkhūl, *op. cit.*, pt. 2, p. 16.
40. Macalister and Masterman, *op. cit.*, 1906, p. 289; Makhkhūl, *op. cit.*, pt. 2, p. 16.
41. The following description of these events differs considerably from Maṣṣūr's account. Our account is primarily based on the Austrian and British archives: **HHStA**, Botschaftsarchiv Konstantinopel, Konsulatsberichte 1863 (reports in German, Italian and French, altogether 81 pages, from Ṣafad of 26 July, 30 July, 23 August, and 4 October, 1863; from Jerusalem of 12 August, 1863; from Ḥaifa of 18, 27, and 29 September, 1863; from Tiberias of 25 and 28 September, 1863); **F.O.78/ 1752** (Jerusalem, 7 July, 16 September, 29 September, and 28 October, 1863; Ḥaifa, 25 September, and 22 October, 1863); **F.O.78/ 1816** (Ḥaifa, 8 January, and 15 December, 1864; Beirut, 27 December, 1864); **F.O.78/ 1872** (Ḥaifa, 30 December, 1864); see also **Das Heilige Land**, VII (1863), pp. 100-103 and VIII (1864), p. 14; Dixon, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 32, 42-43, 170-186; H.B. Tristram, **The Land of Israel**, London 1882, pp. 108-109, 123-124, 407-408, 442-444, 478, 563-564 (1863-1864).
42. **F.O.78/ 1383** (Jerusalem, 29 September, 1858); see also the complaints in **Rambles in the Deserts of Syria and among the Turkomans and Bedaweens**, London 1864, p. 220.
43. The Jews of Tiberias and 'Aḳil obviously had common material interests; see **F.O.78/ 1294** (Jerusalem, 8 April, 1857): "The English-protected people of Tiberias, all Jews, are well wishers to the cause of Akeel Aga, from fear - he having of late years protected them in their farming of the taxes on receipt of a share in their gains".
44. It was probably during this stage of the conflict in 1863 that 'Aḳil paid a visit to Beirut with a large retinue and with an express guarantee of the French consul for his well-being (Maṣṣūr, *op. cit.*, p. 78): "He came to pay his respects to the pasha but had the air of a sultan" (Henry Harris Jessup, **Fifty-Three Years in Syria**, New York 1910, vol. 1, pp. 273-274).
45. **F.O.78/ 1927** (Beirut, 7 February, 1866); the Egyptian ruler was then Ismā'il, not Sa'id as Maṣṣūr (*op. cit.*, p. 80) says.
46. Not in 1866 or 1867, as Macalister and Masterman (*op. cit.*, 1906, pp. 290-291) say.
47. **HHStA**, Konsulatsarchiv Jerusalem, n. 16, Dossier "Reise S.M. des Kaisers, 8-14.11.1869".
48. On this new chapter in the history of the country see Alexander Schoelch, "European Penetration and the Economic Development of Palestine 1856-1882", in Roger Owen (ed.), **Studies in the Political Economy of Palestine in the 19th and 20th Centuries**, London 1980 (forthcoming); Alexander Schoelch, 'Ein palästinischer Repräsentant der Tanzimat-Periode: Yūsuf Diyāaddin al-Ḥalidi (1842-1906)', **Der Islam**, 57 (1980) (forthcoming).
49. Cf. Makhkhūl, *op. cit.*, pt. 1, p. 55; pt. 2, pp. 15-16.
50. **MAE**, Correspondance Politique des Consuls, Jérusalem 5 (Jerusalem, 18 August, 1855); **F.O.78/ 1120** (Hebron, 4 August, 1855; Jerusalem, 6 August, 1855).
52. **MAE**, Mémoires et Documents, vol. 116 (Note sur les affaires de l'Orient, Janvier 1863).
53. C.R. Conder, **Heth and Moab**, London 1883, pp. 375-376, 396-397, 399; for an earlier French lamento on the destruction of local rule by the Ottomans see Baptistin Poujoulat, **La Vérité sur la Syrie et l'Expédition Française**, Paris 1861, pp. 279-294.

Contents

- **The Jewish Settlement in Palestine and the Ottomans Policy**
Ali Ihsam Bagis. 3
- **Deux Révoltes bédouines en Syrie méridionale Au Moyen Age.**
Thierry Bianquis 11
- **The Palestine refugees and the role of unrwa**
Amal Al-Farhan 17
- **British documents on Palestine in St. antonys College oxford**
Derek Hopwood 39
- **Iraq and the Palestine question 1921-1941**
Abbas Kelidar 55
- **The Status of the Muslims under European rule: The eviction of the Cerkes
From the caucasia and the balkans and their Settlement in Syria**
Kemal H. Karpat 67
- **The question of zionism in the Arab Press. 1908-1914**
Rashid Khalidi 93
- **The decline of local power in palestine after 1856: the Case of Aḳīl-AGHA**
Alexander Schoelch 113