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

Letter of Prophet MOHAMMAD to Heracl

Edited

by

Muhammad Adnan Bakhit

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Contents

INTRODUCTION

The papers in this collection treat various issues in the history of Bilad al-Sham during the critical century which witnessed the end of Byzantine and Persian rule in the region with the advent of Islam and the Arab conquests.

Questions of historiography are adressed in two of the studies. In examining the problem of early Arabic historiography in Syria, Fred Donner turns to the Syrian hadith scholars to remedy the paucity of historical accounts on the Islamic community in Bilad al-Sham pre-dating the second Islamic century. Lawrence Conrad calls for a reappraisal of al-Azdi's *Futuh al-Sham*, rejecting contemporary criticisms of the third/ninth century text as excessive or ill-founded, arguing instead that the work represents an important historical source if approached with discernment.

Comparative perspectives of Persian, Byzantine and Muslim rule over Bilad al-Sham are presented in three studies. Michael Morony considers the socio-economic consequences of nineteen years of Persian rule in Syria (610-629 C.E.), with a comparative analysis of the attitudes of Jewish and Jacobite communities to the transfer of authority from Byzantine, to Persian, to Arab Muslim rule. J.M. Fiey, on the other hand, examines the impact of Byzantine rule over the lands north of Baghdad taken in the last Byzantine campaign into Persia. Reviewing the influence of the seven-year Byzantine occupation on local Nestorian and Jacobite Christian communities, the article sheds light on the ready acceptance of subsequent Muslim rule. In light of Byzantine persecution of Syrian Jewry, Stefan Leder attempts to reconstruct the attitudes of the Jewish community to the Islamic conquests, considering the possibility of Jewish cooperation and even collaboration with the Muslims.

Three studies examine Arab-Byzantine military history. Ernst Axel Knauf provides a detailed account of the battles of Mu'ta and Yarmuk, with a description of topographic and strategic feature which proved decisive in the outcome of these. In the absence of a developed Byzantine military strategy, Walter Kaegi examines the body of ideas which influenced Heraclius in his campaign against the Arabs. Following the Byzantine withdrawal from Bilad al-Sham, C.E. Bosworth elaborates on the defensive strategy adopted by Heraclius to protect Asia Minor against Arab incursion, noting the success of this system in preventing the loss of territory from 636 to 680 C.E.

In papers considering related influences between Byzantium and Islam, Maurice Sartre provides a socio-economy of the Hawran region just prior to the Islamic conquest. S. Gero addresses the current debate which

seeks to link the iconoclasm of the Umayyad caliph Yazid II and Byzantine emperor Leo III, concluding that available evidence does not support direct transmission so much as a notion of parallel development in Muslim and Byzantine cultures.

Archaeology, numismatics and traditional historical sources are exploited to cast new light on the first century of Arab rule in Bilad al-Sham. R.J. Hebert provides a description and outline classification of the coinage of Bilad al-Sham cast in relation to the history of the region. Hugh Kennedy draws on the Muslim sources to chronicle the origins of the Qays and Yaman factions in the power struggle which followed the death of the caliph Mu'awiya. Using archaeological evidence, Dr. Kennedy concludes that the defeat of the Qays at Marj Rahit ushered in a period of power and prosperity. A.C. Killick presents preliminary archaeological findings at Udruh, exploiting these and other historical and epigraphic sources pertinent to Udruh during the early Islamic conquests.

An additional paper by E. Van Donzel moves the study from Bilad al-Sham in the first Islamic century to "Arabic and Islam in Holland during the XVII Century," in which Dr. Van Donzel traces the origins of, and landmarks in Dutch studies of Arabic and Islam.

Dr. M.A. Bakhit

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It gives me pleasure here to acknowledge the great support which we have received from the President of the University, Dr. Abd al-Salam al-Majali, as well as the encouragement of Dr. Muhammad Hamdan of Yarmouk University. Particular appreciation is due to Mrs. M. Matthews, who kindly proof-read the English texts, and to Mr. Noufan Al-Hmoud, who was kind enough to prepare the index. Mr. Muhammad Abbadi gave of his valuable time to follow this text through the press. Had it not been for the patience and perseverance of the Director of the Jordan University Press, Mr. Mahmud Buruni, this text would not have been finished within so short a time.

Though the publication of this volume is a result of the efforts of many, all shortcomings remain my sole responsibility.

Dr. M.A. Bakhit

Amman
September 20, 1987.

The Problem of Early Arabic Historiography in Syria

Fred M. Donner, The University of Chicago

I. Introduction

Until recently, discussions of the rise of early Arabic historical writing focused almost entirely upon developments in Iraq and the Hijaz (particularly Medina). Not only were the Iraqi and Medinese historical traditions far better preserved than the Syrian; there was also a general perception that Arabic historiography in Syria really only developed at a late date, and that it never matched Medina or Iraq in its output. H.A.R Gibb claimed that the monographic treatment of historical episodes after the death of the Prophet Muhammad was limited to Iraq[1]. Similarly, ʿAbd al - ʿAzîz al-Dûrî's *The Rise of Historical Writing Among the Arabs*[2] presented a survey of the historical schools of Medina and Iraq, but contained only passing references to Syria, and thus implicitly denied that there was a significant Syrian tradition of historical writing. Julius Wellhausen and Sami Dahan both admitted that an early Syrian historiographical tradition had existed, but had little of substance to say about it[3].

This point of view derived, of course, from the fact that the most important surviving historical compilations for the study of the early Islamic community--at least, those most readily accessible before the 1960s--were marked by a bias in favor of the Iraqi, or to a lesser extent the Medinese, interpretation of Islamic history. Al-Ṭabarî (d. 310/923), for example, relied overwhelmingly on Iraqi or Medinese informants for his accounts of the events of the early Islamic period, and only rarely cites Syrian informants--*even when he relates episodes in the history of Syria.* Of the approximately 200 separate accounts in his *Histroy* dealing with the history of Syria from the beginnings of the Islamic conquest (12 A.H.) to the year 100 A.H., about 80% are provided with *isnâds* tracing the account to

1. H.A.R. Gibb, *"Ta'rikh," El* (1st ed.), Supplement.
2. Original title: *Nash'at 'ilm al-ta'rikh 'indal-'Arab* (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1960). English translation by Lawrence I. Conrad (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
3. J. Wellhausen, *Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (2nd. ed., Berlin: de Gruyter, 1960), p. xii; Sami Dahan, "The Origin and Development of the Local Histories of Syria," in Bernard Lewis and P.M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 108-117.

Iraqi or Medinese informants-- in particular, Sayf b. ʿUmar (d. ca. 180), al-Wâqidî (d. 207), and al-Madâ'inî (d. ca- 235). Of the remaining 20% many are given with incomplete *isnâds,* and hence may also in fact derive from Iraqi or Medinese sources. Indeed, even the overall balance of information offered in al-Ṭabarî's *History* reinforced this impression of a highly developed Iraqi and Medinese historiography, contrasted with a poorly developed early Syrian historiography, for it devotes overwhelmingly more space to events in the Hijaz and in Iraq than to events in Syria.

Other Iraqi or Medinese compilations tended in general to confirm the apparent infirmity of the Syrian historiographical tradition. Al-Yaʿqûbî' rarely provides references to his sources in his *History,* but when he does, it is usually to the Medinese al-Wâqidî. Al-Dînawarî and al-Masʿûdî similarly seem to follow largely Iraqi traditions. Only the *Futûḥ al-buldân* of al-Balâdhurî (d.279) seems to provide a bit more balanced view, for its material on Syria relied on Syrian as well as Iraqi and Medinese informants. It was largely this evidence that led Wellhausen and Dahan to posit the existence of an historical tradition in Syria, most of it lost except for scattered fragments.

More recent scholarship has begun to reexamine these issues, however, largely on the basis of new information provided by historical compilations of Syrian, rather than Iraqi, origin. In general terms, the study of the development of early Islamic *ḥadîth* has shown that Syria was an active center of *ḥadîth* study in the first three Islamic centuries. While the study of *ḥadîth* is not by any means the same as the study of history, the two were, in the early Islamic period, closely related, and many of the earliest "historians" were first and foremost *ḥadîth* scholars who related historical ***akhbâr,*** and not merely *akhbâr* about the Prophet or his immediate companions. The presence in Syria of many well-known *muḥaddithûn,* such as Makḥûl al-Shâmî (d. 112-119), al-Awzâʿî (d. 157), and others, then, might be seen as providing an appropriate milieu in which the development of history could also have flourished[4]. An examination of the activities of Syrian traditionists, then, such as that undertaken by Malika Abyaḍ, *Al-Tarbiya wal-thiqâfa al-ʿarabiyya al-islâmiyya fîl-Shâm wal-Jazîra Khilâl al-qurûn al-thalâtha al-'Ulâlil-hijra,* on the basis of Ibn ʿAsâkir's *Ta'rîkh madînat Dimashq*[5]-- can provide important background material for the study of early Islamic historiography in Syria.

4. For a different opinion, however, see the discussion on p. 15 below.

5. Beirut: Dâr al-ʿilm lil-malâyîn, 1980. I have not seen the French original of this work, *Culture et education arabo-islamiques au Sham pendant les trois premiers siecles de l'Islam.*

With regard to historiography in particular, even scrutiny of al-Balâdhurî's *Futûḥ* brings to light the names of some Syrian historians and compilers from the second and third centuries A.H., and an examination of Syrian compilations not utilized by earlier researchers confirms and augments this information. Gernot Rotter's examination of the manuscript of the *Ta'rîkh* of Abû Zurʿa al-Dimashqî (d. 281)[6] provided him with the opportunity to make some general remarks on a number of these Syrian historians-- Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz al- Tanûkhî (d. 167 or 168), al-Walîd b. Muslim (d. 195 or 196), Abû Mushir al-Ghassânî (d. 218), and Ibn ʿA'idh (d. 233 or 234)-- and on their relationship to Abû Zurʿa's work[7].

On the basis of these studies, it now seems clear that in the second half of the second century and in the third century A.H., Syria was the scene of historiographical activity roughly comparable to that of Iraq and Medina. The figures mentioned by Rotter, as well as others, such as Abû Ḥafṣ al-Dimashqî and Hishâm b. ʿAmmâr al- Dimashqî (d. 245), appear to have been actively writing historical compilations during this period[8], most of which unfortunately have not survived.

What is not yet so clear is whether Syria was a center of historiographical activity before the middle of the second century A.H. (ca. 770 A.D.). That is, were the later Syrian historians of the second and third centuries transmitting an indigenous early Syrian tradition, or were they essentially conveying material of Iraqi or Medinese origin? (The latter possibility is not as improbable as it might at first seem; Rotter has shown, for example, that Abu Zurʿa derives most of his material about the life of the Prophet form Iraqi or Medinese informants, even though he cites Syrians, as well as Iraqis and Medinese, in dealing with other subjects.) If this were the case, it might explain in part why later Iraqi sources such as al-Ṭabarî fail to cite Syrian authorities for information about the early Islamic period: because there was, in essence, nothing to cite. It would also suggest that the

6. The text has since been edited and published on the basis of the (unique) Istanbul manuscript by Shukrallâh al-Qûjânî., (2 vols.,Damascus: Majmʿa al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya, 1980).

7. Ger not Rotter, "Abû Zurʿa ad-Dimašqî (st. 281/894) und das Problem der frühen arabischen Geschichtsschreibung in Syrien;" *Die Welt des Orients* 6 (1971), pp. 80-104. On these authorities, see pp. 99ff.

8. *Pace* S. Dahan, "... Local Histories of Syria," who states (p. 109): "During the 2nd/8th century not a single historian in Syria is known who was working on the history of his country."

disappearance of the later Syrian compilations (e.g., that of al-Walîd b. Muslim) might not represent such a loss to us, because much of their material, being in that case of Iraqi or Medinese origin, might be preserved in Iraqi works in any case. On the other hand, if Syria did have its own historiographical tradition before ca. 150 A.H., we must ask what its scope was, who its practitioners were, and why more of their material has not survived--the latter, especially, a question that bears weighty implications also for our understanding of the reliability of later Iraqi and Medinese historical tradition.

Finding definitive answers for such a battery of questions will require a thorough investigation of the whole early Islamic historiographical tradition, and is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. The following pages, however, attempt to contribute to such an investigation by taking a detailed look at six early Syrian traditionists, selected because their names occurred in the *isnâds* of historical accounts, to see if there is any justification for considering them to have been early historians as well as traditionists. The six individuals--three from the generation dying around 110A.H. (728-9 A.D.), three from the generation dying around 150A.H. (767- 8A.D.)-- were selected rather arbitrarily, moreover, and should not be thought of as necessarily typical; other individuals, when examined, may turn out to be of considerably more (or less) important than any of these six as early historians. On the other hand, the most prominent names in each generation (e.g., Makhûl) were in this case intentionally avoided. While we cannot hope to generalize broadly about early Arabic historiography in Syria from this limited sampling, we can hope that our compilation of information will at least shed a little light on the subject and point the way to further questions in need of resolution.

II. Six Syrian Traditionists

Sulaymân b. Mûsâ

One prominent Syrian traditionist during the latter years of the first century A.H. was Sulaymân b. Mûsâ "al-Ashdaq", a *mawlâ* of the Umayyad family of Abu Sufyân[9]. He lived in the district of "al-Farâdîs" in the suburbs of Damascus, and died between A.H. 115 and 119; the latter date

9. On Sulaymân b. Mûsâ generally, see *Tahdhîb* 4/226-227; *TMD* VII, fol. 256b, lines 30-34; I.S. VIIB, 163; *Mizan* 2/225-226 (no. 3518); Khalîfa, *Ta'rikh* 2/517.

is most frequently given[10]. He may have been on familiar terms with the caliph Hisham, if the accounts of his death--said to have occurred while visiting the caliph in al-Rusafa--are true[11]. The later Syrian authorities Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz al-Tanûkhî (d. 167 or 168) and Abu Mushir al-Ghassani (d. 218), among others, called him the "most learned of the *ahl al-Shâm* after Makḥûl" (d. 112-119), and many accounts praise his qualities as a teacher and the range of his learning[12]. He appears to have favored memorization of accounts and thougtful selection of those memorized, over writing accounts down, and is said to have stressed the careful interrogation *(mas'ala)* of informants as the key to attaining true religious knowledge *('ilm)*[13].

Like most early scholars, he is known primarily as a transmitter of *ḥadîth;* a number of these dealt with details of ritual law, such as the pilgrimage rituals at ʿArafât and Muzdalifa, or questions of ritual purity *(ṭahâra)*[14]. By far the most important account transmitted on his authority, however, is the very famous and widespread *ḥadîth* traced via ʿÂ'isha to the effect that a woman cannot marry without the permission of her guardian,

10. **Divergent dates:** *TMD* VII, fol. 264a, *infra.* **Residence:** *TMD* VII, fol. 260a, lines 32-40 (...Abû Mushir--q--SbA).

11. *TMD* VII, fol. 264a, lines 2-7; Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrikh* 250 (no. 309), 695 (no. 2154). Sulaymân b. Mûsâ is said to have died from a medicine administered by Hishâm's court physician. On learning of his fate, Hishâm ordered the physician to take some of the medicine himself, whereupon the physician also died. This policy was doubtless less costly than maintaining malpractice insurance.

12. *TMD* VII, fol. 260a, lines 32-40 (...Abu Mushir--q--SbA); *Mîzân* 2/226, *Tahdhîb* 4/226, *"faqîh ahl al-Shâm* in his time;" *TMD VII* fol. 261a, lines 30-35, *"sayyid shabâb ahl al-Shâm"* (...Ismâʿîl b. ʿAyyâsh--h--al-Muṭʿim b. al-Miqdâm--s--ʿAṭa' b. Abî Rabâh) Cf. also *TMD* VII, fol. 260b, lines 5-8 (Abû Zurʿa); fol. 260b, line 40-fol 261a, line 5 (...Marwân b. Muḥammad--ana--al-Haytham b. Aḥmad--hi--Yazîd b. Wâqid); fol. 261a, lines 11ff (...Marwân b. Muḥammad < Ibn Lahîʿa); fol. 262a, lines 34-38 (SbA) and *infra;* fol. 262a, lines 38-41 (al-Zuhrî); Abû Zurʿa, *Ta'rikh* 317 (no.597); al-Basawî 1/141, 2/335, 2/393, 2/394, 2/396, 2/397, 2/410.

13. Abû Zurʿa, *Ta'rikh* 317 (no. 598), 318 (no. 599,600,603), 319 (no.604); *TMD* VII, fol. 262b, lines 32ff. See also I.S. VIIB, 163: Sulaymân b. Mûsâ was the one who used to interrogate ʿAṭa' (b. Abî Rabâḥ). On the other hand, note *TMD* VII, fol. 263a, *infra,* where it is claimed that Sulaymân wrote down his *ḥadith. Mîzân* 2/225, Sulaymân relates *ḥadîths* from "a book he had memorized *"(bi-ṣaḥîfatin qad ḥafiẓa-hû).*

14. **Pilgrimage rituals:** *TMD* VII, fol. 257a, lines 5-9 (...ʿAbd al-Raḥmân b. Abî Ḥusayn--?--Sulaymân b. Mûsâ<Jubayr b. Muṭʿim<Prophet). **Purity:** *TMD* VII, fol. 257a, lines 9-11 (--?Ḥamâm?<Sulaymân b. Mûsâ<Nâfiʿ<Ibn ʿUmar<Prohet). **Prayer:** al-Basawî 2/339 (...Burd b. Sinân--ha--Sulaymân b. Mûsâ<Makḥûl<Kathîr b. Murra<Qays b. Marthad al-Judhâmî<Nuʿaym b. Ḥabbâr al-Ghaṭafânî<Prophet). **Jihâd:** al-Basawî 1/304 (...al-Walîd b. Muslim--ha--Muaḥmmad b. al-Muhâjir < al-Ḍaḥḥâk al-Maʿâfirî < Sulaymân b. Mûsâ < Kurayb, *mawlâ* of Ibn ʿAbbâs); Al-Basawî 2/312 (...Ibn Jurayj<Sulaymân b.Mûsâ<Mâlik b. Yukhâmir--hi--Muʿâdh b. Jabal<Prophet). **Slavery:** *Mîzân* 2/226 (...al-Walîd<Ḥafṣ b. Ghaylân < Sulaymân b. Mûsâ < Ibn ʿUmar and Jâbir).

and that the state *(sulṭân)* serves as guardin if no kinsman exists[15]. He also conveyed some accounts that describe events in the life of the Prophet, in one instance in the context of explaining the revelation of a verse of the *Qur'ân*[16]. Opinion was divided regarding his reliability as a transmitter of *ḥadîth,* however; while most later authorities adjudged him trustworthy *(thiqa),* a few claimed that he was "not strong" or noted "some disturbance" *(iḍṭirâb)* in his *ḥadîth,* or said that although reliable, he conveyed some "isolated" *(munfarid) ḥadîth,* i.e., accounts not supported by *isnâds* independent of him[17].

Whatever his role in the transmission of *ḥadîth,* however, Sulaymân b. Mûsâ also served as the source of some historical information about events in his lifetime. One account describes how the *isnad* came to be used during his day[18]. Especially interesting is an account related by Sulayman and found in al-Ṭabarî's *Ta'rîkh* dealing with the siege of Constantinople by Maslama b. 'Abd al-Malik in A.H. 98[19]. This account, which describes in several sentences some details of the siege, was communicated from Sulayman by one of his students, Thawr b. Yazîd al-Kalâcî (d. 150-155), to al-Wâqidî. It is the only account of this kind on Sulaymân's authority found in al-Tabari's compilation–but considering Sulaymân's close contacts with an important Umayyad family one wonders whether he may have been the

15. *Mîzân* 2/225, *TMD* VII, fol. 257a-257b: dozens of versions with different *isnâds.* There are some curiosities about the transmission of this *ḥadîth,* however. For example, while most *isnâds* supporting it trace it through al-Zuhrî (d. 124), one account (fol. 258a, lines 3-5:.. al-Zuhrî <Ibn Jurayj) has al-Zuhrî expressing doubts about the authenticity of the *ḥadîth.* This is countered by another account (fol. 258b-259a) in which it is claimed that al-Zuhri merely forgot this *ḥadîth* -- hence, apparently, his later statement questioning its authenticity. Fol. 258b, *infra,* and *Mîzân,* many accounts state that only the *isnâd* tracing the *ḥadîth* through Sulaymân is sound– i.e., that the *ḥadîth* is without parallel supporting chains.

16. Bal. *Ansâb* (ed. Ḥamîdullâh), 575 and 576 (both Hishâm b. 'Ammâr--ha--al-Walîd b. Muslim<SbA<Sulaymân b. Mûsâ--q) Ibn Hishâm 456 ('Abd al-Raḥmân b. al-Ḥârith and others<Sulaymân b. Mûsâ<Makḥûl<Abû Umâma al-Bâhilî<'Ubada b. al-Ṣâmit) on Badr as occasion for revelation of part of *sûrat al-anfâl.*

17. *Tahdhid* 4/226-227; *Mîzân* 2/225; *TMD* VII, fol. 263a, *infra.* Cf. *TMD* VII, fol. 259b, *infra,* and fol. 263a, lines 19-21: some objectionable accounts *(manâkir)* among his *ḥadîths.*

18. *Abû Zur'a, Ta'rîkh* 316 (no. 593) (al-Walîd b. Muslim--ha--SbA < Sulaymân b. Mûsâ); al-Basawî 2/411 (similar *isnâd).* The text is difficult, and not exactly identical in the two versions. If the account is true, it supports the conclusions of J. Horovitz, "Alter und Ursprung des Isnâd, "*Der Islam* 8 (1918), pp. 39-47, and G.H.A. Juynboll, "The date of the great fitna," *Arabica* 20 (1973), pp. 142-159, who placed first use of *isnads* in the last third of the first century A.H., and contradicts those of J.Schacht, "A Revaluation of Islamic Traditions, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1949, pp. 143-154, who argued for a later date..

19. Tab. II/1314-1315 (Waq--h--Thawr b. Yazîd< Sulaymân b. Mûsâ).

source of considerably more information of this kind that was once recorded but has since gone lost. Certainly Sulayman did not lack students to transmit his *ḥadîth* --about twenty-five transmitters are said to have transmitted his material[20]--but not all may have been interested (as Thawr b. Yazîd evidently was) in handing on materials other than *ḥadîth*.

Khalid b. Maʿdan al-Kalaʿi

Another early figure of interest to us is Khâlid b. Maʿdân al-Kalâʿî; he evidently lived in Ḥimṣ, but is said to have died in Anṭarṭûs sometime between 103 and 108 A.H.[21] The overwhelming impression that comes across in accounts about him is his exemplary piety. He is described as having had a mark on his forehead from numerous prostrations in prayer, and various authorities speak of how people were afraid to speak of worldly things in his presence, and give examples of his own many pious sayings[22]. In one lengthy account about his death, he is even called a *badîl,* i.e., one of the seventy righteous men, no one of whom dies except God substitutes another for him, so their number is always seventy[23]. Of special interest, however, is evidence of Khâlid b. Maʿdân's close connections with the Umayyad regime. He was in charge of the police *(shurṭa)* of the caliphs Muʿâwiya and Yazîd, and the caliph al-Walîd. ʿAbd al-Malik wrote to him about a point of law, subsequently imposing Khâlid's opinion on his judges[24]. He is variously described as corresponding with ʿAbd al-Malik and as hearing that caliph deliver a sermon, again suggesting his close contacts with the ruling house[25]. He was present at the siege of Constantinople in 98A.H. with Maslama b. ʿAbd al-Malik, who took along the notables of

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20. See list in *Tahdhîb* 4/226-227 and *TMD* VII, fol. 256b, lines 34-39.

21. *Tahdhîb* 3/119; I.S. VIIB, 162; Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrikh* 243 (no. 283); 694 (no. 2144); *TMD* V,fol 186a, lines 12-15; Khalîfa, *Taʾrikh* 2/495. Presumably the Khâlid b. Maʿdân mentioned in Bal. *Ansâb* IVA (ed.Kister/Schloessinger) p. 145, line 12 (=ed.ʿAbbâs, p. 170) among the Basrans sent to fight the Kharijite rebel al-Mustawrid b.ʿUllafa is a different person, as our Khâlid is never known to have gone to Iraq.

22. Al-Basawî 2/385 (...Baqiyya- ha--ʿUthmân b. Miqsâm--q); I.S. VIIB, 162; *TMD* V, fol. 186b, lines 36-39; fol. 186b-187a; fol. 187b, *infra*. Other accounts stress his God-fearing piety and zeal for Islam in different ways: cf. Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrîkh* 350 (no. 721), 370 (no. 799); *TMD* V, fol. 187a, lines 16-20; *Mîzân* 1/375 (no. 1406); *ʿUyûn* 2/369, lines 10-11; *ʿIqd* 3/18. One wonders how many of these pious phrases were later "raised" to the status of Prophetic *ḥadîths* by later transmitters: cf.G.H.A. Juynboll, *Muslim Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) *infra* on this phenomenon.

23. *TMD* V, fol. 187b, lines 31-41.

24. **Police:** *TMD* V, fol. 185b, lines 4-5; fol. 186b, lines 17-19, 20-23. **Legal advice:** Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrîkh* 351 (no. 723), 601 (no. 1701); *TMD* V, fol. 186b, lines 30-33.

25. **Correspondence:** *Mîzân* 1/374 (no. 1406) (q--Baqiyya (b. al-Walîd). **Sermon:** al-Basawî 2/226 (Saʿîd (b. ʿÂmir al-Ḍubaʿî) < Ḥamîd b. al-Aswad<Thawr b. Yazîd<Khâlid b. Maʿdân).

Syria *(wûjuh ahl al-Shâm),* including Khâlid[26]. He was evidently listed on the state's payroll until his death, for Yazîd b. ʿAbd Rabbihi claimed to have read in the *dîwân al-catâ'* that Khâlid b. Maʿdân died in the year 104[27].

As a *ḥadîth* scholar, Khâlid b. Maʿdân was generally adjudged reliable, and claimed to have reached seventy companions of the Prophet[28]. Many of his prominent successors, including Thawr b. Yazîd (Who did not hesitate to memorize a *ḥadîth* if he had heard it from Khâlid) and al-Awzâʿi (d.157) held him in highest esteem[29]. Moreover, unlike his slightly younger contemporary Sulaymân b. Mûsâ, Khâlid did not object to writing down his knowledge; his student Buḥayr b. Saʿd claimed that he kept his learning in a book *(muṣḥaf)* having buttons and button-loops[30].

The materials transmitted on Khalid's authority are quite various. There are, of course, numerous *ḥadîths,* most of them of a clearly didactic, moralizing, or polemical character--that is, few have the from of descriptive "historical" accounts about the life of the Prophet himself[31]. Other accounts tell of the "Sufyânî", or interpret verses of the Qurâ'n in a very pro-Syrian fashion[32]. Khâlid also provides several accounts giving details of the life of Abu l-Dardâ'(d. 31 A.H.), a companion of the Prophet who settled in Syria and served both as a model of piety and as an important link to the Prophet for later Syrian traditionists[33]. While these latter might be considered

26. Tab. 11/1314-1315 (Waq-h--Thawr b. Yazîd <Sulaymân b. Mûsâ).

27. *TMD* V, fol. 188a, lines 26-28 (...Abû Maymûn--ana-Abû Zurʿa-hi--Yazîd b. ʿAbd Rabbihi). Curiously, this account is not found in the printed edition of Abû Zurʿa's *Ta'rikh.* Yazîd b. ʿAbd Rabbihi al-Zubaydî (d.224) was a Ḥimsî scholar who is said to have transmitted *ḥadîths* from, among others, Abû Zurʿa: *Tahdhîb* 11/344-345.

28. *Tahdhîb* 3/119; I.S. VIIB, 162; Abû Zurʿa, *Ta'rikh* 350 (no. 718); *TMD* V, fol. 186b, lines 2-8, 8-11. Cf. the large number of informants listed for him in *TMD* V, fol. 185b, lines 5-12, and *Tahdhîb* 3/119.

29. Abû Zurʿa, *Ta'rikh* 350 (no. 719, 720), 360 (no. 766); *Tahdhîb* 3/119. Even the great Makḥûl felt uneasy when he found himself differing in opinion with Khâlid on a point of law: al-Basawî 2/399 (...Abû Mushir--ha-SbA--q). Only one stray account lists Khâlid among the *qadariyya:* Ibn Qutayba, *Maʿârif* (ed. ʿUkkâsha) 625, line 14; it is probably an error.

30. *Tahdhîb* 3.119; Abû Zurʿa, *Ta'rikh* 349-350 (no. 717); *TMD* V, fol. 186b, lines 15-16, 23-26 (... Yazîd b. ʿAbd Rabbihi--s--Baqiyya-h--Buḥayr b. Saʿd).

31. Some examples outside the standard *ḥadîth* collectins: Ibn Hishâm 106 = Tab. *Tafsîr* 3/82 (no. 2070) = Tab. 1/979; Ibn Hishâm 197; *Mîzân* 1/374-5 (no. 1406); *ʿUyûn* 1/2 lines 16-18; al-Basawî 2/312-313, 344 (all...Thawr b. Yazîd<Khâlid b. Maʿdân...); *ʿUyûn* 2/89, lines 10-13; al-Basawî 1/287, 1/340-341, 2/346-7, 2/347, 2/348; Tab. *Tafsîr* 8/249-250 (no. 9224).

32. **Sufyânî** *TMD* I ((Munajjid) 605, lines 10-15 and 19-22 (...Arṭa'a b. Mundhir and Muʿâwiya b. Ṣâliḥ < Sinân b. Qays < Khâlid b. Maʿdân); **Qur'ân:** *TMD* I (Munajjid), 205 lines 5-10 (...Bahr b. Nasr--nâ--Bishr b. Bakr--hi--Umm ʿAbdullâh<Khâlid b. Maʿdan).

33. E.g., I.S. VIIB, 118, lines 15-17 (I.S.--aka--authorities other than Waq< Thawr b Yazîd Khâlid b. Maʿdân), on his death-date; Tab. 1/2826-2827 (Waql--hi--Thawr b. Yazîd<Khâlid b. Maʿdân < Jubayr b. Nufayr), piety of Abûl-Dardâ', set in context of Muslim raid on Cyprus; al-Basawî 3/398 (...ʿAbdullâh b. al-Mubârak<Thawr b. Yazîd< Khâlid b. Maʿdân--q--Abûl-Dardâ'), wisdom of Abûl-Dardâ'.

slightly more "historical" in character, none of these materials would qualify Khâlid b. Maʿdan as anything but a traditionist. We also find, however, a collection of about twenty accounts on Khâlid's authority in al-Ṭabarîs *Taʾrîkh,* most of them dealing with the conquest of Syria by the Muslims[34]. Khâlid's close ties to the Umayyad authorities in Syria may well have put him in a position to consult both official documents and individuals that could have told him much about the conquest of Syria, and so the presence of such a body of accounts may seem quite persuasive evidence of Khâlid's interest in historical matters. These accounts are, however, so different in character from others bearing Khâlid's name, and the transmission of them is so problematic (they are all pruportedly conveyed via unknown authorities to the Iraqi author Sayf b.ʿUmar), that we must remain skeptical about their validity until further research clarifies the question of Sayf's sources, or turns up more accounts of this kind traced from Khalid via transmitters other than Sayf.

ʿUbada b. Nusayy

Our third figure from this early generation of traditionists is ʿUbâda b. Nusayy al-Kindî (d.118A.H.); he evidently served as judge in Tiberias under ʿAbd al-Malik, and then was appointed governor (i.e., military governor?) of Jordan (al-Urdunn) by ʿUmar b.ʿAbd al- Azîz[35]. He is presented in the biographical sources as fearless in his criticism of the morals of the caliphs--when the news of Hishâm's mutilation and execution of Ghaylân al-Dimashqî reached him, he supposedly vowed to write the caliph that he disapproved of such a violation of custom and justice; he is also portrayed (in a very pro-Kindite tradition) as a bulwark against Islam's enemies[36]. He evidently transmitted *ḥadîth* from many companions and had a great

34. The accounts in question are Tab. 1/2086-89; 1/2090-95; 1/2095-2100; 1/2100; 1/2101; 1/2147; 1/2147-48; 1/2150-55; 1/2395-96; 1/2396-98; 1/2404; 1/2405-07; 1/2407; 1/2820;1/2821; 1/2824 (all dealing with the conquest of Syria); 1/2867 (governors in Syria). Some of these are also found in *TMD* I (Munajjid), e.g.p. 484, 513-519,529.

35. Khalîfa, *Ṭabaqât* 11/794 (no. 2939); I.S. VIIB, 162; *Tahdhîb* 5/113-114; Khalîfa, *Taʾrîkh* 2/516; *TMD* VIII, fol. 272b, lines 16-24; fol. 273a, lines 27-30 (in charge of *jund al-Urdunn)*; fol. 273b, lines 12-14, Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrîkh* 339 (no. 671), Khalîfa, *Taʾrîkh* 1/465 *(ʿâmil al-Urdunn); TMD* VIII, fol. 273b. lines 14-16. Khalîfa *(Ṭabaqât)* calls him a Ḥimṣî; Ibn ʿAsâkir, a Jordanian *(TMD)* VIII, for. 272b, line 16). Cf. *TMD* VIII, fol. 273a, lines 35-40, and al-Basawî, 2/329 (...Abû Mushir--s--Kâmil b. Salama), where he is called *sayyid ahl al-Urdunn,* whereas Amr b. Qays is *sayyid ahl al-Ḥimṣ;* cf. Abu Zur a, *Taʾrîkh* 249 (no. 307), 711 (no. 2253).

36. **Ghaylân:** *TMD* VIII, fol. 273b, lines 30-34 (...al-Haytham b. Khârija-no-ʿAbdullâh b. Sâlim al-Ḥimṣî--na-Ibrâhîm b. Abî ʿAbla), cf. Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrîkh* 370 (no. 800). **Kindite tradition:** fol. 273a, line 40-fol. 273b, line 15 (...Abû Mushir--hi-Mughîra b.Mughîra al-Ramlî--q--Maslama b. ʿAbd al-Malik); Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrîkh* 337 (no.662), 711 (no. 2254).

number of students who passed on his information, and was considered trustworthy in *ḥadîth*[37].

In addition to relating *hadiths*, ʿUbada also dealt with events unrelated to the life of the Prophet, as a number of surviving accounts show. Some of these are concerned with religious themes, or with the cultivation of religious knowledge. These include an interpretation of a verse in the *Qurʾân* by a contemporary of ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz[38]; information about the traditionists ʿAbdullah-Ṣanâbiḥî, ʿUqba b. ʿĀmir al-Juhanî, and Hishâm's governor of al-Urdunn, Isḥâq b. Qabîṣa[39] and even an account praising the religious knowledge of ʿAbd al-Malik[40].

Other accounts transmitted by ʿUbâda, however, deal with political events or other matters that only indirectly, at best, involve religion. One, describing the conquest and booty at Qinnasrîn, was communicated via the Syrian authority Yaḥyâ b. Ḥamza to Hishâm b. ʿAmmâr al-Dimashqî (d.245)[41]. Another account, related from ʿUbada via the Syrian authority Hishâm b. al-Ghâz (d.ca. 156), tells of Muʿâwiya b. Abi Sufyân's raids deep in Byzantine Anatolia in the region of ʿAmmûriyya[42] and the garrisons he established there, about 25 A.H. (ca. 646 A.D.).[43] A third tradition, related by

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37. See lists of his informants and students in *Tahdhîb* 5/113-114; *TMD* VIII, fol. 272b, lines 16-24. For an example of his *ḥadîth*, see al-Basawî 1/316, dealing with a detail of ritual purity, *al-mash ʿalâl-khuffayn* (...Yaḥyâ b. Ayyûb<ʿAbd al-Raḥmân b. Razîn<Muḥammad b. Yazîd b. Abî Ziyâd< Ayyûb b. Qaṭan<ʿUbâda b. Nusayy< Ubayy b.ʿUmâra<Prophet).

38. For example, Tab. *Tafsîr* 9/526 (no. 11100), gloss to *Qurʾân* 5:3. The *isnâd* here should read "...Rajāʾ b. Abî Salama--aka-ʿUbâda b. Nusayy--ha-Isḥâq b. Qabîsa<Kaʿb" -- not "...Isḥâq <Qabîsa...", cf. not 39. The editor's suggestion that "Isḥâq" here is Isḥâq b. al-Kharâsha is to be rejected.

39. Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrîkh* 584 (no. 1649) (...Ḍamra<Rajāʾ b. Abî Salama<*ʿUbada* b. Nusayy), on al-Ṣanâbiḥî seated on a throne *(sarîr)* with ʿAbd al-Malik; 339 (no. 672) (same *isnâd* as preceding), on Isḥâq b. Qabîsa, on whome see *Tahdhîb*, s.n.; 227-8 (no.224), 691 (no. 2123) (...Khâlid b. Yazîd b. al-Sâlih al-Murrî<Hishâm b. al-Ghâz<ʿUbâda b. Nusayy), onʿUqba b. ʿĀmir.

40. al-Basawî 1/354, 563 (hi--Saʿid b. Asad-ha-Ḍamra < Rajāʾ b. Abî Salama <ʿUbâda b. Nusayy), on ʿAbd al-Malik's promise as *faqîh*.

41. Bal. *Fut* 145 (hi--Hishâm b. ʿAmmâr al-Dimahqî--ha-Yaḥyâ b. Ḥamza<Abû ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz <ʿUbâda b Nusayy<ʿAbd al-Raḥmân b. Ghanm). All these transmitters were Syrians except Abû ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz (=ʿAbdullah b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz al-Madanî, a great-great grandson of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭâb and famous ascetic, d. 184: *Tahdhîb* 5/302-3).

42. ʿAmmûriyya (Amorium) was located ca. 150 km. northwest of konya (Iconium); cf.Guy le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905), index s.v. "ʿAmmûriyya". Yâqût confirms this, but notes that there was also a small town named ʿAmmûriyya in Syria, between Fâmiya (Apamea) and Shayzar on the Orontes river. The context of the account here seems to indicate that the Anatolian town was intended.

43. Bal. *Fut* 164 (Abû Ṣâliḥ al-Farrâʾ<ʿAbdullâh b. al-Walîd, a man of Damascus<Hishâm b. al-Ghaz< ʿUbâda b. Nusayy).

the same Hishâm b. al-Ghâz to al-Wâqidî, recounts a Byzantine raid on the Muslims in 35A.H., the destruction of the Byzantine fleet in a storm, and the subsequent fate of the Byzantine emperor Constantine IV in Sicily[44]. A fourth, traced through the Medinese scholar Sa'îd b. ʿĀmir al-Khazrajî to al-Madâ'inî, recounts a sermon of Muʿawiya[45]. A fifth, transmitted by a scholar of Mosul, relates details of the early conquest of northern Mesopotamia and Samosata (Sumaysâṭ) in northernmost Syria[46].

In addition to the five already described, moreover, there are any more accounts bout the early history of Syria that are ascribed to ʿUbâda: about: twenty, all dealing with the conquest of Syria, are found in al-Ṭabari's history. Most of these accounts, however, pose the same problem as al-Ṭabari's accounts from Khâlid b. Maʿdân--they come via unknown transmitters to Sayf b. ʿUmar[47]. Like Sayf's accounts from Khâlid b. Maʿdân noted above, these accounts from ʿUbâda are remarkably consistent in their content; all describe the early stages of the conquest of Syria. In this case, however, we may wish to view them more charitably than we did Khâlid b. Maʿdân's accounts, since they are not very different in character from the historical accounts transmitted from ʿUbâda via authorities other than Sayf. Because of the problematic nature of their transmission, however, we must for the present disregard them as possible evidence of ʿUbâda's historical interests.

Even disregarding such porblematic accounts, however, the more secure historical accounts transmitted from ʿUbâda--all of which deal with the early history of Syria during Muʿâwiya's governorship or caliphate--are sufficient to suggest that ʿUbâda b. Nusayy was especially concerned with collecting materials on this theme. What his own sources for this information may have been is less clear. Al-Balâdhurî, after quoting one of ʿUbâda's accounts, says that "the same authority (i.e., ʿUbâda?) says, 'I read in the book of *Maghâzî Muâwiyah*...that Muʿwiyah in the year 31 led

44. Tab. 1/3086-87 (Waq <Hishâm b. al-Ghâz <ʿUbâda b. Nusayy).

45. Bal. *Ansâb* IVA (ed. Kister/Scholessinger), p.34 (=ed. ʿAbbâs, p. 44-45) (Al-Madâ'inî< Saʿîd b. ʿĀmir al-Khazrajî <ʿUbâda b. Nusayy). On Saʿîd b. ʿĀmir, see *Tahdhîb* 4/69.

46. Khalîfa, *Ta'rîkh* 1/131, sub anno 18A.H. (ha-a man < al-Mughîra b. Ziyâd al-Mawsilî < ʿUbâda b. Nusayy)..

47. The following accounts in al-Tabarî's *Ta'rîkh* have Sayf receiving material from ʿUbâda via unknown authorities: Tab. 1/2084-85; 1/2086-89; 1/2090-95; 1/1295-2100; 1/2100; 1/2147; 1/2150-55; 1/2395-96; 1/2396-98; 1/2404; 1/2405-07; 1/2407; 1/2576-77; 1/2584-87; 1/2820; 1/2821; 1/2821-22; 1/2824-25; 1/2825-26. (See also note 35 above.) In the great majority of cases, the unkown intermediary is either Abû ʿUthmân Yazîd b. Asîd al-Ghassânî or Abû Ḥâritha Muḥriz al-ʿAbshamî. Only one account lists a different intermediary: Tab. 1/2821 bis (...Sayf<Muḥammad b. Saʿîd<ʿUbâda b. Nusayy<Junâda b. Abî Umayya al-Azdî), on Muʿâwiya raiding Cyprus.

an invasion setting out from al-Maṣṣîṣah...,[48] and in one of the accounts mentioned above the *isnâd* shows the early Syrian authority ʿAbd al-Raḥmân b. Ghanm as ʿUbâda's informant[49]. We can also plausibly suggest that ʿUbâda may have found some historical information in official documents, in view of his service as judge and gover nor for the Umayyads; such posts might also have provided him with the opportunity to meet individuals who had played a prominent role in the early Islamic history of Syria.

The material assembled above about our three Syrian traditionists from the generation active around 100 A.H. seems, on balance, to give limited support to the notion that there were individuals whom we might call historians active in Syria at this time. In the case of ʿUbâda b. Nusayy, it appears quite clear that he was concerned with the history of a specific set of themes in Syrian history. Our other two choices, Khâlid b. Maʿdân and Sulaymân b. Mûsâ, by comparison, cannot yet be said to merit anything other than the title of "traditionist". Sulaymân's occasional bits of historical information are too few to permit us to state that he had any particular interest in history, as opposed to the study of religious subjects–this despite the fact that,through his family ties, he may have in a position to communicate much of historical interest had he so desired. As for Khâlid, a judgment on his status as historian must await an assessment of the authenticity of those historical accounts bearing his name, which can only be accomplished in the context of a full examination of the accounts of Sayf b. ʿUmar.

The next generation of Syrian scholars--comprising those who died around the middle of the second century A.H., and who were the immediate transmitters of the generation of scholars just examined, also included some who seem to have had a special interest in conveying historical materials, in addition to the more usual *ḥadîth* and *ḥadîth*-related accounts. Again, we shall look closely at three scholars, chosen both because some accounts of historical interest were transmitted by them, and because of their relationship to the three scholars of the earlier generation already exmined.

Al-Wadin b. ʿAtâ' al-Dimashqi

Al-Waḍîn, whose death is dated to 147 or 149 A.H.,[50]. is said to have come originally from the town of Bâniyâs, but he lived in the village of Kafr

48. Bal. *Fut* 164.

49. Bal *Fut* 145, on conquest of Q asrîn *(isnâd,* see note 41 above). ʿAbd al-Raḥmân b. Ghanm, considered trustworth *ḥadîth,* was sent to Syria by the caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭâb to serv as *faqîh:* I.S. *B*, 152.

50. Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrîkh* 259 (no. 352), 701 (no. 2190); I.S. VIIB, 169 ("al-Waṣîn b. ʿAṭâ'"); *TMD* XVII, fol. 433a, lines 7ff; fol. 434a, lines 9ff.

Sûsiyya (near Damascus)[51], died in Damascus, and seems to have been associated with that town's scholars[52]. The Ḥimṣi scholar Maḥfûẓ b. ʿAlqama considered him one of the three most venerable figures of his generation, along with Thawr b. Yazîd (d. 150-155 A.H.) and Naṣr b. ʿAlqama,[53] and he was known as one of the followers of the famous Syrian traditionist Makḥûl (d. 112-119 A.H.), as well as other noteworthy authorities, including Khalid b. Maʿdân al-Kalaʿî, ʿUbâda b. Nusayy, ʿAtâ' b. Abî Rabâḥ, and Abû ʿUthmân Yazîd b. Marthad al-Ṣanʿani[54]. Opinions appear to have been divided, however, on his reliability as a purveyor of *ḥadîth;* for while some considered him trustworthy *(thiqa),* others claimed that he was weak in *ḥadîth.* This difference of opinion may have stemmed in part from the fact that he held *qadarî* attitudes[55]. He seems to have been remembered also for his sermons *(khuṭab)* and his use of logic *(manṭiq)*[56].

There is no record of al-Waḍîn having had any contact with the Umayyad house--rather, his espousal of *qaḍarî* opinions may suggest that he was as ready to oppose the Umayyads as to support or serve them. Indeed, he seems to have been on good terms with the Abbasids at an early date; such, at least, is the implication of an anecdote related by al-Wadin in which the caliph Abû Jaʿfar al-Manṣûr--"with whom," al-Waḍîn notes, "I had had contact *(ḥâla)* before his (accession to the) caliphate"--invited al-

51. *TMD* XVII, fol. 432b, lines 3-4. We must, of course, assume that Bâniyâs here means the town near Mount Hermon in the Jawlan bearing that name, and not the other town today called Bâniyâs situated along the Syrian coast. The old name for the later was not Baniyas, but Bulunyas; the older Arabic historical and geographical sources (and even some later ones, such as Yaqut) uniformly give it this name, and there is no evidence to suggest that the modern name had replaced the old Bulunyâs before Ibn al-Athîr's reference to the coastal town as "Bâniyâs". It is curious, however, that al-Waḍîn, who hailed from Bâniyâs, seems to have been so interested in the history of the *coastal districts* of Syria, as we shall see below. It is tempting, in light of this, to think that al-Waḍîn Baniyas may have been on the coast after all; the reference hence would show either that the "modern" name was actually used much earlier than hitherto believed, or that some later copyist of the manuscript changed the text from "Bulunyâs" to "Bâniyâs, "*El* (2nd ed).

52. I.S. VIIB, 169; *TMD* XVII, fol. 433a, lines 7ff; fol. 433b, lines 1-4.

53. Abu Zur a, *Ta'rikh* 713 (no. 2265). Mahfuz was older than al-Wadin and related accounts to him: *Tahdhib* 10/59.

54. Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrîkh* 391 (no. 882), 394(no. 894,ʿAbd al-Raḥmân b. Ibrâhîm); cf. also *TMD* XVII, fol. 432b, lines 4-6; fol. 433b, lines 1-4 (...Abû l-Ḥasan al-ʿUṭâridî (?)--q-- Abû Bakr al-Kaṭîb); *Mizân* 4/334. But note *TMD* XVII, fol. 433b, lines 13-16, and al-Basawî 2/395, where he is said to have transmitted only a little from Makḥûl.

55. *thiqa: TMD* XVII, fol. 433b, lines 9-13, 18-21, 21-23, etc.; *lâ ba's, qadarî: TMD* XVII, fol. 433b, lines 23-25 (...ʿAbdullâh b. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal ‹his father); *Ṣâliḥ al-ḥadîth, gadarî: TMD* XVII, fol. 433b, line 41-fol. 434a, line 2 (Abû Dâûd al-Âjurrî); *Mîzân* 4/334; *daʿîf: TMD* XVII, fol. 433a, lines 17-18; fol. 434a, lines 2-4 (ʿAbd al-Baqî b. Râfiʿ ‹ʿAbdullâh b. ʿUthmân al- Ṣafâ (?).

Wadîn to Baghdad, and questioned al- Wadîn about his income and the size of his household, but then failed to reward him with the expected largesse[57]

Of interest to us are several accounts related by al-Wadîn b. Atâ' that provide historical information about events in Syria during the first century A.H. All of these, as it turns out, are found in al-Balâdhurî's *Futûh al-buldân*. One of these is a notes briefly that Shurahbîl b. Hasna commanded the Muslim troops that conquered Acre, Tyre, and Saffûriyya (the last-named a town near Tiberias)[58]. A second account describes the conquest of the towns of Sidon, Beirut, Jubayl, Tripoli, ʿIrqa (near Tripoli), and the Syrian littoral, and unsuccessful Byzantine attempts to reclaim this area[59]. A third relates how Mu awiya brought men to garrison the towns along the Syrian coast, which had evidently become depopulated during the conquest period[60]. A fourth account, also to be attributed to al-Wadîn, recounts the conquest of the Syrian coastal cities[61].

Especially noteworthy is the coherent character of these accounts, all of which deal primarily with a single subject: the Islamic conquest of the Syrian coastal districts from Palestine northwards, and the subsequent arrangements made in these areas by the early caliphs. (I have found only one other account of historical character attributed to al-Wadin: it relates the Prophet's siege of al-Tâ'if, and is found in al-Balâdhurî's *Ansâb al-ashrâf*[62].) Indeed, having observed the consistency of the surviving material transmitted by al-Wadîn found in al-Balâdhurî's *Futûh,* we may reasonably propose that some other accounts for which al-Balâdhurî gives only an incomplete attribution of sources also stem from al-Wadîn's collection--particularly when they deal with the Syrian littoral, and reach al-Balâdhurî through Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz al-Tanûkhî and Abû Hafs al-Shâmî, who were the normal intermediaries carrying al-Wadîn's accounts

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56. *Sâhib Khutab: TMD* XVII, fol. 433b, lines 32-34 (al Walîd b. Muslim); *Mîzân* 4/334. *Sâhib mantiq:* Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrîkh* 257 (no. 344), 259 (no. 354), 724 (no. 2317) (Yazîd b. Muhammad--ha--Muhammad b.ʿUthmân--q--Saʿîd b. Bashîr); *TMD* XVII, fol. 433b, lines 9-13, lines 15-19 (same *isnâd).*

57. Tab. III/408-409 and *TMD* XVII, fol. 433b, lines 4-9 (...al-ʿAbbâs b. al-Walîd b. Mazyad--s--Nâʿim b. Mazyad< al- Wadîn b. ʿAtâ'). This, incidentally, appears to be the only account in al-Tabaris history related on the authority of al-Wadîn.

58. Bal. *Fut* 116 (Abû Hafs (al-Dimashqî al-Shâmî)--q--SbA--q--al-Wadîn b. ʿAtâ').

59. Bal. *Fut* 126-7 (SbA--aki--al-Wadîn b. ʿAtâ'). The description of details of the conquest of Tripoli, pp. 127-8, which follows immediately after this account wtihout a new *isnâd (beginning qâlû,* p. 127 line 3), may be part of it.

60. Bal. *Fut* 128 (q--al-Wadîn). The full *isnâd* was doubtless the same as in note 58, above.

61. Bal. *Fut* 128 (hi--Abû Hafs al-Shâmî < Sba < al-Wadîn).

62. Bal. *Ansâb I (ed. Hamîdullah), p.367 (I.S.<Waq<ʿAbd al-Hamîd b. Jaʿfar<al-Wadîn b. ʿAtâ' <Makhûl).*

to al-Balâdhurî. One such account describes the conquest of Syrian coastal towns during the time of Muʿawiya; a second describes the conquest and garrisoning of Latakia, Jabala, and Anṭarṭûs; a third describes the conquest of Balda, near Jabala; and a fourth gives a detailed description of the conquest of Latakia, describes the conquest terms for that town, and lists the Greek raids on the Syrian coast up to the year 100 A.H.[63]. Another group of accounts in the same work, transmitted again from unknown sources by Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz to Abû Ḥafṣ al- Shâmî, may also be traceable to al-Waḍîn. They deal not with the history of the Syrian coastal regions, but with other parts of Syria: the first battle of the conquest at ʿAraba; early campaigns in Palestine, Jordan, and around Damascus; terms of the treaties for Shayzar, Ḥamâ, and other towns in central Syria; the Muslims' relations to the Christians and Jews of Ḥimṣ; and the conquest of Palestine and of Jerusalem[64].

Most striking, perhaps, is the fact that, with one exception, al-Waḍîn's historical accounts deal only with the history of Syria, or even of the Syrian littoral; he really was, in a sense, a local historian, and does not seem to have been concerned with, or informed about, the history of other regions. Indeed, even a *ḥadîth* transmitted on his authority seems to have a Syrian focus[65]. It is unfortunate that he nowhere tells us who his own sources were, but we can safely assume that he collected his material from various local informants.

Thawr b. Yazid al-Kalaʿi

Our next figure presents quite a different picture, in that his historical interests appear to have been much broader than those of al-Waḍîn b. ʿAtâ'. Thawr b. Yazîd al-Kalâʿî appears to have been a native of Ḥimṣ- at least he is identified, as a scholar, with that town. But he must have spent some time in Mecca and Medina, as he is presented in some accounts as teaching there, and at some point in his life the people of Hims burned down his house and expelled him from the city because of his *qaḍarî* views. Thereafter he took up

63. *The four accounts are: (1) Bal Fut* 128 (Abû Ḥafṣ<SbA); (2) Bal. *Fut* 133-134 (Abû Ḥafṣ al-Dimashqî<his authorities); (3) Bal. *Fut* 133, with a complex *isnâd* in which Abû Ḥafṣ has combined two sources (Abû Ḥafṣ- hi-SbA and Saʿîd b. Sulaymân-Ḥimṣî); (4) Bal. *Fut* 132-133, where al-Balâdhurî seems to have combined his sources (hi-Abû Ḥafṣ<SbA, and hi-Mûsâ b. Ibrâhîm al-Tanûkhî < his father < Ḥimṣ authorities). In this last account, the information on Greek raids may be quite independent material conveyed with no *isnâd,* rather than part of the composite account with the aforementioned *isnâd.*

64. Bal. *Fut.* 109, 116, 131, 137, 138-9 respectively.

65. *TMD* II (Munajjid) 123, lines 8-12 (...Nuʿaym b. Ḥammâd-ana-Muḥammad b. Ḥimyar al-Waḍîn b. ʿAṭâ'), on *jabal al-Khalîl* (Hebron).

residence in Jerusalem, where he died between 150 and 155 A.H., aged in his sixties[66].

As with many others who espoused the *qadariyya*, Thawr was judged differently as a transmitter of *ḥadîth* by different scholars. Positive opinions about him were expressed by many, and almost fifty scholars--including such luminaries as Sufyan al-Thawrî, Muḥammad ibn Isḥâq, Baqiyya ibn al-Walîd, al-Walîd ibn Muslim, Mâlik ibn Anas, and al-Wâqidî --are said to have transmitted *ḥadîths* on his authority[67]. He figures in two different lists, one of trustworthy scholars *(al-thabat)* of Ḥimṣ[68], the other of leading scholars of Syria[69]. The Kûfan traditionist Wakîʿ (d. 196 or 197) called him the "most pious *(aʿbad)* of those I have seen;" Sufyân-Thawrî (d. 161) expressed great reverence for his *ḥadîths*, Abû Dâûd (d. 275) and Ibn Saʿd declared him trustworthy *(thiqa)*, and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal stated that there was "no harm in him," that is, in the *ḥadîths* he transmitted[70]. Some noted that he had transmitted a few spurious *ḥadîths*, but felt that the *ḥadîths* he handled were generally to be trusted if they had been related to him by trustworthy sources[71]; and Thawr is said elsewhere to have related *ḥadîths* from at least forty informants, including many who were universally accepted as trustworthy, such as Khâlid b. Mâʿdan, whose traditions he memorized[72]. But others (including some who are said to have transmitted *ḥadîths* on his authority) were less charitable in their view of Thawr. We have already seen how Thawr's *qadarî* leanings led to his expulsion from Hims, and he appears to have suffered lesser insults as well. The famous al-Awzâʿî (d. 157) is said to have refused to extend his hand to Thawr because he was a *qadarî*, and grew angry even at the mention of Thawr, whom he stigmatized with a (clearly spurious!) curse of the Prophet

66. *Tahdhîb* 2/33-53; I.S. VIIB, 170. **In Mecca:** *TMD* III, fol. 224a, lines 20-24, and *Mîzân* 1/374-375 (no. 1406) (...Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyâ b. Saʿîd < his father < his grandfather). **Expulsion from Ḥimṣ:** *Tahdhîb* 2/33 (al-Âjurrî<Abû Dâûd); *TMD* III, fol 225a, lines 5-13 (...ha- Muḥammad b. Ismâʿil-ha-al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlî--s--Yazîd b. Hârûn); *TMD* III, fol. 225b, lines 7-11, and *Mîzân* 1/374 (...ABŪ Mushir < ʿAbdullâh b. Sâlim). **Death dates:** varying opinions (most say 153 A.H.) given in *TMD* III fol. 225b-226a; Abu Zur a, *Ta'rikh* 261 (no. 360), 702 (no. 2195); Khalîfa, *Ta'rîkh* 2/662.

67. See lists in *Tahdhîb* 2/33 and *TMD* III, fol. 223a, lines 10-14.

68. Abû Zurʿa, *Ta'rîkh* 398 (no. 908) (q--ʿAbd al-Raḥmân Ibrâhîm).

69. *TMD* III, fol. 224a, lines 5-13, = al-Basawî 2/386 (... ʿAbdullâh b. Jaʿfar--na-Yaʿqûb--s--Aḥmad b. Ṣâliḥ).

70. All the comments in *Tahdhîb* 2/33-35; cf. I.S. VIIB, 170 *Mîzân* 1/374..

71. *TMD* III, fol. 224b, lines 12-18 (...Ḥamza b. Yûsuf-aka-Abû Aḥmad b. ʿAdî--ha--Abû Aḥmad b. ʿUmayr). He concludes by calling Thawr *mustaqîm al-ḥadîth ṣâliḥ fil-Shâmiyyîn.*

72. *Lists of Thawr's informants: Tahdhib* 2/33; *TMD* III, fol. 222b line 41-223a line 10. **Memorizing ḥadîths of khâlid b. Maʿdân:** Abû Zurʿa *Ta'rîkh* 360 (no. 766) (...al-Walîd b. Hishâm). Scribe: *Mîzân* 1/374 (q--Baqiyya).

upon those who "lie about the divine power *(qadar)* of God"[73]. Although Malik b. Anas is said by some to have transmitted *hadiths* on Thawr's authority, he reportedly refused to site with him (i.e., to hear *ḥadîths)* when he came to Medina[74], and Thawr does not appear among his informants in the Muwaṭṭaʾ[75]. Similarly, Thawr's student Sufyân b. Ḥabîb delivered a silent rebuke to a scholar writing under Thawr's guidance in Mecca by erasing the slates bearing Thawr's dictation[76]. Al-Ṭabarânî, ʿAtâʾ al-Khurasânî, and the Syrian Asad b. Wadâʿa also appear to have refused to recognize Thawr b. Yazîd's work[77].

There is no evidence that Thawr b. Yazîd ever held any official posts under the Umayyads, and we may wonder whether his espousal of the *qadariyya* does not imply a certain critical attitude toward the ruling house, as with al-Waḍîn. On the other hand, he apparently had no love of ʿAlî b. Abî Ṭâlib (or, presumably, of his descendants and their backers), because his grandfather had been killed fighting in Muʿâwiya's army against ʿAli at Ṣiffîn[78].

Thawr seems to have conveyed a great variety of material. As we have seen, he was one of the main transmitters for the accounts of Khâlid b.Maʿdân, many of whose *ḥadîths* and whose information on Abûl-Dardâʾ he collected[79]. He also transmitted *ḥadîths* and accounts of pious sayings– some of them very pro-Syrian-- of the Prophet's companions from authorities other than Khâlid b. Maʿdân[80], as well as moralizing accounts

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73. *TMD* III, fol. 224b, lines 23-28 (...al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlî–ha–al-Rabîʿ b. Nâfiʿ Abû Tawba–ha–our companions); fol. 224b, lines 28-36 (...Abû Mushir–ha–Abû Muslim al-Fazârî), where al-Awzaʿi is also critical of Ibn Isḥâq, whom he calls a Muʿtazilite; for similar sentiments, see also fol. 224b, line 41-fol. 225a, line 5, and *Mizân* 1/374 (...Abû Mushir–s–Salama b. ʿAyyâr).

74. *Tahdhîb*. 2/33-35.

75. At least he is not listed in al-Suyûṭî's *Isʿâf al-mubaṭṭaʾbi-rijâl al-Muwaṭṭaʾ* (Beirut: Dâr al-ʾâfâq al-jadîda, 1981, bound with *al-Muwaṭṭaʾ*).

76. *TMD* III, fol. 224a, lines 20-24 (...Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyâ b. Saʿîd<his father<his grandfather).

77. *TMD* III, fol. 225a, lines 21; fol. 225a, lines 22-25, cf. Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrîkh* 359 (no. 763); *TMD* III, fol. 225b, lines 4-7. Cf. Abû Zurʿa *Taʾrîkh* 359 (no. 764): Asad b. Wadâʿa made Thawr leave Ḥimṣ (ʿAlî b. ʿAyyâsh–s–Ismâʿîl b. ʿAyyâsh). On Asad b. Wadâʿa, a Syrian scholar known for cursing ʿAlî, see *Mîzân* 1/207 (no. 816).

78. I.S. VIIB, 170; TMD III, fol. 223b, lines 4-9.

79. See notes 31, 33 above.

80. E.g., Tab. 1/973-979; *ʿUyûn* 3/9, lines 2-4; Bal. *Ansâb* I (ed. Ḥamîdullâh), p.371; *Mîzân* 1/375; al- Wâqidî, *Kitâb al-Maghâzî* (ed. Marsden Jones, Oxford University Press, 1966) 235, 661; al-Basawî, 1/312, 1/327-329, 1/504, 2/357, 2/427-428, 3/327; *TMD* I (Munajjid) 139, lines 5-10, and pp. 141-2.

about later figures renowned for their piety, such as ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz, or condemned for their lack of it, such as ʿAbd al-Malik[81].

But in addition to these and other essentially traditionist materials, Thawr also communicated a number of accounts having an historical or pseudo-historical character. Among these are several fragments describing episodes from the life of the Prophet-- one on the death of Abu Jahl at Badr, another on the killing of Kaʿb al-Ashrâf, and the third on an instance of theft during the Khaybar campaign[82]. We also find a brief account dealing with the conquest of the Jazira and the tax status of its lands[83]. Most striking, however, are three historical accounts all preserved in al-Ṭabarîs *Taʾrîkh* (and all conveyed to al-Ṭabarî by al-Wâqidî). The first describes the Umayyads' battle with Ibn al- Zubayr in 73 A.H.; the second relates the conquest of the fortress at Ṭuwâna in 88 A.H.; and the third is the account (transmitted, as we have already seen, by Sulaymân b. Mûsâ) dealing with Maslama b. ʿAbd al-Malik's siege of Constantinople in 98 A.H.[84] Whatever our judgment on the "historicity" of some of these accounts--some are, for example, suspect efforts to establish legal principles by calling upon an "historical" precedent--we cannot doubt that Thawr b. Yazîd had a certain interest in materials that, on the surface, seemed to offer historical information, even about topics not directly related to the pursuit of religious knowledge. We may, therefore, be justified in calling him, if not an historian, at least a traditionist with an historical bent[85].

Hisham b. al-Ghaz (d. 153 or 156 or 159 A.H.)

Far less is known about the life of this scholar than the others we have considered--partly because the manuscripts of Ibn ʿAsâkir's *Taʾrîkh madînat Dimashq* available to me have a lacuna covering the passage

81. **ʿUmar 11:** *Mîzân* 1/374; *ʿUyûn* 1/79, lines 1-3. **ʿAbd al-Malik:** Bal. *Ansâb* XI (ed. Ahlwardt), pp. 258-259 (al-Madâʾinî<Thawr b. Yazîd).

82. I.H. 450-51 and 551-52 (both Thawr b. Yazîd<ʿIkrima< Ibn ʿAbbâs); I.H. 765 (Thawr b. Yazîd-hi--Sâlim, freed slave of ʿAbdullâh b. Muṭîʿ<Abû Hurayra). The last account is clearly a moralizing one, and perhaps bears political implications as well; the other two are more difficult to assess.

83. Bal. *Fut.* 175 (hi-I.S.<Waq<Thawr b. Yazîd<Rashid b. Saʿd), clearly an ex post facto effort to establish the tax status of the territory. This is the only account attribut ed to Thawr in al-Balâdhurî's *Futûḥ*.

84. Cf. note 19 above.

85. In an interesting account in al-Basawî (2/383), Thawr offers a refreshingly historical glimpse into the life of the religious and traditionist circles in Ḥimṣ in his day: "The people of Ḥimṣ used to take the books of Ibn ʿA'idh (i.e. ʿAbd al- Raḥmân b. ʿA'idh al-Azdî?), and whatever wisdom (or: legal verdicts *(aḥkâm)* they found in them they would prop to the door of the mosque in satisfaction with them and acceptance of his sayings". (al-Walîd b. Muslim--ha-- Baqiyya-hi-Thawr b. Yazîd).

dealing with the entry for Hishâm. Accounts of his life in other sources are also brief, however, suggesting that he simply was not as renowned a scholar as the ones we have hitherto considered. Evidently he was a Damascene of the tribe of Jurash who settled in Baghdad later in life, where he was placed in charge of the caliph al-Manṣûr's treasury. He is said to have related *ḥadîths* from several informants, including ᶜUbâda b. Nusayy, Makhûl, and al-Zuhri; and the list of transmitters who passed on accounts heard from him numbers over twenty. All commentators seem to have found him trustworthy in the matter of *ḥadîth*[86].

The limited number of accounts conveyed by him seem to fall into two groups. The first consists of *ḥadîths* and accounts dealing with the lives of the companions of the Prophet, such as Abû Dharr al-Ghifârî (an early paragon of ascetic piety) and Abûl-Dardâ'; extant samples of this group seem to have been transmitted on the authority of Makḥûl[87]. The second group of accounts consists of information about Muᶜâwiyas campaigns against the Byzantines, or about scholars of the generation preceding Hishâm b. al-Ghâz, that is, about people who lived in the last three decades of the first century A.H. All of these--when they are not information conveyed directly by Hishâm himself, such as his description of Makḥûl's visit to the tomb of the Umayyad "saint-caliph", ᶜUmar b. ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzîz[88]--are conveyed by Hisham from his predecessor ᶜUbâda b. Nusayy. In one, ᶜUbâda relates an encounter with a companion of the Prophet, ᶜUqba b. ᶜĀmir Al-Juhanî[89]; in a second, ᶜUbâda notes that he himself had served ᶜAbd al-Malik as governor over al-Urdunn[90]. Two other accounts deal with the Byzantine frontier wars. One--the only account on Hisham's authority included by al-Ṭabarî in his *Ta'rîk*--describes how the Emperor Constantine IV sent a flotilla of 1000 ships to raid the Muslims, but saw the fleet destroyed in a storm, after which he withdrew to Sicily, where he was

86. *Tahdhîb* 11/55; *Mîzân* 4/304 (no. 9236); I.S. VIIB, 171; al-Basawî 2/394, 2/459; al-Basawî 3/28: Hishâm b. al-Ghâz was associated with al-Zuhri for 4 years.

87. **Ḥadîths:** al-Basawî 1/294-5=3/355-6 (...Muḥammad b. Sulaymân<Ibn Ghunaym al-Baᶜlabakkî<Hishâm b. al-Ghâz<Makhûl...); Bal. *Ansâb V (ed. Goitein, Jerusalem, 1938), pp.53-54 (*=ed. ᶜAbbâs (Wiesbaden, 1979, p. 543, no. 1391) (Waq<Hishâm b. al-Ghâz<Makḥûl), on Abû Dharr al-Ghifârî; Abû Zurᶜa, *Tarîkh* 220 (no. 203) (Abû Mushir--ha-Khâlid b. Yazîd al-Murrî<Hishâm b. al-Ghaz<Makḥûl), Abû-Dardâ' transferred from Ḥimṣ to Damascus by ᶜUmar 1.

88. al-Basawî 1/588 (ha-ᶜAbdullâh b.ᶜUthmân--aka-ᶜAbdullâh--aka-Hishâm b. al-Ghâz)..

89. Abû Zurᶜa, *Taᵓrîkh* 227-8 (no. 224), 691 (no. 2123) (...Abûl-Naḍr Isḥâq b. Ibrâhîm- ha-Khâlid b. Yazîd b. Ṣâlih al- Murrî<Hishâm b. al-Ghâz<ᶜUbada b. Nusayy--q).

90. Abû Zurᶜa, *Ta'rikh* 339 (no. 671) (same *isnâd* as in note 89).

murdered[91]. The other account--the only account from Hishâm found in al-Baladhuri's *Futh*--describes Muʿawiya's raid and the region of ʿAmmûriyya in Anatolia, and the garrisons he established there[92]. Together, these accounts suggest that Hishâm was at least interested in passing on ʿUbâda's historical materials.

Of the three traditionists active in the second quarter of the second century A.H. whom we have examined, the one for whom the evidence shows the clearest interest in historical materials is al-Waḍîn b. ʿAtâ'; the coherent focus in several of his accounts on the history of Syria suggests that he was consciously collecting information on that theme, and not merely handing on incidental bits of material. Since he does seem to have been active as an historian, moreover, we may wonder whether his account dealing with the Prophet's *maghâzî* does not represent the remnant of a compilation by him on that popular theme as well. By comparison, Thawr b. Yazîd's historical accounts seem to have been less clearly focused, and there is no evidence in what remains of them to suggest that he compiled monographs on any particular historical theme. If he was primarily a traditionist, however, the several historical accounts he transmitted show that he was a traditionist with a rather strong interest in historical accounts that might have provided background material for the study of *ḥadîth* and early Islamic piety. Our third figure, Hishâm b. al-Ghâz, may only have been a dutiful transmitter handing on accounts of the traditionist ʿUbâda b. Nusayy, who was, as we have seen, himself interested in historical materials. A few accounts dealing with the lives of prominent early companions, though transmitted by Hishâm from authorities other than Ubada, are so closely tied in their subject-matter to the normal concerns of the *muḥaddithûn* that we must be reluctant to consider them as evidence of truly historiographical activity. Unless other historical accounts come to light in which Hisham's informants are figures other than ʿUbâda b. Nusayy, there seems little reason to consider Hisham to have been more than a traditionist.

III. Conclusions

The material assembled above shows that there probably were at least a few historians active in Syria in the first half of the second century A.H., and even in the years around 100 A.H. Not much of what they compiled has survived, as far as we can tell--Wellhausen's description of what remains as

91. Tab. 1/3086-87 (Waq< Hishâm b. al-Ghâz <ʿUbâda b. Nusayy).

92. Bal. *Fut* 164 (hi--Abû Ṣâliḥ al-Farrâ'<Abdullâh b. al-Walîd, a man of Damascus Hishâm b. al-Ghâz<ʿUbâda b. Nusayy) Note that al-Balâdhurî did include at least one other account from Hishâm b. al-Ghâz in his *Ansâb al-ashrâf* (note 87, above).

"traces" (Spuren) seems fitting--which leads us to ask *why* so little has survived. This question resolves itself in fact into two questions, each requiring a separate answer. We must ask why early Syrian historical tradition did not survive in later compilations made by Iraqi or Medinese authors, and we must ask also why so little of substance seems to have survived even in later compilations made by Syrian scholars, such as Abû Zurʿa.

The most important of the Iraqi compilations of the third-foruth centuries A.H. is doubtless that of al-Ṭabarî. We have seen already that al-Ṭabarî's identifiable direct informants, even for envents in Syria, were mainly Iraqîs or Medinese. Given the likelihood that earlier Syrian authorities did exist, this pattern in al-Ṭabarî could be interpreted in at least two ways: (1) the early Syrian historical tradition, although extant in Syria itself, had not circulated very widely, and hence al-Ṭabarî did not have access to it, for which reason it does not appear in his *Taʾrîkh;* or, (2) the Syrian historical tradition was available to al-Ṭabarî, but he preferred to exclude it from his compilation for methodological, theological, or political reasons. There are, I think, some reasons to believe that the latter interpretation, however unwelcome it may seem, is a valid one. For one thing, some early Syrian material, generally communicated through the second and third century Syrian scholars Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz and Abû Ḥafṣ al-Dimashqî, was available to another Iraqi scholar, al-Balâdhurî, who chose to include at least a little of it in his own works, mainly the *Futûḥ al-buldân*[93]. It is hard to believe that these works were available to al-Balâdhurî (d. 279), who worked in Baghdâd in the mid-third century A.H., and not to al-Ṭabarî (d. 310), who worked in the same city a few years later; in any case, al-Ṭabarî (like al-Balâdhurî) is known to have visited Syria himself. Moreover, a close look at al-Ṭabarî's *Taʾrîkh* reveals that he did in fact have access to at least some accounts transmitted by Syrian compilers such as Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz and al-Walîd b. Muslim, since the work contains *isnâds* in which the names of these scholars occur[94]. It is possible that both Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz's and al-Walîd b. Muslim's compilations had already been lost by the time al-Ṭabarî (and al-Balâdhurî) worked, and that what al-Ṭabarî transmits from them are merely a few stray accounts that survived in the compilations of yet other intermediary scholars (e.g., ʿAlî b. Sahl al-Ramlî (d. 261), who is al-Ṭabarî's informant for three of the five accounts he relates from al-Walîd b. Muslim). Even centuries after al-Ṭabarî, however, Ibn ʿAsâkir (d.571) was able to quote in his *Taʾrîkh madînat Dimashq* many more accounts derived from Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz and al-Walîd b. Muslim than al-Ṭabarî had seen fit to reproduce. It therefore seems very likely that al-Tabari did, in fact, have access to the compilations

93. See, for example, the accounts cited in notes 58-61, 63 above.

94. Tab. 11/4-5 (SbA); Tab. 1/409, 566, 2593, 2826, 11/1476-77 (al-Walîd b. Muslim).

of at least some of the second and third-century Syrian historians, but chose for the most part not to utilize their information.

Before condemning al-Ṭabarî too harshly for his bias against the Syrian historical tradition, however, we should also note that that tradition had some weaknesses of its own that may have contributed to al-Ṭabarî's failure to quote it extensively. As noted above, even a Syrian compiler such as Abû Zurʿa relied heavily (though not exclusively) on Medinese or Iraqi informants when speaking of the life of the Prophet, which suggests that Syria may have lagged far behind Medina and Iraq in supplying information on this theme[95]. This fact can, I think, be explained in part by the dynamics of migration and settlement during the conquest period. The ruling elite during the conquest period seems to have encouraged most of the Medinese *Anṣâr* to migrate to Iraq (if they left Medina at all), whereas they considered Syria the preserve of the Quraysh[96]. Many of these Qurashîs who came to Syria had embraced Islam relatively late, and not a few had even stayed in Mecca throughout the Prophet's years in Medina. The Quraysh as a group were, then, both less well-informed about the Prophet and, perhaps, less likely to be asked about him, then were the Medinese *Anṣâr*, who had come to know the Prophet intimately in Medina. Simply stated, then, many fewer close companions of the Prophet migrated to Syria than to Iraq, and hence less information about the Prophet was available in Syria than in Iraq.

Al-Ṭabarî's failure to cite Syrian compilers in discussing the conquests in Syria, however, cannot be attributed to an absence of information on this subject within the early Syrian historical tradition, for as we have seen at least one Syrian historian of the first half of the 2nd century A.H.--al-Waḍîn b. ʿAṭâ'--seems to have had a special interest in this theme. We might note here that one of al-Ṭabarî's Iraqi authorities--Sayf b. ʿUmar--related a good number of accounts about the conquest of Syria ostensibly obtained from the Syrians Khâlid b. Maʿdan or ʿUbada b. Nusayy. If these accounts prove, on closer examination, to be "authentic"--that is, if they really do go back to Khâlid and ʿUbâda--they show that al-Ṭabarî was willing enough to quote Syrian tradition at second hand, but that may only be because Sayf or one of the other Iraqi intermediaries in the *isnâd* had already edited out anything that al-Ṭabarî would have found objectionable. (It is perhaps worth recalling at this point that many of the other accounts in which al-Ṭabarî quotes early Syrian authorities, such as Hishâm b. al-Ghâz, also come via Iraqi or Medinese intermediaries, such as al-Wâqidî[97].) On the other hand,

95. Rotter, "Abû Zurʿa al-Dimasqî...," p. 100; cf.p. 2 abve.

96. F.M. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 249- 250).

97. E.g., the accounts cited in notes 87, 91 above.

even if the accounts are fabricated, they show that tracing (pseudo-) historical accounts about the conquest of Syria back to authorities such as Khâlid and ʿUbada struck somewhat later Iraqî traditionists as perfectly plausible, which supports indirectly the contention that these two early Syrian authorities dealt with such material, and that the existence of their material, if not the material itself, was known in Iraq. All told, then, our considerations of al-Ṭabarî seem to reinforce our conclusion that there was an early Syrian historiographical tradition, at least for subjects dating after the life of the Prophet, and seem to support the idea that al-Ṭabarî's failure to retain Syrian material reflects a conscious decision on his part not to reproduce that tradition. The limits on Syrian material found in al-Balâdhurî's works, although slightly less severe than in the case of al-Tabari, seem likely to be elucidated by the same line of analysis, and again, we can only assume that al-Balâdhurî, like al-Ṭabarî, consciously limited his replication of the Syrian tradition. Exactly what their reasons may have been for doing so we must leave for others to resolve.

The failure of the substance of the Syrian historical tradition to survive in Syria itself is a different question, and once again, it is a question that resolves itself into two related problems. The first is to explain why so few of the second and third century Syrian historical compilations are extant; for its is quite striking that no significant portion seems to remain of the works of Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz, al-Walîd b. Muslim, Muḥammad b. ʿA'idh, or Abû Mushir--works which, to judge from the few scraps that survive here and there, collected and synthesized the substantive accounts of early Islamic history that circulated in Syria. The second problem is to explain why the later Syrian works that are extant-- notably, the *Ta'rîkh* of Abû Zurʿâ al-Dimashqî (d.281)-- appear to contain so little of the substance of the Syrian tradition, giving us instead only the formal externals necessary for the proper pursuit of the science of tradition.

Rotter has proposed an answer that, to a certain extent, applies to both of these problems--namely, that the strictly conservative character of the Syrian school of tradition and law, as exemplified by al-Awzâʿî (d. 157), caused scholars there to consider any information that was not directly relevant to the study of Prophetic tradition and its transmission as a distraction from the true study of the faith and, in terms of one's ultimate salvation, positively dangerous[98]. That is, Rotter would have us believe that in their view, essentially "secular" information such as the disposition of governors by the Umayyads, details of the tax system, the struggle against the Byzantines, rebellions against the authorities, and the like was simply not suitable material for traditionists to deal with, for which reason works containing such material either were not composed, or because of the hostile

98. Rotter, p. 103.

environment were not preserved. This explanation certainly may be applicable to the work of Abu Zurʿa, for the collection of accounts in his *Taʾrîkh* is focused with striking sharpness on the kinds of information that provide either religious and moral guidance, or assistance in evaluating the reliability of purveyors of *ḥadîths*.

It is one thing to say that a conservative religious outlook may have kept a single author such as Abu Zurʿa from including "mere history" in his *Taʾrîkh*, however, and quite another to claim that this outlook affected all other writers of the time. From what little we know of the compilations of Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz, al-Walîd b. Muslim, Muḥammad ibn ʿÂʾidh, Hishâm b. ʿAmmâr, Abû Ḥafṣ al-Dimashqî, and others from the scraps that have survived, we must conclude that they did, in fact, contain a good deal of substantive historical information about the early Islamic period, and were not just collections of data useful for the correct handling of *ḥadîth*[99]. These works were written, however, during or shortly after the lifetime of al-Awzâʿi himself, so the spirit of that age seems to have had little success in dampening the spirit of contemporary or slightly later historical inquiry[100].

Moreover, theological and legal conservatism in Syria lived on for many centuries after al-Awzâʿi; it was still very much alive even in the 8th/14th century, when Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), who must be reckoned among the most conservative traditionists and legal scholars in the whole Islamic tradition, flourished in Damascus. Yet this conservative attitude among the religious elite did not apparently prevent an outburst of secular historiography in Syria during the sixth and seventh centuries A.H., as revealed in the important works of such authors as al-ʿAẓîmî (fl. ca. 520), al-Qalânisî (d. 551/1165), Ibn ʿAsâkir (d. 571/1175), and Ibn al-ʿAdîm (d. 660/1262)[101]. In short, the case for attributing the dearth of extant Syrian historical works to the conservative outlook of Syrian traditionists does not seem strong.

An important fact that still needs to be established is whether the main historical compilations of the second and third-century writers were still in existence in Syria when later writers who dealt with the early Islamic period, such as Ibn ʿAsâkir, were active. This can be determined only by means of a thorough examination of, in particular, Ibn ʿAsâkir's *Taʾrîkh*

99. For some of these fragments dealing with the Islamic conquest period, see Donner, *Early Islamic Conquests*, "Index of Traditionists".

100. Dahan (p.109) even claims that al-Awzâʿî himself wrote a *History of Syria*. It may be, of course, that such a work--if it existed- contained entirely traditionist material. However, Dahan gives no source to support his contention that al-Awzâʿî wrote such a work, and *GAS* makes no mention of it *(GAS* 1/516-517); it is thus questionable whether this work ever existed.

101. Dahan, "Local Histories of Syria," briefly discusses these and other authors.

madînat Dimashq, which because of the author's strict use of the *isnâd* will help us to know the amount and kind of information available to him. Very preliminary indications are that some, perhaps even much, of the work of Hishâm b. ʿAmmâr and al-Walîd b. Muslim may have been available to, and may indeed be recoverable from, Ibn ʿAsâkir, whereas the outlook for Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz or Abû Ḥafṣ al-Dimashqî, for example, is considerably less rosy. But a full examination of Ibn ʿAsâkir will require enormous labor in the manuscripts of the text, or the preparation of an index of traditionists to guide us to specific accounts of interest. Once this has been done, we may be able to restore some of the early Syrian historical tradition, and to know better which parts of it vanished in the turbulent years between al-Balâdhurî and al-Ṭabarî, who quoted bits of it early in the 4th/10th century, and Ibn ʿAsâkir, working late in the 6th/12th.

Abbreviations

Abû Zurʿa, *Taʾrîkh*	*Abû Zurʿa al-Dimashqî, taʾrîkh* (ed. Shukrallâh al-Qûjânî, Damascus: Majmaʿ al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya, 1980)
Bal. *Ansâb* I (ed. Ḥamîdullâh)	al-Balâdhurî, *Ansâb al-ashrâf,* part 1 (ed. Muhammad Ḥamîdullâh, Cairo: Dâr al-Maʿ-ârif, 1959)
Bal. *Ansâb* IVA (ed. Kister/Schloessinger)	———, part IVA (ed. M.J.Kister and Max Schloessinger, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1971)
Bal. *Ansâb* IVA (ed. ʿAbbâs)	———, part IVA (ed. Ihsân ʿAbbâs, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1979)
Bal. *Ansâb* V (ed. Goitein)	———, part V (ed. S.D. Goitin, Jerusalem: University Press, 1936)
Bal. *Ansâb* XI (ed. Ahlwardt)	———, part XI (ed. Ahlwardt, Greifswald, 1883)
Bal. *Fut.*	al-Balâdhurî, *Futûḥ al-buldân* (ed. M.J.de Goeje, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1866)
al-Basawî	Abû Yûsuf Yaʿqûb b. Sufyân al-Basawî (al-Fasawî), *Kitâb al-maʿrifa wa-tâ'rîkh* (3 vols., ed. Akram Ḍiyâʾ al-ʿUmarî, Baghdad: Matbaʿat al-ʾirshad, 1974, 1975, 1976)
I.H.	ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Hishâm, *al-Sira al-nabawiyya* (ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Gotingen: Dieterich, 1858-60)
ʿ*Iqd*	Ibn ʿAbd Rabbihi, *al-ʿIqd al-farîd* (8 vols., ed. Muḥammad Saʿîd al-ʿIryân, Cairo: al-Maktaba al-tijâriyya al-Kubrâ, n.d.; reprinted Beirut, 1953).

I.S.	Muḥammad ibn Saʿd, *Kitâb al-ṭabaqât al-Kabîr* (9 vols., ed., E. Sachau et al., Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1904-1940.
Khalifa, *Taʾrîkh*	*Khalîfa b. Khayyâṭ al-ʿUṣfuri, Taʾrikh* (2 vols., ed. Akram Ḍiyâʾ al-ʿUmarî, al-Najaf, 1967)
Khalifa, *Ṭabaqât*	*Khalîfa b. Khayyâṭ al-ʿUṣfûrî, Kitâb al-ṭabaqât* (2 vols., ed. Suhayl Zakkar, Damascus: Wizârat al-thaqâfa, 1966)
Mîzân	Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dhahabî, *Mîzân al-iʿtidâl fi nagd al-rijâl* (4 vols., ed. ʿAlî Muḥammad al-Bajawî, Cairo: Dâr ihya' al-Kutub al-ʿarabiyya, 1963)

Abbreviations

Tab.	Muḥammad b. Jarîr al-Tabarî, *Taʾrîkh al-rusul wal-mulûk* (15 vols., ed. M.J.de Goeje et al, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1879-1901).
Tab. *Tafsîr*	Muḥammad b. Jarîr al-Tabarî, *Jâmiʿ al-bayân fi tafsîr al-Qurʾân* (ed. Maḥmûd Muḥammad Shâkir and Aḥmad Muḥammad Shâkir, Cairo: Dâr al-Maʿârif, 1954-continuing)
Tahdhîb	Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalânî, *Tahdhîb al-tahdhîb* (12 vols., Hyderabad, India: Majlis Dâʾirât al-Maʿârif al-Niẓâmiyya, 1325-1327 A.H.)
TMD 1, etc.	Ibn ʿAsâkir, *Taʾrîkh madînat Dimashq,* MS in al-Ẓâhiriyya library, Damascus, volumes 1-XIX.
TMD I (Munajjid)	————, vol. I (ed. Salâḥ al-Dîn al-Munajjid, Damascus: Majmaʿ al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya, 1951)
TMD II (Munajjid)	————, vol. II (ed. Salâḥ al-Dîn al-Munajjid, Damascus: Majmaʿ al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya, 1954)
Uyun	Ibn Qutayba, *ʿUyûn al-akhbâr* (4 vols., ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qâdir Hâtim, Cairo: Dâr al-Kutub, 1924-1930)

Abbreviations Used In *Isnāds*

means of transmission			traditionists
<	*ʿan*	SbA	Saʿid b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz
-aka-	*akhbara-nâ*		al-Tanûkhî
--aki--	*akhbara-nî*		

--ana--	*anba'a-nâ*	Waq	Muhammad b. ᶜUmar
--h--	*ḥuddith tu an*, etc.		al-Wâqidî
--ha-	*ḥaddatha-nâ*		
--hi--	*ḥaddatha-nî*		
--q--	*qâla, qâlû*		
--s--	*samiᶜitu...yagûlu*		

Al-Azdī's History of the Arab Conquests in Bilād al-Shām: Some Historiographical Observations

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The past decade has witnessed the development of a heated controversy concerning the early history of Islam, the character and value of the various sources available for its study, and ultimately, how early Islamic history can and should be studied. The issues under dispute are of the utmost importance; and regardless of the views one holds, the debate can hardly be ignored or underestimated.

The controversy has unfortunately tended to focus on very broad questions relating to entire historical traditions. It has only recently begun to move to the examination of individual texts, though it is reasonable to suspect that it is there that real progress will first have to be made. For the purposes of this scholarly meeting, then, it would seem particularly appropriate that attention be focused upon one of the most controversial Arabic sources for the history of the Arab/Islamic conquests in Bilād al-Shām, the *Futūḥ al-Shām* attributed to a certain Abū Ismā'il Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Azdī al-Baṣrī. Though not a long work (less than a third of the size of al-Balādhurī's *Futūh al-buldān,* it poses numerous historiographical problems of considerable importance and difficulty. A full discussion of these would require a separate monograph, and here it will be possible only to deal with a limited number of central issues.

The Problem of Authorship

The difficulties encountered in assigning a date or provenance to the *Futūh al-Shām* are in large part due to the fact that the author is unknown. William Nassau Lees, who prepared the first edition of the text in 1854, was able to locate no biographical information about al-Azdi in any of the sources available to him. Nevertheless, examination of the *isnāds* used in the text led him to conclude that this writer had probably died about A.H. 178, "which is perhaps somewhat later than the reality[1]". Elsewhere, he

1. *The Fotooh al-Shám: Being an Account of the Moslim Conquests in Syria, by Aboo Ismā'aīl Mohammad bin 'Abd Allah, al-Azdī al-Baçrī, Who Flourished About the Middle of the Second Century of the Mohammadan Era,* edited with a few notes, by Ensign W.N. Lees, Forty-Second Regiment Bengal Light Infantry. Calcutta: Printed by J. Thomas, at the Baptist Mission Press, 1854. See p. v of Lees' Introduction. This edition will henceforth be referred to as "al-Azdī".

refers to al-Azdī as a contemporary of Ibn Ishāq (d. 151/761) and Abū Mikhnaf (d. 157/774)[2].

Ten years later, however, Michael Jan de Goeje published a devastating critique of Lees' conclusions. The name of the work's author was not to be found in early biographical notices, he argued, because no such person had ever lived: Abū Ismā'il Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Azdī was just a fictitious name, probably invented simply by rearranging the name of Abû 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), the author of the renowned *Ṣaḥīḥ*. As for the *isnāds*, De Goeje found them highly defective and sometimes historically absurd. The text itself, he proposed, was a "pious fraud" that had gone through various stages of redaction and elaboration, primarily at the time of the Crusades, with the aim of encouraging the faithful in the *jihād* against the Franks[3].

This assessment of the authorship of the *Futūḥ al-Shām* prevailed in Orientalist circles for more than a century. Among Arab historians, however, De Goeje's criticisms were to some unconvincing and to others unknown; in any case, al-Azdī was and continues to be cited in modern Arabic historical scholarship on the conquests in Bilád al-Shám. And a significant step toward restoration of the book's credibility was marked by the publication of a new edition by 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd Allāh 'Āmir in 1970. In his introduction, 'Āmir maintained that he had found references to al-Azdi in several *rijāl* works; and on the basis of these accounts he described him as a highly esteemed scholar who spent his career in Baghdad, transmitted Prophetic traditions to a number of eminent authorities on *ḥadīth*, and died in the 'Abbasid capital in 231/845-46[4]. The question of the text's authorship, and hence also its provenance and general date, therefore seemed to have been settled.

Unfortunately, this proves not to be the case. Consultation of 'Āmir's sources reveals that he is citing from the *tarjama* of a Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh whose *nisba* is al-Aruzzī, not al-Azdī. The written forms of these two names are of course quite similar; and although 'Amir never states this, it could be argued that our al-Azdī is the person meant in these biographies, and that the form al-Aruzzī arises from copyist error. But in this instance

2. Cf. Lees' Preface to his edition of the pseudo-Wāqidī, *Futūḥ al-Shām* (Calcutta, 1854-60), I, v.

3. M.J. de Goeje, *Mémoire sur le Fotouho's-Scham attribué à Abou Ismail al-Baçri* (Leiden, 1864; *Mémoires d'histoire et de géographie orientales*, no. 2), pp. 3, 14-22, 24, 32, 33-34, 38-39.

4. Al-Azdī, *Ta'rīkh futūḥ al-Shām*, edited by 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd Allāh 'Āmir (Cairo, 1970), pp. ḵ-1 of the editor's *Muqaddima*. This edition will henceforth be referred to as "'Āmir".

such an argument must be rejected. A blunder in one text is conceivable, but the name al- Aruzzī appears repeatedly and consistently in the various works in which this individual is discussed[5]. Furthermore, the al-Aruzzī of the dictionaries bears the *kunya* Abū Ja'far, while that of the al-Azdī of the *Futūh al-Shām* is Abū Ismā'il. The *tarājim* inform us that al-Aruzzī was a well-known traditionist cited by Muslim, Abū Da'ūd, and Aḥmad ibn Hanbal. Al-Azdi, on the other hand, is never quoted by these authors; and even in the *Futūh al-Shām* itself, as we shall see, *hadīth* is only cited informally, without *isnāds*. 'Āmir's identification of al-Azdī must therefore be set aside, and may be viewed within the context of the numerous errors to be found in his readings of proper names and in his notes identifying persons mentioned in the text and *isnāds* of the *Futūh al-Shām*.

Many of these errors were pointed out by Akram Diyā al- 'Umarī in a recent detailed cirtique of 'Āmir's edition[6]. Al-'Umarī reaffirms that no account of al-Azdī is to be found in the *rijāl* works and other biographical sources. Nevertheless, he considers that the death dates of the immediate authorities cited in his *isnāds* indicate the general era to which al-Azdī should be assigned. As many of these informants died in the 140s and 150s A.H., al-'Umarī proposes that al-Azdi be dated to the late second century and considered roughly as a contemporary of Abū Mikhnaf[7]. As for the question of attribution, al-'Umarī argued in favor of al-Azdī's authorship of the *Futūh al-Shām*. Al-Sakhawi (d. 902/1497) assigns the text to him, and Ibn Hajar (d. 852/1449) does likewise in both his *Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb* and his *Al-Isāba*. Furthermore, the Ms. used by Lees also attributes the work to al-Azdī[8].

These conclusions echo the earlier judgments of Lees, whose agrgument for an early date of authorship on the basis of *inād*s was dismissed by De Goeje on the grounds that these chains of transmission were defective and highly suspect. The use of the *isnād* is in fact a problematic feature of the *Futūh al-Shām*. An *isnād* is given 95 times in the text, providing the names of 43 different persons who appear to be the

5. See, for example, al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), *Al-Ta'rīkh al-kabīr* (Hyderabad, 1360-64/1940-44), I.1, 144:1, no. 430; al-Khaṭib al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1071), *Ta'rīkh Baghdād aw Madīnat al-Salām* (Cairo, 1349/1931), V, 415: 4-416:1, no. 2926; al-Sam'ānī (d. 562/1166), *Kitāb al-ansāb*, edited by 'Abd al- Raḥmān ibn Yaḥyā al-Mu'allimī al-Yamānī (Hyderabad, 1382-86/1962-66; six volumes only), I, 165: 4-10, no. 99; Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalānī (d. 852/1449), *Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb* (Hyderabad, 1325-27 A.H.), IX, 285: 6-18, no. 467.

6. Akram Diyā' al-'Umarī, "Al-Azdī wa-kitabuhu Futūḥ al-Shām," in his *Dirāsāt ta'rīkhīya* (Medina, 1403/1983), pp. 67-79.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 72 - 73.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

immediate informants of the author. As al-'Umarī points out, a significant number of these can be dated to the mid-second century. But at least as many others are difficult to identify, and there would seem to be no reason to presume that our dates would necessarily agree with the range suggested by those of the known informants. At the same time, it is often impossible to make chronological sense of the alleged links between these authorities and the individuals from whom they in turn took their information. We also find that some of the *rijāl al-sanad* are Kūfans or Basrans, while others are from Medina or Syria. A geographical range of informants as broad as this could be expected in works of the third century and after, and is not without parallel among authors of the second[9]. But it is remarkable that a second-century author with contacts in most of the great centers of early Islamic learning (as suggested by the *isnāds)* should remain so completely unknown to the later academic circles in all of these places that no one (at least no one whose work has survived) felt the need to devote a *tarjama* to him.

Hints of disorder are also to be found elsewhere. Some section headings have apparently been misplaced[10]. A number of interpolations intrude to explain terms, place names, or individuals[11], while others, less apparent, represent efforts directly to amplify the text itself.[12] The reader further encounters a distinct element of textual inconsistency. To indicate but a few examples, contradictory statements attribute overall command of the Muslims in Bilad al-Sham to different *amirs*[13]. The text places the emperor Herakleios in Palestine the beginning of the Muslim advance; but then it has the urban Syrians writing to him for reinforcements in a way that implies that he is unaware of the danger and hence must be rather far removed from the scene of events[14]. In one place the penalty for *zinā* is said

9. See, for example, A.A. Duri, *The Rise of Historical Writing Among the Arabs,* edited and translated by Lawrence I. Conrad (Princeton, 1983), pp. 44, 46, concerning the sources of Abu Mikhnaf (d. 157/774), 'Awāna ibn al-Ḥakam (d. 147/764), and Sayf ibn ʿUmar (d. 180/796). Concerning Abū Mikhnaf, cf. also Ursula Sezgin, *Abū Mihnaf. Ein Beitrag zur Historiographie der umaiyadischen Zeit* (Leiden, 1971), pp. 66-98.

10. See, for example al-Azdī, p. 177:1 (the story actually begins four pages earlier).

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 23:14-15, 26:14-15, 16, 34:8, 45:11, 48:6, 52:6, 7, 65:9, 87:1-2, 96:3, 108:1, 11, 123:5, 200:7, 236: 14, 254: 5-6

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 25ult, 58:8-11, 76:15-17, 82:3-10.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 5:1-2, 9:3, 33:7-8, and elsewhere. Such confusion is of course not uncommon in other sources. See Fred M. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton, 1981), pp. 112-16.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 22: 6, 36:8-10.

to be flogging, while in another it is stoning[15]. The drinking of wine *(khamr)* is repeatedly excoriated as a Byzantine vice prohibited to Muslims,[16] only to be cited by ibn Hubayra as one of the Syrian luxuries that will be lost to the Arabs if Byzantine control of the province is restored[17].

These difficulties not only serve to illustrate the problems involved in dealing with the *isnāds* in this text (a problem aggravated by the lack of a good critical edition), they also raise the possibility that the *Futūh al-Shām* is a composite work the core of which was elaborated in various times and places by a succession of *ruwāt*, a conclusion rather close to De Goeje's view. Such a possibility is not obviated by al-Umarī's observations that both al-Sakhāwi and Ibn Hajar attribute the work to al-Azdi and that the Ms. used by Lees does likewise. These authorities both lived more than 600 years after al-Azdī's time, and their agreement that he was the author of the *Futūh al-Shām* indicates only that this was the view that had come to prevail by the ninth century A.H.; it does not prove that this view was correct. And even if one accepts 'Āmir's doubtful claim that his edition is based upon a Ms. of the sixth century A.H.,[18] the problem remains unsolved; all this would tell us is that by that time it was considered that the *Futūh al-Shām* was the work of al-Azdī.

In others words, al-Azdī remains an outhor known to us only through the book that survives under his name. His *isnāds* are suggestive of a second-century origin, but at the same time both these chains of transmission and the narrative itself raise the possibility of confusion and instability in the text. In light of these problems, it would seem useful to examine the text itself more closely to see if its contents do not betray other more subtle indications of the work's date and provenance. The conclusions so derived may then be tested by the prosopographical evidence for the transmission of the work.

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15. *Ibid.*, pp. 104:3, 189:9.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 103:3, 133:10, 156:1, 219: 14-15, 244:4.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 152: 4-6. This statement is, admittedly, quite extraordinary, and the anomaly disasppears if we read *wa-l-thamar*, "fruits", instead of *wa-l-khamr*, "wine".

18. It is to be noted that 'Āmir states that the manuscript he used is in private possession in Damascus, that he publishes no photographs of this copy, despite its obvious importance, and that the present writer's queries so far suggest that no one else seems to know of the existence of this manuscript. Further, 'Āmir's notes to his text reveal that the Damascus copy and that used by Lees are often worm-eaten in exactly the same places, and that they often contain exactly the same marginalia. For other coincidences along similar lines, see al-Umari, *Dirāsāt ta'rīkhīya*, p. 78.

Dating

We may first take up the question of whether al-Azdī's work can be considered a forgery from the time of the Crusades, or perhaps a work which, though containing some early material, was elaborated and enlarged on into the era of the Crusades. In this regard we may note that a late forgery can be expected to begin from a core of information (not necessarily a text) that in the time of the forger (s) was generally accepted as historically sound, and then to inflate that material into a more detailed narrative. Hence, because a definite and early historical point of reference may in fact exist, the resulting text bears a distinct appearance of plausibility, although the new content is largely baseless. It is difficult, however, for such a work to avoid errors and allusions that betray its true character upon a careful reading of the text. Reports from the pseudo-Wāqidī *Futūḥ al-Shām,* for example, are still cited by modern researchers because they bear the "ring of truth". But this work also reveals signs serving notice of how deceptive such appearances are. References to the crosses marked on the chests of the Christian cavalrymen, to "the Franks" in dubious contexts, and to the role of the Pope in Rome, have been noted by others and need not be discussed again here[19]. To these cases, however, can be added yet another, in which the pseudo-Waqidi refers to Ba'labakk as "the most heavily fortified city in Syria" *(aḥṣan madīna bi-l-Shām.*[20] Both textual and archaeological evidence indicate that such a statement, not only referring to strong fortifications at Ba'labakk, but also implying their superiority to those of Damascus and Aleppo, could not be earlier than the First Crusade and the Zengid governors of Syria[21].

The *Futūh al-Shām* attributed to al-Azdī, on the other hand, reveals no such indications of a late date. On the contrary, such dating evidence as it does contain points to an early date of composition. The most readily apparent indications of this are the numerous references to Jerusalem. In the earliest Arabic reports concerning the city, it is called iliya (a rendering of its old Roman name Aelia Capitolina) or Bayt al-Maqdis, but never al-Quds. This last name, the one in use today, originated in the Aramaic *qudsha* and came into use in the tenth century A.D., after which time the earlier appellations gradually fell into disuse[22]. Medieval scholarly and

19. See D.B. Haneberg, *Erorterüngen über pseudo-Wakidis Geschichte der Eroberung Syriens* (Munich, 1890), p. 129; Emmanuel Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade: idéologie et propagande dans les réactions musulmanes aux Croisades* (Pairs, 1968), pp. 197-99.

20. Pseudo-Wāqidī, *Futūḥ al-Shām,* II, 89:4.

21. This question is discuseed in the present writer's "The Pseudo-Wāqidī *Futūḥ al-Shām* as a Potential Historical Source", forthcoming.

22. See *EI*[2], v, 323-24 (S.D. Goitein).

literary circles were aware of the venerable standing of the names I'liya' and particularly the deferential Bayt al-Maqdis, but not of the recent origin of al-Quds. Hence, if the *Futūḥ al-Shām* originated in the period after the name al-Quds had become current, or if it was still being expanded and elaborated after that time, as De Goeje claimed was the case, we should expect to see this betrayed in references to Jerusalem by all three of its Arabic names, including al-Quds. Such expectations are justified by the references to Jerusalem in the *Faḍā'il al-bayt al-muqaddas* of al-Wāsiṭī (wr. before 410/1019) and in the *Futūh al-Shām* falsely ascribed to al-Wāqidī, although in both of these works the later name al-Quds occurs only twice[23].

There is certainly no lack of opportunity for the name al-Quds to appear in al-Azdi's work, since Jerusalem is mentioned on 31 occasions throughout the text. But the preferred name for the city here is the oldest form, Iliya[24], which appears in every case except for two places, in a passage found only in 'Amir's edition, where Bayt al-Maqdis is used[25]. The later name al-Quds is never mentioned. It is also worth noting that al-Azdi's book does not assign Jerusalem any exalted status. If any city is singled out for favor, it is Hims. In a letter to 'Umar, Abu 'Ubayda describes Hims as "the finest region in Syria, with the best people and best citadel, as well as the most populous and most productive of tax revenue"[26]. In other works, al-Azdī's *Futūḥ al-Shām* neither reveals the tendency of the era of the Crusades to glorify Jerusalem as a martial focus of the *jihād*[27], nor shows any sign of awareness of the name by which Jerusalem increasingly came to be known beginning in the fourth century A.H. It can therefore be maintained that

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23. Al-Wāsiṭī, *Faḍā'il al-bayt al-muqaddas*, edited by Isaac Hasson (Jerusalem, 1979), pp. 17:6, 61:3; pseudo-Waqidi, *Futūḥ al-Shām*, II, 252:13, 271:12.

24. Al-Azdī, pp. 80:1, 125: 13, 18, 132pu, 133ult, 134:4, 144:2, 146:7, 8. 10, 11. 16, 147:1 (twice), 8, 148:15, 218pu, 219:5, 9, 220: 15, 221:9, 15, 223:6, 224:3, 228:3, 229:2, 15, 16. cf. also Amir, p. 257: 15, in a long passage not found in Lees' edition.

25. 'Āmir, pp. 258: 16, 259:4. In a footnote (p. 169 n.2), 'Āmir identifies Ayla, which also appears twice in the text (al-Azdī, p. 151:2, 4; 'Āmir, pp. 169ult, 170:3), as a variant of Īliyā', but this is of course wrong. Ayla is the port at the head of the Gulf of 'Aqaba, and the context of the passage in question clearly indicates that Jerusalem cannot be the place intended.

26. Al-Azdī, p. 128: 17-18.

27. See the account of the fall of the city in the pseudo-Waqidi, *Futūḥ al-Shām*, II, 247:18-272:5. Jerusalem was of course always held in special esteem in medieval Islamic spirituality, ranking third in importance behind Mecca and Medina. It is considered by some that it was not venerated as a sacred place in early Islam, but this view can now be set aside as false, on the basis of Umayyad traditions assigning it great apocalyptic significance. See my "Views About Jerusalem in Umayyad Syria," forthcoming.

regardless of the factors that may have served to influence and shape the work in earlier times, the text of the *Futūh al-Shām* as we now have it had stabilized by the fourth/tenth century at the latest, and was not affected by efforts to marshal popular opinion against the Franks two centuries later.

The plausible range for the date of the work may be narrowed further on the basis of its repeated references to a monastic establishment on the outskirts of Damascus called Dayr Khalid. The early *ruwāt* and compiler's on the history of Bilad al-Sham rarely referred to the name of this *dayr,* its location, or its role in the conquests. Indeed, most of them seem to have been entirely unaware of any of these matters. But among the Syrians themselves were some who were familiar with the place and who transmitted information about it. The central figure here is al-Walid ibn Muslim (d. 195/810), a local Damascene authority who explained that the monastery took its name from the fact that Khalid ibn al-Walid had camped there during the siege of Damascus. The monks living there *(ahl al-dayr)* provided the Muslims with a ladder for scaling the city wall, and in return were granted a reduction of their *kharāj* after the fall of the town. This information was transmitted to the renowned genealogist Hishām ibn Muḥammad al-Kalbī (d. 204/819), from whence it was incorporated by al-Balādhurī (d. 279/892) into his account of the Syrian conquests[28]. In his own account of these events, Ibn 'Asākir (d. 571/1175) also has his information about Dayr Khālid from al-Walid ibn Muslim[29]. Al-Balādhurī probably had more than one informant about this place. His account of the fall of Damascus, in which he describes the events at Dayr Khālid and locates it near the al-Bāb al-Sharqī gate of the city[30], is introduced by a reference to his authorities for this information by the word *qālu,*"they said", which in the usage of al-Balādhurī is often a term implying a consensus among multiple informants[31]. This would seem significant, for al-Baladhuri's authorities for the conquest of Bilād al-Shām number close

28. Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān,* edited by M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1866), p. 129:17-20. Cf. also, for Ibn al-Kalbī, Yāqūt (d. 626/1229), *Mujam al-buldān,* edited by Fredinand Wustenfeld (Leipzig, 1866-73), II, 657: 19-20.

29. Ibn 'Asākir, *Ta'rīkh madīnat Dimashq,* I, edited by Salāh al-Dīn al-Munajjid (Damascus, 1371/1951), pp. 502: 21, 503: 10.

30. *Futūḥ al-buldān,* p. 121:2.

31. *Ibid.,* p. 120:17. On al-Balādhurī's sources and his methods for citing them, see Duri, *Historical Writing,* pp. 61-64. The much more specific intent of *qālū* elaborated by Fuat Sezgin in his *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums,* I (Leiden, 1967), pp. 242-43, does not apply to this particular case, and perhaps not to al-Balādhurī at all.

to thirty *ruwāt* and authors, ranging from the early second century (e.g., al-Waḍīn ibn ʿAtā, d. 147/764[32]) to such well-known figures as al-Hytham ibn ʿAdī (d. 206/821) and Hishām ibn ʿAmmār (d. 245/859) in the third. It is thus probable that al-Walīd ibn Muslim was not the only second-century authority who knew of Dayr Khālid, and that there was a small circle of informants, most likely limited to Syria, who were familiar with the place's role in the conquests.

It appears that in the mid-third century Dayr Khālid was still an active monastery and was still known by this name. A report concerning al-Ḥasan ibn Shawdhab, a pious *shaykh* of Damascus and a contemporary of Aḥmad ibn Abi l-Ḥawārī (d. 246/860) and al-Qāsim ibn ʿUthmān al-Jawī (d. 248/862), tells of his encounter with a monk there and calls the place by no other name[33]. But reports after this time indicate that other names soon came to be attached to the place. By the mid-fourth century it was primarily known as Dayr Ṣalībā, the name Dayr Khālid being cited only as a secondary alternative. The poet Ibn Abi l-Liqa' came for a visit at about this time, and referred to "Dayr Ṣalībā, also known as Dayr Khālid"[34]. Slightly

32. On him, see Fred M. Donner's contribution to this volume, "The Problem of Early Arabic Historiography in Syria".

33. See Ibn ʿAsākir, *Taʾrīkh madīnat Dimashq,* Zāhiriya Library (Damascus), Ms. Taʾrikh nos. 1-18, 113, IV, 231v: 22-30; XIX 311r:23-25. For a condensed version of the former report, see the unfinished abridgement of the text, *Al-Taʾrīkh al-kabīr,* edited by ʿAbd al-Qādir Badrān and Aḥmad ʿUbayd (Damascus, 1329-51 A.H.), IV, 188: 17-21. Al-Ḥasan ibn Shawdhab's death date is unknown, but he is cited by Ibn ʿAsākir as a contemporary of the two figures named above. On them, see Abū Zurʿa al-Dimashqī (d. 280/893), *Taʾrīkh Abī Zurʿa al-Dimashqī,* edited by Shukr Allāh ibn Niʿmat Allāh al-Qūchānī (Damascus, 1400/1980), I, 288:1-4; Ibn ʿAsākir (Ms.), XIV, 171r: 4-173r:5; XIX, 310v: 23-311r: 23-311v: 10.

34. See Ibn ʿAsākir (Ms.), XIX, 138r:26-138v:4. The dates for Abū l-Fatḥ Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Abī l-Liqāʾ are unknown. His description of Dayr Saliba and verses in praise of it were transmitted orally by him to Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAli ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Muẓaffar al-Shimshāṭī, who quoted Ibn Abī l-Liqāʾ in his *Kitāb al-diyārāt* (or *al-diyara),* now lost. Al-Nadīm was a personal acquaintance of al-Shimshāṭī. He described him as a historian who also composed an abridgement of al-Tabari's history, and at the time he was writing his *Fihrist* (ca. 377/987) he referred to al-Shimshāṭī as aged, but still living; see al Nadīm, *Kitāb al-fihrist,* edited by Riḍā-Tajaddud (Tehran, 1391/1971), pp. 172:2, 291pu. This would seem to place Ibn Abī l-Liqāʾ roughly in the middle of the fourth century A.H., and perhaps earlier. The matter would be clearer if a definite death date for al-Shimshāṭī was known; but unfortunately, the later biographers who mention him know nothing of this. See al-Najashi (d. ca. 450/1085), *Kitāb al-rijal* (Bombay, 1317 A.H.), pp. 186: 19-188:11; Yāqūt, *Muʿjam al-buldān,* III, 320:10-18; *idem, Irshād al-arīb ilā maʿrifat al-adīb,* edited by D.S. Margoliouth, 2nd edition (Leiden, 1923-31), V, 375: 10- 377:17, no. 132. Cf. also Ḥabīb Zayyāt, *Al-Diyārāt al-naṣrānīya fī l-Islām* (Beirut, 5-6; *GAL,* SI, 251; Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, *Al-Aʿlām,* 3rd edition (Beirut, n.d.), V, 143.

later, al-Shābushtī (d. 388/998) wrote his *kitab al-diyārāt,* the extant Ms. of which contains no reference to a Dayr Khālid or a Dayr Ṣalībā[35] but from quotations by later authors it is clear that he knew of the place, and the extant fragments of this part of al-Shabushti's text give no indication that he was aware of any name for it other than Dayr Ṣalībā[36].

As the new name for the monastery gained ground, the events from which the old name had arisen became obscure and even the location of the site became a disputed issue. A reference to a "Dayr al-Walīd", almost certainly arising from a corruption of "Dayr (Khālid ibn) al-**Walid", puzzled** Yāqūt (d. 626/1229), who admitted that he had no idea where in Syria this place was to be sought[37]. The error was probably already rather old by his time, for in the late fourth/tenth century the al-Khālidi brothers were linking Dayr Ṣalībā to the Umayyad caliph al-Walīd (II) ibn Yazīd (r. 125/743) and claiming that it had been a favorite spot for this ruler's notorious bouts of drinking and frivolity[38]. It may also have been the al-Khālidīs who first proposed the eventually very popular notion that references in the poetry of Jarīr (d. 110/728) to Christian monastic activities near the Bab al-Farādīs gate of the Umayyad Mosque refer to Dayr Ṣalībā, and that the monastery therefore was north instead of east of the city[39]. In later medieval times, there appeared yet another name for the monastery, Dayr al-Sā'ima[40].

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35. Edited by Gurgis 'Awwād, 2nd edition (Baghdad, 1386/1966).

36. See Ibn Shaddad (d. 684/1285), *Al-Alāq al-khaṭīra fī dhikr umarā' al-Shām wa-l-Jazīra,* II. 1, edited by Sāmī al-Dahhān (Damascus, 1375/1956), p. 278:2-8; Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-Umarī (d. 749/1349), *Masālik al-abṣār fi mamālik al-amṣar. I,* edited by Aḥmad Zakī Pāshā (Cairo, 1342/1924), p. 349: 12-13. Derived from this latter account is that of Ibn Tūlūn (d. 953/1546), *Al-Lam'āt al-barqīya fī l-nukat al-ta'rīkhīya,* printed in his *Rasā'il ta'rīkhīya* (Damascus, 1348/1929), IV, 38:1-3. 'Awwād quotes the version of Ibn Shaddād in an appendix to his edition of al-Shābushtī's *Kitāb al-diyārāt,* pp. 339-40, no. 4.

37. Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-buldān,* II, 705:19.

38. See the long citation from the al-Khālidī brothers in Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-abṣār,* I, 349:9-350:14, which is probably taken from their own *Kitāb al-diyārāt.* Cf. Sezgin, I, 382-83; F. Justus Heer, *Die historischen und geographischen Quellen in Yāqūt's Geographischem Wörterbuch* (Strassburg, 1898), p. 23.

39. See Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-buldān,* II, 657: 18, 674:4, 705:19-21; Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-abṣār,* I, 349:3-4, 8-10. For the verses of Jarir, see his *Dīwān,* edited with the commentary of Muḥammad ibn Habīb (d. 245/859) by Nu'mān Amīn Talal (Cairo, 1969-71), I, 126, , 9 vss. 7-8.

40. Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umari, *Masālik al-abṣār,* I, 349:3.

The confusion is understandable, for beginning as early as the late third century Dayr Ṣalībā was falling onto hard times. Al-Shābushtī refers to cells *(qalālīy)* for monks and to wine-making at Dayr Ṣalībā, and Ibn Abī l-Liqā' speaks of "many buildings"; but both are primarily impressed with the natural beauty of the site, and it is entirely possible that even by then it had begun to decline[41]. Ibn 'Asākir speaks of it as already ruined before his own time, although enough remained of the monastery for him to specify its location--beyond the al-Bāb al-Sharqī gate of Damascus, near the village of Bayt al-Abar[42]. Later, Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī (d. 749/1349), who built his own house in the area, says that not a trace of Dayr Ṣalībā remains: the site is now covered with houses, buildings, mosques and cemeteries[43].

The history of the monastery thus reveals a pattern of changing names, gradual obfuscation of historical detail concerning the origin of the name Dayr Khālid, increasing confusion about the location of the establishment, and evntually, its ruin and disappearance. As these developments can be reconstructed within an approximate chronological framework, they can serve as a general guide for dating al-Azdī's own references to Dayr Khālid.

The *Futūḥ al-Shām* mentions the monastery in two glosses to narratives dealing with the conquest of Damascus. The first report states that Khalid ibn al-Walid advanced on the city until, near the al-Bab al-Sharqi gate, he stopped and camped at a monastery known as Dayr Khālid, "by which name it is known until today"[44]. The second report is more specific: Khālid ordered his men to march on Damascus, so the army advanced until it arrived at the city and stopped at a monastery where they made their camp. "This was Dayr Khālid, by which name it is called until today, a mile's distance from Damascus near the al-Bāb al-Sharqī gate"[45].

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41. For the verses of al-Shabushti, see the sources cited in n. 28 above. Those of Ibn Abi l-Liqā' together with his description, are quoted in Ibn 'Asākir (Ms.), XIX, 138r:31-138v:4; Yāqūt has the verses only (and their author's name incorrectly as Abū l-Liqā) in his *Mu'jam al-buldān,* II, 674:5-14. On Yāqūt's use of the *Diyārāt* books, see Heer, *Quellen in Yāqūt's geographischem Wörterbuch, pp.* 23, 88-98.

42. *Ta'rīkh madīnat Dimashq* (Ms.), IV, 231v: 30; = (Badrān and 'Ubayd), IV, 188: 20-21.

43. *Masālik al-abṣār,* I, 350:15-17.

44. Al-Azdī, p. 72:6-8: *wa-bihi yu'rafu ilā l-yawm.*

45. *Ibid.,* p. 81:9-10: *wa-huwa Dayr Khālid wa-bihi yud'ā ilā l-yawm wa-huwa min Dimashq 'alā bu'd mīl mimmā yalī l-Bāb al-Sharqī.*

Al-Azdī is clearly well informed about the place, a fact which links him to the chain of authorities extending from Ibn 'Asākir back to al-Walīd ibn Muslim. Within this series, an earlier rather than later date is suggested by several fators. First, al-Azdī shows no awareness of the confusion, apparent from the fourth/tenth century onward and perhaps of earlier origin, about the site of Dayr Khālid; he specifies its location percisely and accurately. More imortant, he reveals no sign of any awareness of the name Dayr Ṣalībā. Here we must note that al-Azdī's comments interrupt his narrative, and probably do so for the purpose of clarification for the benefit of his readers. If the name of the monastery had even begun to vary or shift in favor of some other name, al-Azdī could not have expected his gloss to serve its purpose without also mentioning the alternative. The fact that he does not do so suggests that in his day there were no alternatives: the *Futūḥ al-Shām* predates the emergence of the name Dayr Ṣalībā, and hence was written prior to the fourth/tenth century. Al-Azdī's knowledge of Dayr Khālid is comparable to, but independent of, that of al-Walīd ibn Muslim; and if this is of some indicative value for dating purposes, late second-century authorship is more likely than third.

It should now be clear that De Goeje's argument for assigning the final form of the *Futūḥ al-Shām* to the era of the Crusades is untenable, and further, that even by the fourth/tenth century--two hundred years before the arrival of the Franks before the walls of Antioch--the text as we have it today had already stabilized. But is the work a roduct of the second or third centuries A.H.? The distinction is an important one. If al-Azdi's book belongs to the earlier period, it is not just the oldest Arabic historical text on the conquests, but the sole surviving example of such a work from that era, and hence of far greater historical and historiographical significance than would be a work of the third century, from which we have numerous other sources available to us.

The impression suggested above, that the *Futūḥ al- Shām* is a product of the late second century, is supported by the way in which certain topics and issues are, or are not, approached and discussed. Of significance here is the book's treatment of Khālid ibn al-Walīd. In some parts of the work, al-Azdī presents his readers with the extravagant heroics and vivid narrative spirit of the old *ayyām* lore of the Jāhilīya, while in others he tempers this presentation with formal religious elements. The result is an engaging historical narrative that serves to emphasize the theme that the Muslim victory in Bilād al-Shām, while certainly a triumph of arms, should primarily be seen as an expression of the divine will and plan of God at work

in the domain of human affairs[46]. The interweaving of martial and spiritual elements is quite effective, and is perhaps most striking in the juxtaposition of the book's two leading personalities: Abū 'Ubayda ibn al-Jarrāḥ and Khālid ibn al-Walīd. Abū 'Ubayda is the wise and level-headed leader, the keen decision-maker and perceptive arbiter upon whom success depends, a pious man entirely committed to God's cause and caring nothing for the ephemeral distractions of the world. As such, he tends to be a focus of the formal religious content of the *Futūḥ al-Shām.*[47] Already a well-developed character by the time Khalid is first introduced in the text[48], he is the ideal foil to the latter. Khālid is the martial hero of the *ayyām* perspective, the fearless and hot-tempered warrior of long campaign experience, the soldier who has little patience for negotiations over matters he knows will have to be settled by force. Al-Azdī does not question his spiritual integrity, but rather chooses to emphasize his prowess in battle and his military contribution to God's plan for the Muslim conquest of Bilād al-Shām[49].

Within this framework, as the metaphors and images appropriate to the two leaders accumulate, it is interesting to note how al-Azdi makes use of Khalid's famous nom de guerre *Sayf Allāh,* "Sword of God". Authors from the third century onward often express the view that the Prophet gave this title to Khālid in recognition of his valor at the battle of Mu'ta against

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46. *Ibid.*, pp. 21:15, 22:13-23:5, 77:12-14, 97: 6-9, 99:5-100:3, 110:5-15, 134:16-20, 137:2-6, 147:8-148:7, 152: 4-7, 155: 13-158:9, 175:6-176:2, 179:15-184:14, 193:10-18. These passages provide a clear exposition of al-Azdī's explanation for the conquest. The Arabs in pre-Islamic times led a wretched and impoverished existence in the harsh environment of Arabia.But then God summoned him to believe in Him and in His Messenger; and because the Arabs responded by accepting Islam, God is now rewarding them appointing them to assme authority over the fertile and prosperous land of Syria, which will thus become part of Dār al-Islām. This also serves to punish the Byzantines. They too once enjoyed God's favor and were allowed by Him to triumph over their idolatrous and pagan enemies. But they have associated other beings (i.e., Jesus) in divinity with God, and further, have been oppressive and unjust. Hence they shall be driven out, and the Muslims will take their place.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 12:18-14:14, 19:15-18, 33:8-11, 41:8-14, 91:4-7, 135:1-141ult, 231:1-232:3, 240:3-242:12.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 45:7.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 56:5-8, 58:8-11 (perhaps and interpolation), 74:6-9, 91:4-7, 119:14-18, 151:15-17, 159:5-11, 168:3-9, 177: 1-185:3, 202pu-203:2.

Byzantine forces in 8/629[50]. Earlier, however, this explantion of the epithet is unknown. In its place, we find that Khālid was first called *Sayf Allāh* by Abū Bakr, who coined the title in defense of Khālid's conduct of the campaigns against tribes involved in the Ridda. The fascinating process by which this title emerged in early historical circles and developed over the centuries is beyond the scope of present concerns[51]. Here it will suffice to note that it is typical of second-century reports to indicate an awareness of *Sayf Allāh* as Khālid's title; but if they in any way allude to its origins, they attribute its first use to Abū Bakr with reference to Khālid's conduct of the Ridda campaigns, and definitely not to the Prophet with reference to Mu'ta. The Medinans up until the time of al-Wāqidī (d. 207/823), for example, still say nothing at all about Khālid as *Sayf Allāh*[52]. And even in the case of al-Wāqidī's secretary, Ibn S'id (d. 230/844), Khālid's title is mentioned only in one passing reference and does not appear in the account of the battle of Mu'ta[53]. Among Iraqis and Syrians, the narratives reported by such second-hand authorities as al-Walīd ibn Muslim (d. 195/810), Sayf ibn 'Umar (d. 180/796), and Ibn al-Kalbī (d. 204/819) all indicate that the title *Sayf Allāh* was generally considered to have been assigned to Khālid by Abū Bakr in

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50. See, for example, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 242/855), *Musnad* (Cairo, 1311 A.H.), I, 204:20-205:1; V, 299:5-17, 300:24-301:8; al-Bukhārī, *Al-Jāmi' al-ṣaḥīḥ*, edited by Ludolf Krehl and Th. W. Juynboll (Leiden, 1862-1908), II, 445:4-8, *Faḍā'il aṣḥāb al-Nabī* no. 25; al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), *Ta'rikh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, edited by Muḥammad Abū l-Fāḍl Ibrāhīm, 2nd edition (Cairo, 1968-69), III, 41:10-12. In several summary statements al-Balādhurī says that Khālid was first called *Sayf Allāh* by Muḥammad; but he specifies that this occurred after Khālid's expedition against Banū Jadhīma at Yulamlam. See al-Balādhurī's *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, I, edited by Muḥammad Ḥamīd Allāh (Cairo, 1960), p. 382: 1; also Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul), Reisüküttap Ms. 598, fol. 271r: 32-34.

51. The battle of Mu'ta and Khālid's role in it were hotly disputed issues among early Muslim historians and *ruwāt;* and even as late as the time of Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258) and Ibn Sayyid al-Nās (d. 734/1334), the affair was still not entirely settled.The emergence of Khālid as *Sayf Allāh* was an integral part of these discussions. These questions are discussed in detail in my *The expedition to Mu'ta: a Study in Comparative Historiography,* forthcoming.

52. See al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī,* edited by Marsden Jones (London, 1966), 11, 755:11-769: 14, where we can see that the Medinan attitude towards Khalid's role at Mu'ta is still rather negative.

53. Ibn Sa'd, *Kitāb al-tabaqāt al-kabīr,* edited by Eduard Sachau *et al-* (Leiden, 1904-40), I.2, 36:20. Ibn Sa'd's account of Khālid unfortunately is interrupted by a lacuna in the middle of the report about the swords broken by Khālid at Mu'ta (IV.2, 2: 15). For his account of this battle, see II.I, 92: 20-94:25.

connection with the Ridda. In these circles, the association with Mu'ta is still unknown[54].

It should come as no surprise to us that al-Azdī refers to Khālid as *Sayf Allāh:* the epithet evokes perfectly the image which he seeks to project--that of Khālid as a vehement champion whose sword is now turned to serve God's cause. But it is noteworthy that he does not do so with reference to Mu'ta. This is not because al-Azdī was unaware of the historical traditions about Mu'ta in circulation in his day, or because he perhaps considered this early battle in the lifetime of the Prophet to be beyond the scope of his discussion of events that occurred after Muḥammad's death. He does make a passing reference to Mu'ta, and does so precisely in order to stress Khalid's martial reputation, quoting the famous statement attributed to him, "On the day of Mu'ta nine swords broke in my hand, and in it only a Yemeni broadsword survived"[55]. Yet even with this ideal opening for a reference to Khālid as *Sayf Allāh,* the epithet is not introduced here. It appears elsewhere, in a passage in which Khālid writes to Abū Bakr a letter in which he refers to himself as *Sayf Allāh al-maṣbūb 'ala l-mushrikin,* "the sword of God hurled (lit.: poured) against the polytheists"[56]. The phrasing of the reference and its association with Abu Bakr are entirely consistent with the usage of the title as it was known in the second century. The fact that it is not introduced in the report about Mu'ta despite the perfect opportunity the passage provides for al-Azdī to promote his theme of a divinely guided struggle against the Byzantines, suggests that al-Azdī is writing at a time when reports to this effect had yet to be set in circulation, i.e., in the late second or very early third century.

The dating of the *Futūḥ al-Shām* can also be considered in terms of its presentation of legal points and *ḥadīth.* As Schacht has demonstrated, precedents and actions that could be cited as the commonly accepted practice, or that were reported from the Companions or Successors, were the prevailing sources from which second-century legal discussions derived their sanctioning authority for systematic legal judgments and

54. Ibn al-Kalbī, *Jamharat al-nasab,* British Museum, Ms. Add. or. 23297, fol. 101r:12; al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh,* III, 391:19-20, 398ult-399:6; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr (d. 463/1070), *Al-Istī'āb fi ma'rifat al-aṣḥāb,* edited by 'Alī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī (Cairo, n.d.), II, 429:13-17; Ibn 'Asākir (Ms.), V, 271r: 10-20, 271r: 29-271v:8; Ibn Ḥajar, *Al-Iṣāba fī tamyīz al-ṣaḥāba* (Cairo, 1328 A.H.), I, 414:6-8. For the extant fragments of al-Walīd ibn Muslim's account of Mu'ta, see Ibn 'Asākir (Munajjid), I, 390: 23-391:4, 393: 22-393:13, 396:15-398:2, 399:21-400:14.

55. Al-Azdī, p. 56: 7-8: *indaqqa fī yadī tis'a asyāf yawm Mu'ta wa-baqiya fi yadī ṣafīḥa Yamānīya.*

56. *Ibid.,* p. 80:7. For *al-maṣbūb* we should perhaps read *al-muṣawwab,* which would give, "the sword of God, well-aimed against the polytheists".

conclusions. Traditions from the Prophet were of course known in the second century; but it was the decisive influence of al-Shāfi'ī (d. 204/820), and possibly of other like-minded scholars whose contributions are now lost, that in the third century led to the rise of traditions from the Prophet to a position of authority second only to that of the Qur'ān.[57]. One need not enter into the controversy provoked by Schacht's (in my view excessive) scepticism concerning the authenticity of *ḥadīṯ* in general in order to see the value of his investigations for the dating of problematic early works containing legal or *ḥadīṯ* materials. That is, issues and questions which in the second century can still be settled by reference to prevailing consensus or to the opinions or precedents of Companions, are in the third century more strictly argued on the basis of traditions from the Prophet. Likewise, traditions cited in the second century, whether from the Prophet or from Companions, are very often generally phrased statements lacking proper *isnāds;* while in the third century, after al-Shāfi'i, there is far greater concern to specify in most exact terms the chain of authorities through which a given tradition is claimed to derive from the Prophet. Various aspect of the early stages of this process of development can be observed quite clearly in second-century legal writings, or extracts therefrom, by Ibn Abī Layla (d. 148/765), Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), al-Awzāī (d. 157/774), Mālik (d. 179/795), Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), al-Shaybāni (d. 189/805), and Bishr ibn Ghānim (d. ca. 200/815)[58].

Al-Azdī's treatment of matters pertaining to law and *ḥadīth* is very much in keeping with the trends evident in these second-century works, but would be quite anomalous within the context of discussions a hundred years later. He quotes traditions from the Prophet on six occasions. Three are statements of basic tenets of the Islamic faith, and are quoted from the Prophet by Abū ʿUbayda to the Byzantines, by 'Umar at al-Jābiya, and in the *waṣīya* of Mu'adh ibn Jabal.[59] The text also contains Prophetic traditions that assure ultimate victory to those who will persevere in their commitment to Islam[60] and predict the triumph over the Rum[61], as well as

57. See Joseph Schacht, *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (Oxford, 1950), especially pp. 21-35, 58-81, for concerns pertinent to this study.

58. See Schacht, *Origins,* p.22; Josef van Ess, *Zwischen Ḥadīṯ und Theologie: Studien zum prädestinatianischer Überlieferung* (Berlin, 1975), pp. 186-87; Michael Cook, *Early Muslin Dogma: a Source- Critical Study* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 131.

59. Al-Azdī, pp. 108:17-109:7, 227:10-228:2, 245:7-11.

60. *Ibid.,* p. 3:5-7.

61. *Ibid.,* p. 158:11-12. Cf. also pp. 22:7-8, 112:5, for references to the tribesmen's participation in the campaigns based on their affirmation *(tasdiq)* of their faith in these traditions. The first of these references is made by Byzantine advisors to Herakleios.

ḥadīth qudsī giving an account of God's creation of an esteem for the intellect[62]. All of these are well- attested in sources from the third century onward as *aḥādīth* formally traced back to the Prophet with full *isnāds*. Al-Azdī, however, cites them informally within long narratives on other matters, and makes no effort to substantiate their validity by providing *isnads*. For example, various versions of the Prohet's predictions for the conquest of Bilād al-Shām are commonly cited in our sources as *ahadith* with complete *isnāds*.[63] What we find in the *Futūḥ al-Shām,* however, is a long narrative related by a Christian Tanūkhī tribesman about Byzantine excesses prior to al-Yarmūk: within this story the informant suddenly states that the Greeks were in awe of the Muslims because they had heard that the Arab Prophet had said to his followers, "You will triumph over the Byzantines".

It should be noted that although al-Azdī pointedly upholds the *sunna* of the Prophet as a source of guidance to which Muslims should adhere[64], he does not seem to consider that traditions from Muhammad (as opposed to the customary practice of the *umma* of the views of Companions) are essential to a knowledge of that *sunna*. That is, when he cites Prophetic traditions he does not appeal to them for decisive authority, and they are not crucial to his arguments. These trends, coupled with the way he quotes traditions without *isnāds* and introduces them informally into larger discussions, speaks for a second rather than third-century origin for the *Futūḥ al-Shām*.

A particularly interesting case of a discussion culminating in a quotation from a Companion points to the same conclusion. In his account of the Muslim withdrawal southward before a vast Byzantine host advancing on Ḥimṣ, prior to the decisive battle of al-Yarmūk, al-Azdī confronts a major problem stated quite clearly by him in the text. God had ordained the conquest of Bilad al-Sham and had granted the Muslims victory in the face of impossible numerical odds; and the Muslims, in turn, had given guarantees of safety and protection to the peoples and places that had surrendered to them. How then was it possible to justify Abū ʿUbayda's withdrawal in the face of the enemy?[65]

62. *Ibid.*, p. 178:3-6.

63. See, for example, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, I, 178: 21-28, IV, 128:21-24, 160:14-17, 337:29-31, 337ult-338:5; V, 219: 27-220:6, 241:3-7, 270:8-10, 288:13-20; VI, 24:23-26; al-Bukhārī, *Al-Jāmiʿal-ṣaḥīḥ*, I, 468:16-469:2, *Faḍā'il al-Madīna* no. 5; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, II, 1008:13-1009:8, *Hajj* nos. 496-97; IV, 2225:1-8, *Fitan* no. 38, 2274: 13-2275:1, *Zuhd* no. 7; Ibn ʿAsākir (Munajjid), I, 375:1-384ult, 558:12-17; (Badrān and 'Ubayd), VI, 303: 21-22.

64. See al-Azdī, pp. 4:15, 103:2, 104:2; also cf. p. 22pu, where the notion of a prophetic *sunna* among the Byzantines is proposed.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 139:10-13, 139ult-140:1, 141:13-19, 143:4-12.

Al-Azdī's response to the issue is that Abū 'Ubayda consulted his commanders and the other leading Muslims before a decision was reached, and all agreed that the army should withdraw. There is repeated stress on the point that there was a general consultation, that there was really little dispute, that unanimity of opinion was reached[66]. Abū 'Ubayda is privately favorable to remaining at Ḥimṣ; but he gives the order to withdraw since he does not want to stand against the consensus of the others and anticipates that the unanimity of their opinion will prove to be a portent of blessing and good fortune [67]. The caliph 'Umar is at first aghast at the withdrawal; but when Abu 'Ubayda's letter and his messenger assure him that the Muslims were all of one accord on the matter, he no longer disapproves. "I knew", he writes in a response to Abu 'Ubayda, "that God would not allow your opinions to meet in agreement except on a course of action that would be successful, appropriate, and rightly guided. This relieved me of the antipathy I had earlier felt because of your (decision to) turn back".[68] The reader is further reminded that God's protection of the communal consensus was confirmed by the final climax of the Muslim manoevre—the great victory at al-Yarmūk, which wreaked upon the Byzantines a destruction comparable to the destruction of 'Ād and Thamūd[69].

This argument, based on the principle of *ijmā'* or consensus, is one to which an early date can be assigned. Al-Azdī's point is that the Muslims were in complete accord on withdrawal; and the fact that a unanimous consensus was reached is a sign that the agreed-upon decision is approved and protected by God, regardless of whether or not a rational justification for it is immediately apparent[70]. This recalls the famous *ḥadīth,* "My community will never agree upon an error," a tradition frequently quoted from the Prophet in the third century. The idea of the divine sanction of the *ijmā'* is already cited earlier on the authority of the Prophet by al-Shaybānī: "The Muslims agree on this and deem it commendable. It is reported that the Prophet -- may the blessing and peace of God be upon him -- said: Whatever the believers deem commendable is commendable in the eyes of

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 135:3-5, 12-14, 135:14-137:9, 139:1-2, 8-10, 140: 2-3. Cf. also pp. 96:9-11, 125:2-3, 160ult-161:2, 162: 3-5.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 137:7-8.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 141:10-13.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 140:6. The comparison with the fate of 'Ād and Thamūd appears again, after al-Yarmūk; cf. pp. 190:10-11, 15, quoting Sūrat al-Fajr (89), vss. 6-8, and Sūrat al-Shāms (91), vss. 11-12.

70. The Byzantines also arrive at a consensus prior to the battle of al-Yarmūk; but their *ijmā'*, of course, produces the opposite result. See al-Azdī, pp. 186ult-187:2, 187:10-12.

God, and whatever the Muslims deem objectionable is objectionable in the eyes of God."[71] Schacht considers this to be "the first external justification of the principle of consensus".[72] But while al-Shaybani cites the *ḥadīth* informally and without an *isnād*, he at least seeks sanction in the authority of Muḥammad. But for al-Azdī it is still possible to assert the special character of the *ijmāʿ* -- or as he informally calls it, *ijtimāʿal-raʾy* -- by citing only Companions. In his presentation, Abū ʿUbayda anticipates *khayr* and *baraka* to result from the unanimous consensus, and it is Umar who makes the decisive and explicit declaration in its favor. It is doubtful that any author after the early third century could have expected such an argument, neglecting the by then well-known *ḥadīth* materials from the Prophet on this principle, to be received as authoritative and convincing.

In objection to this argument it could be pointed out that the conquest of Bilād al-Shām was, after all, a historical event which occurred after Muḥammad's death, so that one might naturally expect to find emphasis placed upon the actions and precedents of the Companions involved in the conquest, with little attention paid to potentially relevant traditions from the Prophet. This is the case, for example, in much of the *Futūḥ Al-buldān* of al-Balādhurī, a work of the late third century A.H.

Such an argument presupposes that the *Futūḥ al-Shām* is a text similar in style, theme, and content to other works on the subject, and hence that it can be evaluated and judged within the context of these other works. In fact, however, this assumption is erroneous and the source of much of the misunderstanding concerning al-Azdī's book. It can be said, of course, that any author, regardless of his efforts to remain faithful to "the facts", of necessity projects into his work a certain a priori structure, of notions -- both his own and those of his culture -- of what these "facts" are, what they mean, and why they are important. But while other treatments of the conquests seek primarily to provide the reader with the history of the events under consideration, al-Azdī is above all else addressing himself to the larger spiritual meaning and significance of these events. This makes for some important differences between the *Futūḥ al-Shām* and other works of a kind more familiar to modern researchers; and as it has an important bearing on the dating of the work, this point merits consideration here.

Al-Balādhurī's *Futūḥ al-buldān,* for example, revolves around the theme of the establishment of the Islamic empire as a political and social entity. In the course of relating what is essentially a narrative of the conquests in the various provinces, the author also provides all sorts of

71. Malik ibn Anas, *Al-Muwaṭṭaʾ*, in the recension of al-Shaybānī, edited with a commentary by Abd al-Ḥayy al-Lakhnāwī (Lucknow, 1306 A.H.), pp. 139ult-140:3.

72. Schacht, *Origins,* p. 86.

important details on local topography and the social, administrative, and fiscal organization of the newly won territories, with a view to the relevance of these details to the status and prerogatives of these lands in his own time.[73] Other matters, especially details on the many individuals involved in the conquests, he leaves aside for discussion later in his *Ansāb al-ashrāf.*[74] Al-Azdī, in contrast, organizes his work around the theme of the defeat of the Byzantine Greeks and wishes to elucidate, as indicated above, its overarching spiritual significance. Unlike such scholars as Abū Yūsuf, Abū 'Ubayd ibn Sallām (d. 224/838), al-Balādhurī, or al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), he is not interested in administrative, social, or fiscal affairs. For example, he refers nearly thirty times to the conclusion of truces, surrender pacts, or *ṣulḥ* documents between the Arab forces and the occupied settlements of Bilād al-Shām, yet he *never* quotes the text of one of the agreements, as other later writers were fond of doing, and on only seven occasions does he make reference to what the terms were[75]. Further, topography recedes behind the theme of military conflict, and all builds steadily to the decisive and climatic battle of al-Yarmūk. God's plan and purpose in all this is the theme that dictates what will be included in or excluded from the text; and it is this that the constituent element of the text are marshalled to illuminate and articulate. This distinction is critical, for it leads us to look more closely at the means al-Azdī chooses to use for advancing his argument, and to regard such choices as a matter of considerable significance for purposes of dating the text.

As it happens, al-Azdī's primary tools are the Qur'ān and the views of the Companions. The former is directly and formally quoted only fourteen times in the*Futūḥ al-Shām;*[76] but Qur'ānic verses and expressions, usually

73. See Duri, *Historical Writing,* pp. 61-62 and the additional references cited therein, also pp. 64, 149, 158.

74. See al-Balādhurī's *Ansāb al-ashrāf,* Ms. 598, fol. 346r: 25, where he refers to the conquest of Syria in the following terms: "This is a topic I have already discussed in the book I composed on the affairs of the provinces, "*wa-qad dhakartūha fī l-Kitāb alladhī allaftuhu fi umūr al-buldān.* Elsewhere (Ms. 598, fol. 271r: 31-32), he says of Khālid, "I have already given an account of him in *The Book of the Provinces", wa-qad dhakartu khabarahu fi Kitāb al-buldān.*

75. Al-Azdī, pp. 53: 13-14, 54:1-2, 67:3-4, 10, 68:1-2, 69:3, 9, 15-16, 91:9, 92:7, 93:6-8, 98:10-12, 123:11-13, 126:5-6, 11, 142:5, 208:1-9, 218:17-18, 223:7-9, 12-16, 229:17-18--none mentioning the terms of these agreements; also pp. 54:10, 54ult- 55:2, 57:4-6, 123:5-11, 128:2-11, 223:18-19, 224:9-11--with specific reference to terms.

76. *Ibid,* pp. 5pu (Sūrat al-Ṣaff, vs. 9), 47:1-3 (Sūrat al-Baqara, vs. 216), 51: 7-8 (Sūrat al-Fatḥ, vs. 33), 103:12-13 (Sūrat al-Tawba, vs. 122), 105: 7-8 (Sūrat al-Baqara, vs. 249), 163:5-6 (Sūrat al-Aḥzab, vs. 22), 163:11-14 (Sūrat Al ʿImrān, vss. 146-48), 175:12-13 (Sūrat Al ʿImrān, vs. 58), 13-16 (Sūrat al-Nisā', vss, 170-171), 190:9-15 (Sūrat al-Fajr, vss. 1-2, 6-8, 14; Sūrat al-Shams, vss. 11-12), 195ult-196:1 (Sūrat al-Nūr, vs. 55), 196:2-3 (Sūrat al-Anfāl, vs. 46), 206:9-11 (Sūrat al-Tawba, vs. III), 235pu-236:1 (Sūrat al-Nisā', vs. 47). Also see ʿĀmir, p.263: 7-8 (Sūrat al-Nisā, vs. 33).

brief passages, appear throughout the text without being specifically cited as quotations from the Qur'ān[77]. Both quotations and allusions are particularly frequent in speeches and letters and in debates with non-Muslims; and their function is to assert, on the highest authority, that the conquest of Bilād al-Shām is a response to God's command, a manifestation of His will, and part of His foreordained plan for mankind.

The Qur'ānic material is elaborated by reference to the Companions, and most particularly by citation of the correspondence between them. Speeches are somewhat limited in al-Azdī's text; but by contrast, the letters of Companions loom very large indeed. There are 57 of these documents spread throughout the *Futūḥ al-Shām;* and although they are seldom lengthy, they occupy approximately ten percent of the entire text. Al-Azdī is far more reliant upon them than are other writers, and for a specific reason. It is largely in these letters that he advances and elaborates his spiritually oriented arguments, the foundations of which he already has from the Qur'ān. Qur'ānic citations and phraseology are in fact very prominent in the letters, so much so that it can be said that without these documents the religious discussion of the *Futūḥ al-Shām* would be very much obscured.

In other words, al-Azdī is familiar with Prophetic traditions, but uses them only informally and without *isnāds*. For the very important spiritual points he wishes to assert, he looks elsewhere for authority, to the Qur'ān and to the Companions. This tendency, in conjunction with the other features discussed above, would seem to indicate that we have here a work of the late second century, or at the latest, of the early third century prior to the decisive developments at the time of al-Shāfi'i.

Provenance of the Text

'Āmir described the *Futūḥ al-Shām* as the work of a *muḥaddith* active in Baghdad. Leaving aside the problem that he has confused al-Azdī with someone else, an Iraqi origin is not implausible, or a Syrian origin more likely, simply because the text is devoted to events in Bilād al-Shām. The conquests there were considered by numerous authors whose accounts have survived, and these discussions often reveal a heavy reliance upon Medinan and especially Iraqi versions of events. The *isnāds* in the text of the *Futūḥ*

77. Most frequently used (thirteen times) is the famous summons in Sūrat al-Tawba (9), vs. 29: "Fight those who believe not in God and the Last Day, and do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden--such men as practice not the religion of truth, being of those who have been given the Book--until they pay the tribute out of hand and have been humbled". See al-Azdī, pp. 6:5, 9:1, 12, 109: 3-4, 146:9-10, 148:4, 174:9-10, 183:11-12, 184:2, 219:13, 220:16, 225:1-2, 251:8.

al-Shām thrice give the author the *nisbas* of al-Azdī and al-Baṣrī,[78] but this information is of little use for determining the regional provenance of the work. The tribe of al-Azdī was to be found in both Syria and Iraq; and as we shall see below, geographical *nisbas* are very often misleading. So in the case of al-Azdī, for whom no other source of biographical information has yet come to light, we are again left with the *Futūḥ al-Shām* itself as the sole source of evidence for the regional provenance of the work. Fortunately, it provides numerous indications of its origions, and all of these point to Syria.

We may note that al-Azdī's account of the conquests in Bilād al-Shām reveals a sophisticated knowledge of the activities and attitudes of the Syrian Christian communities during the conquest period. He knows, first of all, that these communities were not monolithic in their spiritual view, and that there were significant points of difference between the Chalcedonian doctrines of the Rum and those of many Syrian Christians[79]. The Syrians themselves he divides into several categories: the *ahl al-balad* ("provincials", as opposed to the Rūm), the *ahl madā'in al-Shām* (urban Syrians), the *anbāṭ* (probably the rural peasantry), and the *arab* (bedouins, whether fully or only partially nomadic). The *'arab* he further differentiates into those who accepted Islam and so supported and aided the invaders, sincere and committed Christians who supported the Greeks, and an amorphous third group of nominal Christians who wavered between the two sides, loathe to fight their co-religionists, but also loathe to help the non-Arabs *(al-'ajam)* against their own people *(qawminā)*[80]. The same level of sophistication is evident in al-Azdī's account of Christian reactions through the course of the Arab/Islamic campaigns. He presents a detailed picture of realignments, shifting loyalties, and complex manoeuvering that is quite different from the more simplistic treatment by other authors[81]. The accuracy of this information is an issue that cannot be considered here. For present purposes, it will suffice to note that al-Azdī's details do not fit into any stereotyped pattern, as would be the case if he were simply employing a repertoire of potentially ahistorical topoi. Rather, his information seems to be of the sort that one would expect from knowledgeable local, i.e., Syrian, informants.

This impression finds support in several specific instances. Al-Azdī relates a legend about a man who fell into a well and eventually found himself in a fantastic garden full of exquisite fruits and trees. After a time,

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 36: 6-7, 54:11-12, 114:9.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 97: 16-17.

80. *Ibid.*, pp. 36:15-18, 150:9-14.

81. *Ibid.*, pp. 22:12-13, 36:8-18, 37:3-7, 57:9-10, 71:6-7, 72:11-12, 75:1-3, 94:2-4, 97:3-12, 110:1-2, 16, 138:5-7, 150: 7-9, 153: 6-11, 154: 8-12, 189:1-3, 189:11-190:1, 208:3-7, 212:17-18, 218:5-9, 254:8-11.

an apparition came and led him out, with two leaves from one of the trees still in his hand to prove the truth of his story[82]. The author concludes the tale thus: "The people of Syria *(ahl al-Shām)* allege that he had entered Paradise, and that those two leaves were leaves of Paradise. They also say that the caliphs used to preserve the two leaves in the Treasury *(al-khizāna)*".[83]

It is also to be noted that some reports in the *Futūḥ al-Shām* also appear in Ibn Ꜥsākir's *Tarīkh madīnat Dimashq,* a Syrian work on Syrian history. This in itself proves nothing, since by Ibn 'Asākir's time historical reports from all over the Islamic world have been available for his perusal. But one case is of special interest and importance here. Al-Azdī gives a long detailed account of the battle of al-Yarmūk[84]; and this narrative is for all intents and purposes an abridgement of the account in Ibn Ꜥsākir, who says that he has it from the Khurāsānian Abū Ḥudhayfa (d. 206/821), who received it from Sa'īd ibn Ꜥbd al-Ꜥzīz al-Tanūkhī (d. ca. 167/784), who claims to be relating the account *ꜥan qudamā' ahl al-Shām wa-ghayrihim,* "from early Syrian authorities and others"[85]. Further comparisons of this kind would require an ambitious undertaking beyond the scope of this paper, but here it can at least be suggested that in the end the *Futūḥ al-Shām* may prove to be an early abridgement of a lost work by al-Tanūkhī. For the moment, the detailed correspondence between these two important narratives at the least comprises strong evidence for the Syrian basis of al-Azdī's narratives.

Further indication of Syrian origin is provided in an interesting account of 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb's attitude toward the drinking of wine. The Qur'an of course takes a clearly negative position on this, condemning drunkenness at prayers, stressing the ill effects of wine *(khamr)* over its benefits, and finally declaring it an abomination that Muslims should avoid[86]. Wine-drinking remained common in early Islamic times[87], however and generated widespread discussion on the question of which of the many fermented drinks known under various names were to be eschewed in light of the Qur'ānic pronouncement against *khamr.* In most provinces, and especially in Iraq, the debate centered the example of *nabīdh,* a kind of date

82. *Ibid.,* pp. 222: 7-223:5.

83. *Ibid.,* p. 223: 4-5.

84. *Ibid.,* pp. 194:4-211:10.

85. Ibn 'Asākir (Munajjid), I, 535:1-545:16.

86. See Sūrat al-Baqara (2), vs. 219; Sūrat al-Nisā (4), vs. 43; Sūrat al-Ma'ida (5), vs. 90.

87. See the detailed account in Leone Caetani, *Annali dell'Islam* (Milan, 1905-26), III, 448-78; also Ignaz Goldziher, *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law,* translated by Andras and Ruth Hamori (Princeton, 1981), pp. 59-62.

wine. In late Umayyad Syria, however, the discussion revolved around *ṭilā'*, a fermented and boiled-down grape drink from which the alcohol would have evaporated[88]. Al-Azdī's account follows the Syrians in choosing *ṭilā'* as the basis for discussion[89]; and the tradition there cited, in which 'Umar tastes the *ṭilā'* and finds it blameless, is essentially the same as one cited in a fiscal rescript of the 'Umayyad caliph 'Umar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz (r. 99-101/717-20).[90]. At the same time, however, al-Azdī maintains a hostile attitude toward *khamr*[91].

Further evidence of a Syrian origin can be discerned in certain narratives already considered above in relation to the dating of the *Futūḥ al-Shām*. As one would expect in any case, the location and early name of Dayr Khālid are best known to local Syrian authorities, such as al-Walīd ibn Muslim and al-Ḥasan ibn Shawdhab, and those who discuss it are Syrians, and often Damascenes, or authors who had access to Syrian informants. Beyond such circles, Dayr Khālid is simply unknown. The geographical works of al-Ya'qūbī (d. 284/897), Ibn al-Faqīh (wr. 290/903), Ibn Khurradādhbih (d. ca. 300/912), Ibn Rusta (wr. ca. 300/912), al-Iṣṭakhrī (wr. early 4th/10th century), al-Mas'udī (d. 345/956), Ibn Ḥawqal (wr. ca. 378/988), al-Bakrī (d. 487/1094), and al-Idrīsī (wr. 548/1154) say nothing about a Dayr Khālid or a Dayr Ṣalībā, and even the Syrian al-Muqaddasī (wr. ca. 375/985) is silent. Al-Ṭabarī's vast range of sources reveal nothing to us in his great *Ta'rīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk;* and Yāqūt knows of Dayr Khālid only through Ibn al-Kalbī, who probably cited his information from al-Walīd ibn Muslim[92]. In view of the silence in every other quarter, al-Azdī's knowledge of the monastery suggests that the *Futūḥ al-Shām* too is a Syrian work or one based upon Syrian sources.

88. On the Syrian discussions of *ṭilā'*, see *EI*$_2$, IV, 995 (A.J. Wensinck); H.A.R. Gibb, "The Fiscal Rescript of 'Umar II", *Arabica,* 2 (1955), p. 11. Al-Nasā'ī (d. 303/915) has a detailed collection of traditions on this question in his *Sunan* (Cairo, 1312 A.H.), II, 335:6-29. Cf. also Majd al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 606/1210), *al-Nihāya fi gharīb al-ḥadīth*, edited by Ṭāhir Aḥmad al-Zāwī and Maḥmud Muḥammad al-Tannaḥi (Cairo, 1383-85/1963-65), III, 137:9-15.

89. Al-Azdī, pp. 229ult-230ult.

90. See Gibb, "Fiscal Rescript", pp. 5-6; Cook, *Early Muslim Dogma,* pp. 7, 101-102. Cook refers to this document as the "so-called" fiscal rescript of 'Umar II. But his reservation here refers not to the question of whether this is an authentic document of the first century A.H., but rather to the fact that it is not really a rescript in the strict sense of the term.

91. But see notes 16-17 above.

92. In al-Baladhuri, *Futūḥ al-buldān,* p. 129: 17-29, Hisham ibn al-Kalbī cites al-Walīd as his informant. Yāqūt used the works of al-Balādhurī extensively and may not have access to Ibn al-Kalbī's comments on Dayr Khālid ⇨

A Syrian provenance also makes sense in light of several tendencies evident in the *Futūḥ al-Shām*. First, the work takes a special interest in the city of Ḥimṣ. It devotes great attention to affairs of the town during the conquest period, noting its *ṣulḥ* arrangements and even such details as the bearer of the first Muslim banner *(rāya)* into the domains of Ḥimṣ, the first Muslim to kill a polytheist in the area, and the first Muslim born in the town, as well as particulars on the villages, streams, and monasteries around it[93]. It is to be noted that the question posed by Abū 'Ubayda's withdrawal before the advancing Greeks revolves around the porblem of the fate of Ḥimṣ[94]. And as already mentioned above, it is Ḥimṣ that is singled out for favor over all the other towns of Bilād al-Shām[95]. It is further affirmed that Ḥimṣ ranks among the great cities of Syria, and that its *jund* is the "foremost" *(aqdam)*, since it occupies the most advanced position vis-a-vis the Byzantines and the other *ajnād* lie sheltered behind it[96]. In the account of the battles of Dāthin and al-Ꜥaraba, command of the Muslim forces is attributed to Abū Umama al-Bahili (d. 81/700), the last of the Syrian *ṣaḥāba* and an adopted son of Ḥimṣ[97]. When final victory is secured, affairs of the *jund* of Ḥimṣ recieve special attention[98].

Ḥimṣ in early Islamic times was an important and flourishing center

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independently of al-Balādhurī. See Heer, *Quellen in Jāqūt's Geographischem Wörterbuch*, pp. 45-87. Ibn al-Kalbī is, however, cited as author of his own work on the *diyārāt* in al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 109ult. And it must further be noted that Yāqūt was sufficiently interested in Ibn al-Kalbī to make an abridgement, entitled *Al-Muqtaḍab min kitāb jamharat al-nasab*, of the latter's most important work. On the *Muqtaḍab*, which is extant in a Cairo Ms. see Werner Caskel, *Ǧamharat ʿan-nasab. das genealogische Werk des Hišām ibn Muḥammad al-Kalbī* (Leiden, 1966), I, 106-107.

93. Al-Azdī, pp. 125:9-133ult, 142:1-14, 208:6-7.

94. *Ibid.*, pp. 135:14-136:17, 137:13-138:7, 142:1-10, 143:4-12.

95. The *jund* of Ḥimṣ was in fact very prosperous in early Islamic times. Its lands produced almost as much revenue as the other three Syrian *ajnād* (Damascus, Filasṭīn, and al-Urdunn) combined. See Gernot Rotter , *Die Umayyaden und der zweite Bürgerkrieg* (Wiesbaden, 1982), p. 61.

96. AL-Azdī, pp. 94:15-16, 218pu-219:3.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 44:8-18. This report, or one related to it, makes its influence felt in al-Baladhuri, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 109:7-13; al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīkh*, III, 406:16-19. It is to be noted, however, that none of the biographical accounts of Abū Umāma--not even those of Ibn ʿAsākir, who was extremely well-informed on Syrian affairs, or Ibn Ḥajar, who was familiar with al Azdī's *Futūḥ al-Shām* --assign him any role in the conquests.

98. *Ibid.*, pp. 248:7-249:15.

for the Yemenite tribes[99]. It is therefore of particular interest to find that al-Azdī, whose *nisba* links him with the Yamaniya in any case, reveals a predominant interest in the role of the southern tribes in the conquest of Bilād al-Shām. Such northern tribes as Rabī'a, Tamīm, and Asad were important in the Arab/Islamic conquests, he admits, but in Iraq, not in Syria.[100] Those northern tribes that did participate in the Syrian compaigns he assigns to secondary roles, mentions only in passing, or notes for the small size of the contingents they sent[101]. On the other hand, it was to the *ahl al-Yaman* that Abū Bakr first wrote when he decided to raise troops for the conquest of Bilād al-Shām. Their response was immediate and enthusiastic. They provided the most and the best warriors, hence it was they who conquered and surrounded Bilād al-Shām and became "its people"[102]. Al-Azdī describes the roles of no less than twenty Yemenite tribes and clans in the conquest, the most important being Himyar, Tayyi' and his own tribe of al-Azd.[103] The great victory at al-Yarmūk is pointedly made a Yemenite triumph from which the northern tribes are excluded, and in the battle the role of greatest glory is assigned to al-Azd[104]. Yemenite personalities are also prominent. The great hero of the Ḥimṣis, Dhū l-kīla', summons the Yemenites to arms the very moment he receives the appeal of Abū Bakr,[105] and one of his men is the first Muslim to enter the conquered Ḥimṣ[106]. The well-known story of the conversion of Ka'b al-Aḥbār to Islam is related at length, with particular note being taken of the fact that he was a Yemenite from the tribe of Ḥimyar[107].

Finally, the *Futūḥ al-Shām* takes a definite interest in the issue of *qadar*. Implicit in al-Azdī's general theme in any case is the assertion that it is God's omnipotent will that determines the course of human events. For him, the conquest of Bilād al-Shām proves this in terms not open to

99. On the families and *ashraf* of Ḥimṣ, see Patricia Crone, *Slaves on Horses: the Evolution of the Islamic Policy* (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 94-95, 97, 99, 101, nos. 2, 5, 8, 10.

100. Al-Azdī, pp. 12:5-6, 47pu, 195: 5-7.

101. *Ibid.*, pp. 12:5-7, 34:13-14, 35:7-8, 41:2, 48:15, 58: 13-15, 66ult, 70:6, 121:12-13, 126:15, 130: 11; 168:15, 195:5, 203:11, 205: 3.

102. *Ibid.*, pp. 5:11-7:9, 11:17-18, 12:6-7, 195:5.

103 *Ibid.*, pp. 7:13, 11:16-12:7, 19:9-10, 20:8-9, 31:12-32:2, 35:7-8, 66:5-6, 70:12-13, 99:1, 126:15, 127:6, 130ult-131:3, 195:2-7, 199:16, 200:5, 202:2, 203:10-11, 208: 11-12, 214ult, 236:14.

104. *Ibid.*, pp. 195:2-7, 200pu-201: 12.

105. *Ibid.*, pp. 6:16-7:9.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 127: 16-18.

107. *Ibid.*, pp. 233:1-236:14.

alternative explanations. But his text also contains specific statements on this controversial issue. Noticing how sagacious a certain Christian is, 'Umar wonders how he could hesitate to accept Islam and calls upon him to convert. The man does, and becomes a good Muslim[108]. The point at issue here that the natural inclination of the human intellect is to recognize and adhere to the will of God becomes clearer later in the text, where Bahan compliments Khālid as a wise man possessed of *ʿaql*. Khālid spurns the compliment, saying that if he has been granted *ʿaql*, then it is God who merits praise for that. In support of his argument, he cites a *ḥadīth qudsī* from the Prophet (mentioned briefly above) describing how God created the intellect *(al-ʿaql)*, examined it, and then praised it, saying, "By my might, nothing of that which I have created is dearer to me than you. Through you I am praised, through you I am worshipped, through you I am known, through you obedience is rendered unto me, and through you is entry gained to my Paradise"[109].

Elsewhere, in his account of 'Umar's tour of Syria, al-Azdī's position on *qadar* is stated in no uncertain terms. Delivering a *khuṭaba* to the Muslims in al-Jābiya, 'Umar begins by praising God, "whose worshipper is led aright if He wishes to grant him guidance, but for whom you will never find a benefactor to show him the way if He lead him astray". A Christian priest in the audience thereupon objects, "God forbid! God does not lead astray anyone who seeks guidance!" The dispute is not resolved; it simply ends when the caliph's antagonist falls silent under threat of execution[110]. In fact, there is nothing to argue about, since the caliph's position is already of unimpeachable authority: it is an almost literal citation from the Qur'ān[111].

Al-Azdī is quite clearly an opponent of the Qadarīya, those who upheld the freedom of the human will to choose as it wished, independent of the will of God. His position on the issue is impossible to date, or to assign to Syria as opposed to some other region. And indeed, it is at least open to question whether it is possible to propose any chronological reconstruction for the Qadarite controversy without recourse to purely speculative and arbitrary means[112]. However, leaving aside the interpretation of specific documents

108. *Ibid.*, pp. 110:16-111:14.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 178:3-6; cf. also 'Amir, p. 200:6-7. On this tradition, see Ignaz Goldziher, "Neuplatonische und gnostische Elemente im Hadit", *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und verwandte Gebiete*, 22 (1909), pp. 318-19; Van Ess, *Zwischen Ḥadīt und Theologie*, pp. 121-22.

110. Al-Azdī, pp. 226:13-227:10.

111. Sūrat al-Kahf (18), vs. 17. This is one of the many instances of indirect citation from the Qur'an in the *Futūḥ al-Shām*.

112. See Cook, *Early Muslim Dogma*, pp. 107-52.

and individual arguments, it is clear that the question of *qadar* was hotly disputed in second-century Syria.[113] The extant evidence, including a second-century papyrus fragment from a *ḥadīth* collection, indicates that the Syrians, in particular the scholars of Ḥimṣ and Aleppo, were then active in transmitting *'aql* traditions from the Prophet[114]. At the same time, on the other hand, the Medinans appear to have been satisfied with a version tracing the tradition only as far back as Kurayb ibn Abī Muslim (d. 98/716-17).[115] Al-Azdī's work, so conscious of the issues, fits perfectly into the social and intellectual milieu of Syria in this era. We might also note that the account of the creation of the *'aql* seems to represent a secondary stage of argument and hence also appears to accord with assignment of the *Futūḥ al-Shām* to late second-century Syria. That is, the proposition that the human intellect is, by reason of its divinely created nature, a priori submissive to the will of its Creator, seems to presuppose the earlier advocacy of the contrary view i.e., that the intellect is not bound to adhere to divine will, but rather may lead man to any number of freely chosen alternatives. Such a position is, in fact, attributed to the Syrian Ghaylan al-Dimashqi (d. ca. 116/734)[116].

Transmission of the Text

Thus far, the issue of the transmitters of the *Futūḥ al-Shām* has been avoided, in order to demonstrate that regardless of the judgment that may in the end be passed on this matter, it is still possible to identify the general date and provenance of this work. And although the prosopographical dimension is a key element in any comprehensive examination of a work's passage from medieval times, it cannot be taken up in detail here. It may be valuable, however, to raise in general terms a few main points that bear on the issues already discussed.

The *Futūḥ al-Shām* bears an *isnād* indicating that the text was transmitted from al-Azdī by a certain al-Ḥusayn ibn Ziyād al-Ramlī to Abū

113. See Van Ess, *Zwischen Ḥadīt und Theologie,* pp. 68-71.

114. See Nabia Abbott, *Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri* (Chicago, 1957-72), II, 222, no. 10:12-13; Ibn Abī l-Dunyā (d. 281/894), *Kitāb al-ʿaql wa-faḍlihi,* edited by Muḥammad Zāhid ibn al-Ḥasan al-Kawtharī (Baghdad, 1365/1946), p. 12: 8-15.

115. Ibn Abī l-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-ʿaql,* pp. 12:16-13:1. On Kurayb, see Ibn Hajar, *Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb,* VIII, 433:3-18, no. 783.

116. On him, see W. Montgomery Watt, *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam* (London, 1948), pp. 40-42; Tilman Nagel, *Rechtleitung und Kalifat: Versuch über eine Grundfrage der islamischen Geschichte* (Bonn, 1975), pp. 71-74; Josef van Ess, "Les Qadarites et la Gailānīya de Yazīd III, "*Studia Islamica,* 31 (1970), pp. 269-86; *idem, Anfänge muslimischer Theologie* (Beirut, 1977), pp. 177-245.

l-'Abbās al-Walīd ibn Ḥammād al-Ramlī, and thence through a series of four other *ruwāt* to the renowned Egyptian scholar Abū Ṭāhir Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Sliafī (d. 576/1180)[117]. De Goeje of course rejects this. Arguing that Lees could find no author attesting to the existence of the *Futūḥ al-Shām* prior to the time of al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1347), that al-Silafī was a serious scholar and hence would have scorned a book with such disorderly *isnāds*, and that the other four transmitters between al-Walid ibn Ḥammād and al-Silafī are unknown, he concludes that what lies before us is undoubtedly an attempt to endow a later forgery with a respectable pedigree[118].

In 1886 De Goeje announced his intention to perpare a second edition of his critique of al-Azdī, but this never appeared. Lees himself wrote to the Dutch scholar to concede that he had been wrong in his initial assessment of the *Futūḥ al-Shām*, most scholars had agreed with De Goeje's first appraisal anyway, and so plans for a revised *mémoire* were cancelled[119]. This is perhaps unfortunate, for had De Goeje taken up the subject again, he would have found that the far broader range of manuscript and printed sources that had become available since 1864 required a reconsideration of his case. In 1985, they require its rejection.

To begin with al-Silafī, it is quite clear that he took something of an interest in the old *futūḥ* books that had been passed down from early Islamic times. He is a key transmitter of the *Futūḥ Miṣr* of Ibn ʿAbd al-'Ḥakam (d. 257/870), and if one compares the names of transmitters and the formulae in this book with those in the *isnād* attesting to the transmission of the *Futūḥ al-Shām* of al-Azdī, one finds too much agreement to be coincidental[120]. The role of al-Silafī in transmitting the latter work does not, therefore, seem to be open to serious doubt. As for the lack of any attestation of the existence of al-Azdī's book prior to al-Dhahabī's time, this is surely a flimsy argument against the authenticity of the work. Much of the literature from early Islamic times became rare at an early stage in its transmission, and there are too many works preserved in only a unique Ms., and for which

117. Al-Azdī, pp. 35:10-36:7.

118. De Goeje, *Mémoire sur le Fotouho's-Scham*, pp. 19-22.

119. De Goeje announced his plan for a revised edition in his *Mémoire sur les Carmathes du Bahrain et les Fatimides*, 2nd edition (Leiden, 1886; *Mémoires d'histoire et de geographie orientales*, no. 1), i. The correspondence with Lees, who died in 1889, and the cancellation of the revised *mémoire*, are mentioned in the second edition of De Goeje's *Mémoire sur la conquete de la Syrie* (Leiden, 1900; *Mémoires d'histoire et de geographie orientales*, no. 2),i.

120. Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr wa-akhbāruhā*, edited by Charles C. Torrey (New Haven, 1922), pp. 1:3-4, 99 n. 2, and Torrey's Introduction, pp. 9-16.

both the author and the work are otherwise entirely unknown, for De Goeje's objection to be taken seriously. In any case, it is not true that no author earlier than the time of al-Dhahabī mentions the *Futūḥ al-Shām*. Abū Bakr ibn Khayr al-Ishbīlī (d. 575/1179) lists an Abū Ismā'īl Muḥammad ibn Ābd Allāh al-Azdī and his *kitab futūḥ al-Shām* in his *Fahrasa;* and here he specifies its transmission through al-Walīd ibn Ḥammād, after whom the text passes to Egypt, and then in the fourth century A.H. to Sapin, where a series of scholars transmit it down to the time of Ibn Khayr[121]. From this information, coupled with that in the *isnād* in the text of the *Futūḥ al-Shām* itself, it is clear that al-Azdī's book was known to al-Walīd ibn Ḥammād, and that it was already in circulation in Egypt two centuries before the time of al-Silafī.

Our attention is thus brought to focus on the two transmitters who relate the text from al-Azdī in Syria, al-Walīd ibn Ḥammād and al-Husayn ibn Ziyād. Al-Dhahabī knows the former as the author of a book on the merits of Jerusalem *(Faḍā'il Bayt al-Maqdis)* and a pious learned man who survived until close to the end of the third century A.H.[122] In fact, his reports on the merits of Jerusalem form the core of the work by al-Wāsiṭī[123]. Ibn 'Asākir has little biographical information about al-Walīd, but gives the names of some of his teachers and students and describes him as a scholar who heard works being recited in Damascus and elsewhere[124]. The death dates of his teachers and informants tend to cluster in the period 230-45 A.H., and it is therefore to this period that we should assign the death of al-Ḥusayn ibn Ziyād, the *rāwī* from whom al-Walīd ibn Ḥammād took the *Futūḥ al Shām*. Almost nothing is known about al-Ḥusayn. That he was a Syrian is suggested by his association with al-Walīd and by the fact that the *isnāds* in the *Futūḥ al-Shām* twice assign al-Ḥusayn the *nisba* al-Ramlī,[125] which is also the *nisba* of al-Walīd ibn Ḥammād. Al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067) includes al-Ḥusayn in his *Fihrist* and cites him as the author of a *Kitāb al-*

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121. Ibn Khyr al-Ishbīlī, *Fahrasat mā rawāhu an shuyūkhihi min al-dawāwīn fī durūb al-ilm wa-anwā al-ma'ārif,* edited by Francisco Codera and J. Ribera Y. Tarrago (Saragossa, 1894-95), I, 238: 1-5. I am grateful to Michael Cook for drawing this to my attention.

122. Al-Dhahabī, *Siyar a'lām al-nubalā;* edited by Shu'ayb al-Arna'ūt *et al.* (Beirut, 1401-1405/1981-85), XIV, 78:10-79:4, no. 37.

123. Al-Walīd ibn Ḥammād is quoted for 117 of the 165 traditions in the *Fadā'il al-Bayt al-Muqaddas* of al-Wāsiṭī

124. *Ta'rīkh madīnat Dimashq* (Ms.), XVII, 408vu-409v:2.

125. Al-Azdī, pp. 37:6, 233:2.

riḍā; transmitted by al-Walīd[126]. This indicates that al-Ḥusayn ibn Ziyād was a Shi'ite (or at least that al-Ṭūsī thought he was), and that al-Azdī's *Futūḥ al-Shām* was not the only book transmitted on his authority by al-Walīd ibn Ḥammād.

This information accords very well with that already gleaned from the text. If al-Ḥasayn ibn Ziyād belongs approximately to the period 230-45 A.H., then it is reasonable to assign al-Azdī to the previous generation, i.e., to about 190-205 A.H./805-20 A.D., exactly where the textual evidence suggests that he should be. The fact that the first two transmitters receiving the text from him are Syrians confirms the conclusion, based on the text, that the work itself must be Syrian. The *nisba* al-Ramlī, borne by both al-Ḥusayn ib Ziyād and al-Walīd ibn Ḥammād, would seem to pose difficulties for the Ḥimṣī influence suggested above, but in fact this is not so. The evidence of *nisbas* is often undependable if it cannot be checked on the basis of other information. As already mentioned above, al-Azdī is three times given the *nisba* al-Baṣrī in the text of the *Futūḥ al-Shām,* although every other indication is that he was a Syrian. Al-Silafī has the *nisba* al-Iṣfahānī and was in fact born in this part of Iran. But he set out on the *riḥla fī ṭalab al-'ilm* at a young age, arrived in Alexandria in 511/1117, and from then until the end of his life 65 years later he left his adopted city only once, to hear another famous scholar teaching in Cairo[127]. For all practical purposes, then, he is an Egyptian. Al-Wāsiṭī's *nisba* should make him an Iraqi, and perhaps by origin he was; what concerns us, however, is the fact that he emerages to our view as a *muḥaddith* living in Jerusalem[128]. Similarly, both al-Ḥusayn ibn Ziyād and al-Walīd ibn Ḥammād could have come from al-Ramla, but their careers in Abbāsid Syria probably required that they make their way to the more active cultural centers where teachers, students, and patronage were to be found. Such centers included not only Damascus, but also Ḥimṣ, where scholarship was sufficiently prominent for substantial

126. Al-Tūsī, *Fihrist kutub al-shī'a* edited by Alois Sprenger, Mawlawy 'Abd al-Ḥaqq, and Mawlawy Gholam Qadir (Calcutta, 1853-55), p. 104:3, no. 223 .Cf. also Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn Shahrāshūb (d. 588/1192), *M'ālim al-'Ulamā,* edited by 'Abbās Iqbāl (Tehran, 1353 A.H.), p. 34:3, no. 239.

127. See Ibn 'Asākir (Ms.), II, 50v:4-51r: 27; = (Badrān and 'Ubayd), I, 450: 17-451 pu; Ibn Khallikān (wr. 672/1274), *Wafayāt al-a'yān,* edited by Ihsān 'Abbās (Beirut, 1969-72), I, 105: 1-107u, no. 44; al-Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāz* (Hyderabad, 1388-90/1968-70), IV, 1298:8-1304:14, no. 1082; idem, *Siyar al'lām al-nubalā',* XXI, 5:1-39u, no. 1; al-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1362), *Al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt,* edited by Hellmut Ritter *et al.* (Wiesbaden and Beirut, 1931-proceeding), VII, 351:15-356:10, no. 3344; Ibn al-'Imād (d. 1089/1679),*Shadharāt al-dhahab* (Cairo, 1350-51 A.H.), IV, 255: 2-20.

128. See al-Wāsiṭī, *Faḍā'il al-Bayt al-Muqaddas,* pp. 7-8 of Hasson's Introduction.

biographical dictionaries devoted to Ḥimṣi personalities to be authored in the third and fourth centuries A.H.[129].

Some Concluding Remarks

In light of the foregoing observations, it would seem impossible to uphold any longer De Goeje's radical critique of the *Futūḥ al-Shām,* or to justify any further exclusion of this text from scholarly discussion of the history of Bilād al-Shām in early Islamic times. If the views outlined here are accepted, then it can be said that al-Azdī, whoever he may have been, has left us a work dominated by the informants, historical knowledge, interests, and intellectual perspectives of late second-century Syria. Further, it appears to have been influenced by Yemenite circles that flourished in the region, most particularly in Ḥimṣ, and by the polemic against the Qadarīya, again, in the second century. There are definite textual correspondences between al-Azdī and Abū Ḥudhayfa, and it is my preliminary view that both take as their starting point an earlier Syrian narrative, perhaps by Sa'īd ibn Ābd al-'Azīz al-Tanūkhī. In the case of al-Azdī, his handling of the *akhbār* available on his subject lent his work no particular favor in historical circles, in which the fuller account of Abū Ḥudhayfa was preferred, while his limited and informal use of Prophetic traditions meant that his name was of no importance to compilers of the later *rijāl* works. His anonymity should therefore come as no surprise.

The extent to which these "conclusions" are really "conclusive", however, is problematic, for they lead us to no end-point, but rather on to other questions. One of these concerns method. It will have been noticed that the argument from silence, always a risky buisness, plays a significant role in the analysis presented in this study. It must also be conceded that each argument advanced here, if taken in isolation, could be challenged in some way or another. Al-Azdī's silence on al-Quds, for example, loses some of its argumentative force if we pause to ponder the fact that the later pseudo-Wāqidī, in over 600 pages of extravagant narration of the same events, uses the term only twice.

Such problems are worthy of our attention, but in this case they do not comprise serious obstacles. To raise negative or *exsilentio* arguments here is simply to assert the following: If we take as our starting point De Goeje's categorical dismissal of al-Azdī's *Futūḥ al-Shām* as a "pious fraud", perpetrated largely in the era of the Crusades, then we turn to the text

129. These included a *Ta'rīkh al-himsīyīn* by Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Baghdādī (d. 257/870), and a *Ta'rīkh Ḥimṣ* by Abū l-Qāsim 'Abd al-Ṣamad ibn Sa'īd al-Ḥimṣi (d. 324/936). Both of these works are lost, but are cited in a number of the extant biographical works. See Sezgin, I, 347.

expecting to find in it information and indicators reflective of trends which, from many other reliably dated works, are known to be characteristic of such later writing. But such expectations are disappointed, and instead lead us only into confrontation with the repeated anomalies of a book quite out of keeping with the age from which it supposedy derives. The remarks above seek to draw attention to these apparent anomalies, and to assert that they warn us to look elsewhere for the origins of this book. As it happens, the only context with which the *Futūḥ al-Shām* is in harmony, and there entirely so, is that of Bilād al-Shām in the late second or very early third century A.H. This attribution, we may further note, appeals to no single decisive argument for its authority. Indeed, the most important spheres of research in early Islamic studies-- the Qur'ān *ḥadīth*, history, and dogma--are in such an uproarious state of controversy that one might wonder what such a compelling argument would be. Rather, what al-Azdī's text provides for our examination is a host of less categorical indicators which, taken separately, can perhaps be debated, but which, viewed collectively as evidence relevant to the particular problem under discussion, point quite clearly to and (at least in my view) only to the conclusion suggested here.

In addition to the question of method, there is that of the historical value of the *Futūḥ al-Shām*. To grant that this text is a late second-century Syrian work is to admit its historiographical importance, but concedes nothing so far as its usefulness for the study of t he conquest of Bilād al-Shām is concerned. The era of al-Azdī's informants is still far removed from that of the conquests themselves, and little is as yet known (or perhaps can be known) about these individuals or the transmission of their information from earlier times. It can be demonstrated that this process of transmission involved corruption and obfuscation from an early date[130]. For present purposes, the point is that use of the *Futūḥ al-Shām* as a historical source must take into account the fact that al-Azdī can generally be expected to repeat such errors as had entered the *futūḥ* tradition prior to his own time. Further historiographical research on the relevant literature may serve to reduce the scale of this problem, but it is not touched by simplistic observation of agreement between al-Azdī's narratives and other later versions.

Assessment of the work as a historical source must also take into account several problems arising from the apparently composite character of the text that has come down to us under al-Azdī's name. As argued above, his primary concern is not to relate historcial events, but to advocate a specific religious interpretation of these events, and this spiritual theme played a decisive role in the way he made use of the narratives upon which

130. This problem is considered in detail in the present writer's forthcoming study of the Arab conquests in southern Palestine.

his own work was based. This at times results in divergences from the received tradition, some of which reflect neither better infromation nor lack of historical sense, but rather interests which take al-Azdī in other directions. De Goeje roundly criticized him, for example, for presenting the Muslim forces as united under the command of Abū ʿUbayda, when other sources indicated very clearly that there was no unity of command, and that Abū ʿUbayda did not play anything close to a leading role until late in the conquest period[131]. But such criticism is quite beside the point. The frequent references in the text to *imāra* and the role of the *umarā'* argue the point that since the cause is that of God, and not a matter of worldly gain, commanders should not quarrel over leadership or undermine each other's efforts, which would be tantamount to obstruction of God's plan[132]. The ideal warrior's aim should not be worldly glory, but the countenance of God[133]. And the paragon of this principle, as discussed above, is Abū 'Ubayda.

Al-Azdī's divergences from the general *futūḥ* tradition also include numerous amplifications, some of which are clearly of an ahistorical character. This material consists for the most part of *qiṣaṣ*[134], folkloric narratives that tell a tale with a view to its didactic merit or entertainment value. The *Futūḥ al-Shām* contains at least seven narratives that clearly blong to this category: two accounts of interviews between Muslim leaders (Muʿādh ibn Jabal and Khālid ibn al-Walīd) and Byzantine commanders[135], two tales about the reaction of Herakleios to Byzantine defeats,[136] a story of Byzantine injustice,[137] and two accounts already mentioned above: the tale of the man with the two leaves and the account of the conversion of Kaʿb al-Aḥbār to Islam. In others of a similar sort, al-Azdī tells of visions *(ru'an)* experienced by Shurahbīl ibn Ḥasana, Bāhān, Abū 'Ubayda, Abū Marthad al-Khawlānī, and an unknown Greek[138].

The purpose of all this material is clear enough. It provides al-Azdī with important opportunities and in this respect it is comparable to the correspondence he cites to promote his view of the significance of the

131. De Goeje. *Mémoire sur le Fotouho s-Scham,* pp. 28-29.

132. Al-Azdī, pp. 2ult-3:1, 3:12-14, 4:4-5, 9-13, 8:3-4, 21: 11-16, 48:2-6, 95:8-9, 250:9-10, ult.

133. *Ibid.,* pp. 28:12-15, 41:11-12.

134. On the *qiṣaṣ* lore, see Duri, *Historical Writing,* pp. 24 28, 122-35, and the more recent works cited therein.

135. Al-Azdī, pp. 100:4-109:13, 173:10-185:3.

136. *Ibid.,* pp. 132:9-133ult, 211:11-213:15.

137. *Ibid.,* pp. 193:8-194:3.

138. *Ibid.,* pp. 10:5-11:1, 173:11-14, 187:13-188:5-, 190:5- 193:7.

conquest of Bilād al-Shām. But what is the modern historian to make of such lore? While it is no doubt true that it often has some basis in historical fact, it is equally true that considerations of fidelity to the historical record have little restraining or directing influence on the subsequent course or content of the tale that emerges to our view. This *caveat,* I would suggest, applies even when the narrative in question does not (as it often does) warn us off by vaulting into the domain of the fabulous. This is not to say that such material is of no use, but rather that mere observation that an element in such a story is within the realm of the possible, and does not "appear" to be mythical, merits recognition as a very weak argument for embracing that element as historical truth.

These reservations are offered in order to draw attention to the fact that, for the historian of early Islam, the *Futūḥ al-Shām* poses numerous problems that are not disposed of by the arguments made here for an early date and a local Syrian provenance. On the other hand, these proposals will hopefully serve to suggest lines for further investigations. Al-Azdī's work has much to tell us, not only about the events he describes, but also about the development of the ways in which those events were discussed in the formative era of medieval Islamic civilization.

Udruh and the Early Islamic Conquests

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This paper will consist of three sections; 1). An introduction to the site of Udruh and the work being undertaken there. 2). The historical and epigraphic sources relating to Udruh for the period under discussion. 3). The archaeological evidence from the excavations and survey for that same period.

I

The village of Udruh lies 20 kilometres north-west of Ma'an and 10km. east of Wadi Musa, at a height of 1300m. above sea level. The present village, which has only been there since 1920, comprises 60 houses with a population of about 700. The area has an annual rainfall of less than 20cm. and a perennial spring has consequently attracted settlement to the site throughout antiquity. In modern times a channel irrigation system was developed to water the only good pastural land available, which slopes away from Udruh to the east. The main site of Udruh lies to the west of the village and consists of a large fortress with 200m. long walls and projecting defensive towers. The area inside these walls is strewn with large masonry rubble and building debris. Astride the north perimeter wall is an Islamic fort with walls standing 6m. high. Outside the south-west corner tower of the fortress is a church/meeting hall.

Brunnow and Domaszewski rcorded the site of Udruh/Udḥruh and its fortifications on 14-15th March 1897 and 24-27th March 1898 (1904, 431). Much of the site had been destroyed by modern building activity in the intervening years before any further serious work was conducted there. In September 1980 a British expedition spent a month re-surveying Udruh in preparaion for the first season of excavation in 1981. Two further excavation seasons have been undertaken in 1982 and 1983 and a study season in 1984. A further excavation season will be undertaken in 1985, after which the writer hopes to publish the first five years of work at the site. This will include the publication of the detailed survey of the region (Shobek-Wadi Musa-Ma'an) which has been undertaken alongside the excavations.

II

There are few historical references to Udruh in the classical sources. The single major reference (Ptolemy, V,16,4) lists Ἄδρου in the second century A.D. as a town in Arabia Petraea. The town is missing from the military lists of the Notitia Dignitatum at the end of the fourth century A.D. In the early sixth century A.D. Udruh is said to have been considerably (re)built by the Ghassanid, Jabala ibn Harith (Hamza al Isfahani, Ta'rikh,

Beirut ed. 1961, 100). Certainly the importance of Udruh at this time is attested by other sources. It appears in the lists of Steven of Byzantium as Ἀδαρα18 :18) and most importantly at the top of the list of towns inscribed on the Bersabee edict. Ἀδρα was paying 65 gold pieces in tax, the highest in the list of towns of Palaestina Tertia.

It can be strongly suggested that when the Muslim forces arrived at the battlefield of Mu'ta in 629 A.D. they arrived along the Via Traiana Nova (Knauf; this conference). Is it not also conceivable that they followed the road further south also and passed by Udruh? Indeed one author actually mentions that the forces halted at Udruh on their way to Mu'ta (Lammens, 1907, 18, n. 7; Osd III.158). The absence of Udruh in the other sources is surprising and suggests that the inhabitants of Udruh either retired into their city walls (always formidable to the Muslim forces) and put up no resistance to the passing force or alternatively welcomed the Muslim forces. The same question can be posed for the inhabitants of Jerba. I think the answer to this question is clear from the events of the following year. In 630 A.D. Udruh sent a delegation to the prophet at Tabuk (as did Jerba, Maqna, Ayla and even possibly Ma'an (Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, 109 and esp. n.90, 91) to request terms for protection and accordingly Udruh agreed to pay a tax of 100 dinars for this service. Several factors make it clear that the towns of southern Jordan were left with no choice but to change allegiance at this time. The Byzantine Emperor Heraclius may have withdrawn his subsidy and protection of the frontier tribes after the battle of Mu'ta (Theophanes, Chronographia, 335) but certainly his control was limited in the south as far as the Dead Sea (P. Mayerson, The First Muslim Attacks on southern Palestine, A.D 633-634, p.165). At the same time Heraclius attempted to increase his ties with the Syrian population in order to protect Syria against attacks from the south-east. It is clear that the inhabitants of Udruh were left with little choice but to join the Muslim forces, if indeed they had not already done this prior to the battle of Mu'ta the previous year.

Udruh is not mentioned again until after the battle of Siffin. In A.D. 658 the historic conference took place at Udruh. That the conference took place at Udruh is clear from the analysis of Lammens (1907, Etudes sur le règne du Calife Omaiyade Mo'awia ler, Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale, Beyrouth, 1907), although some of the later historiographers had put the conference at Duma. Amr ibn al Aasi representing Muawiya ibn abi Sofian, governor of Syria, and Abu Musa al Asari representing Khalif Ali ibn abi Talib, cousin and son in law of the Prophet met to discuss the ascendancy. As for what happened at the conference and how Amr ibn al Aasi took advantage of Abu Musa al Asari either by skill or treachery, I leave others to discuss. It is of interest to note that both sides brought 400 men to Udruh and the Medinans with a large staff were also invited, which totals 800

together with the Medinans and indigenous population based at Udruh, to have been chosen for the conference, must hasve had the potential : to be well supplied with food; for the water resources to be more than adequate for the indigenous population; to have had a camp site available to permit an influx of over 1000 people.

After the murder of Ali, Muawiya may have held an assembly at Udrūh (al-Tabari, II, 198) to receive the submission of Hasan. Occupation continued at Udruh and in the 10th century A.D. a manuscript from the Sinai is signed "Father Mousa ibn al-Hakim, the monk of Adroh" (Z.D.M.G. LI, p. 454-455).

III

Excavations are still underway at Udruh and details of analysis awaits the final report. The publication of Udruh and the area survey will present the only ceramic typology, settlement pattern, site architectural typology for southern Jordan and northern Arabia from Bronze Age to Mamluk/Ottoman. During the 500's/600's A.D. major areas of the site were significantly rebuilt. Numismatic evidence for this period from Udruh is so far lacking, while ceramic and lamp analysis from the site cannot yet distinguish whether the re-building was in the 500's A.D. by Hamza al Isfahani or in the early 600's. AS the excavations continue we are certain to be able to refine this date. There are unfortunately no other excavated sites of this priod in southern Jordan.

(The ceramics, lamps and rebuilding phases of the period under discussion at Udruh are illustrated in the slide sequence and commentary).



Fig. 1. Location map of the site of Udruh



Fig. 2. Survey sites in the immediate vicinity of Udruh

Fig. 3. Aerial photograph of Udruh (courtesy of the Ministry of Culture, Spain)



Fig. 4. The central building at Udruh, note the Umayyad? Tabula Ansata at the bottom.



Fig. 5. The southern gateway of the site which was probably blocked in the 6th/7th centuries A.D.



Fig. 6. An Umayyad? arch stone with plaster facing



Fig. 7. The first storey of Tower One which was rebuilt in the 6th/7th centuries A.D.

Aspects of Historical Topography Relating to the Battles of Mu'ta and the Yarmuk

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It seems to be commonly agreed that the sources for Early Islamic History give us valuable and reliable details for some events, but fail to order these individual events within an acceptable chronological framework. The historiographers did not find enough evidence for chronology and the order of events in the *axba:r* at their disposal; so they had to reconstruct these independently, and different schools came to different conclusions, none of which may be the "true" one. To give one example : different chronicles and chronographies date the capitulation of Jerusalem variously as A.D.636,637 and 638. On the basis of the only contemporary source, the Christmas sermon delivered by St. Sophronius of Jerusalem in 634, Prof. Busse of Kiel University (in a paper hopefully forthcoming this year) has, in my opinion, convincingly shown that Jerusalem capitulated before easter 635.

In this paper, which is intended as a modest contribution to further discussion only, I will not take the analysis of sources any further than has already been done by F.M.Donner; both because I am not a specialist in this field, and also, because I doubt that this will significantly add to our knowledge. In the absence of documentary evidence (from inscriptions and papyri contemporary with the events), although future archaeological work may, I would like to suggest turning to the kind of primary evidence which does not require excavation in order to be evaluated : the scenes of events, and their implications for the reconstruction of history.

I

Mu'ta is situated on a plain surrounded on all sides by slightly higher hills. To the north the plain is dominated by a hill with the settlement of *Miḥna:*, a toponym obviously going back to Canaanite (WILD : 236 sub *Miḥmarš*). If Theophanes (Migne) 689 (MUSIL : 152 n.2) refers to the same place and the same event, it was this settlement which gave the battle its name in the Greek tradition. The present "Kings' Highway passes near Miḥna : and led down to el-Kerak through a valley. However the Via Traiana, remnants of which are still to be seen in this area, climbed the ridge to the north-east of *Mu'ta* and passed by a village now called *Muše:rfe,* then led on towards *et-Taniyye.* A lower ridge to the south separates *Mu'ta* from the *maza:r* of Jaʿfar ibn Abi : Ṭalib, first erected in A.H. 727 = 1327 A.D. (VAN BERCHEM in BRÜNNOW-DOMASZEWSKI : 105). Then the Via Traiana, the main road through Transjordan in Nabataean, Roman and

Byzantine times, attested at *Mu'ta* by 2 (BRÜNNOW-DOMASZEWSKI : 104) or 3 (MUSIL : 152) milestones, went down to *Wadi: Ḥasa:* by *Ḏa:t Ra:s.* That the Muslim forces in September 629 A.D. approached on the Via Traiana itself; through the middle of the cultivated land, can be derived from *Ibn Hiša:m* who says that the Arabs met the "forces of Heraclius" near a village called *Maša:rif* and then withdrew towards *Mu'ta* where the actual battle was fought (BH 794).

As for the enemies of the Muslims at *Mu'ta,* we have to dismiss the account that Heraclius was present at the city of *Ma'a:b* with 100,000 Greeks and 100,000 Arabs (BH 792). In 628, Heraclius had concluded his war against the Sasanid Persians who had been in control of Syria and Palestine since 614 (at least, nominally) and had returned to his capital after an absence of 6 years. In 630 he came to Jerusalem, and it is highly unlikely that he reorganised Syria and Palestine before this. As we will see later, the Persian occupation meant that Transjordan at this time was free of any foreign troops and entirely left to its own resources.

The Byzantine Arab "forces" which the Muslims met at *Mu'ta* are said to have consisted of men from *Laxm* and *Juḏa:m* and *al-Qayn* and *Bahra:'* and *Bali:* commanded by a man of *Bali: ibn Ira:ša* (BH 792); or of men from *Bahra:'* and *Wa:'il (Wa:'il ibn Rabi: ʿa ibn Ḥadas* cf. BH 797-, part of *Laxm,* or *Wa:il ibn Zaidmana:t,* (part of *Juḏa:m* cf. CASKEL : 585) and *Bakr* and *Laxm* and *Juḏa:m* (Wa :qidi : 172a). The differences between *Ibn Hiša:m* and *al-Wa:qidi:* are a nice example of how traditions grow. *Bakr* and *Bahra :* have to be dismissed from the list, because their tribal territory lay far north of the events (CASKEL : 220. 223). They were just added to complete the list with tribes known to have been pre-Isalmic Syrian Arab tribes. The same principle has led to attributing the command of the Byzantine Arabs at *Mu'ta* to a man from *Ġassa:n* in an even later development of the tradition (cf. DONNER: 107). The tribal territory of *Laxm* and *Juḏa:m* extended from *Tabu:k* to *ʿAmma:n* with the *al-Qayn* to the east of them; so parts of these tribes and of *Bali: ibn Ira:ša* may well have been present at *Mu'ta.* For the "Byzantine" participants, Mu'ta obviously was no more than a tribal skirmish which they were accustomed to fight regularly. After they killed the most prominent leaders of their enemies, the matter was settled, in their opinion, and they let them retreat without any attempt to annihilate the small force which was far away from its operational base. For the Muslims, of course, it was more : the beginning of the *fatḥ aš-ša:m.* To understand this, we have to consider the first battle of *Mu'ta.*

The Muslim Arabs and the Byzantine Arabs who clashed on this plain in 629 A.D. were not the first Arabs to wage war there. In 87 B.C., Antiochos XII., the last offspring of the Seleucid royal family trying to regain their

former possessions, left Damascus to subdue the "rebels" in the South who were against his rule : the Hasmonaean Jews and the Nabataeans. He won a complete victory over the Jews and then marched on towards the Nabataeans. He did not invade Nabataean territory from the north where it bordered on his possessions in Syria, but from the southern end of the Dead Sea, in an attempt to cut off the northern half of the Nabataeans dominium in Transjordan from its southern half. Immediately after he had climbed the plateau, he met the enemy - at *Mo:tho:*, the present *Mu'ta*. Both the Seleucid and the Nabataean kings (Rabb'il I.) lost their lives. But the Syrians were routed and fled in disorder across *Wa:di: ʿAraba* as far as *Wa:di 1-Qe:ni:* in Southern Palestine (Steph. Byz. s.v.; Ios. ant. 13, 387- 391; bell. I, 99-102; ROSCHINSKI : 15f; the combination of Stephen of Byzantium and Josephus makes it clear that Motho is *Mu'ta* and not *Imta:n*. As a result of this victory, the successor of Rabb'il I., Aretas III., could claim sovereignty over Damascus and feel himself heir to the Selecid empire for some time. But when the Romans arrived in 64/63 B.C., he had to concede his claims and was reduced to the status of a Roman client king. In 87 B.C., the Arabs won the battle, but lost the war. Many of the Syrian population were already at this time Arab, but the Arabs were not the majority. In 629 A.D. the Muslims lost the battle, but won the war, mainly because the demographic pattern of Syria had in the meantime considerably changed.

In 629 A.D., *Laxm* and *Juḏa:m* inhabitated the majority of what was formerly the Nabataean empire. It is significant, I think, that they did not dare to resist the Muslim raiding party south of *Wa:di: Ḥasa:*, and thereby abandoned the larger part of their territory without fighting. Obviously there were no Byzantine strongholds to rely upon or Byzantine forces at hand in the area south of *Wa:di: Ḥasa:*. In the north, there was the stronghold of *Ma'a:b* which strengthened their rear. The city is commonly identified with *el-Kerak* (Byzantine *Rabbathmo:ba)*. In the south, then, there was no comparable fortress. This sheds some light on the history of *Uḏruḥ* in this time. Together with *Aila, Maqna:* and *Du:mat al-Jandal Uḏruḥ* submitted to the Prophet (Wa :qidi : 230a-231b; BH 902-903). This places southern Jordan together with parts of Arabia at this time. *Uḏruḥ* may have submitted under the impact of the Mu'ta raid, or because the Arabs who surrounded the town became more and more affiliated to the Muslim community. The Byzantine governor of *Aila* is depicted as a "king" in these narratives, and I think this feature correctly reflects the state of affairs in Southern Jordan at this time. The border between Arabia and Syria in those days was *Wa:di: l-Ḥasa:;* crossing the Wadi meant starting the conquest of Syria. This, and the objective of the raid, which was not scheduled to stop at *Mu'ta,* is clearly stated in the verses of ʿAbdalla :h ibn Rawa :ha which he sang to his camel :

ida : addaitini : wa-ḥamalti raḥli : masi :rata arba in baʿda l-hisa :'i : fa-sa'nuki anʿumum wa-xala :ki dammun wa-la : arjiʿila : ahli : wara :i :

(BH 793; Wa :qidi : 172a; Tabari : I 1613)

Wa:di: l-Ḥasa: separated the more Canaanite Moabites from the more Arab Edomites in the Iron Age; the Ptolemaic possessions in Transjordan from the Nabataean realm in the 3rd century B.C.; the newly established province of Palaestina Tertia from Arabia (curiously, then to the north of it!) at the time of Diocletian; and even today, when I go to Petra, it is usually in *Wa:di: l-Ḥasa:* or shortly thereafter that I meet the first camels...

II

We have seen that *Mu'ta* and *Wa:di: l-Ḥasa:* played a prominent role in Arab history even before Islam. With some modifications, the same holds true for the *Yarmu:k*. For obvious reasons, I lack personal knowledge of the battlefield. So my comments will not be as extensive as on the battle of *Mu'ta*.

The sources are discussed and analysed in DONNER (128-148). From the different accounts and different dates, I would choose the following as the most likely, based on Spring 635 for the capitulation of Jerusalem; 634, Ajnadain; Winter 634/635, Fahl; in the course of 635, the capitulation of Jerusalem, Damascus, and other cities. Up to this moment, only local forces were involved on the Byzantine site. It seems that the Byzantines in 634 and 635 did not recognize what was going on and thought the beginning *futu:ḥ* to be no more than a series of bedouin raids which they had been accustomed to suffering from. After the capitulation of these major cities and after these "bedouin" refused to retreat when they got their booty, the Byzantine emperor started a counter-offensive. His army may have consisted of some 36,000 men : a third Greek, a third Armenian, and a third Arab under a Ghassanid prince. After the reforms of Heraclius, the Byzantine army relied mainly on its light cavalry. The Muslim army, encamped at *Ja:biya,* may have numbered some 24,000 men, mainly foot-soldiers. The name of the battle, to be fought in 636, is variously given as the battle of the *Yarmu:k,* of *Nahr ar-Ruqqa:d, of Wa:qu:ṣa/Ya:qu:ṣa,* or of Gabitha/ *Ja:biya.* All these names refer to the same place. Where the *Yarmu:k* changes its direction from the west to the south-west approximately opposite the Jordanian village of *Ibda:r,* it is joined by the *Wa:di: r-Ruqqa:d* from the northeast. The two wadis form a sharp triangle; both are deeply cut into the plateau of the *Jo:la:n.* To the west of the *Wa:di: r-Ruqqa:d,* and to the north the *Yarmu:k* is, or has been until very recent times, f *el-Ya:qu:ṣe.* An inf ry army opposed to a cavalry unit larger in number could not choose a better position than the one between the *Yarmu:k* and the *Wa:di: r-Ruqqa:d.* Here it was secure of being safe frm being outflanked. Neither the larger number nor the superior mobility was,

in this position, of any advantage to the enemy. Once they had encountered the first onslaught, the Muslims had the advantage of a unified command and a language common to all the combatants, whereas it is not difficult to imagine that the Byzantine army was hardly able to reorganise during action. Quite a number of sources agree that the Greeks, after their defeat, suffered a lot from the deep ravines connected to the field of battle. This fits perfectly the reconstruction which I offer.

So the battle of the *Yarmu:k* was fought tactically as a defensive battle, although the Arabs were strategically on the offensive. This is no surprise. E.g., the Duke of Wellington fought his battles and won his campaigns on very similar principles. When the Muslim Arabs had their headquarters in *Ja:biya*, before the battle of *Yarmu:k*,they simply followed in the footsteps of the Ghassanids, who had their main camp at the same place. **Ja:biya** was the center of the Syrian Arabs in the late Byzantine period. Establishing a camp there, the Muslims demonstrated their claim of succession. To call the battle of the *Yarmu:k* After *Ja:biya* is as appropiate as it was for the Duke of Wellington to call the battle of Belle-Alliance (where it took place) the battle of Waterloo (where no fighting occurred, but where his headquarters were). When in A.D. 636 the Arabs made skilful use of a terrain which they knew better than their enemies, they took the same advantage as the Nabataeans did in 31 B.C. when they defeated Herod near *Qanawa:t* (Jos. bell. I 366-368). The first foreign ruler who had to fight Arabs in the *Haura:n* was the Assyrian King Ashurbaipal ca. 644 B.C. (KNAUF : 101f).

For some scholars, the "Islamic Conquest" of Syria is still an unexplainable catastrophe which flooded a flourishing country with hordes of barbarian bedouin and vandals, destroying an old culture and cutting it off from the rest of the world, by which they mean from Western Europe. It is hard to imagine a view which is more aberrant. At the end of Late Antiquity, it was the West which fell into barbarism, not the Levant. The Arab "conquest" of Syria was not the beginning of a completely new chapter in history, but the final completion of a process which had started more than 1000 years earlier and had, gradually, transformed Syria and Palestine from an Aramaean and Canaanite country into a part of Arabia. When the Arabs came to Syria in 634, they came to a region which was already their own. The immediate outcome of the "conquest" was the Umayyad culture, when Syria reached the peak of its cultural development and prosperity.

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Arabic and Islam in Holland During the XVIIth Century

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When invited to read a paper on the contribution of Dutch scholars to the history of Bilād al-Shām I spontaneously accepted, thinking that it would not be too difficult to collect the material needed. Soon, however, I realized that it would be impossible to give, in twenty minutes, a general survey of what scholars like Dozy, de Goeje and Snouck Hurgronje had written on this subject. Apart from the fact that these three great Orientalists of the 19th and 20th centuries do not seem to have concentrated on this particular field — they were linguists, text—editors, historians in other fields, and Islamologists —, it would have meant to inviting you to walk with me on well-known paths, which probably would not lead to new insights. Instead, I decided to concentrate on the two Dutchmen who, in the 17th century, laid the foundations of Arabic scholarship in Holland, Thomas Erpenius and Jacobus Golius. But, as I soon found out, these do not have much to offer to studies of Bilād al-Shām either. Being founders, they had to deal with elementary subjects : grammar, lexicology and text-editing. Nevertheless, Ifrankly found myself willing to miss an opportunity to come back to hospitable Jordan, and so thought that it might perhaps be acceptable to say a few words on the reasons which, led to the study of Arabic in Holland (in the 17th century), and to put before you some reflections on the attitude towards Islam in that country at that time. I realize that such a paper reveals more about Holland than about Bilād al-Shām, but I hope that my remarks are not completely out of place here.

With the publications of Professor Jan Brugman, in English[1], and of Dr. W.M.C. Juynboll, in Dutch[2], as my guides, I divide my remarks into three headings, corresponding to the incentives which led to the study of Arabic :

1. Scholary interest in the Arabic language and civilisation.
2. Awareness of the practical usefulness of Arabic.
3. Missionary ardour.

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1. J. Brugman, Arabic Scholarship, in Leiden University in the Seventeenth Century, An Exchange of Learning, Leiden 1975, 203-15.
2. W.M.C. Juynboll, Zeventiende-eeuwsche Beoefenaars van het Arabisch in Nederland, Utrecht 1932.

As a preliminary, it should be remarked that the study of Arabic in Holland was an activity based not merely there, but indeed is Western-Europe generally. It was started in Leiden by Franciscus Raphelengius — in French; Francois Raphelengien, in Dutch; Frans van Ravelingen (1539-1597), born at Lannoy, near modern Lille in Northern France, and by his more famous contemporary Josephus Scaliger (1540-1609), a Frenchman of Italian origin. The first professor of Arabic at Leiden University, which was founded in 1575, was a certain Philippus Ferdinandus, a Jewish convert to Christianity of Polish extraction. His successor, Thomas Erpenius, in Dutch Van Erpe, had very close relations with European scholars, such as William Bedwell in London, Isaac Casaubon and Stephanus Hubertus in Paris.

1. Human relations being what they are, the Crusades, the even closer contacts between Europeans and Arabs in Spain, and also Sicily with Idrisi's famous "Book of Roger", had made Europeans aware of the high quality of Arab science. Not only had the Arabs, through their studies of Aristotle, Euclid, Ptolemy, Hippocrates and Galen, brought these highlights of human knowledge to the attention of the West, but the names of Algaurizim (al-Khwārazmī), Albumasar (Abū Ma'shar), Albategnius (al-Battānī), Alkabitus (al-Ḳabīṣī), Rhazes (al-Rāzī), Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), Mesue (Masawih), Albubatar (Ibn Bitār), Abenzoar (Ibn Zuhr), had all become familiar to European scientists. Even by adding the names of Geber (Djābir), Alhazen (al-Ḥasan b. al-Haytham) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd), I cannot pretend to give anything but the briefest of surveys of the scientific contact between the two cultures. It should only be remarked that roughly between the 12th and 16th centuries this was mostly a one-way traffic, from East to West, not vice-versa. Nor is it necessary to insist on this nowadays all too often forgotten Eastern influence on Western culture, for, as it has been said : scientibus legem loquor, I am speaking to people who are well aware of all this. For my purpose it suffices to say that, towards the end of the 16th century, the Dutch too began to realize the importance of Arabic and Arab science. In his inaugural oration in 1613 Erpenius, wanting to prove to his audience the *utilitas* of the study of Arabic, argued (I quote Professor Brugman's English translation of the Latin text), - : "(For) the Turks, whose rule began three hundred years ago, and who, after they had embraced the religion of the Arabs, turned against them and added a part of their realm to their own, are far removed from the study of science. But the Arabs, whose realm lasted for seven hundred years, and flourished for a long time and over a great territory in Asia, Africa and a large part of Europe, during all that time were diligent not alone in the study of Mars, but also in that of Minerva"[3]. He fully recognized the role of the Arabs in transmitting Greek and Roman science, and also realized that they had

3. Arabic Scholarship, 207.

sometimes surpassed them. It has not been recorded, as far as I know, but one might imagine that some of the fine humanists present at the oration, who wrote Latin more elegantly than Dutch, may have raised their eyebrows when they were addressed as follows : (qui) Graeciae et Latii amore abrepti quidquid Hellenismum no olet, insipidum ilico et inelegans esse opninantur i.e. (who), carried away by their love of Greece and Latium, are of the opinion that everything which does not smell of Hellenism, is completely insipid and inelegant"[4]. In 1627, Golius would repeat the same in a less unfriendly way[5]. However, Erpenius also realized that pure science had to come second in the task to which he had been appointed. He had to teach Arabic. Since there were hardly any grammars or texts available, he wrote his famous *Grammatica, arabica* published in Leiden in 1613, and printed his own texts on his personal printing press. The grammar has been republished many times, as late as 1829 by the Propaganda Fide in Rome, and again in Paris in 1844. Between 1613 and his death in 1624, Erpenius printed, translated and published no less than 14 Arabic titles, besides three in Hebrew. His best known Arabic publication is the *Historia Saracenica,* the *Madjmu'* of Djirdjis al-Makīn. Hottinger used this edition for his "Bibliotheca Orientalis", and Samuel Purchas, the author of "Purchas his pilgrimage", translated Erpenius' Latin text into English.

Erpenius met his untimely death at the age of forty in 1624, a victim of the pest-epidemic then raging in the Low Countries. His pupil, Jacobus Golius — Jacob Gool in Dutch (1596 - 1667), — was not only a worthy successor, at the age of 29, but he was also, as Professor Brugman puts it, "an example of the versatility that seems to have been common among Orientalists of its generation."[6] Besides being a fine Orientalist, he was an accomplished mathematician, and for 38 years he held the Chairs of both Arabic and Mathematics at Leiden University in the fine Oriental tradition of linguistics, history and science. His fame in the West is mainly based on his *Lexicon Arabico-Latinum,* first published in 1654, which remained standard through the 17th to 19th centuries, until it was finally superseded by the lexicons of Freytag and Lane. Of his other works the editiong and Latin translation of Ibn 'Arabshāh, *'Adjāïb al-makdūr fī nawā'ib Timūr,* Leiden 1636 should be mentioned, and of al-Farghānī, *Elementa astronomica,* published after his death in 1669. His Latin translation of a treatise of Ibn al-Haytham "on the most accurate determination of the altitude of the pole" (de accuratissima poli altitudinis definitione) is in manuscript in the British Museum. His year-long study of the *Conica* of Apollonius of Perge, in the Arabic version of Thābit b. Ḳurra of Ḥarrān, has also never been published.

4. Quoted in Juynboll,

5. Cp. Juynboll, 136.

6. Arabic Scholarship, 208.

2. I can be brief about the second incentive for the study of Arabic in Holland in the 17th century, namely its practical usefulness. Arabic was important for the contacts of the young Republic with the East and the Maghreb. Towards the end of the 16th century, Dutch merchants had established relations with the Mediterranean, Morocco and Turkey. In 1596 Raphelengius had translated into Arabic a letter addressed by the States-General to what was called "the great emperor of Marocos", and in 1604 Scaliger had translated into French a letter of the Sharif of Morocco[7], while a letter in Arabic from the Turkish admiral Khalil Pasha of 1611 had been rendered into Dutch[7a]. From 1614 onwards, Erpenius was active as a translator, and in 1624 he was appointed official translator for "Arabic, Turkish, Persian and other Oriental languages"[8]. The relations with North Africa in particular were important at that time. Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean suffered much damage at the hands of the pirates, and so it was essential for Dutch ships to be able to use one or more ports of refuge on the Moroccon coast. In 1622 Golius had accompanied a Dutch delegation to the Moroccon sultan Mawlay Zaydan[9], and in 1626-1627 he was "cancellarius" to the Dutch consulate in Aleppo. Although (around 1625) this town had lost its importance as the main staple-place of spices and other costly Oriental goods on their way from East to West - it was called "little India" —, to the Dutch it remained important as a market for Persian silk. Having travelled widely in the Near East, to Antioch, Istanbul and as far as the Turkish-Persian frontier, Golius had been able to buy some 300 Arabic, Turkish and Persian manuscripts for about 3.200 Dutch florins, quite a sum in those days. Many of these are now in the Bodleian Library in Oxford[11].

This incentive for the study of Arabic did not last long. Dutch merchantile interest quickly turned to what was to become the Dutch East Indies, and moreover, after the death of Golius, a successor of his or Erpenius' standing was not available.

3. The third incentive for the study of Arbic, missionary ardour, is a point of discussion, as is almost anything which, in the Low Countries of the 16th and 17th centuries, had to do with religion. In the days of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, everything was touched by

7. Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal, 1507-1609, uitg. dr.N. Japikse. 's-Gravenhage 1926, ix, 147 note 3; De Castries, Les Siurces, inedites, i, 154 ff.

7a. A.H. de Groot, The Ottoman Empire and The Dutch Republic. A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations, 1610-1630. Leiden 1978, 106 n. 2.

8. Juynboll, 105.

9. Cp. De Groot, 141 ff.

10. Dunlop, Bronnen Geschiedenisd OIC in Perzië, i, 1xiv.

11. Juynboll, 182.

religion, even Arabic. In France, Gulielmus Postel (1510-1581), professor of Arabic at the College de France which, had been founded in 1510, had wanted to use Arabic for the spreading of the Christian religion. In the Low Countries, he was closely followed by Nicolaus Clenardus — Kleynaarts in Dutch, Clenard in French (1496-1542). Very famous for his Latin, Greek and Hebrew grammars — his Hebrew grammar went through 21 editions in the 16th century —, Clenardus started to study Arabic in order to arrive at a deeper insight into Hebrew. Other European champions of this role of Arabic were Joannes Mercerus, or Jean Mercier, one of the teachers of Raphelengius (who died in 1570), and the Englishman William Bedwell (1561-1632). The latter's attitude towards Islam is clearly expressed in the title of a small work, printed and probably written in Rome in 1615 : "Mohammedis imposturae, that is a discovery of the manifold forgeries, falshoods and horrible impieties of the blasphemous seducer Mohammed : with a demonstration of the insufficiencie of his law, contained in the cursed; Alkoran; delivered in a conference had between two Mohametans, in their returne from Mecha.... together with an Index of the Chapters of the Alkoran, for the understanding of the confutations of that booke". Sit venia verbi for this quotation, it shows how unfriendly the general approach to Islam was. For all these Europeans, including Erpenius and Golius, Hebrew was the "mother" of all languages, and Arabic was important because of its role of "ancilla" or maid-servant.

Was missionary zeal a motive for the study of Arabic in Holland in the 17th century? Dr. Juynboll does not doubt it[12], but Professor Brugman writes : "It is difficult to believe that missionary zeal ever played an important role, if it was operative at all"[13]. On the other hand, says Brugman, neither Erpenius nor Golius had any sympathy for, or understanding of, Islam as a system of religious truths. Indeed, although they were men of great learning and wide interest, the intense preoccupation with Islam which heir studies of Arabic involved, did not interfere with their religious convictions, which were profoundly bedded in 17th century Dutch Protestantism. I do not think Erpenius' description of the Ḳur'ān as *scelestissimus,* "very wicked", or his referring to Islam as the "Muhammedana superstitio,"[14] should be overstressed. These expressions are not stronger than those used against Rome. Erpenius was not a fanatic like Postel and Bedwell, but neither was he, nor he could be, an ecumenist. There does not seem to be any doubt that for him, the study of Arabic was important for missionary work. "The command of this language", he said towards the end of his oration of 1613, "is profitable for Christians, and

12. Juynboll, 23.

13. Arabic Scholarship, 209.

14. Ibid.

even necessary in order to bring back to Christ so many and such great peoples, that have been tempted away by the Ishmailian imposter"[15]. His Arabic editions of the New Testament and the Pentateuch should, according to his own words[16], spread "through the sailing to East India, God's Holy Word among the blinded people". Professor Brugman remarks that "it is by no means clear whether the interest Erpenius expressed in the mission to the Mohammedans was anything more than a polite bow in the direction of current public opinion"[17]. But my impression is that Erpenius' attitude towards a religious mission to the Muslims was more than a "bow". His attitude towards Islam must have been like that of so many of his Christian contemporaries; although his much greater knowledge did not lead him to fanaticism, it did not lead him to scepticism either.

Golius' attitude towards Islam seems to have been somewhat more outspoken. He had made friends with the Muslims he had been living with while in the East, he respected their religious convictions and piety, but, as a convinced member of the Dutch Reformed Church, he felt that they should be converted. He too used the almost stereotype expressions which were en vogue, like "the imposture of the pseudo-prophet Muhammad", and "the errors and superstition of a people who had been led astry"[18], but, as with Erpenius, these should not be given too much weight. More remarkable is the fact that he wished to publish a new Latin translation of the polemic against Islam known as "Refutation of the Muhammadan sect", written in 1487 by the Spanish Moor Abdallah, better known under the name of Jhannes Andreas, which he had assumed after his conversion to Christianity[19]. Although Golius' translation was never published, probably because in 1646 there appeared in Utrecht a reprint of the translation of Johannes Lauterbach, originally published in Leipzig, it is clear that he had given serious attention to this work. Codex 1272 of the Leiden University Library contains the first nine chapters in Golius' own handwriting. He must indeed have been a convinced Protestant, as is clear from his interest in the spreading of Protestantism among the Greek Orthodox. While in Istanbul he had supported the plan of Cornelis Haga, the Dutch ambassador to the Porte, and of Antoine Leger, the Dutch pastor there, for close cooperation with Cyrillus Lucaris, the reform-minded Greek patriarch[20]. He also persuaded one of the closest followers of Lucaris, a

15. Arabic Scholarship, 209.
16. Pentateuchus, Praefatio.
17. Arabic Scholarship, 209.
18. Ahmedis Arabsiadae vitae et rerum gestarum Timuri, qui vulgo Tamerlanes dicitur, Historia. Praefatio.
19. See on him.
20. Cp. de Groot, index s.v.

certain Nathaniel Conopius, who then found himself in Leiden, to translate into Arabic the well-known *Institutiones* of Calvin[21]. And finally, he himself, in close cooperation with Mozes Michaelis, a priest from Damascus, translated into Arabic the Catechism and Creed of the Dutch Reformed Church, the liturgy used in Dutch Protestant Churches, and the prescriptions and regulations established by the National Synod of Dordrecht of 1619. The States-General decided to publish this Arabic translation[22], but nothing came of it, perhaps for lack of money. A considerable part of the translation, in Golius' own handwriting, is to be found in Codex 10 of the Royal Dutch Academy[23], and a copy of the translation, probably written by Mozes Michaelis, is in Codex 2088 of the Leiden University Library[24], while a second copy is in Oxford[25].

Thus, while it may be said that Erpenius and Golius remain unsurpassed in promoting the study of Arabic and Arab civilization, it must be added that they, like all of us, were children of their time and therefore did not promote respect of Islam as a religion.

I cannot conclude this paper without saying a few words on that other, more internationally known Dutch scholar of the 17th century, Hugo Grotius - de Groot in Dutch -, and his attitude yowards Islam.

In 1619, while a prisoner in the fortress of Loevestein, Grotius wrote in 1619 a didactical poem in Dutch called "Bewijs van den waeren Godsdienst in ses Boecken gestelt" i.e. Proof of the true religion, in six books. According to some authorities[26] he was, among his contemporaries, more famous for this work than for his well-known "De jure belli ac pacis". The purpose of this poem was to give religious instruction to -, so that they might be able to defend their religion and to convince "infidels, heathens, Jews and Muslims" of its truth. First published in Dutch in 1622, the "Proof" was translated into Latin in Paris in 1627 under the title "De veritate religionis christianae". In 1640, the well-known English Orientalist Edward Pococke told Grotius that he planned to translate the "De veritate" into Arabic. This translation did indeed appear in Oxford in 1660 under the title : Kitāb fī ṣiḥḥa ash-sharī'a al-masīḥiyya. Nukila min al-lāṭīnī ilā l-'arabī. In the VIth

21. C. Sepp, Het Nieuw-Grieksche Testament van 1633. Bibliogr. Mededeelingen, Leiden 1883, 232.

22. Sepp, op. cit. 235; cp. Houtsma, Correspondentie, 62 ff.

23. P. de Jong, Catalogus Cod. Or. Bibl. Acad. Regiae, 189.

24. Catalogus v, 327 no. 2832; co. 89 no. 2391.

25. Uri, Cat. Bibl. Bodlej. no. 35.

26. J. Huizinga, Grotius plaats in de geschiedenis van den menschelijken geest. Tien Studiën. Haarlem 1926, 118.

book, Pococke had found a number a prejudices against the Prophet, introduced by Grotius on the authority of Scaliger[27]. Grotius readily agreed that these should be corrected and they are to be found in Pococke's letter of October 5, 1660, to his Maecenas Robert Boyle[28]. The Arabic text was spread in the East through the English Company for Levantine Trade, perhaps also by the English East India Company, and in any case by Dr. Robert Huntington, who between 1671 and 1682 was chaplain to the English factory in Aleppo[29]. Meanwhile, however, Grotius' mistakes about Islam and the Prophet had been perpetrated, at least in Holland and Western Europe, and had certainly not contributed to a better understanding between the two religions.

27. H.C. Millies, Over de Oostersche vertalingen van het beroemde geschrift van Hugo Grotius : De Veritate Religionis Christianae. Verslagen en Mededeelingen der Kon. Akad. v. Wetensch., afd. Letterkunde, vii, 116 ff., Amsterdam 1863; The Theological Works of Pocock, i, 18ff, 56 ff.; Ed. Pococke, Specimen historiae Arabum. Oxon. 1650, 186; Hadr. Relandi de religione Mohammedanica libri duo. Traj. ad Rhenum 1717, 260

28. Works of Robert Boyle, v, London 1744, 421, cp. 293-5, 422, 553, 617.

29. The Theological Works of Pococke, i, 57, 68, 71.

Syria Under the Persians 610-629

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The Persian occupation of Syria in the early seventh century tends to be overshadowed by the Muslim conquest. This is mainly because the Persian conquest of Syria came to nothing in the end, whereas the Muslim conquest turned out to be permanent. But the Persian rule of Syria lasted for almost two decades (610-29) and was important, if for no other reason, at least for the disruption it caused. It was significant for other reasons as well, the most obvious being the way it revealed the intensity of discontent with Byzantine rule among Jews and Jacobite Christians. It is also worth remembering that the great war between the Persians and the Byzantines from 604 to 629 coincided with the career of Muhammad; during most of Muhammad's mission Syria was under Persians, not Byzantine control.

Apart from accounts of the actual Persian conquest of Syria, 610-614, information on conditions in Syria under Persian rule is rather scarce. The chronicles that cover this period concentrate on military events in Anatolia, Armenia, and western Iran where the decisive fighting took place. Some indication of the situation under the Persians in Syria may be found in accounts of the measures taken by Herakleios when Byzantine control was restored in 629. The main aim of this research is to discover source material, since the Persians do not seem to have left documents in Syria as they did in Egypt. The ultimate goal is to find out as much as possible about what happened in Syria under the Persians, how the province was governed, what it meant for Jews and Jacobites to be in control, and whether any significant changes took place during the occupation.

Historians of Islam tend to minimize or overlook these events. Attention is focused on Arabia during the lifetime of Muhammad and expanded to include Syria and other regions as they became part of the Islamic empire. Events in Syria before the Muslim conquest are noticed to the extent that Byzantine reactions to collaboration with the Persians contributed to aggravating local disaffection and thereby to the conquest itself. Historians of Byzantium tend to pay more attention to these events because Syria was still part of the Byzantine empire when the Persians conquered it, and since the Byzantines managed to reoccupy Syria, it was they who lost it to the Muslims. The most extreme claims for the epochal consequences of the Persian occupation of Syria were made by Kondakov, as popularized by Vasiliev:

> The Persian invasion immediately removed the effects of the imported artificial Graeco-Roman civilization in

> Palestine. It ruined agriculture, depopulated the cities, destroyed temporarily or permanently many monasteries and lauras, and stopped all trade development. This invasion freed the marauding Arabian tribes from the ties of association and the fear which had controlled them, and they began to form the unity which made possible their general attacks of a later period. From now on the cultural development of the country is ended. Palestine enters upon that troubled period which might very naturally be called the period of the Middle Ages, were it not for the fact that it has lasted to our times[1].

This is an exaggeration indeed, based mainly on the remains of Christian architecture, and ascribing, as it does, centuries-long changes to a single catastrophic event (similar to claims made for the effects of the Mongol conquests) Even if one concedes that the preoccupation of the two major powers in their great war enabled events to take their own course in Arabia, it is unlikely that commerce ceased completely. Commerce is more likely to have been redirected within territories under Persian control and conducted by Persian subjects as is indicated by the presence of Persians at Ba'labak at the time of the Muslim conquest who were allowed to trade in Muslim territory, although there is no way of knowing whether these Persians had arrived at Ba'labak during the Persian occupation. In any case caravans going from Makka to Syria between 614 and 629 were entering Persian-held territory.

Just how destructive to life and property was the Persian conquest? In general, a case could be made for depopulation. Apart from the casualties inflicted on Byzantine armies and garrisons, captives were deported *en masse* to Iran. According to Theophanes in 606 the Persians took Dara, all of Mesopotamia, and Syria, capturing innumerable prisoners[2], and when they crossed the Euphrates in 607, they took captives "throughout Syria, Palestine, and Phoenicia"[3]. Michael the Syrian also has the Persians taking innumerable captives in Mesopotamia, Syria, Cilicia, Palestine, and Egypt up to about 615[4], but elsewhere he is more specific: in Byzantine

1. N.P. Kondakov, *An Archeological Journey through Syria and Palestine,* pp. 173-74, quoted by A. A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Madison, 1961), I, 195.

2. Theophanes, *Chronicle* (de Boor), I, 293, tr. H. Turtledove, *The Chronicle of Theophanes* (Philadelphia, 1982), p. 4.

3. Theophanes, I, 295; Turtledove, p. 6.

4. Michael the Syrian, tr. J.-B. Chabot, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien, patriarche jacobite d'Antioch 1166-1199* (Paris, 1901), II, 404/401.

Mesopotamia, between Dara and the Euphrates, the Persians killed all the "Romans" they found but did no harm to anyone else[5]. The Persians are said to have taken large numbers of captives at Antioch in 611[6] and at Damascus in 613[6]. There is no question that Jerusalem suffered huge casualties when it fell to the Persians in the spring of 614, but there is disagreement over their extent. Stratos estimates that between 2,000 and 10,000 defenders were killed, and an oft-repeated story tells how local Jews ransomed Christian prisoners from the Persians cheaply and killed 34,000, 57,000, or 90,000 of them[7]. According to Michael the Syrian, the Persians took such Jews captive, and Theophanes has the Persians deporting many (surviving) prisoners to Iran[8]. In about 626 Khusraw II ordered the entire population of Edessa deported to Iran, but the *marzbān* of Edessa mercifully decided not to send them all at once but a few at a time, hoping the king would relent. One quarter of the population of Edessa had been deported to Sīstān and Khurāsān, including the wife of the local notable, Iwannis Rasafaya, and his son Sergius, when word came that Herakleios had invaded Persian territory, to the rest were spared[9]. Herakleios is also said to have freed Syrians who had been resettled east of Ctesiphon when he invaded Iraq in 627-28. Stratos claims that even earlier influential Christians at the Persians court had persuaded Khusraw II to allow some of the Palestinian captives to be released[10]. The peace terms between Qubādh II (Shīroe) and Herakleios provided for the release of Christian prisoners and captives from all over Iran, including Zachariah, the Chalcedonian patriarch of Jerusalem[11]. Those Edessenes who had survived captivity are specifically said to have returned home after the fall of Shahrbaraz in 630[12]. At this point there is no way of knowing what proportion of the population was actually deported from other places in Syria by the Persians, how many of them actually returned, or the net degree of depopulation caused by the Persians.

Internecine conflict in Syria is also likely to have contributed to

5. Ibid., p. 390/378.

6. A. N. Stratos, *Byzantium in the Seventh Century* (Amsterdam, 1968), I, 104.

7. Theophanes, I, 300; Turtledove, p. 11. H. Lammens *(La Syrie, précis historique,* Beirut, 1921, I, 21) implies that they took the entire population of Damascus captive, which is hardly likely.

8. Stratos, I, 109; Michael the Syrian, II, 403-4/400; Theophanes, I, 300-1; Turtledove, p. 11.

9. Michael the Syrian, II, 408/411.

10. Stratos, p. 110.

11. Ibid., pp. 230-31; Theophanes, I, 327; Turtledove, p. 29.

12. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronicon,* 93; Michael the Syrian, II, 410/410.

depopulation in the first decades of the seventh century. According to Michael the Syrian, riots of the Demes devastated the towns in 605, and Phocas sent a general to Syria who killed many people. In 609 while the Persians raided northern Syria, Phocas was having the notables and commoners killed in the interior, although Michael's claim that as a result every free man able to fight disappeared is surely an exaggeration. Michael gives these circumstances as the reason for a Jewish rising at Antioch in 610 in which many people were killed, including the Chalcedonian patriarch, Anastasios[13]. Theophanes puts this Jewish rising in 608 and says they killed many landowners and defeated a Byzantine army sent against them[14]. Agapius may be generalizing from this event when he reports that the Jews of Syria and the Jazīra planned to kill the Christians and destroy their churches in 610 but were discovered and attacked by the Christians who killed many of them. In reprisal, Phocas is said to have raised the taxes of Christians in Antioch, Latakia and the rest of Syria and the Jazīra, but it is questionable whether he would have had the time or the degree of control in Syria to have done so (the Jazīra was already under Persian control)[15]. Theoretically, this account by Agapius may mean that events in Antioch provoked Christians to attack Jews in other places in Syria.

Natural disasters are equally likely causes of depopulation during this period. Bitter cold in 605 froze the Euphrates and destroyed crops and trees. A drought in 611 caused a famine due to lack of grain. The same year bedouin from Arabia raided Syria pillaging and burning numerous places and killing many people, perhaps as an indirect result of the drought[16]. Two years before the Persian evacuation, thousands of people perished from an epidemic of bubonic plague in Palestine in 627[17].

Whatever the demographic changes may have been, during the Persian conquest and occupation Syria was subjected to the pillaging and destruction of property that is likely to have depressed the economy and made recovery more difficult. At Jerusalem alone some three hundred monasteries and churches were burned, and Michael the Syrian syas that in general the Persians carried of all sorts of valuable things to Iran including

13. Michael the Syrian, II, 391-2/378-9.

14. Theophanes, I, 296; Turtledove, p. 7.

15. Agapius of Manbij, *Kitāb al-Unwān, Patrologia Orientalis,* 8/3 (1912), 449.

16. Michael the Syrian, II, 391/378, 403/401; Theophanes, I, 300; Turtledove, p. 11.

17. Michael the Syrian, II, 409/412. The plague spread to Iran during the reign of Shiroe, in the spring and summer of 628, where it decimated the population (Tabari, I, 1061; Yāqūt, *Buldān,* II, 143).

marble columns and facings from Anatolia, Syria, and elsewhere. However, Khusraw is also said to hve allowed money to be sent to Jerusalem for popular relief and permitted churches and monasteries to be rebuilt[18]. In 626 Khusraw is reported to have confiscated the treasures of all the churces under Persian control in order to finance the war[19], but the only specific example is Edessa where over 100,000 pounds of gold were stripped from the altar, cupola, and column of the Old Church and sent to him[20].

Although it is easy to gain such an impression, Persian rule in Syria was not totally rapacious. Unfortunately, very little seems to be known about the organization of Persian administration in Syria or even where they had garrisons. Lammens asserts that Syria was organized as a "satrapy" from 611 until 622 (sic)[21], but he seems to have been guessing. Apart from the anachronistic notion of a"satrapy" in this period, the territory the Persians conquered from the Byzantines in the early seventh century is more likely to have been treated administratively as an extension of the Quarter of West(*Khvarvarān*)since that was the contemporary unit of organization. The Persian generals engaged in the conquest of Byzantine territory were also the chief administrative officials of this section of the empire. The commander-in-chief, Shahrbarāz, was the governor-general *(išpahbadh, ṣepahbadh)* of the Quarter of the West[22], while his lieutenant, Shāhīn Vahmanzādhaghān, was the *pādhghōspān* of the West under Khusraw II[23]. Since they both spent most of their time campaigning, neither of them seems to have had a permanent administrative center.

Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest where local administrative centers may have been under the Persians. A Middle Persian list of provincial capitals of the empire, the *Shatristānihā-i Ērānshahr,* includes Edessa (Urha) and cities built in Syria (Sham) and Africa in the Quarter of the West[24]. The early seventh century is the only period for which such a claim could have been made. The identification of Edessa as an administrative center under the Persians is fairly secure. Michael the Syrian reports that Khusraw II appointed a local notable called Qūra as governor there to collect the tribute[25]. According to Agapius, Qurra (sic) was

18. Michael the Syrian, II, 404/401; Stratos, pp. 109-10.
19. Stratos, p. 166; Theophanes, I, 314; Turtledove, p. 21.
20. Michael the Syrian, II, 408/411.
21. Lammens, p. 21. This is repeated uncritically by Stratos (p. 110).
22. al-Mas'udi, *Muruj* (Beirut, 1966), I, 319, where he is called *marzubān al-maghrib.*
23. Ṭabarī, I, 1002.
24. Markwart, *Ērānshahr,* pp. 13-14, 16.
25. Michael the Syrian, II, 403-4/402.

a native of Edessa related to Yunan, Khusraw's Jacobite physician, and was appointed to collect taxes (*kharāj)* for Khusraw at Edessa[26]. The *marzbān* at Edessa in the 620's was apparently a different person[27], and the division of fiscal and military responsibilities in local administration conforms to late Sasanian practice. As far as other administrative centers are concerned, the best that can be done at present is to note that Ibn Rustah translates *Khurbarān* as *maghrib ash-Shams* and includes the Jazira and ash-Sha'm (sic) among the *kuwar* of Īrānshahr[28]. Consequently, his list of the subdivisions of Syria may be derived from Sasanian tradition. According to Ibn Rustah, these subdivisions (also called *kuwar)* were Ḥalab, Qinnasrīn, Anṭākiyya, Shayzar, Ḥamā, Ḥimṣ, Fāmiyya, Ba'labakk, Dimashq, at-Tabariyya, ar-Ramla, and Īliyyā[29]. Naturally this list needs to be compared with the actual administrative situation in Islamic times, and ar-Ramla would seem to be an anachronism. In any case this list might prove to be a useful starting point.

The claim of Lammens that the Persians did not collect taxes in Syria and that Herakleios reimposed taxes afterwards is disposed of easily[30]. Michael the Syrian reports in general terms that, in 622, flushed with victory, Khusraw grew tyrannical and that the tribute, taxes, and other forms of oppression he imposed were too many to relate[31]. Even before that the tribute imposed on Edessa was apparently so heavy that the people insisted that Qûra go to Khusraw to ask him to reduce it[32].

Disaffected elements in the Syrian population, Jews, Samaritans, and Jacobite Christians, tended to support or collaborate with the Persians. Jews took advantage of the circumstances to engage in reprisals against Christians. The Persian capture of Antioch may have been assisted by a Jewish revolt there, and thousands of Jews joined the Persian army when it attacked Jerusalem in a veritable messianic rising. Jews controlled Jerusalem briefly afterwards until the Persians expelled them from the city and the region in 617[33]. A wealthy Jew named Benjamin is said to have

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26. Agapius, p. 459.
27. Michael the Syrian, II, 408/411.
28. Ibn Rustah, *ʿAlāq an-nāfisa,* pp. 103, 105.
29. Ibid., p. 107.
30. Lammens, p. 22.
31. Michael the Syrian, II, 408/408.
32. Ibid., 403-4/402. The (come of this mission was that Qūra told Khusraw how rich Ede . was, and it was Qūra who collected the gold from the church and se.it it to him (Ibid., 404/403, 408/411).
33. Ibid., 403-4/400; Stratos, pp. 109-11.

mistreated Christians at Tiberias during the Persian occupation[34], possibly as a local official in Persian service as Qûra was at Edessa. In 628, Jews at Edessa joined the Persian army as auxiliaries in order to resist reoccupation by the Byzantines[35]. According to Agapius, the Jews of Edessa aided the Persians and persecuted the Christians during the occupation, and Michael the Syrian identifies a Jewish notable named Joseph who got Herakleios to pardon them[36]. In general Jewish support of the Persians was more a consequence of Byzantine persecution than a matter of principle, that is, they do not seem to have favored the Persians as such but had no alternative. They naturally suffered the consequences when the Byzantines reoccupied Syria; Herakleios "persuaded" Benjamin to convert to Christianity at Tiberias in the spring of 629 and expelled the Jews from Jerusalem again[37].

Jacobite Christians also had reason to favor the Persians, although, as Hage points out, there were Jacobites among the Christians taken captive by the Persians at Hims and Jerusalem[38], and the Edessenes deported to Iran were Jacobites. The Jacobite Church profited directly, however, from the Persian occupation. At the end of the sixth century, the Chalcedonian bishop of Melitene, Domitian, had persecuted Jacobites and expelled them from their bishoprics, churches, and monasteries. The Jacobite bishops who had fled to Egypt were returned to their sees in Syria at Khusraw's command, churches and monasteries were restored to them, and all the Chalcedonian bishops were expelled from Mesopotamia and Syria. However, as soon as the Persians had secured Byzantine Mesopotamia in about 610, they installed eastern Jacobite bishops from their own territories at Edessa, Amid, and Tella[39]. It should be noted that this was before the Persians had occupied Syria and Egypt and that Khusraw's order for the Jocobite bishops who had fled to Egypt to return to Syria may have been as late as 620. According to Michael the Syrian, the villagers around Edessa, Amid, and Tella refused to accept the eastern bishops because they had not been ordained by Athanasius, patriarch of Antioch, but by the metropolitan at Mar Mattai near Nineveh. Since Cyriacus of Amid was the only surviving bishop who had been expelled by Domitian, Athanasius sent him

34. Theophanes, I, 328; Turtledove, p. 30.

35. Michael the Sryian, II, 409-10/409-10.

36. Agapius, pp. 466-7; Michael the Syrian, II, 410/410.

37. Theophanes, I, 328; Turtledove, p. 30.

38. W. Hage, *Die syrisch-jakobitische Kirche im frühislamitischer Zeit nach orientalischen Quellen* (Wiesbaden, 1966), p. 64.

39. Ibid., pp. 63-64, 95, 98, 105; Michael the Syrian, II, 389-91/379-81, 403/401.

to the region of Amid and other parts of the Jazira to make the necessary ordinations so the villagers would accept the bishops installed by the Persians. But the mission of Cyriacus was resisted by Samuel of Amid and the other eastern bishops who "threatened him with Khusraw"[40]. There may have been an element of rural-urban conflict involved as well, since Michael also relates that the most prominent families at Edessa, the Beit Rasafaya, Beit Tellmaḥraya, Beit Qosma Bar Arābī, and many others supported the eastern bishop, Yesayā, there against Herakleios[41]. This conflict seems to have been limited to the Jazīra, and, in any case, Chalcedonians disappeared east of the Euphrates under the Persians. Elsewhere Jacobite bishoprics seem to be attested only at Bosra, Harrân, and Samosata during the Persian occupation[42]. However, Athanasius went to Herakleios at Mabbug afterwards accompained by the bishops of Tadmur, Ḥimṣ, 'Aras (?), Cyrrus, Mabbug, Ḥarrān, Edessa, Qenneshrīn, Arabissus, Epiphania in Cilicia, and Samosata[43]. Since they were all Jacobites, it seems reasonable to suppose that they had held their sees under the Persians, but it is worth noting that only Ḥimṣ, Qenneshirīn, and Antioch (the patriarchal see) also occur in Ibn Rustah's list of *kuwar*. It is also clear that in this period the Jacobite Church was strongest in northern Syria and the Jazīra; there were no bishoprics south of Ḥimṣ. The monks, however, were Jacobite at Beit Maron, Mabbug, Ḥimṣ, and "the South" when Herakleios came to Syria in 629; at that time many of them became Chalcedonian and took over most of the churches and monasteries[44]. Herakleios also turned over the churches of Edessa and Ḥarrān to the Chalcedonians[45]. Since the Muslims allowed each confession to keep the churches they held at the time of their conquest, Michael the Syrian concluded that Jacobites had gained no advantage from peace and rescue from the Byzantines[46]. From the Jacobite point of view, it would have been better for them if the Muslims had conquered Syria from the Persians than from the Byzantines, but then the Muslims might have met more resistance.

Part of the significance of the Persian occupation of Syria lies in the contrast between it and the Muslim conquest. While the Muslims found some individual collaboration from Jews, there were no mass risings in

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40. Michael the Syrian, II, 390-91/380-81, 399/394.
41. Ibid., p. 409/412.
42. Hage, pp. 96, 100, 104.
43. Michael the Syrian, II, 409-10/412.
44. Ibid., p. 410/412.
45. Ibid., pp. 409/412, 410/413; Theophanes, I, 328-9; Turtledove, p. 30.
46. Michael the Syrian, II, 410/413.

their support (recent experience may have made it seem futile), nor was the Muslim conquest of Syria accompanied by serious intercommunal conflict. Although Neusner suggests that the Persians were over-extended in their western conquests and had no time to develop local sources of support[47], there is more to be said. As far as Syria is concerned, the war was dcided elsewhere; the Persians evacuated Syria as part of the peace terms. More importantly, local support for the Persians by both Jews and Jacobites in Syria was contradictory by its very nature, and it is difficult to see how they could have resolved the contradiction. They seem to have been inconsistent in responding to local support; by taking advantage of local conflicts they allowed themselves to be drawn into them; by playing Jews and Christians, and Jacobites and Chalcedonians off against each other they may have encouraged communal conflict; and, as eastern Christian sources seem to indicate, they were the victims of their own destructiveness.

47. J. Neusner, *History of the Jews of Babylonia,* V, 131.

The Last Byzantine Campaign into Persia and Its Influence on the Attitude of the Local Populations Towards the Muslim Conquerors 7-16 H./ 628-636 A.D.

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It is well recognized nowadays that one cannot write the history of a people without adding to that people's own records the testimony of its neighbours, or of members of other racial or religious groups living in its midst.

On the subject of the Persian campaign, the Greek sources have been well studied by many historians, one of the most recent being A.N. Stratos who, in his book *Byzantium in the VIIth Century,* has a chapter on the *Final Campaign against Persia*[1]. As for the consequences of that campaign, that is, how the events which occurred during the Byzantine occupation of new territories influenced the attitude of the local populations towards advancing Moslems, we cannot disregard the Syriac sources. Their importance as a source material for the history of Islamic peoples in general has been pointed out, several years ago, by J.B. Segal[2]; and we now possess a repertory, by Prof. Sebastian P.Brock, of Oxford, of *Syriac sources for seventh century history*[3], which exactly covers the period of the present enquiry.

Let us first cast a quick glance at the campaign:

At the end of the year 627 A.D., probably on the 12th of December, the Byzantines, led by emperor Heraclios, and coming down from Lake Urmiah, defeated the Persian army near Nineveh. Crossing the Greater and the Lesser Zab, Heraclios reached what is now Kirkuk, where he celebrated Christmas, and then descended towards Chosroes the Second's residence, Dastegerd, which he entered on the 3rd or 4th of January 628. Without pushing further across the Nahrawan[4], the war council having decided against attacking Ctesiphon, the Byzantines marched their way along the Diyala river to Shahrzur, and then to the North.

1. English translation by M. Oglivie-Grant, Amsterdam, I, 1968, ch. XVI, p. 210-222.
2. In *Historians of the Middle East,* ed.B. Lewis and P.M. Holt, London, 1962, p.246-258.
3. In *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies,* II, Oxford, 1976, pp.17-36, reproduced by Variorum Reprints, in *Syriac Perspectives on Late Antiquity,* London, 1984, n° VII.
4. Mari b. Sulayman, *Akhbar batarikat kursi al-Mashriq,* ed. Gismondi, Rome, 1899, Ar. p. 61, confirms that the bridge was cut.

This simplified picture of the campaign, the exact dates of which are still discussed among scholars, does not tell us if, or where, the Byzantines left behind any kind of administration in what is now the North of Iraq. It is clear that the internal situation in Persia, Chosroes' assassination, and the succession of weak kings, did not allow any counter attack, until, in 630, queen Puran (others say king Shiroe) sent an embassy to ask for peace. Practically, we can say that the whole territory North to what is now Baghdad, fell under Byzantine rule. We shall see later that the "Roman" governor of that new province was at Takrit.

Now, if we remember that the Muslim conquest occurred there in 16 H./635 A.D., we see that there had already been some seven years of Byzantine occupation. What did it mean for the local population, and how did it later condition their attitude towards the Muslim conquerors?

But, first of all, what was the composition of the local poplulation at that period[5]?

Most of the ruling class, made up of Zoroastrian Persians, seems to have disappeared with the retreating Persian army, so that remained the local, mainly Aramaean-speaking Christian[6] population in the towns and villages, those whom the Arabs call the "Nabat", together with some Arab groups, Christian or pagan, in towns like Takrit or in the desert west of the Tigris and alongside the Euphrates[7]. Left without rulers, the cities would normally adopt the bishops as their heads, and the attitude of the bishops towards the advancing Muslims would be conditioned by the way they were created by the Byzantines.

5. Michael G. Morony has several articles on the subject: "Religious Communities in Late Sasanian and Early Muslim Iraq", in *JESHO,* XVII (1974), p.113-135; "The Effects of the Muslim Conquest on the Persian Population of Iraq", in *Iran* (London).XIV (1976), p. 41-59; "Continuity and Change in the Administrative Geography of Late Sasanian and Early Islamic al'Iraq", in *Iran,*XX (1982), p.1-49.

6. As for the majority of the population of the Jazira being Christian at that time, see TABARI, *Chronique,* French translation ZOTENBERG (1871), III, p.428: IBN ABD RABBIH, *al-'Iqd al-Farid,* Cairo ed. (1965), VI, p. 248, etc.

7. I do not discuss here the attitude of the Arabs, most of them dwelling outside the occupied territories. References would be, among others: Carlos CHAD, "Causes du ralliement des Arabes chretiens en Syrie" in *Khalid b. al-Walid,* p. 75-90, and by the same, "Isalmisation des Arabes de Syrie", in *En terre d'Islam.* 1947, p. 171-189; J.B.SEGAL, "Western and Eastern Mesopotamian Communities from Julian to the Rise of Islam", *Proceedings of the British Academy,* XLI (1955), p. 109-139, and "Arabs in Syriac Literature before the Rise of Islam", in *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam,* 4 (1984), p.83-123; Fred McGraw Donner, "The Bakr b. Wa'il Tribes and Politics in Northeastern Arabia on the Eve of Islam", in *Studia Islamica.* LI (1980), p.5-38.

You know that the Christians in the new territories were divided, from the point of view of their religious beliefs. Since around 485 A.D. the Eastern Syriac Church, the Church of the Persian Empire (which, one should remember, had nothing to do with Constantinople and the Greek Church and was even independent from Antioch), had officially adopted nestorianism. However, some people were reluctant to accept the new doctrine; and this gave birth, on the very territory of the Persian empire, to a "recusant", later frankly monophysite group, which started achieving some status around 540, and was boosted by James Baradat around 553 (hence their nickname of "Jacobites"), but which was not yet well organized.

As for the Nestorians (properly: the Eastern Syriacs), they had become generally-with ups and downs — favourite at the Sassanian court, which made it quite normal that the "Persian" embassy of 630 to Heraclios should be made up of their catholicos, Isho'yahb II, and of the bishops of towns now in occupied territories[8], those of Nisibis, Adiabene (Arbil), Karka d'Beth Slokh (Kirkuk), Nineveh, Mahoza d'Arewan (Mahuz), etc.

Now that the Byzantines were ruling the northern half of present Iraq, which of the two groups, Nestorians or Jacobites, would they prefer? That is where we notice a surprising turn in Heraclios' policy. While inside his original kingdom he favoured the Chalcedonian Melkites (the King's party) and persecuted the anti-Chalcedonian "Jacobites", here, in the former Persian empire, "under the influence of some Jacobites who were with him,"[9] he favoured the same Jacobites against the pro-Persian Nestorians[10] to the extent that, in the very first year of Byazantine occupation, the Jacobites were able to unite to with the patriarchal See of Antioch, and organize themselves into ten dioceses, with a Great Metropolite in Takrit, where the Byzantine governor was[11]. Such was, under the protection of Byzantine arms, the origin of the Western Syriac vicariate on former Persian territory, later known by the name of Maphrianate.

8. J.M.Fiey, "Isho'yabh le Grand", in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica,* (Rome) XXXV (1969), p. 305-333;XXXVI (1970), p.5-46.- On "Le röle de la hierarchie chretinne dans les rapports diplomatiques entre Byzance et les Sassanides", see Nina G. GARSOIAN, in *Revue des etudes armeniennes,* X (1973-1974). p.119-138.

9. MARI, Ar.p. 61.

10. Of course, in certain particular cases, the "Romans" protected the Nestorians. E.g. what happened to the monastery of Bar 'Eta, in my article in *L'Orient Syrien* (Paris), XI (1966), p. 6-9, but there their behaviour was due to an apparition.

11. The name of the last one, Antaq (Antiochus) is found in the Arabic texts about the fall of Takrit, v.g. TABARI, *Chronique,* III, p. 421; AL-NUWAYRI, *Nihaya.* XIX, p. 236-237.

This organization gives us an idea of the area kept by the Byzantines under their direct rule. It extended down to the Nahrawan, included Takrit, where both the governor and the Jacobite metropolite were, together with (from North to South) Sinjar, Ma'altha (near present day Duhok), the Gomel, on the river of that name, the famous monastery of Mar Matta, plus three dioceses north of Takrit:Ba Rimma and Karma on the East bank of the Tigris; Bahrin (not to be mistaken for Bahrayn), and the Jezira on the West bank. More to the East was the diocese of Shahrzur; to the West two dioceses of the Arabs: al-Anbar (the city of the Tayyayé), and further North 'Ana of the Bani Taghlib[12]. This was in 629.

In fact, we will not have to discuss the attitude of these Arabs towards Islam because we see that in 12 H./633 when Khalid made his famous raid, he found al-Anbar and its citadel back in the possesion of a Persian chief, Shirzad, governor of Sabat[13]. That seems to indicate that the Byzantines had retroceded to the Persians the valley of the Euphrates (nothing is said of 'Ana) between 629 and 633, possibly according to the agreement signed in 630, when Heraclios granted the Catholicos "everything he wated"[14].

Now, when the Muslim armies pushed further North, let us say in 16/635, what would the two Christian groups, Nestorians and Jacobites, living in former Persian, now Byzantine territory, have to gain or to loose? In fact, they were both equally on losing terms, because of the former collusion of the Nestorians with the Persians, and of the Jacobites with the Byzantines. So, the struggle was now begun for both parties to try to keep with the advancing Arabs the gains they had secured with their different former masters.

Late Syriac writers, like Michael I, patriarch of Antioch from 1166 to 1199 A.D., in his important *Chronicle*[15], have enthusiastically stressed that "the Romans (i.e. the Byzantines) were oppressing the Orthodox. The Arabs delivered them". Let us be frank about it. Firstlt,the text was written more than 500 years after the conquest, when the Arabs were well in power, so

12. J.M. Fiey, "Les dioceses du maphrianat syrien", in *Parole de l'Orient* (Kaslik), V (1974) p.133-164, 331-393; VIII (1977-78) p. 347-378.

13. Tabari, *Tarikh,* I,p. 2059-2061.- Sabat is one of the royal cities of the Persians (al-Mada'in), cf.J.M. Fiey, "Topography of Mada'in", with maps, in *Sumer* (Baghdad), 1967, p.3-38.

14. *Chronicum anonymum,* GUIDI, (CSCO), p. 26; *Chronique de Seert,* (Patrologia Orientalis), II, p. 238.

15. MICHEL LE SYRIEN, *Chronique,* (ed. Chabot) II,p. 412-413; parallel text in *Chronicum anonymum A.D. 1234,* (CSCO), p. 236-237. Both statements may have been influenced by the eleventh century persecution of the Jacobites by the Melchites. See J.Nasrallah, *Histoire du mouvement litteraire de l'Englise melchite du Ve au XXe siecle.* III.1, (1983), p. 244-246.

that there was no more risk in taking side with them, and secondly, we have seen that, if the "Romans" oppressed the Orthodox inside their own empire, this was not so in former Persian territory.

So, let us see what we find in contemporary Syriac texts regarding the Muslim conquest[16], again in the territories occupied by the Byzantines. Our information is limited to two of the more important towns, Mosul (with Nineveh) and Takrit.

In Mosul, Nestorian bishop Mar Emmeh opened to the Arabs the gates of the city and of the citadel (Hisna 'Ebraya, the citadel of the other side), after the first citadel, that of the Eastern side, Nineveh, had been taken by force[17]. The bishop also provided the Muslim armies with food[18]. To reward him for his help a chart was granted to the Christians, guaranteeing their rights to keep their churches. This last point was checked by caliph al-Ma'mun's qadhi al-Qudhat Yahya al-Aktham, in 214/829, when a dispute arose over a Jacobite church[19]. Eleven years after the surreuder of Mosul, in 646, Mar Emmeh, although an old man, was rewarded again by the Arabs, by being made the Catholicos of the Eastern Syriacs[20]. So, the score in Mosul was one point for the Nestorians against the Jacobites.

But, as for keeping the balance, the same gain was secured by the Western Syriacs, the Jacobites, in their centre Takrit, where their Great Metropolite, Marutha, is reported to have convinced the defenders of the citadel to open its gates to the Muslims[21].

16. S.P. Brock, "Syriac View of Emergent Islam", in *Studies in the First Century of Islamic Society,* ed.G.H.A. Juynboll, Southern Illinois University Press, 1982, p.9-21, 199-203. Reproduced in *Syriac Perspectives,* cit., VIII.

17. Arab sources provide different versions and different dates for the conquest of Mosul. See SA'ID AL-DEWAHDJI in the magazine *al-Majalla* (Mosul), I.1 (1968) p. 27-29. The author settles for 16 H./637 A.D. - Since the publication of that study, volume XIX of NUWAYRI's *Nihaya* has appeared (1975), which sums up the different versions about Takrit and Mosul (p. 236-237).

18. *Chronique de Seert,* II.p. 309-310; MARI, p.62.

19. MICHEL LE SYRIEN, III. p. 69

20. MARI, p. 62; *Chronicon anonymum,* GUIDI, p. 27.

21. BAR HEBRAEUS (Ibn al-'Ibri), *Chronicon ecclesiasticum.* II. col. 123; 126.— It should be pointed out that earlier Syriac sources seem to ignore the story.— About Arabic Sources, see my article "Tagrit" in *L'Orient syrien,* VIII (1963),p. 289-342, reproduced in *Communautes syriaques en Iran et Iraq des origines a 1552,* Variorum Reprints, 1979, X.

As for the two other main towns of the territories occupied by the Byzantines, Arbil and Kirkuk, the Syriac sources do not tell how their Christian population passed from Byzantine to Arab rule. Apparently, the Nestorian metropolite Isho'yahb of Arbil was less committal, perhaps because he was the son of a dihqan, well educated in Persian culture? As penance he would have to wait for the second turn to become catholicos, after Mar Emmeh. Nothing is said about Kirkuk.

Now, what were the true reasons for the Christian Nabats, through their bishops, to surrender their towns so quickly to the Arabs?

Of course, the Christians were not armed, so all resistance would have been useless anyway. But there are deeper reasons. First, the Nabats did not care to fight for their former masters, either Persians or Byzantines. They had been protected by them; now they would be protected by somebody else. And, second, we find in all the contemporary Syriac sources that the rapid advance of the Muslim armies was clearly felt as a sign that their victory was according to the will of God[22]. Of course, the view that victory is granted by God is common to all the ancient historians, whether in the East or in the West, but the victory here was not felt by the Christians as won over themselves, but over their masters, both of whom were thought to deserve a good lesson[23], the Persians because they had (long ago, but it was not forgotten) persecuted the Nestorians, and the Byzantines because they had oppressed the Jacobites in their own kingdom. God avenged the Christians, so to speak. As for the religious implications of the conquest, the Christians were not aware of them yet[24]; polemics would not start until later.

So the population of the occupied territories changed masters willingly. The Moslems, on their part, did not want to be involved in the discussions among Christians as to who was the legitimate owner of this or that building, which might have changed hands during the Byzantine occupation. They assigned the churches to those in whose possession they found then[25].

So much for the actual conquest. Soon after that, when it became clear that the Arabs had come to stay, each of the Christian groups started manoeuvring to try to regain the position it had enjoyed, the Nestorians

22. *Chronicum anonymum,* GUIDI, p.38. (An Arabic translation by P. Haddad of that first hand document, has been published by the Syriac Academy, Baghdad, 1976, under the title *Al-tarikh al-saghir,* p.91); MICHEL LE SYRIEN, III, p. 424, etc.

23. JEAN BAR PENKAYE (VIIth century writer), in A. MINGANA, *Sources syriaques* (Mosul-Leipzig), II. 1908. p. 141-142. 174, 175.

24. Cl. CAHEN, "Notes sur l'accueil des chretiens d'Orient a l'Islam", in *Revue de l'histoire des religions* (Paris), 1954, p. 51-58.

25. *Chron. Anon. 1234,* p. 186.

before, the Jacobites during the Byzantine spell.

Here, we are fortunate enough to possess the letters[26] written by Isho'yahb of Adiabane. This Nestorian prelate was made bishop of Nineveh at the beginning of the Byzantine occupation[27]. He became metropolite of Arbil before the Arab conquest, and was elected catholicos in Mada'in in 29/649[28]. As bishop of Nineveh he had battled against the Jacobites, who were protected by the Byzantines. He had even been successful, by a visit to Takrit, and possibly through bribery, in stopping them from building a church outside the gate of Nineveh. As he writes: "They, who are the scum of the Church, have built for themselves a house of derision and disrespect which they call a church, at the very place where people go out to relieve their bellies"... etc.

We note that later, immediately after the Muslim conquest, there is no mention of the Arabs in the letters Isho'yahb wrote when he was metropolite of Arbil. Clearly, he could not claim he had helped them to enter the city.

One has to wait until his promotion to the catholical seat of al-Mada'in to find new references to the Arabs. We are now between 29 and 39 H./649-659 A.D., some 15 to 25 years after the actual conquest, during the Rashidia Caliphs' reigns[29]. Of course, one may doubt Isho'yahb's sincerity. Although he writes in Syriac, he knows that his enemies, the Jacobites, could use his writings against him, and denounce him to the Arbas, so his words may be a "captatio benevolentiae", aimed indirectly at the Muslim rulers. Whatever the case may be[30], Isho'yahb's letters do reflect clearly one thing: I mean the struggle between the two Christian factions to win the favours of the Arabs[31]. In one letter, Isho'yahb writes to metropolite Simeon of Rew

26. CSCO (Louvain), Syriac text, vol. 11 (1904), latin translation by R. DUVAL vol. 12 (1905).

27. He was a member of the "Persian" embassy to Heraclios, whom they met in Aleppo, in 630.

28. He then left Mada'in for Kirkuk; he died in his former monastery of Beth 'Awe in 39 H./659 A.D.

29. BAR PENKAYE and the different Apocalypses' views, quoted by S.P. Brock *(Syriac Views,* p. 15-21) may reflect a different situation, since they were written after the coming of the Umayyads, that is after the time of "emergent Islam".

30. S.P. Brock prefers (p.15) to think that "Isho'yahb takes a very positive attitude towards the events of his time".

31. Were the Arabs convinced of the sincerity of these words? It would not be long before we hear Mu'awiya (according to the testimony of Michel le Syrien himself, *Chronique,* II,p. 453) saying bluntly: "You all are our enemies, however we must favour the one who is the more attached to us, and who shall give us the higher tribute".

Ardashir[32] saying: "These Arabs, to whom God has given dominion in this tempest, you know that they are for us (that is: against the Jacobites). Not only do they not combat the Christian religion, but they praise our faith, they respect the priests and the holy men of Our Lord, and make donations to our churches and monasteries". And in another letter[33]: "The heretics (again, from his point of view, the Jacobites) try to deceive you (in saying): This what is happening, does so by order of the Arabs. Utter nonsense! It is quite untrue that the Arabs help those who claim that God Almighty has suffered and died. If it happens that they do help them, for whatever reason, you can tell them the truth and presuade them as it should be". One sees here an argument used at all times by the Nestorians against the Jacobites (the Theopaschites, as they call them), when talking to the Muslims.

The result is known. Syriac writers claim that, in addition to the chart of protection already received by his predecessor from the first caliphs, Isho'yahb himself obtained one (the text does not say from whom), and he used to go, every Friday, to meet the governor of al-Mada'in "to expound his needs and ask for whatever should be useful for the good of the Christians"[34].

When Isho'yahb writes in another letter[35] that "faith is flourishing", he means that he has won the day. The Nestorians had recovered the privileged position they had under the Sassanids[36], over the Jacobites who had prevailed over them for a short time, during the Byzantine occupation. It would be up to them, now, to consolidate their leading position among the Christians. That is what they would do under the Abbassid caliphate[37].

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32. Letter XIV, CSCO 12, p.182.
33. Letter XLVIII, p. 73.— The attribution of this letter to the period in which Isho'yahb was still bishop of Nineveh is obviously worng, since the conquest occurred when he had become metropolite of Arbil.
34. *Chron. anon.* GUIDI, p. 27; *Chronique de Seert,* II, p. 300-303; MARI, p. 62-63. According to this last writer, the situation was not as idyllic as Isho'yahb says. The chart was intended to stop petty harassments on the part of some local governor, namely that of al-Mada'in.
35. Letter C. 12, p. 172.
36. S.P. Brock, "Christians in the Sasanid Empire, a Case of Divided Loyalties", in *Religion and National Identity, Studies in Church History,* XVIII, ed. Stuart NEWS, Oxford. 1972, p.1-19; reproduced in *Syriac Perspectives,* VI.
37. J.M. Fiey, *Chrétiens syriaques sous les Abbassides,* CSCO, 1980.

The Strategy of Heraclius

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The Muslim Conquest have received some quite valuable recent historical inquiry, yet the strategy of the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius, who reigned from 610 to 641, has recived much less. The primary sources in Greek are very poor, and it is difficult to extract reliable conclusions from the non-Greek Christian and Muslim ones. It is nevertheless possible to make some observations. Modern military thinkers may make a tripartite classification of topics of military thought into strategy, military operations, and tactics, but such categories were alien to the Byzantines, who knew of such ones as strategy, tactics, stratagems, poliorcetics or the art of besieging a city, and naval warfare. It is inappropriate here to discuss the substantial Graeco-Roman corpus of military treatises and concepts that the Byzantines inherited, copied and adapted for their own purposes. There was no Byzantine grand strategy. Theere were collections of axioms, stratagems, narratives of significant military case histories, warnings, and miscellaneous reflections on warfare and craft and other bits of practical advice, none of which was really rigorously organized and developed, although they formed a substantial and unique corpus of military experiences.

Heraclius had acquainted himself with some unidentified Byzantine military manuals. These presumably included the so-called *Strategikon* of Maurice, which was written around A.D. 600. Byzantine military treatises have little to say about fighting the Arabs before the appearance of Islam. Byzantine writers possessed some clichés about fighting the Arabs. The Arabs cannot storm walls, according to Procopius of Caesarea. Evagrius Scholasticus states that it is better to use Arabs to fight Arabs. Heraclius's court historian Theophylact Simocatta, who was himself from Upper Egypt, speaks of the tendency of the Arabs to be unfaithful, namely, to switch from one side to the other. These clichés reinforced more general trends in Byzantine military thought. There was a Byzantine preference to avoid decisive combat on the battlefield, and instead the desire to use clever ruses and stratagems to defeat one's enemy without much bloodshed. Strategists counseled the use of timing, patience, and warfare of manoeuver and attrition, instead of head-on battle. Yet given the dearth of information in the military manuals about fighting the Arabs or about fighting in the regions where the Muslims invaded, there were few written precedents for warfare, strategy, or operations of the kind that were needed by the Byzantines in the 630s; at least there is no record of any such works having existed.

These tendencies reveal themselves in any close investigation of the activities of the Byzantines in their attempt to resist the Muslims. It is proper to speak of a strategy of Heraclius. Arab historians definitely attribute decision-making responsibility to Heraclius in all critical military matters concerning Byzantine resistance throughout the span of the Muslim conquest of Syria. Heraclius in fact was the first reigning Byzantine emperor to visit Syria since the fourth century. Although his knowledge of Syria was not exhausitve, he had visited key areas of it during his pilgrimage to Jerusalem in early 631. He had some familiarity with its terrain, climate, people, and communications. He was not far away in Constantinople during the key events of the conquest. Although he did not lead troops in person against the Muslims, he was continuously in Syria from 634 to 636, and even before that he had been able to maintain close communicaitons while trying to settle ecclesiastical problems in northern Syria and his native Armenia. His bases of operations, first at Emesa or Hims, and then at Antioch, permitted him to remain in reasonably close contact with the battlefronts. He was not oblivious to the situation. The Muslim sources suggest, in fact, that he was relatively well informed about affairs and they may be right about this.

It is very erroneous to assume that the Muslim leadership was oblivious to the role of sophisticated military thinking. Indeed some Muslim sources, in particular Ibn 'Asakir, indicate a Muslim awareness of the Byzantine propensity to using clever machinations in warfare, and the need to try to avoid being caught by them. A basic strategy of Abu Bakr, according to Azdi, sought an opposite way to victory: seeking to cause the Byzantines to concentrate masses of troops, draw them into a pitched battle, and defeat them decisively. The Muslims wanted decisive battle, presumably because of their numerical supriority, familiarity with the terrain and climate, and their position. The Byzantine leadership did not wish it, except under special circumstances. There was, therfore an asymmetry in strategy and military operations of the two. Whatever the initial goals of the Muslims at the very beginning of their clashes with the Byzantines, their strategy quickly clarified while that of the Byzantine continued to be troubled with various dilemmas. Byzantine strategic perceptions may well have resulted from their own perceived numerical inferiority, as well as from their inheritance of such strategic thought, although in its turn it may have developed out of actual Graeco-Roman numerical inferiority on a number of past occasions.

Both antagonists sought to use military thinking to win. It is incorrect to assume that the Muslims were deviod of it. In addition to the use of rational order of battle as early as the battle of Mu'ta, according to the Arabic adaptation of Aelian's *Tactics*, other Muslim campaigning appears to indicate that rational ,military calculation lay behind many moves. This

does not mean that everything went nearly according to Muslim planning, because it did not.

It is impossible to penetrate the mind of Heraclius himself. No military memoranda survive from his reign, although military manuals and memoranda on how to fight other enemies of the empire, such as Persia, apparently existed in some earlier periods of Roman and Byzantine history. No memoirs of his adviser or other relevant archival material survives. It is impossible to discover precisely how he reahced military decisions. No Byzantine source provides such details. It is very doubtful that some reports in the *Kitab al-futuh* of Ibn A'tham al-Kufi about conversations of Heraclius with commanders of emissaries are accurate -- it is difficult to understand how Ibn A'tham or his sources could have learned such details. They are probably fanciful.

Byzantium had no general staff or war college for the formulation of military strategy. In all likelihood, it was Heraclius and his most immediate advisers, espcially his brother Theodore, and a small group of generals who included Niketas, the son of the great Persian general and short but brief King Shahrbaraz (Niketas almost certainly is a Hellenic name adopted after his flight from Persia), who decided on Byzantine strategic plans and the general outlines of military operaitons. This probably took place in the presence of or in proximity to Heraclius himself, at Hims, and then at Antioch, both in Syria, not in distant Constantinople.

Muslim sources report that Heraclius first learned of the impending Muslim invasions when he was in Palestine. Heraclius probably made his pilgrimage to Jerusalem in March, 631, too early for the major Muslim invasions. Yet it is possible that he heard something of the Mu'ta, or reports of the restiveness of tribes who abutted tribes who were friendly with Byzantium. That is the only known visit of Heraclius to Jerusalem.

The reliable Christian Arab historian Eutychius reports that Heraclius was in Damascus at the time of the battle of Dathin, near Gaza, which took place in February, 634. It is conceivable that he could have visited Jerusalem during that trip that brought him to Damascus, but it is surprising that any such second visit to Jerusalem would have remained unattested. But the fact remains that at the moment of the great early victory of 'Amr ibn al-'As over the Byzantines near Gaza, Heraclius was not very far away at all. The reports of Muslim historians that Heraclius visited Damascus, Hims, and Antioch to organize resistance to the Muslims, and to appoint special military commanders over these cities, are plausible. The doubts that De Goeje voiced in 1864 against the *Tar'ikh futuh al-Sham* of Azdi are less persuasive today because of new corroborating evidence in Ibn A'tham al-Kufi and from a close examination of Byzantine texts that narrate events at the end of the 630s, in which there is more evidence for the appointment of emergency military commanders to direct resistance.

Muslim sources such as Azdi, Ibn 'Asakir, Ib A'tham, and Kufan traditions of Sayf b. 'Umar, reported by Tabari, and later by Ibn al-Athir, indicate that from the beginning Heraclius was responsible for creating a basic strategy. That strategy involved a primary decision to aviod fighting the Muslims in the open countryside whenever posible, in order to wait for the arrival of the best Byzantine troops. Heraclius warned, according to the eighth-centry Byzantine historian Nicephorus, Byzantine commanders to watch out for Arab ambushes, to avoid being ensnared in them.

Crucial to the success of Heraclius' strategy was reliance upon walled towns in the region. The inhabitants of each city were to close their gates and to prepare for struggle, and to obey the special commanders whom he was apointing from his army over each of them. They were to await relief from the crack forces that he was summoning from other parts of his empire. These new forces were to concentrate and then deliver the decisive blows against the Muslim invaders. According to some Muslim sources, Heraclius drew these forces from all regions of his empire, but especially from Christian Arab tribes, and from his fellow Armenians. The latter has served as the core of manpower for his recent victory over the Persians.

The initial Byzantine collision with Muslims at Mu'ta in 629 probably occurred while the Byzantines were reasserting their control in areas east of the Dead Sea after the withdrawal of the Persian army. This extension of Byzantine authority was also probably motivated by the desire to secure the area in order to insure that there would be no embarrassments for the Byzantine military while Heraclius made his impending pilgrimage to Jerusalem (which he reached on 21 March 631) by way of Damascus. Byzantine military goals at that time, that is, end of the 620s, were probably very limited and defensive. They happened to collide, in an area of a power vacuum, with Muslims who were beginning to penetrate north. The rumors of the massing of Byzantine troops at Mab or Areopolis, which Waqidi reports in his *Kitab al-Maghazi* for example, were in my opinion not part of any great Byzantine plan to strike at the Muslims. These may have been rumors deliberately floated -- they were capable of doing that -- to strike fear into tribes on the edge of Byzantine authority, while plans were being made for Heraclius to make his pilgrimage to Jerusalem and back via Damascus. There was no Byzantine grand strategy at that time, but there were limited security interests.

Initial Byzantine clashes occurred in areas of traditional Late Roman or Byzantine military strength--Mu'ta and Mab or Areopolis were important military staging points even back in the late fourth or early fifth century, according to the *Notitia Dignitatum*. There was no special strategy of any kind involved, except that at Mu'ta the important Byzantine source Theophanes already reports that the Byzantine commander the *vicarius*

Theodore has already learned of the impending Muslim attack from one of the Quraysh and planned a skilful and successful counterattack at the absolutely correct time and place. Mu'ta, then, involved a sophisticated Byzantine response. It was not a surprise encounter.

Muslim sources assert that Heraclius, and presumably his commanders, were not -- contrary to what is often asserted in modern histories -- uninformed about the possibility of Muslim invasions. According to them, he did learn of this and made every reasonable effort to disseminate the news of this impending attack, and encourage local inhabitants to resist. The Byzantine military reaction was not, according to this tradition, a completely *ad hoc* one. There was not a lot of time to prepare to resist the Muslims, but there was some time. In such conditions, there was at least time for Heraclius' known visit to Jerusalem, and his several visits to Damascus, of which there were at least three, and the plausibility of other material about Byzantium and local conditions in those same sources, leads to a reappraisal that gives more credibility than has usually been accorded, to some of those sources, including some important traditions from Kufa that find some corroboration in the scanty but more contemporary Christian sources.

It is uncertain how early Heraclius became involved in Byzantine strategy against the Muslims. It appears that by sometimes in February, 634, he had become involved. He does not appear to have been personally familiar with terrain and conditions in southern Palestine and land east of the 'Arabah and the Dead sea. He appointed his brother Theodore to command Byzantine troops raised early in 634 after the battle of Dathin. Through his brother Theodore Heraclius became and remained familiar with military conditions at the front. He himself was never too far from the scene of battle, because his base was at Hims and then Antioch. Appointment of his brother also, of course, gave Heraclius very effective and reliable delegation of command of his army, which insured as far as possible the implementation of military operations in conformity with his own wishes and general strategic guidelines.

Many military experiences probably contributed to the formation of Heraclius' approahces to strategic and operational thinking. He had been almost continuously engaged in war against Persia between 610 and 628. His own unsuccessful efforts to create an effective defense of northern Syria, especially the region around Antioch, in 613 probably left a strong impression on him. At that time he gained an appreciation of roads and the significance of mountain passes in the Taurus range, and the various choke-points that a commander could use to block the advance of an enemy. His cousin Niketas may have explained to him operational problems of trying to bring military forces from Byzantine Egypt, as he had tried to do in 613-614, to the defense of Palestine and Syria. His efforts had failed to

halt the Persians. Even more obscure yet potentially more important for future conflict was the unsuccessful Byzantine effort to stem the Persian advance on Palestine in the area of Syria or Arabia between Adhri'at (Deraa today) and Bostra (modern Busra). The Byzantines lost a major battle there in 614, thereby opening the way for the Persians to penetrate into Palestine, as far as Jerusalem, which fell later in 614. No details are known of this battle, except Tabari reports that it was this battle to which *Sura* 30 of the *Qur'an* refers.

Byzantinists and Arabists have equally ignored this battle. It was important because it sealed the fate of the Byzantines in 614, but it also permitted Byzantines, Persians, and presumably various Arab contemporaries to comprehend the strategic importance of the region of Adhri'at, and to calculate the kinds of tactical options that might be available to a defender or an attacker there. The area was another critical choke point, or nodal point, about which many living military minds had reflected extensively in 614. Some of these presumably were stillalive in the 630s, and had drawn many conclusions about the virtues and failings of various manoeuvers and strong points and tactics at Adhri'at. It is also significant that Heraclius' armies drew on the military experience of another Niketas, the son of the Persian General Shahrbaraz, who had commanded that victorious Persian army at Adhri'at. in 613-614.

It is impossible to know how much Byzantine military thinking and operations drew on the Persian experiences from their campaign in 614, but their positions were superficially comparable in many ways. It is impossible to know how much advice Shahrbaraz had imparted to his son Niketas, for Shahrbaraz had perished in Persia in 630. There are a number of ironies in this. Yet presumably many Arabs had learned something of the positions of both Persian and Byzantine armies in 614 around Adhri'at and Bostra, and had drawn conclusions about how the son of Shahrbaraz might try to repeat actions and manoeuvers of his victorious father in the same region. The sources are simply lacking to permit any serious inquiry, but these points deserve to be remembered. Recent military history invariably created part of the memories that helped to shape military decisions of the Byzantine -- and probably the Muslims as well --in the 630s. These experiences have been completely neglected in scholarly assessments of strategic and tactical calculations about the battle of the Yarmuk, yet the antagonists probably calculated and acted in terms of the most recent military experiences that had taken place over much of the same terrain a few decades earlier.

Heraclius had previously employed a decisive strategy against the Persians. He personally commanded the Byzantine forces that brought the war into the heart of the Persian Empire. He did not employ such a strategy against the Muslims. There is every indication that he and his subordinate

commanders never had the confidence in fighting the Muslims that they once had, despite enormous odds against them, in fighting the Persians. Both Christian, including Greek and Christian Oriental histories, and Muslim sources appear to agree on that point.

Heraclius' strategy against the Muslims did not remain constant throughout the 630s. What did remain constant, however, was a preference to rely upon Palestine Byzantine military superiority when occupying strong fixed positions, whether fortified lines or walled towns. There was a disinclination to try to manoeuver in the open countryside, whether or not on the edge of desert country. This tendency to use walled towns as strongpoints had merit if one assumed that the Arabs were incapable of attacking walled towns successfully. But it reinforced the propensity of Byzantine soldiers to prefer the softer life of towns to the risks and rigors of conditions in the countryside. It increased hardships for townspeople, with whom soldiers competed for lodging and provisions. It dispersed the Byzantine military strength and implicitly conceded the initiative, mobility, and the countryside to the Muslims. This tendency accelerated after the Byzantine defeats at Dathin in February 634 and Ajnadayn in late July 634.

Another dangerous assumption on the part of Heraclius, according to Tabari, was his confidence in the unfamiliarity of Arabs with the harshness of the winter in Syria, and their resulting alleged military vulnerability in cold weather. No Byzantine text attributes this observation to Heraclius, although a late military manual (*Tactica* of Emperor Leo VI who wrote it ca. 900) also advises Byzantine commanders to attack Arabs in the winter, because of their dislike of the cold. The question is whether this remark of Heraclius is in fact an anachronism, one appropriate to later warfare in the harsher winter conditions of the Anatolian plateau and its mountains, rather than Syria in the reign of Heraclius. The question cannot be definitively resolved at this time.

Whether or not on Heraclius' explicit orders, local Byzantine commanders from the beginning of contact with the Muslims, at Dathin, preferred to talk-fight, fight-talk, instead of engaging in continuous warfare.These respites provided potential opportunities for the Byzantines to develop ruses, to learn more about their opponents, and to try to divide, mislead, and break up their enemy by a number of measures. That type of warfare suited the temperament of Byzantine commanders rather well. Although one may reasonably doubt the authenticity of the Arabic historians' narratives of various verbal exchanges between Byzantine and Muslim before or during battle, the reality probably included some communications and even face-to-face meetings of commanders, or at least their emissaries at various points, and not merely for the discussion of terms of surrender. These were typical Byzantine methods of warfare. Such

parleys had been used to capture the Ghassanid chief al-Mundhir in the late sixth century, and it is perfectly credible that Byzantine commanders attempted to repeat them against Muslim commanders, such as the effort reported by Eutychius of the commander of Gaza who tried to capture 'Amr ibn al-'As and other Muslim commanders at a face-to-face conference. It was a form of decapitation. Removal of the Muslim leadership by such means would have been preferable to a bloody contest on the battlefield in a period of scarce military manpower.

Extant Byzantine sources are careful not to criticize the strategic advice of Heraclius. If anything, Heraclius is represented as having given wide advice to his commanders, which they unwisely disregarded. Byzantine defeats result from not following Heraclius' advice, or from other external factors, such as bad weather (the storm that blew into Byzantine faces at the battle of the Yarmuk), or the bad actions of other ethnic groups, such as the Armenian soldiers who allegedly mutinied at the Yarmuk, which is not mentioned in any Muslim source although they do speak of soldiers' indiscipline and plundering of Syrian civilians. Perhaps it was in conformity with the old guidelines of the rhetoricians for describing the military leadership of generals (one thinks of Menander Rhetor's scond tract, for example) — in particular for describing how the emperor should receive praise for discerning avoiding the ambushes of the enemy — that Heraclius is so described in the very few Byzantine accounts that survive. The Byzantines, who were probably forming their traditions about the events of the conquest while other descendants of Heraclius reigned at Constantinople, did not wish to smear the reputation of the founder of their ruling dynasty. They were probably deliberately avoiding any remarks that might call into question the excellence of Heraclius' military leadership, including his strategic ideas and advice on military operations. There is evidence that Heraclius was very interested in astronomy and astrology. It is less clear whether these heavenly interests affected his choice of strategy and his direction of military operations.

Byzantine sources are careful to dissociate Heraclius from the disaster of the battle of the Yarmuk. It is he who sent General Vahan with troops to counterattack and, with initial success, drive the Muslims out of Hims and Damascus. In fact there is no evidence that Heraclius could have directed the particular manoeuvers of the Byzantine army at the battle of the Yarmuk.

The Byzantine armies initially disintegrated after the battle of the Yarmuk on 20 August 636. That debacle appears to have reached a climax when the Muslims caught up with the fleeing core of Byzantines near Hims and utterly destroyed their effectiveness as a fighting force. There was a Byzantine flight in every direction, and an astute Muslim mopping-up. The Muslims did exploit a breakthrough at that time.

There was strategic rationality -- hitherto neglected -- to the last moments of Byzantine military presence in Syria, however. Eutychius, who is a rather reliabe Christian Arab source, reports a truce at Chalkis/Qinnasrin, which probably took place between early 637 and early 638, for one year. This was a rational place for the Byzantines to ask for such a truce. The ostensible reason was to allow local people who wished to leave to have time to evacuate in an orderly manner. The Byzantines paid tribute for this peace. But this truce gave the Byzantines, as did the ensuing one for a year for Mesopotamia, a valuable time of respite to regroup, raise more troops, revive fatigued and battered soldiers, rethink strategy, and create fortresses and obstacles against any future Muslim advance. Chalkis/Qinnasrin was the place to ask for such a peace, because it dominated east-west and north-south road systems. As a vital crossroads, it protected the remaining rich and populous area of northern Syria. Once it was lost; other positions were dangerously exposed, if not cut off.

This truce, however humiliating, was another example of the Byzantine desire to talk-fight, fight-talk. It gave them time to rethink matters, desperately regroup, while always vainly hoping that the Muslims would somehow fall into dissension and become vulnerable to some Byzantine stratagem. There was always the theoretical possibility of a Byzantine resumption of hostilities. There was strategic sense to this truce, which was probably partially responsible for the survival of Byzantine Anatolia. The truce suited the Byzantines for many reasons. Strategy for the Byzantines did not exclusively involve warfare, but also diplomacy, espionage, dissemination of false information, and resort to ruses. It was a strategically intelligent place to try to make the Muslims halt. It temporarily, at a very vulnerable moment for the Byzantines, removed the chance for a Muslim breakthrough. Careful comparative study of events in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Chalkis indicates that there was a truce there. It gave the Muslims a chance to receive much financial gain as well as to consolidate their very considerable territorial gains thus far, so it was not a stupid agreement for them to have accepted. It was risky to continue full pursuit at that time.

In none of these last moments of Byzantine Syria was Heraclius incompetent or inactive. He was the inspiration of a spirited defense. He did plan various strategic lines of secondary defense. These withdrawals and redeployments were rational ones, evne if not glorious. It was a difficult matter to reorganize some semblance of a defensive line after the earlier shattering blows that the Byzantines had received. Yet Heraclius managed to do this. He did not save Syria for the Byzantines, or even Upper Mesopotamia, but he did help to save Byzantine Anatolia by these neglected herculean efforts at the end of the 630s. He did not regard everything as lost. These were strategic withdrawals, which were admirably handled under the difficult circumstances.

The reports in the Syriac historian Michael the Syrian that Heraclius urged all commanders to hold on to what they could as posts, but not to fight the Arabs in the open, was a rational strategy in the circumstances. But it was doomed to ultimate failure, because the Muslims learned to reduce towns, and where necessary (as at Baalbek, as one learns from the treaty that Baladhuri preserves) to prevent suspicious parties from continuing to inhabit towns where they might lock out the Muslims and turn the towns into fortresses against the Muslims. The Muslims learned to reduce the towns one by one.

Another reason for the failure of the strategy was the practice in Syria and Mesopotamia of negotiating peace terms, including monetary payment, with an invader instead of resisting violently until the end. Local elites had been so accustomed to dealing with the Persians in the sixth and early seventh centuries. That is probably another reason why Heraclius needed to appoint military commanders of unquestioning obedience to rule walled towns, so that they would not be surrendered to the Muslims. Yet the policy ultimately did not work. The towns managed to negotiate satisfactory terms with the Muslims, in most cases.

It is quite wrong to assume that there was no strategy on either side, that these events are not militarily comprehensible. But the existence of a strategy did not assure military victory. What was assumed to be a sensible strategy militarily, and one that was best for the majority of the civilian population, and one that rested on the strengths of the Byzantine army, became a trap that immobilized Byzantine troops, paralyzed communications, and trade, and cost the empire much tax revenue. It also foundered partly on rivalries between military, civilian, and ecclesiastical bureaucracies, who had somewhat different interests and could not compose these well even under the pressure of a threat of the total destruction of the existing system.

Fiscal constraints affected Byzantine recruitment of soldiers. The Late Roman system of military provisioning in terms of the *annona militaris* probably still existed. Yet the need to provide for supplies for so many soldiers limited the mobility of the Byzantine armies that were sent against the Muslims. There unquestionably were fiscal restraints on strategy as well as military operations of the Byzantines. The *annona militaris* with its need for central distribution of grain, probably encouraged dependence on large cities as military bases, because these served as depots for collection and distribution of *annonae*. That system limited Byzantine mobility and in particular made it difficult to pursue the Muslims into their own territory, if that were ever contemplated.

It is possible to write an entire volume of conclusions concerning Byzantine strategy, tactics, and operational decisions and actions, as well

as another on those of the Muslims. But that would be for another occasion. A few observations will suffice at this time.

Clamors from towns for immediate reinforcement and relief were a factor that seriously upset Heraclius' strategy, according to some Muslim sources, including Azdi. Their pressures probably forced Heraclius to do something, even if it was premature, to retain credibility and to encourage towns to try to hold out against the Muslims. Intensification of these clamors made it more difficult to make rational, calculating decisions about strategy and military operations. There was too much pressure of urgency from towns to be able to ignore them. Delegations from leading towns were demanding immediate action, yet relief for them could divert valuable troops from the essential problem of defeating the Muslims' striking forces. Yet Heraclius' strategy with its emphasis on walled towns made it difficult to ignore the pleas of the inhabitants of these endangered towns, which were militarily and fiscally important, indeed vital, to the Byzantines.

Khalid ibn al-Walid's expedition to Syria from Iraq in 634 ruined the Byzantine position's equilibrium; it was not merely his timely arrival, but it was his coming from an entirely unexpected direction that turned the flank of Byzantine defenses and contributed to the wrecking of a defensive strategy that otherwise had some plausibility.

Heraclius continued to hope that Byzantine commanders and towns would hold out for a long time against the Muslims, not only for the sake of the independence of those towns and their remaining allegiance to Byzantium, but because they tied down Muslim troops and and commanders, and diverted attention away from the north, where Heraclius and his subordinates were creating new defensive lines. This was another way to stall for time. His appeal was not as pathetic and hopeless and puzzling as it first appears to have been.

No extant Byzantine military manual or history contains evidence that any systematic Byzantine analysis was made of the strategic and tactical conclusions, or "lessons" from the disastrous Byzantine expereinces in fighting the Muslims in the 630s. Later Byzantine military authors, such as Emperor Leo VI (886-912) and other tenth-century authors include sections on how to fight the Arabs, but they do not cite specific cases from the 630s to document their points. Except for a treatise written under the alleged encouragement of Emperor Nicephorus Phocas (963-969), none of these really give much space specifically to fighting the Arabs. Whether other treatises once existed is unclear. Those campaigns may have been too painful to analyze, even though that was not a positive way to handle such experiences. They left no evident effect in extant Byzantine military writings, even though, as I have analyzed elswhere, the Byzantine military

defeats at the hands of the Muslims did have a major effect on the Byzantine moods in the seventh century and left some imprint in other seventh-century Byzantine literature.

This is a reading of the extant evidence, in the light of Late Roman and Byzantine conditions and sources, especially military ones. Many problems and questions remain obscure, but it is important to attempt a critical analysis of as many of them as possible.

The Byzantine Defence System in Asia Minor and the First Arab Incursions

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The first Arab raids into the Syro-Palestinian region fell between 632 and 634 during abū- Bakr's caliphate[1]. At first unregarded by the Byzantine governor, the Patricius Sergius in his seat at Caesarea, the might of the Arab raiders speedily showed itself in his defeat and death. The Emperor Heraclius, by this time erected in the popular mind into a charismatic figure through his success as the restorer of Byzantine fortunes in the final phase of the centuries-old struggle with the rival empire of Persia, assembled a large army under his brother Theodorus, with the aim of expelling the Arab irritant.

Abū- Bakr, however, sensing that opportunities in Syria for the Arabs merited a more concerted effort than the despatch of more mere raiding parties, strengthened the Arab forces by transferring his best general, Khalid b. al-Walīd, from the front in Iraq against the Persians to Syria. This change in command paid off immediately; Theodorus was defeated at al-Ajnādayn (probably to be located at Biblical Yarmuth near the Wādī l-Simṭ, 18 miles WSW of Jerusalem[2]) in Jumādā I or II 13/July or August 634. This was aturning-point in the campaign for the Arabs; there now opened up the possibility of converting what had so far been a series of plunder raids, albeit with increasingly strengthened forces, into a full-size military campaign for the permanent occupation of Palestine and Syria.

The indigenous population -- the semi-sedentarised Arab tribesmen, the *mustaʿriba,* along the desert fringes of Syria, and the ethnically and linguistically Aramaic peoples of the towns and countryside -- must have sensed this to a certain extent, facilitating during the next two or three years the speedy overrunning of Syria as far north as Ḥimṣ. Most of the towns either surrendered without a blow or after a comparatively short siege. Even before the battle of the Yarmūk, the people of the Ḥimṣ-Ḥamā region had, according to al-Balādhurī, expressly promised the Arabs their

1. See in general, on the Arab campaigns in Syria and Palestine, M.J. de Goeje, *Mémoire sur la conquête de la Syrie,* Leiden 1900; M.A. Shaban, *Islamic history A.D. 600-750 (A.H. 132), a new interpretation,* Cambridge 1971, 25-6, 29ff., 40-4; D.R. Hill, *The termination of hostilities in the early Arab conquests A.D. 634-656,* London 1971, 59-84; R.—J. Lilie, *Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber. Studien zur Strukturwandlung des byzantinisches Staates im 7. und 8. Jhd.,* Munich 1976, 40-6; F. McG. Donner, *The early Islamic conquests,* Princeton 1981, 91-155.

2. Thus located by e.g. Donner, *op. cit.,* 129; cf. also *EI*$_2$ art. "al-Adjnādayn" (H.A.R. Gibb).

support: "The people of Ḥimṣ saw them (sc. the incoming Muslims who were pursuing the defeated Byzantines), being at that moment in a state of disappointment and frustration at Heraclius's flight from them and at the news they had received of the Muslims' craftiness in war, their bravery and their victoriousness. So they proffered their hands and cried out for a promise of quarter. The Muslims offered quarter and relaxed their grip over them. So the population provided them with fodder and with food," and "The people of Ḥimṣ said, 'We prefer your rule and your justice to the state of oppression and tyranny we suffered under formerly. We shall certainly repel Heraclius's army from the town with the help of your commander *(camil)*. Also, the Jews rose up and said, 'By the Torah! Heraclius's commander shall not enter the town of Ḥimṣ unless we ourselves are defeated and hard-pressed'[3]. Only the strongly-defended city of Damascus, with its proud position as the bastion of Syrian Christianity, the city of Jacob Baradaeus, held out during a six months' siege until Rajab 14/September 635[4].

Heraclius meanwhile assembled a fresh, powerful army, in which, according to al-Balādhurī, were to be found Greeks from Asia Minor, Syrians, Mesopotamians, Armenians and *mustaʿriba* from Lakhm, Judham, etc. But the interval of about two years between al-Ajnādayn and the appearance in the field of the new army is a measure of the financial difficulties which the Emperor was facing; he had already been finding it difficult to pay the troops of the regular imperial army. With the prospect of battle, his forces failed to hold together; the Armenian troops attempted to nominate an emperor of their own, the general Baanes, and failed to fight when the time came, so that Heraclius's remaining forces were defeated at the Yarmūk in Rajāb 15/August 636[5].

The Emperor had to withdraw, leaving Damascus to be re-occupied by the Arabs, and went with part of his army to Asia Minor, despatching other contingents from it to hold the towns and strongholds of Palestine and Syria which still remained in Byzantine hands, and to Mesopotamia and Armenia; apparently he hoped to slow down the Arab advance, to gain time and to re-orgnise the empire's defences. But Jerusalem and Antioch fell by 638, and even coastal towns such as Caesarea and Askelon, where the Greek official and military presence was especially strong and reinforcement by sea possible, were mainly in Arab hands by 641[6]. Heraclius's return to

3. *Fūtuḥ al-buldān*, Cairo 1959, 136-7, 143.

4. Ibid., 140; Hill, *op. cit.*, 60-3, 78-9; *EI*[2] art. "Dimashk" (N. Elissé-eff). The date of Rajab 14 is the date given in the accounts of Ibn Isḥa-q, al-Wāqidī and Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī.

5. al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.*, 140ff.; Donner, *op. cit.*, 133ff.

6. Tripoli, however, held out till after cUthma-n's accession, i.e. till after 644, according to al-Balādhurī, see Donner, *op. cit.*, 154.

northern Syria in 638 with an army of Christian Arab auxiliraries from Mesopotamia did not lead to the recapture of lost territory. The Arab conquest of Syria was thus virtually completed by 641, and Byzantine naval attacks on the coastal towns in the 640s, although involving the brief recapture of certain places, could not change the essential picture of firm Arab control. The way was now open for the Arabs to move into Mesopotamia or al-Jazīra, whose Byzantine garrisons were now only able to maintain contact with the heartland of the empire northwards via Armenia[7]. Hence, according to the Greek historian Theophanes (d. 817), the Byzantine governor Johannes came to an agreement with the Muslims, promising a tribute of 100,000 gold pieces for the Arabs in order to secure his province's safety. Heraclius, however, rejected the peace agreement and dismissed Johannes; as a result, ʿIyāḍ b. Ghanm was easily able to occupy the western part of al-Jazīra, from Edessa to Sinjar and al-Raqqa, in 639-41, whilst the eastern part fell to troops despatched from Iraq via Mosul[8]. There was thus no obstacle now to the Muslims' moving against the last great Levantine province still held by Byzantium, Egypt.

Thus after the Yarmūk disaster, in which the Emperor had lost many of his best troops, it must have become clear to the Byzantines that a reconquest of the lost provinces was not possible, at least in the foresee able future. Heraclius had in the years immediately succeeding the Yarmuk battle endeavoured to strengthen the Byzantine position in northern Syria, bringing in fresh troops (just as he also sent Thracian troops to Egypt) for the strongholds, with orders for them to avoid open, pitched battles with the palpably stronger Arabs. Yet this hope speedily proved vain; the Muslims were completing the conquest of Iraq and ready to release warriors from there for other fronts, but above all, there were no natural defensive barriers in northern Syria to hold up the Arabs. Hence after 639, Syria was given up for lost, and al-Baladhuri reports that when the Emperor fled westwards via Antioch and the Cilician Gate *(al-darb)*[9] into Asia Minor, he turned round and said, 'Farewell O Syria! What a fine land this is for the enemy', meaning the land of Shām, because of its extensive pasture lands"[10]. Accordingly, he now adopted a defensive role in order to protect the heartland of Asia Minor and Armenia (concerning this last region, he may well have had doubts about its loyalty, after the behaviour of the Armenian soldiers before the Yarmūk battle), but here he could, for the first time, now count on assistance from the elevated and mountainous terrain and the harsh winter climate of Asia Minor. It was, indeed, the natural barrier of the Taurus Mountains

7. See for these operations, *EI*$_2$ art. "al-*Djazīra*" (M. Canard).

8. al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.*, 179; Hill, *op. cit.*, 84-99.

9. Or possibly, the Amanus Gate is meant.

10. al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.*, 142.

which was to form the normal boundary between Islam and Byzantium for some four centuries. Even so; it cannot at that time have been certain for Heraclius that the Arabs would not continue their victorious march through the Asia Minor heartland to Constantinople itself.

Defensive measures were thus urgently required to protect this core of the empire. Heraclius did not think that the Cilician plain, the modern Cukurova, was defensible; hence he ordered, as he retreated, that Cilicia should be laid waste and made into a frontier zone against the Arabs. Al-Balādhurī again states: "It is said that Heraclius took into his column the people of the towns here (sc. of *al-thughūr al-shāmiyya)* when he left Antioch, so that the Muslims should not be able to traverse any populated and cultivated land between Antioch and the land of Byzantium ... The generally-recognised account of events current among us is that Heraclius transported the inhabitants of these strongholds with him and then demolished the strongholds. Hence when the Muslims raided (into this region), they found no-one; often, groups of Byzantine troops would lie in wait for them and then swoop down on careless stragglers from the main force or those who had become separated from it"[10a]. The Syriac historian Michael the Syrian (wrote in the last decades of the 12th century[11]) likewise describes the sufferings of the Cilician people -- possibly these were, confessionally, his Monophysite co-religionists -- "He had given orders to his troops and had sent them to pillage and devastate the villages and towns, just as if it were enemy territory. The Romans stole and plundered everything they found, laying waste the lands in a worse fashion than the Ṭayyāyē (sc. the Arabs). They retreated and abandoned them to the hands of the Ṭayyāyē, who now took over control there"[12].

The zone thus created was to be a kind of *cordon sanitaire,* called in Byzantine Greek a *Kleisoura* (like many Byzantine military terms, one taken over from Latin, in this case *clausura* "narrow pass, road used for the passage of armies"), rendered in Michael the Syrian as Callisura and considered by him as a place name when he describes Heraclius's nomination of a certain general called Gregorius as its defender[13]. Such *Kleisourai* were already known in the Byzantine empire before the 7th century, but had been located on the empire's frontiers in Armenia, Transcaucasia and Egypt; previous to this, there had never been any need

10a. *Ibid.*, 168.

11. See for his value as a source on Arab-Byzantine historical events, J.B. Segal, "Syriac chronicles as source material for the history of Islamic peoples", in *Historians of the Middle East,* ed. B. Lewis and P.M. Holt, London 1962, 255-6.

12. *Michel le Syrien, Chronique,* ed. and tr. J.B. Chabot, Paris 1899-1904, II, 424.

13. *Ibid.*, II, 422-3; Lilie, *op. cit.*, 303 n. 35.

to create such a zone along the Taurus and to garrison fortified points there because the region had, before the Arab invasions, been well within the frontiers of the empire[14].

The Arab invasions were thus the stimulus for the new strategic role which the Taurus Mountains barrier was to play for the next four centuries in Muslim-Byzantine military and political relations. Heraclius's decision over the *kleisoura,* on his retreat from Syria and Mesopotamia, may accordingly be viewed as one step towards the militarisation of the government of Asia Minor which was to reach its full flower in the theme system as it burgeoned from the 8th century onwards. Such a policy of militarisation in the administration speedily became necessary when it became apparent, during Muʿawiya's governorship of Syria, that the idea of a *kleisoura* in Cilicia was not going to stop the regular raids, the *ṣawā'if* or summer expeditions of the Arabs. Soon after 640, the Arabs under the leadership of Muʿāwiya, penetrated deep into Asia Minor, attacking Euchaita in Helenopontus and Amorion in Pisidia[15], achieving on such raids a temporary mastery of the open countryside which isolated from their agricultural hinterlands and left comparatively helpless the Byzantine towns and strongholds.

One aspect of this militarisation process within the Byzantine empire was the construction of fortifications or the refortifying of towns which had previously been either totally unprotected or inadequately protected, never having needed defences; we know of the construction of such defensive works at Miletus, Akroinon, Pergamon, Ankyra, Kotyaion, Seleucia, Sision and Mopsuestia[16]. These works of military engineering were of course closely linked with the development of the military theme system in Asia Minor in fully recognisable form during the later 7th century.

The appearance of the theme system has usually, and it seems, correctly, been linked with the period of the Heraclian dynasty (610-711)[17]. The evolution of the system was clearly a gradual rather than a sudden one, involving an increase in the military and defensive power of the provincial governors at the expense of the civil authorities, until the military

14. *Ibid.*, 302ff.

15. *Ibid.*, 61, 63ff. The site of Euchaita has never been identified for certain. Ruge, in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Alter-tumswissenschaft,* VI/1, col. 880, mentions Çorum, Osmancik and Elvan Çelebi as sites which have been suggested.

16. Lilie, *op. cit.*, 305-6 n. 33.

17. Out of a large literature on the subject of the themes, see H. Gelzer, *Die Genesis der byzantinischen Themenverfassung,* in *Abh. derKönigl. Sächsischen Gesell. der Wiss.,* Phil. hist. Cl., XVIII (1899), No. V., A.A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine empire,* Madison, Wisc. 1952, I, 226—9; Lilie, *op. cit.*, 287-338, with further bibliographical details at 287-8 n. 1.

governors were eventually left with all responsibilities, civil and military, within their hands. The gradualness of the process is shown by the fact that for long, the Greek word *thēma* meant a military contingent stationed in the provinces, and only later was it applied not merely to these armed forces but also to the province where they were stationed, i.e. it became a term designating an administrative division. The rationale of the system was a logical one: if the fortified towns and strongholds of Asia Minor were to act as concentration-points for the rural population, into which people could retreat and beasts could be driven for security and protection when an Arab incursion was imminent, executive power within a region could not be divided amongst two or more authorities, since the taking of a decision by more than one person would inevitably mean bureaucratic delays, if not administrative paralysis, probably rendering any action too late. Similar swift action was required if populations were to be evacuated in face of the enemy. The military commander or governor was the obvious person to co-ordinate such defensive measures; the classic division of civil and military powers in the Roman empire since the era of Diocletian and Constantine was a luxury that could no longer be afforded.

The forerunners of the theme system were the two Exarchates established by the Emperor Maurice at the end of the 6th century: that of Ravenna in northern Italy against the Germanic Lombards, who had already overrun two-thirds of the country; and that of Africa or Carthage against the Maurusii or Moors, the indigenous Berber peoples of North Africa who were pressing on the Byzantine-held coastlands, and then the Arab invaders moving westwords from Alexandria and Barca. By such means, the emperors endeavoured to establish more efficient defence systems with broad territorial bases, and the concentration of power in the hands of one man, in these frontier provinces. Further pressure from outside barbarians in the Balkans, from the Avars and Slavs in northwestern Greece and from the Bulgars in Thrace and Macedonia, stimulated the appearance of military districts of Hellas or Helladikon and of Thrace, with the military governor there usually having the title of *Strategus*[18].

Heraclius had already organised Byzantine Armenia, finally wrested from the Persians by his victories of 627-9, on military lines, without the introduction of a civil administration, and the application of the theme system to the rest of Asia Minor may in this wise be considered as an extension of his Armenian policy. In the second half of the 7th century, we learn from Greek sources of the appearance of four great themes, which in the ensuing centuries were to be increasingly subdivided, until in *ca.* 800 there were ten; in 899 there were 25, according to the Court Marshal Philotheus's *Kleterologium,* incorporated in the Emperor Constantine

18. Gelzer, *op. cit.*, 608; Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, I, 174-6.

Porphyrogenitus's *De ceremoniis;* in the mid-10th century there were 29, according to this same Emperor's *De thematibus;* and in the 11th century, no fewer than 38[19].

The four great military districts of the 7th century were as follows[20]:

1. The Armeniakon in northeastern Asia Minor, bordering on independent Armenia, attested first in the literary source of Theophanes in 667-8.
2. The Anatolikon (Greek *anatolē* "the east"), covering the south-central part of Asia Minor from Cappadocia westwards to the Aegean and southwards to Seleucia and the Mediterranean, first mentioned by Theophanes in 669-70. These two themes were intended to guard the Asia Minor heartlands from Arab land attacks, and were under a *Strategus* or general, as were to be most of the later themes..
3. The Opsikion (named after the imperial guard, Latin *obsequium),* described as "Imperial and God-guarded," covering north-central and north- western Asia Minor, and adjoining the Black Sea and the Straits, first mentioned by Theophanes in 689-90 and by other sources in 680. This theme was intended to act as a shield for the imperial capital, Constantinople, and was under a *Comes* or count.
4. The maritime Cibyrrhaeot, *thema Caravisionorum,* on the southern shores of Asia Minor and taking in the island of Rhodes and the Aegean ones, first mentioned by Theophanes in 697-8 and Zonaras in 678. This was intended to guard the southern Mediterranean coasts of Asia Minor against the Arab fleet, and was under a *Drungarius* or vice-admiral; the stimulus to its formation must have been the Arab naval operations off the Lycian coast in 655 which culminated in the "Battle of the masts." *Dhāt al-sawārī-,* and the defeat of the Byzantine fleet under ConstansII[20a]

As already noted, there was no cataclysmic change in the general administration of the empire. The themes became consolidated, and in the 8th century and after were subdivided, but in the 7th and 8th centuries the old civil administrative provinces continued to exist side-by-side with the themes; it is unclear how their respective functions were related to each other, but it does not seem that the one administrative arrangement excluded the other.

It was the Armenikon and Anatolikon themes which were to bear the brunt of Arab attacks. Although the front of the Anatolikon theme facing

19. See the tables listing these in Gelzer, *op. cit.,* 127-33.

20. For a convenient exposition of these, see Vasiliev, *op. cit.,* I, 228.

20a. See for this battle, *EI*[2] Suppl., art. s.v. (C.E. Bosworth).

the Arabs in western Cilicia was comparatively restricted, it was regarded by the emperors as of paramount importance since it barred the way of raiders to the economically richest parts of Asia Minor, the western and northwestern ones, and to the capital itself; whereas the Armenikon theme, which abutted on to the eastern part of the Muslims' *thughūr al-Shām* and the whole of the *thughūr al-Jazīra,* protected the less economically important regions of eastern Asia Minor and Armenia. Consequently, although the *Strategi* of the two themes received the same salary[21], the *Strategus* of the Anatolikon generally came before his Armenikon colleague in the official hierarchy (premier rank in the hierarchy of the themes in general was accorded to the *Comes* of the Opsikion, as governor of the most economically-significant sector of Asia Minor, protecting the approaches to Constantinople, and the one regarded moreover as a reserve area for troops which could be rushed to other themes or to the Balkans, especially as the *Comes* at times functioned also as *Hypostrategus,* commander-in-chief, of Thrace).

The subsequent history of Arab incursions into Asia Minor falls outside our period under consideration, but the general observation may be made that the theme system did not prevent major Arab expeditions from penetrating into the heart of Asia Minor, but it was able to prevent any further loss of territory after the period from roughly 636 to 680, during which the Arabs had seemed unstoppable[22]. In the 8th century, the Arab expeditions did not usually penetrate beyond the defensive line guarded by the fortresses of Dorylaeon, Amorion, Ankyra and Gangra, and on the few occasions when they did penetrate to the northwest of Asia Minor, they risked isolation and harassment as their lines of communication lengthened.

The outer zone beyond the eastern and southern borders of the Anatolikon and Armenikon themes, what the Arabs called *al-Ḍāwaḥī* or the *Ḍawāḥī al-Rūm*[23], was left as an area to be fought over with the Arabs by means of relatively small-scale raids, often organised by irregular bands of *ghuzāt* and *akritai,* or by the Mardaites or Jarajima of the Amanus mountain region and the plains north of Antioch[24]. In the course of these local incursions, the fortresses of the region, like Tarsus, Germanikeia (Marʿash), Melitene (Malaṭya), Samosata, etc., generally stayed firm in the

21. Gelzer, *op. cit.*, 121.

22. See Lilie, *op. cit.*, 60-96, for the Arab compaigns in Asia Minor and around its coasts during the period 640-80.

23. As in al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh al-rusul wa 'l-mulūk,* ed. de Goeje *et alii,* Leiden 1879-1901, II, 1317 (year 98/716-17); cf. E. Honigmann, *Die Ostgrenze des byzantinischen Reiches von 363 bis 1071 ...*, Brussels 1935, 40.

24. See for this people, *ibid.*, 41; *EI*$_2$ art. *"Djarādjima"* (Canard).

possession of one side or the other and changed hands only infrequently. Apart from constituting these fortified points, the Byzantines had pursued on occasion in this outer zone something like a "scorched earth policy', evacuating much of the earlier population of the area to places further within the empire, in some cases as far as Thrace, and leaving the countryside protected only with guard posts (Arabic *masā-liḥ);* only occasionally do we find measures taken to replace diminished or evacuated populations, e.g. settlements of Armenians at Malaṭya in 711-12 and in Cappadocia in 750-1. It should, however, be noted that other sources speak of Arab commanders, such as Muʿāwiya and al-Walīd b. cAbd al-Malik, pursuing similar "scorched earth" tactics and bringing into the region a melange of peoples, including Mardaites, Christian Arabs, Zuṭṭ or Jhats from Sind, Ṣayā-bija or Malays originally from Sumatra, Persians, etc., in order to replace the dispersed original inhabitants[26].

25. See Lilie, *op. cit.*, 342ff. for an estimate of the successfulness or otherwise of Byzantine policy here.

26. Honigmann, *op. cit.*, 40.

Early Contacts Between Byzantium and the Arab Empire: A Review and Some Reconsiderations

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The Prophet of Islam spent his life in a part of the world far removed from the centers of political power and decision-making. But he did live at the time of the last great war between the Byzantine and Persian empires, a desperate struggle which, according to most historians, paved the way for the later Islamic conquest of the Middle East. Mohammed himself may have undertaken trips to Syria for commercial purposes, but politically his aims did not extend beyond the Arabian peninsula. There is no solid evidence for regarding him as the planner and architect of world conquest. At one point the Qur'ān refers to the Byzantine-Persian war. According to Sura 30 (called al-Rūm), the Byzantines have been overcome in the nearest land (probably Syria or Palestine is meant), but after their defeat they shall conquer, and on that day the believers shall rejoice. This is an ambiguous statement in prophetic style, and one for which no timetable is given. One can discern therein a sympathy for the Byzantine cause, but it would be going too far to regard the statement as demonstrating a *parti pris* for the monotheistic Christians of Byzantium against the Persian pagans, as some commentators have interpreted the text. Accounts in later sources, according to which Mohammed wrote letters to various rulers, in particular to the Byzantine emperor Heraclius, inviting them to adopt Islam are with much likelihood apocryphal. The history of the relations between Byzantium and Islam commences after the time of Mohammed.

The military and political aspects of the Muslim conquest of the eastern provinces of the Byzantine empire after Mohammed's death have been studied by several scholars in recent years; here I would merely mention the monograph of Dr. Donner[1] and the ongoing investigations of Prof. Kaegi[2]. The possible immediate historical reasons for the conquest are still not entirely clear; Donner favors returning to an ideological explanation and the crucial motivating role of the Islamic faith[3]. The tide of conquest was only checked at the gates of Constantinople, after two major Arab sieges of the Byzantine capital, first in the seventh, then in the early eighth century. The heartland of Asia Minor was saved for the Byzantine empire and in the late ninth and tenth centuries, which are beyond our purview now, the Byzantines were even able to mount a major counterattack, putting the

1. Fred M. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton, 1981).
2. E. g. Walter E. Kaegi, "Some reconsiderations" on the Themes (Seventh-Ninth Centuries), *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik* 16(1967), pp. 39-53.
3. Donner, op. cit., pp. 269 ff.

Muslim states on the defensive. The period of interest to as now is rather characterized by a systematic border warfare, the technicalities of which have also been intensively studied in recent years by military and social historians[4]. By contrast the ideological and specifically religious dimensions of the Byzantine-Muslim encounter in the early Islamic centuries have been somewhat neglected; this is the theme which will specifically concern us here.

It is interesting how little one can find in the Byzantine sources of the seventh century about the momentous event of the Muslim conquest. The invaders, when mentioned at all, are regarded as simply destructive barbarians, with no ideological programme[5]. For instance the Patriarch Sophronius of Jerusalem refers to the godless Saracens in his sermons — the Arab invasion, to be sure, was divinely ordained, and war occasioned by the sins of the Christians. Sophronius predicts of course the eventual triumph of Christianity despite the dire situation[6]. The depiction in the apocalypse of pseudo-Methodius (late seventh century), written perhaps in Syriac, but translated early into Greek, depicts also the "Ismaelites" as but the instruments of divine wrath[7]. A similar theological perspective can be found in one of the writings of Anastasius of Sinai, who, as a good Chalcedonian, regards the Muslim devastation as divine vengeance for the heretical monothelite emperor's persecution of Pope Martin[8]. (Incidentally Anastasius in another text, the Hodēgos, refers to the partial acceptance of the Christian scriptures by the Arabs[9]). It should be noted that these several sources, though broadly speaking Byzantine witnesses, emanate from authors residing in the provinces directly affected; no comparable material comes from Constantinople proper. Thus there is no mention of Islam or Muslims, for instance, in the extensive disciplinary canons of the Council in Trullo held in 692.

The first detailed description of Islamic tenets comes from John of

4. E.g. Héléne Ahrweiler, "L'Asie Mineure et les invasions arabes (VII^{e}-IX^{e} siècles)," *Revue historique* 227 (1962), pp. 1-32.; Ralf Johannes Lilie, *Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber. Studien zur Strukturwandlung des byzantinischen Staates um 7. und 8. Jhd.* (München, 1976).

5. Demetrios J. Constantelos, "The Muslim Conquests as Revealed in the Greek Sources of the Seventh and the Eighth Century," *Byzantion* 42 (1972), pp. 325ff.

6. On this text see W.E. Kaegi, "Initial Byzantine Reactions to the Arab Conquest," *Church History* 38 (1969), pp. 140ff.

7. ed. A. Lolos, *Die Apocalypse des Ps.- Methodios* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1976), pp.96 ff.

8. Kaegi, *op.cit.*, p.142.

9. *Anastasii Sinaitae Viae Dux*, ed. K.H. Uthemann, (Turnhout 1981), p. 113.

Damascus, in the first half of the eighth century. He regards Islam as a Christian heresy, is particularly concerned with Qur'ānic material of Christological relevance and questions the credibility of some Qur'ānic and extra-Qur'ānic narratives[10]. There again we are dealing with an author who already lived under Muslim political domination; it is interesting to note that no full-scale discussion of Islam is found in Byzantine literature proper until the middle of the ninth century, post-dating the iconoclastic period[11]. That there were contacts pertaining to religious matters between Muslims and Christians linving under Muslim rules is shown, for instance, by the extant Syriac dialogue between the Jacobite patriarch of Antioch and a Muslim emir dating from the middle of the seventh century[12]. The Muslim disputant, or rather enquirer is mostly interested in knowing whether the Christians have a law code and if so, what are its sources. There is a discussion of the theological question of the divine sonship of Christ, but no mention of the person of Mohammed. One sees here the tentative beginnings of a religious dialogue — which later however for the most part degenerates into rigid polemic.

One gains in general the impression that the Muslims, after the early civil wars, during the time of the Ummayad caliphate were eager recipients of the Byzantine cultural heritage and technical skills — one can simply note the well-known Byzantine influence on Ummayad palace art and the continued use of Greek as the language of administration, at least until the end of the seventh century. In this whole domain of cultural interaction the question of the reciprocal relaionship between the developing attitudes to religious art in the Byzantine and the Muslim empires plays an important role; the following remarks will be primarily devoted to this crucial and basically still unsolved problem.

Apropos the question of images and iconoclasm one should note that the Arab rulers continued to use modified Byzantine-style coins for several decades; it was the caliph 'Abd al-Malik (685-705) who first substituted

10. De haeresibus, ed. Bonifatius Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos (Berlin -New York, 1981), pp. 60 ff.

11. Nicetas of Byzantium, *Refutatio Mohamedis,* in *Patrologia Graeca,* vol. 105, col. 669 ff. See Adel-Theodore Khoury, Les théologiens byzantins et l'Islam (Louvain-Paris, 1969), pp. 110ff.

12. Ed. F. Nau, "Un colloque du patriarche Jean avec l'émir des Agaréens...", *Journal asiatique*[11] 5(1915), pp. 226ff. See further Harald Suermann, "Orientalische Christen und der Islam. Christliche Texte aus der Zeit von 632-750," *Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft* 67 (1983), pp. 122ff.

Muslim religious symbols for portraits of Byzantine emperors[13]. So it is *prima facie* paradoxical that in the Christian sources one finds the very first impulse of the iconoclastic movement, which kept the Byzantine empire in turmoil for over a century being directly attributed to Muslim influence. The caliph Yazīd II (720-724) ordered the obliteration of figurative decorations throughout his dominions including crosses and icons in Christian churches. He was motivated to this course of action according to several Byzantine accounts by a Jewish soothsayer's prediction of a long reign for him as a reward for iconoclastic policy. Though Yazīd's reign and iconoclastic campaign were cut short by his death, the Jewish troublemaker(s), according to the Byzantine sources, went on to Byzantium and were able to influence the emperor Leo III to act in this way also. There are many versions of this story and I have dealt with the development of its legendary features elsewhere[14]. Here I would rather concentrate on some basic issues.

The fact of Yazīd's iconoclasm is abundantly and reliably documented in Byzantine and Oriental sources[15]. It would however not specifically directed against Christian cultic art but against figurative representation in general. This has caused difficulty for historians of Muslim art, who have been able to trace the image prohibition only to the later eighth century. But the recent work of Rudi Paret has solved the chronological problem; his analysis of relevant hadīṯ (the Qur'ān is silent on this question) shows that the issue of the kinds of images permissible for Muslims was already a matter of legal discussion around the end of the seventh century, and, crucially, the rigorous view that the depiction of animal beings is not permissible was already dominant by the 690's[16]. The Muslim aversion to the Christian representation and display of the cross is by contrast very early and is connected with the ḍocetic interpretation of the curcifixion of Jesus in the Qur'ān. The Yazīd should have acted as a destroyer of Christian icons and crosses thus poses no historical problem. What about

13. André Grabar, L'iconoclasme byzantine: *Dossier archéologique* (Paris, 1957), pp.

14. See my monograph *Byzantine Iconoclasm during the Reign of Leo III, with Particular Attention to the Oriental Sources* (Louvain, 1973), pp. 59ff. (henceforth abbreviated as BI).

15. Alexander A. Vasiliev, "The Iconoclastic Edict of the Caliph Yazid II, A.D. 721," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 9/10 (1956), pp. 23 ff is still the standard treatment. See now also Leslie W. Barnard, "The Sources of the Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy: Leo III and Yazid II - A Reconsideration," *Texte und Untersuchungen,* vol. 125 (Berlin, 1981), pp. 29 ff.

16. R. Paret, "Die Entstehungszeit des Islamischen Bilderverbots," *Kunst des Orients.* 11(1976-77), pp. 158 ff.

the putative Jewish influence on Yazīd ? Here no clear-cut answer can be given. In the historian Tabari there is an account according to which a Jewish soothsayer did indeed predict a reign of forty years to Yazīd — but in this text, in contrast to the Byzantine sources, there is no mention of the condition that he must become an iconoclast to enjoy a long reign[17]. Though it is often stated that nascent Islam became hostile to images, because of the massive influx of Jewish converts already so disposed, this kind of influence cannot specifically be demonstrated in the case of Yazīd. The connection of the Jewish prediction of a long reign with his iconoclastic policy, two separate matters, appears to be Byzantine iconophile propaganda, concerned to show the extraneous, ultimately Jewish roots of the inner-Byzantine opposition to image-worship.

The nagging question remains : could Leo have imitated the Arab caliph's example — which is chronologically possible — and if so, how did he gain the information? After the failure of the great siege of Constantinople in 717-718 the two empires suspended major hostilities, though the border clashes of course continued. The introduction of Yazīd's Jewish magician or magicians as Leo's inspiration is Byzantine legend, as I have shown elsewhere. But Leo was in some ways very open to oriental influence. He originated from an eastern border region of the Byzantine empire, had travelled extensively in the Caucasus as a military officer, spoke Arabic fluently, and had personal contact with the Muslim general Maslama, who in some sources is described as Yazīd's Chief lieutenant for carrying out the iconoclastic directives. Furthermore we know that there was an exchange of letters between Yazīd's predecessor, the caliph 'Umar II (715 - 720), and Leo, on which occasion Leo defended Christian doctrines[18]. The text of the correspondence is unfortunately lost — the material in an Armenian chronicle, which purports to reproduce the text, is a later apocryphon[19]. (There is another, Arabic account in a Muslim chronicle of a discussion on Christological matters between Leo and an Arab envoy, but the image question is not broached).

Could one point however to some specific channel of transmission, if we must dismiss the iconoclastic Jewish magicians as legendary ? In Byzantine sources a favorite, a courtier of Leo appears, who bears the name Beser (that is to say Basir or Bišr). He is described as being "Saracen-minded," and as Leo's helper in his iconoclastic campaign[20]. Time and

17. Gerhard Strohmaier, "Der Kalif Yazid II und sein Traumdeuter. Eine byzantinische Legende über den Ursprung des Ikonoklasmus," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte des Feudalismus* 3 (1979), pp. 12 ff.

18. BI, pp. 45 ff.

19. BI, pp. 153 ff.

20. BI, pp. 189 ff.

again Beser has been proposed as the missing link, so to speak, between Muslim and Byzantine iconoclasm, most recently in a provocative but eccentric study by Dr. Patricia Crone[21]. Beser is indeed a curious figure, a man of two worlds. Of Christian extraction, he was taken captive in Syria and became a Muslim there; eventually he returned to Byzantium and became a Christian again, rising high in the favor of Leo because of his physical prowess — so relates the ninth-century Byzantine chronicler Theophanes. The career of Beser is also similarly described in an independent Muslim narrative source (still an *ineditum;* the manuscript is in Leyden)[22]. Bašir is the son of a Greek noble, is taken captive in his youth by the Arabs, Becomes a Muslim and is educated at the court of the caliph, ʿAbd al-Malik. Later in life, this Muslim source informs us, Satan leads him back to Christianity. Bašir flees to Byzantium, and receives great honors and possessions from the emperor; he is given land which "until today" are called villages of Bašir. Some thirty Muslims are taken captive from the Byzantines and brought to the capital. The narrator Wasil is their chief spokesman in a religious disputation in the presence of the emperor; Bašir is the exponent for the Christian cause. The debate is supposedly won by the Muslims and Wasil is allowed to return to Damascus. This new source argues, to my mind, against Bašir-Beser having been a crypto-Muslim ("Saracen-minded") and certainly no identification with Yazīd's Jew is called for. That Bašir's Muslim past made him sympathetic to inconoclasm is surely possible, and he willingly joined the iconoclastic movement launched by a group of reform-minded bishops in Asia Minor, which was then espoused by the emperor Leo. But to make him the linchpin of the whole movement, and to depict him as a kind of heretical Judaeo-Christian. as Crone's article attempts to do, is quite un-warranted.

Beser's career was cut short on the battlefield; he died defending the legitimate dynasty against the usurper Artavasdus around 740. The next iconoclastic emperor, Constantine V[23], had no like "Saracen-minded" helper — it is rather significant that the iconophile controversialist John of Damascus was condemned as "Saracen-minded" by Constantine's

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21. "Islam, Judeo-Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm," in *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 2(1980), pp. 59 ff.

22. See R.P.A. Dozy, *Catalogus codicum orientalium bibliothecae Academiae Lugduno Batavae* (Leyden, 1851), pp. 142-43; Moritz Steinschneider, *Polemische und apologetische Literatur in arabischer Sprache zwischen Muslimen, Christen und Juden* (Leipzig, 1877), p. 44.

23. See in general my monograph, *Byzantine Iconoclasm during the Reign of Constantine V, with Particular Attention to the Oriental Sources* (Louvain, 1977)

iconoclastic church council[24]. In general Constantine V's radicalization of the iconoclastic campaign, extending it to relics and the intercession of the saints, and his struggle to eradicate asceticism and monasticism have no perceptible direct connection with Muslim ideology. One should nole that for Christians under Muslim rule the image question was not even potentially as important as for the Byzantines, and in fact on the whole the Christian leaders in Muslim lands were favorable to the iconophile cause.

After an iconophile intermezzo, Byzantium experienced a resurgence of officially-sponsored iconoclasm in the ninth century. By now the Muslims were not culturally underdeveloped, so to speak, and the splendors of the new Arab capital Baghdad were celebrated by the Byzantines themselves. Though the border warfare and raiding continued, without great success for the Byzantines, iconophiles or iconoclasts, there were cultural contacts. In particular we know that the emperor Theophilus (829-842) was impressed by Muslim technology and architecture. His ambassador to Baghdad, John the Grammarian, became later patriarch and zealous promoter of the iconoclastic cause to the very end[25]. Can one make a case at least for Muslim influence on this second phase of iconoclasm ? I don't think so, though perhaps one can note a convergence of aims between iconoclasm and the Mu'tazila, two contemporary "rationalistic" movements[26]. It is noteworthy that there are several stories of iconoclastic emperors unmasking in a "rationalistc" fashion fraudulent wonder-working of supposedly ancient icons[27]. One can at least see a parallelism between Mu'tazilite thinking and the emphasis on free will in some iconoclastic sources, and one can discern a common concern with divine transcendene in the disputes over the createdness or uncreatedness of the Qur'an on one hand and over the pictorial depictability of the incarnate divine nature on the other.

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24. Op. cit., p. 94.

25. See John Rosser, "John the Grammarian's Embassy to Baghdad and the Recall of Manuel," *Byzantinoslavica* 37 (1976), pp. 168 ff. and more generally see my article "John the Grammarian, the Last Iconoclastic Patriarch of Constantinople, The Man and the Legend," *Byzantina* (Uppsala), 3-4 (1974-5), pp. 25 ff.

26. See the suggestive observations of Robert M. Haddad, "Iconoclasts and Mu'tazila: The Politics of Anthropomorphism," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 27 (1982), pp. 287 ff.

27. See my article "The Resurgence of Byzantine Iconoclasm in the Ninth Century according to a Syriac Source," *Speculum* 51 (1976), pp. 1 ff. and Sydney H. Griffith, "Eutychius of Alexandria on the Emperor Theophilus and Iconoclasm in Byzantium: A Tenth-Century Moment in Christian Apologetics in Arabic," *Byzantion* 52 (1982), pp. 154 ff.

But these are in the end only suggestive similarities and nothing more. The evidence (or the lack of it) on the whole still forces one back to the notion of parallel development of the Byzantine and Muslim cultures, specifically in the question of the role of religious art. Two worlds side by side, culturally autonomous — but an acquaintance with both is needed for a more sensitive understanding of the mediterranean cultural heritage of Europe.

The Early Coinage of Bilād al-Shām

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In the decades immediately preceding the Prophet Muḥammad's birth on August 20, 570 at Mecca, then an important religious and commercial center, and up to the time of his death on 13 Rabi' ul-Awwal 11/9 June 632, there was no indigenous coinage in Bilād al-Shām. What was circulating was the gold rūmī and bronze pieces of the dominant Byzantine Greeks, and the silver kesraī of their neighbors to the east, the Sasanid Persians. As Wellhausen tells us , when the young Muḥammad accompanied his uncle
SLIDES Abū Ṭālib on trading journies to Syria, "Greek gold and Persian silver coins
1-2 were in circulation, and a few Himyarite silver coins (with the Attic owl upon them)". While it is true that the Nabataeans of Petra (Arabia Petraea) who at their peak in the 3d century ruled an area stretching from the Gulf of Aqaba northwards to the Dead Sea and including much of northern Ḥijāz; the fortified city of Hatra in the desert between the Tigris and the Euphrates
SLIDE Rivers, and the aramaised Arab border emporium of Palmyra in the Syro-
3 Arabian desert in the 1st and 3d centuries respectively; the state of Kinda based at Qaryat al-Fau and flourishing between the 2d and 5th centuries; the kingdom of Edessa (ar-Ruhā') in the 2d and 3d centuries; as well as the judaised Himyarites of south Arabia in the late 5th century, had each issued its own coinage, none of these were of importance for the time and place
SLIDE with which we are concerned. The people of Bilād al-Shām seem to have
4 found their commercial needs met by barter, bullion, and the coinages of the Byzantines and the Sasanids.

For some centuries the Christian Byzantines and the Zoroastrian Sasanids had been at one another's throats, with Arab buffer/client states keeping them apart. The Byzantines had their Ghassanids and the Sasanids had their Lakhmids. By the time of Muḥammad's death, the two colossi had mutually weakened one another through prolonged bloodletting. The Byzantines had been forced to stop paying subsidies to their pagan Bedouin Arab clients who were unhappy as a result and ready to join the Muslims arriving from the south. In addition, the levying of back-breaking taxes on the Syrian Christians and Jewish city dwellers to pay for these wars also alienated these groups. Furthermore, Byzantium was then wracked with internal dissention arising out of Christological disputes. In fact, it is possible that the Qur'ān is referring tangentially to these problems in the beginning of Surah 30, written in Mecca some time before the year 1/622 and before the tide in the Byzantino-Persian war had begun to turn in favor of the Greeks. Listen to the Qurā'nic words:

> "The Greeks are overcome in the highest parts of the land, but after being overcome they shall overcome in a few years;...and in that day the believers shall rejoice in the help of God".

By the year 13/634, Arabia had been united, and the first armies of Islam sent out. In a little more than a decade, the Muslims had forced Syria (conquered 15-17/636-638), Egypt (19-22/640-642), and Mesopotamia (18-
SLIDE 26/639-646) to submit. The aged Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (610-641)
5 who had only just recovered his eastern provinces from the Sasanid King of Kings Khusro II (590-628), and who had lost his imperial possessions in Spain to the Visigoths in the year 10/631, and Genoa to the Lombards in 19/640, must have wondered if his life's work had been in vain when he saw what had happened to his dismembered Empire.

SLIDE The Sasanid ruler Khusro II and the string of ephemeral kings that
6 followed him suffered equally severe reverses. The Muslim occupation of Persia took just twelve years (16-29/637-649). The last Sasanid king, Yazdegird III(11-31/632-651) held out in a remote corner of what were once his eastern provinces until 31/651 when he was tracked down and assassinated. Two decisive factors in the Sasanid debacle were the defeat of 20,000 Persians by a far smaller Muslim force at Qadisiya in the summer of 16/637, and the epoch-making victory at Nihawend in 22/642, the latter marking the date of the effective completion of Muslim conquest. By the time of the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty in 41/661, the Muslims under the white flag of Islam had conquered the entire Sasanid empire, as well as the Syria-Palestine-North Africa portion of Byzantium. Of this conquest, McNeill says:

> Such were the modest beginnings of Islam. Yet within less than two decades, Mohammed united nearly all Arabia into a new religious-political community; and this community, having effectively suppressed divisive feuds among the tribes, enabled the Arabs in the twenty-years following Mohammed's death to seize the richest provinces of the Byzantine empire and completely to destroy the Sassanian state. Never before or since has a prophet won such success so quickly; nor has the work of a single man so rapidly and radically transformed the course of world history. Through his inspired utterances, his personal example, and the organizational framework he established for Islam, Mohammed laid the basis for a distinctive new style of life, which within the space of two centuries attracted the allegiance of a major fraction of the human race and today commands the loyalty of about one-seventh of mankind.

In fact, he adds elsewhere that the "Moslem reformation of Middle Eastern civilization marked a reassertion of that region's ancient cultural primacy in Eurasia".

With victory the conquerors found themselves "confronted with a new and colossal problem for which they were ill prepared. There was nothing in their past experience on which they could draw." In an attempt to solve the problems that were facing them, a three-week conference was held by 'Umar and his generals. At the Jābiyah conference, the newly conquered region known as the province of Syria which extended from the Mediterranean in the west to the Euphrates in the east, and from the frontier of the Byzantine Empire in the north to the Sinai in the south was divided for administrative purposes into four military districts (from the north to the south). Ḥimṣ, Dimashq, al-Urdunn, and Filasṭīn, corresponding to Byzantine divisions found at the time of the conquest. Later, the Caliph Yazīd I (60-64/680-683) formed a new district, Qinnasrīn, detached from Ḥimṣ.

SLIDE 7

In addition, with regard to taxation and finance administration, the Muslims "continued in Allah's name the system of Byzantine provincial government already established in Syria and Egypt." This means that the staff of the former Byzantine mints, including engravers, now were preparing coins for the new rulers.

In the early years of Islam, the conquerors both exploited and adopted many elements of the coinage of the lands they had occupied---in the former Sasanid lands, the silver, which we term Arab-Sasanid, and in the former Byzantine lands, the gold and bronze which we term Arab Byzantine. Some numismatists have use the term "barbaric imitation" for this coinage. Others use the term "contemporary imitation'. Yet Grierson tells us that among numismatists there is a "theoretical difference between the terms, for contemporary imitation usually implies a counterfeit, issued within the Empire by some private person with intent to deceive, while 'barbarous' cover legitimate issues of contemporary political authorities outside the Imperial frontiers but imitating the Imperial types." He adds that the imitation of Byzantine coin types by Arabs "did not imply any recognition of Byzantine authority; advantage was simply being taken of the fact that since such coins circulated widely and enjoyed a good reputation, imitations of them would be more readily acceptable than would coins having unfamiliar inscriptions and types. It is also possible that local authorities sometimes indulged in semi-official minting to make good local shortages of coins, especially of small change, or for some other reason." It is with the "small change" that we will concern ourselves in this talk.

There was little imitating of Byzantine gold coinage. Apparently there seem to have been large supplies of imperial Byzantine coins available in the occupied provinces, or were arriving by way of tribute. In addition, the

Muslims at first had few scruples over using coins marked with Christian
SLIDES symbols. The only exceptions are late and transitional and these are the
8-9 rare copies of the "two bust" and "three figure" solidi struck in Syria. The much commoner Carthaginian "two bust" solidi struck in North African need not concern us here.

Grierson calls our attention to the fact that, ulike the pseudo-Imperial coinage of the Germanic people who occupied the western Byzantine provinces in the 6th and 7th centuries, Arab-Byzantine coinage differs in three different respects: "In the first place, it was mainly a coinage of copper, while the Germanic coinages were almost exclusively of gold. Secondly it was largely municipal, the coins usually bearing the names of the places where they were minted but no name of a ruler. Finally the Arabs brought with them a prejudice against representational art which led to various modifications in the traditionally Byzantine types and ultimately to the complete abandonment of these in favor of the purely epigraphic dsigns which characterize the vast bulk of Islamic coinage". In this
SLIDE connection, it is interesting how this "prejudice against representational
10 art" resulted in epigraphic and calligraphic masterpieces. Hitti points out that this hostility does "not manifest itself until early Ábbāsid times," and he suggests that "it evidently reflects views of converted Jews and a residue of the primitive notion that he who holds a likeness of another is in a position to exercise magical influence on that person." The frescoes of Quṣayr 'Amrah, the earliest illustrations of Moslem pictorial art, betray the workmanship of Christian painters.

The earliest Arab bronze, the so-called Arab-Byzantine series, dates
SLIDES from about 20/640, during the Caliphates of 'Umar (13-24/634-644) and
11-12 'Uthmān (24-36/644-656) when the Muslims in Syria and Palestine ceased using purely Byzantine types and began to adapt local bronzes, called *fulūs* (plural of *fals)* adding Kufic Arabic words and phrases. The word *fulūs* derives from Latin *folles* rather than from the Greek *nummia* (hence "numismatics"). There is a remarkable continuity and long history of this denomination (as well as the gold *dinar* and silver *dirhem)* within Islamic civilizations. In some countries, such as this one, the names of the basic types have extended right into the 20th centuries.

It is clear from a comparison of pure Byzantine bronzes with the Arab-Bayzantine pieces that at this early period the Arab conquerors were more concerned with adapting temselves to local usages rather than replacing them with entirely new types. I must add that there is some contoversy over the dating of the inception of the Arab bronze coinage. Recent thought has tended to ascribe the issue as belonging to the last couple of decades of the 1st/7th century, while the traditional view has favored a dating some 30 or 40 years earlier. Most Arab-Byzantine bronzes are found today in

considerable quantities not far from where they were issued, since it is a truism that coppler does not travel far.

The gold *dinars* and silver *dirhems* are less interesting and provide us with relatively fewer problems for research since they settled into stable types which though beautiful eqigraphically are more or less monotonous with little variation except for the date and mint signature, on the other hand, the *fulūs* coming from less centrally supervised local mints, which often had been active in Roman times, and then had been dormant under the Byzantines, consequently resulted in more diverse designs which could even be described as minor examples of early Islamic art.

SLIDES 13-14

The wide range of iconography on these pieces is in striking contrast to the gold and silver. It has been suggested that the objects depicted were intended to substitute for mint signatures. In any case these are diverse, including mounted horsemen, the forepart of a horse, flying birds, an elephant, a jerboa, trees, flowers, buds, scorpions, crouching lions, fish, palm branches, plant stalks, helmeted heads, five branched candelabra, and geometric form. The interpretation of some of these is still debateable.

SLIDES 15-18

We divide Arab Byzantine coinage into two periods: pre-Reform transitional types, and post-Reform types, the "Reform" referring to that of 'Abd al-Malik (65-86/685-705) in the year 77/696-697 when "the designs and Christian or Zoroastrian symbols of the coins were replaced by Arabic imprints (the Profession of Faith with the issue's name and title and the place of minting); though there is evidence from numerous specimens which have been found that this change in the coinage had been inititated earlier with minor alterations in the old Byzantine and Sāsānid designs."

SLIDES 19-22

The pre-Reform transitional Arab Byzantine coinage has been classified by Walker into three major goupings: Byzantine (Greek), Byzantine (Latin), and Byzantine (Pahlevi) types.

The Byzantine (Greek) coinage can be further subdivided into the following: I. *folles* and half *folles* based on Nicomedian prototypes of *Justin I and Sophia* including the excessively rare mint of Baisān, the Biblical Beth Shean, on the edge of the Jordan Valley, in western Palestine, known as Nysa Scythopolis Samariae under the Romans from Nero to Gordian III. For some reason, the prototype of this coinage were unusually common in Palestine (Nicomedia is modern Izmit in Turkey).

SLIDES 23-24

SLIDES 25-26 II. types based on prototypes of *Heraclius and his family,* further subdivided into a) the *Emperor Enthroned,* including the common mint signature Dimashq,

SLIDES 27-28 b) the *Emperor Standing,* including the mint-signatures of Ba'albak, Dimashq, Ḥimṣ, and the rare Ṭabarīyah,

SLIDES 29-30 c) the *Emperor and Son,* including the mint signatures Ba'albak, Dimashq, and no mint- signature indicated.

SLIDES 31-32 d) the *Emperor and Two Sons,* based on a Cypriote issue of Heraclius of the years 17-19 (432, 433), including the mint Ṭabarīyah and the rare specimens with no mint signature, and

SLIDES 33-34 e) the *Imperial Bust* including the mint signatures of Ḥimṣ and Ṭarṭūs, the Antarados of the ancients, the Tortosa of the Crusaders. The latter is the only issue struck on any port of the Mediterranean since the choice of mint sites of the early Arabs was typical of a land-basedempire. Grierson tells us that "the *chlamys* and the design of the crown and hair show that the model cannot have been an early *follis* of Heraclius as Walker believed." Instead it was "copied from the *solidus* of Heraclius or the early issues of Constans II and in any case of the 640s."

III. Bronze coinage of the Umayyad Caliphate subdivided into

SLIDES 35-36 a) those without the Caliph's name or titles, including the mint signatures Ilyā Filasṭīn, Jerusalem, derived from the Roman Colonia Aelia Capitolina, a Roman Colonial mint from the time of Hadrian to Hostilian, Ḥarrān, ancient Carrhae, Dimashq, the scare ar-Ruḥā', modern Urfa, Ṣarmīn, 'Ammān, the Biblical Rabbath Beth Ammon, not to be confused with 'Omān, an Umayyad post-Reform silver mint signature, with the same outlines in Kufic script, and pieces without mint signatures,

SLIDES 37-38 b) those without the Caliph's name but with titles, including the mint signatures Ma'arrat Miṣrīn, in Syria, and Manbij, ancient Hierapolis, in northern Syria,

SLIDES 39-40 c) those with the Caliph's names and titles, including mint signatures. Ba'albak, Jibrīn, ancient Baitogabra, Jibelin of the Crusaders, Ḥalab, Ḥimṣ, Dimashq, Sarmīn in Syria, 'Ammān, Qinnaṣrīn in Syria, the excessively rare Qūrus, classical Cyrrhus, Manbij, and pieces without mint signatures, and

SLIDES 41-42 d) those with dates, all without mint signature.

SLIDES 43-44 IV. *Twin Standing figures,* without mint signature.

V. Uncertain and Probable Arab Byzantine pieces including
a) with M reverse, and b) with m reverse.

Not of interest today are the Byzantine (Latin) type which includes

I. Those with *Two Imperial Busts* subdivided into
a) those with religious legends only minted in North Africa, and
b) those with names of governors minted at Tripoli and North Africa.
II. those with *Imperial Bust.*
III. with *Imperial Head,*
IV. *Portraitless* with
a) Latin legends only, and b) Latin and Arabic legends or the Byzantine

(Pahlevi) type including
I. *Emperor and Two Sons,* II. The *Umayyad Caliph,* and III. *Standing Figure with Upraised Arms.*

The Post-Reform bronze consists of pieces with a) religious formulae only (with or without symbols), b) with mint name (with or without date), and c) with date but without mint signature. In the Post-Reform coinage the much larger number of mints reflecting the spread of Islam and the Arabic character of the coinage is more strongly marked.

SLIDES 45-46 The gold *dīnars* are either mintless (actully Dimashq), or with mint-signatures Ifriqiya, al-Andalus, or the remarkable Ma'din Amīr al Mu'minīn bi'l-Ḥijāz, while for the silver, there is a unique mintless piece, and a large number of others with mint-signatures from all parts of the Umayyad world. We await with some impatience what will be the definitive catalog of the silver coinage by Robert Darley-Doran, consultant to Spink's.

Much remains to be done with the bronze. The late George Miles, referring to the pre-Reform material, made the plea that "Certainly the classification of these early anonymous coppers is something that should be undertaken. The student who undertakes such a study should have access to all the larger collections, and in attempting to determine the provenance should travel throughout the former Umayyad lands gathering the evidence on the spot, for copper seldom travels far. Above all, he should make full use of the mass of excavation specimens the vast majority of them unpublished but doubtless stored in the basements and closets of many museums in Europe and America". Though such a project would be onerous, yet it would receive the thanks of those who are interested in this ancillary yet important branch of Islamic history.

1-2 Slide //12 (Obverse) & //20 (Reverse)
Byzantine Greek prototype with Justin II and Sophia A.D. 565-578, enthroned, bronze follis, Nicomedia mint, Walker p.1, // (a)

3-4 Slide //3 (Obverse) & //4 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Justin II & Sophia enthroned, circa A.D. 650 bronze fals, ʿAmman mint, unique and unpublished.



5-6 Slide //8 (Obverse) & //16 (Reverse)
Byzantine Greek possible prototype (for obverse) of Maurice Tiberius, A.D. 582-602, gold solidus, Constantinople mint, Walker p. 3, //(b).




7-8 Slide //21 (Obverse) & //11 (Reverse)
Byzantine Latin prototype of Heraclius and Heraclius Constantine, gold solidus, Carthage mint, A.D. 612-613, Walker p. 54, //(a).




9-10 Slide //28 (Obverse) & //3 (Reverse)
Byzantine Latin prototype of Heraclius and Heraclius Constantine, gold solidus, Carthage mint, A.D. 610-611, Walker p. 54, //(a)


11-12 Slide //6 (Obverse) & //31 (Reverse)
Byzantine Greek prototype of Heraclius enthroned, bronze follis, Antioch mint, Walker p. 3,// (b)

13-14 Slide //13 (Obverse) & //22 (Reverse)
Byzantine Greek prototype of Heraclius enthroned bronze follis. constantinople mint, A,D. 613, Walker p.3, // (b).

15-16 Slide //15 (Obverse) & //16 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Heraclius enthroned, circa A.D. 650, bronze fals, Damascus (Dimishq) mint, Walker // W. 7-11, p.5-6

17-18 Slide //11 (Obverse) & //12 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Heraclius enthroned, circa 750, bronze fals, Damascus (Dimishq) mint. Obverse as Walker // W.4, and Reverse as Walker // W.20. Unpublished.




19-20 Slide //25 (Obverse) & // 26 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Heraclius enthroned, circa A.D. 750, bronze fals, Damascus (Dimishq) mint, Walker // W.19, p.7


21-22 Slide //17 (Obverse) & //18 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Heraclius enthroned, circa A.D. 750, bronze fals, Damascus (Dimishq) mint, Walker, // ANS 1, p.8


23-24 Slide //31 (Obverse) & //2 (Reverse)
Byzantine Greek prototype of Heraclius and Heraclius Constantine, bronze follis, Thessalonika mint, A.D. 617-618, Walker p. 12, // (d)




25-26 Slide //30 (Obverse) & //36 (Reverse)
Byzantine Greek prototype of Heraclius and Heraclius Constantine, gold solidus, Constantinople mint, A.D.629-641, Walker p. 17, //(f)


27-28 Slide //36 (Obverse) & //26 (Reverse)
Byzantine Greek prototype of Heraclius and Two sons flanking him, bronze follis, Nicomedia mint, Walker p. 15, // (e)


29-30 Slide //9 (Obverse) & //10 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Heraclius and Heraclius Constantine, bronze fals, Baalbek (Ba'albak) mint, Walker //35, p.12

31-32 Slide //5 (Obverse) & //6 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Heraclius and two sons flanking him, bronze fals, Tiberias (Tabariya) mint, Walker //43-46, p. 12





33-34 Slide //15 (Obverse) & //16 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Heraclius and two sons flanking him, bronze fals, No mint signature, Walker // J.1, p.17

35-36 Slide //50 (Obverse) & //51 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Heraclius and two sons flanking him, gold solidus or dinar, No mint signature, Walker //54, p. 18

37-38 Slide //12 (Obverse) & //19 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Heraclius, bronze fals, Emesa (Hims) mint, Walker //57, p.20.

39-40 Slide //31 (Obverse) & //32 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Heraclius, bronze fals, Emesa (Hims) mint, Walker //57, p. 20

41-42 Slide //19 (Obverse) & // 20 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Heraclius, bronze fals, Emesa (Hims) mint, Walker //66, p. 21.


43-44 Slide //35 (Obverse) & //36 (Reverse)
cUmayyad type without Caliph's name okr titles, bronze fals, Ilya Filistin mint, Walker // 78, p.23




45-46 Slide // 29 (Obverse) & //30 (Reverse)
cUmayyad type without Caliph's name or titles, bronze fals, Ilya Filistin, Walker //75, p.23


47-48 Slide //27 (Obverse) & // 28(Reverse)
cUmayyad type without Caliph's name or titles, bronze fals, Harran mint, Walker //Vat.1, p. 25


49-50 Slide //23 (Obverse) & //24 (Reverse)
ʿUmayyad type without Caliph's name or titles, bronze fals, Damascus (Dimishq) ,mint, Walker //89, p.27.


51-52 Slide //35 (Obverse) & //36 (Reverse)
ʿUmayyad type without Caliph's name or titles, bronze fals, Edessa (ar-Ruha) mint. Walker //92, p.28.


53-54 Slide //1 (Obverse) & //2 (Reverse)
ʿUmayyad type without Caliph's name or titles, bronze fals, Saruj mint, Unpublished.


55-56 Slide //7 (Obverse) & //8 (Reverse)
ʿUmayyad type without Caliph's name or titles, bronze fals, Labwah mint, Unpublished.


57-58 Slide //1 (Obverse) & //2 (Reverse)
ʿUmayyad type with Caliph's name and titles, bronze fals, Aleppo (Halab) mint, Walker //106-117, p. 33-35


59-60 Slide //21 (Obverse) & //22 (Reverse)
ʿUmayyad type with Caliph's name and titles, bronze fals, Aleppo (Halab) mint, Walker //117, p.35.


61-62 Slide //33 (Obverse) & //34 (Reverse)
ʿUmayyad type with Caliph's name and titles, bronze fals, Qurus mint, Walker //J. 2 variety, p. 40




63-64 Slide //7 (Obverse) & //15 (Reverse)
Uncertain and probable Arab-Byzantine, bronze fals, no mint signature, Walker //ASK. 2, p.50


65-66 Slide //11 (Obverse) & //12 (Reverse)
Uncertain and probable Arab-Byzantine, bronze fals, no mint signature, Walker // ANS. 9, p. 51

67-68 Slide //3 (Obverse) & //4 (Reverse)
Arab imitation of Byzantine Pehlevi type with Emperor and two sons, bronze fals, Susa (?) mint, cf Walker p. 81

69-70 Slide //31 (Obverse) & //32 (Reverse)
Byzantine bronze piece counterstamped BI-LUDD on the reverse

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Le Hawran Byzantin A La Veille De La Conquete Musulmane

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Dans l'histoire des débuts de la Syrie musulmane, le Hawran joue le role de precurseur. Premiere region syrienne conquise par les troupes musulmanes, le Hawran vit aussis' he élever les premieres mosquees de Syrie et recut le premier Coran. Mais, avant meme l'arrivee des troupes du Hijaz, Bostra et le Hawran avaient noué des relations etroites avec la péninsule arabique : les Mekkois n'etaient pas des inconnus pour les habitants du Hawran, pas plus que les Mekkois n'ignoraient l'importance et la richesse de Bostra.

Ces liens particuliers méritent qu'on s'arrete un instant sur lae situation du Hawran byzantin dans la seconde moitié du VIeme siecle et au début du VIIeme siecle. Tandis que la crise religieuse mine le pouvoir byzantin dans tout l'Orient syrien et egyptien, que la desorganisation militaire laisse les villes de Syrie du Nord et du Centre a la merci des armees perses, que les tremblements de terre et les epidemies ravagent villes et villages, le Hawran semble echapper au pire.

Il convient donc d'examiner dans quelle mesure la prosperite du Hawran est reelle, quels en sont les fondements, d'apprecier l'importance des relations nouees avee le Hijaz et de mesurer les effets des crises politiques, militaires et religieuses qui affectent le Hawran en meme temps que le reste de la Syrie. On verra alors si la Syrie du Sud beneficie d'une situation particuliere ou non.

Un Hawran Prospere

Durant le siecle qui precede la conquete islamique, la prosperite du Hawran se manifeste de diverses facons et il n'y a guere de raisons de douter que cette prosperite est bien reelle.

En mai-juin 536, l'empereur Justinien decida de reformer l'administration de la province d'Arabie dont l'essentiel etait constitue par le Hawran actuel (1). Il confia l'administration civile a un *moderator Arabiae* tandis que les pouvoirs militaires restaient entre les main du *dux* et que le phylarque ghassanide conservait son autorite sur les Arabes

1. Sur les frontieres de l'Arabie, cf. M.SARTRE, *Trois Etudes sur l'Arabie romaine et byzantine,* Bruxelles, 1982, p. 64-75. La question de l'*Arabia item Arabia* de la liste de Verone et de la creation d'une seconde *Arabia Nova* est maintenant a revoir a la lumiere de *P.Oxy.* 3574; cf. P. MAYERSON, P.Oxy. 3574, "Eleutheropolis of the new Arabia", *ZPE,* 53, 1983, p. 251-258.

auxiliaires (2). On peut douter que cette reforme soit reellement entree en vigueur (3) mais les raisons invoquees par Justinien pour sa mise en place meritent qu'on s'y arrete. Ason avis, la province d'Arabie rapporte trop peu au tresor imperial alors que sa richesse est de notoriete publique. Au lieu de profiter a l'empereur, ses ressources enrichissent les *potentiores* de la region, grace a la complicite du *dux* et du phylarque qui s'opposent efficacement aux tentatives des services fiscaux de faire rentrer l'impot.

Cette amere constatation de Justinien ne doit sans doute pas etre prise pour argent comptant: il est de tradition que l'Etat surevalue la richesse des provinces pour faire payer davantage d'impots. Mais on ne peut recuser completement l'argumentation de Justinien car elle semble largement confirmee par les trouvailles archeologiques malgre des nuances qu'il conviendra d'expliquer.

On aimerait mieux connaitre le developpement des villages hauranais aux VI-VIIe siecles. Les travaux de prospection ne font que commencer (4) et l'on bute encore sur la question de la datation precise des edifices byzantins. Il est donc premature de vouloir tirer des conclusions precises sur l'accroissement du nombre des villages (ou leur diminution), sur l'augmentation du chiffre de la population ou l'extension des terres cultivees durant cette periode. Mais l'epigraphie peut fournir quelques elements. d'appreciation sur l'importance des constructions officielles durant tout ce siecle. Sans refaire ici un inventaire exhaustif des inscriptions utiles a ce propos (5), on peut neanmoins presenter les conclusions auxquelles elles permettent de parvenir.

Des les annees 530-540, les deux plus importantes cites de la region, Bostra et Gerasa, se couvrent d'edifices nouveaux ou reparent les anciens reparation des remparts et des aqueducs, constructions d'eglises, d'hospices, de bains et de divers edifices civils non identifies. A. Bostra, ces constructions sont entreprises et peut-etre achevees en deux ou trois ans,

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2. *Novelle* 102.
3. *Trois Etudes,* p. 109-112 et p. 118-119.
4. Le travail essentiel en ce domaine est celui de F. VILLENEUVE, *Recherches sur les villages antiques du Haurane,* These 3eme cycle, Paris I, Paris 1983 (dactylographié), premiere etape d'un travail de plus grande ampleur.
5. Cf. mon *Bostra,* Paris, 1985.
6. *IGLS* XIII, 9128-9137, avec le commentaire d'ensemble, p. 209-212.
7. Tous les textes de Bostra mentionnes a la note precedente font etat de la liberalite imperiale, alors que cette indication n'apparait jamais a Gerasa. Ce ne peut etre une simple flatterie car un texte signale une ambassade conduite par l'archeveque Jean aupres de l'empereur *(IGLS* XIII, 9134).

entre 539 et 541 (6), a l'initiative de l'empereur lui-meme (7) alors que l'initiative revient a la population locale a Gerasa. Cette activite de construction tranche avec un relatif sommeil durant les vingt ou trente ans precedents.

Dans la campagne hauranaise, le mouvement debute alors qu'il semble acheve a Bostra. Depuis la construction de l'eglise Saint Elie a Sala, dans l'est du Dj. Druze, en 547, jusqu'a celle de l'eglise Saint-Theodore de Shaqqa en 596, il ne se passe guére d'anees sans que l'on construise une nouvelle eglise dans quelque village hauranais: on connait deja par la seule épigraphie plus de vingt monuments dates precisement, aussi bien dans la plaine que dans la montagne, depuis Amra au Nord jusqu'a Khirbet Samra et Rihab au Sud (8). Or il est douteux que nous ayons conserve la trace de toutes les eglises construites durant cette période: compte tenu du fait que presque aucun village n'a fait l'objet de fouilles, on conviendra que nous ne connaissons sans doute pas la moitie ou le quart des constructions reelles, peut-etre moins encore. L'activite des batisseurs n'en est que plus remarquable.

Vers 600, le mouvement parait ralentir, mais il est loin de cesser: des eglises encore construites ou embellies a Rihab en 605, 620, 623, a Nahite en 623, a Kh. Samra en 634, a Rihab encore en 635 (9).

On doit interpreter avec prudence de telles donnees. Nous ignorons la taille de ces edifices, leur plus ou moins grand luxe (decor de mosaiques, peintures), ce qui pourrait permettre d'evaluer leur coût et, en conséquence la richesse des donateurs. Il faudrait aussi pouvoir faire la part des repartations, des agrandissements et des constructions *ex nihilo*. Enfin, nous ne savons que trop rarement qui paie : est-ce l'ensemble de la communaute villageoise, est-ce seulement quelque notable local, grand propprietaire ou riche commercant? Le sens de la construction n'en serait pas le meme. Les textes sont rarement tres explicites sur ce point. Cependant, on peut noter qu'a Bostra l'initiative imperiale est soulignee a

8. Cf. *Bostra,* p. 132-139; pour Kh. Samra, cf. J.B. HUMBERT et A. DESREUMAUX, Khirbet Samra, la ruine sombre..., *MBible,* 35, 1984, p. 14-15; Rihab: M. PICCIRILLO, Le Antichita di Rihab dei Beni Hasan, *LA,* 30, 1980, p. 317-350, reproduit avec quelques corrections de dates dans *Chiese e Mosaici della Giordania settentrionale,* Jerusalem 1981, p. 63-96.
9. Ste Sophie de Rihab en 605 (*Chiese,* p. 68-70), St Etienne de Rihab en 620 (*Chiese,* p. 73-74), St Pierre de Rihab en 623 (*Chiese,* p. 80-82). St Georges de Nahite en 623 (W.H. WADDINGTON? *I. Syrie,* Paris 1870, n 2412 m), St Georges de Sama en 624-625 (E. LITTMANN, *PAES* 3 A, n 24-25); a KH. Samra, une eglie signalee par J.B. HUMBERT ET A. DESREUMAUX, *o.c.,* sous l'archevêque Polyeuctos; St Isaie (*Chiese,* p. 74-75) et St Menas (*Chiese,* p, 76-77) a Rihab, en mars 635.

chaque fois, meme lorsqu'il est sür que ce sont les habitants de la ville qui paient les travaux : on le voit expressement lors de la renovation d'un aqueduc ou est mentionne un bijoutier (10). Il peut arriver aussi qu'un notable fonde, a ses frais, une eglise: c'est le cas d'un phylarque Azraël pour une eglise de Harran (11). Mais ces indices sont trop rares dans le Hawran. Les seules series de donateurs un peu fournies sont celles des eglises de Rihab; encore ignore-t-on assez souvent l'importance de la donation (s'agit-il de toute l'eglise ou seulement de la mosaique?) et la profession des donateurs, en debors de quelques ecclesiastiques (12). On voit que le secours de l'epigraphie est ici limite.

En revanche, les sources arabes creditent les emirs ghassanides de tres nombreuses fondations dans le Hawran, notamment de monasteres. Meme en faisant la part de l'exageration, il es probable que ceux-ci contribuerent a enrichir les couvents monophysites qu'ils protegeaient. Mais nous sommes dans l'incapicite de mesurer l'ampleur reelle de ces phenomenes (13).

Il parait en definitive certain que le mouvement de construction fut important dans le Hawran de 550 a 635, ce qui temoigne probablement d'une reelle prosperite economique.

Nous connaissons, du moins partiellement, les sources de cette prosperite, grace aux textes, principalement arabes. L'agriculture reste le fondement de la prosperite du Hawran byzantin. On vient de rappeler que les villages sont nombreux; c'est la qu'on edifie les nouvelles eglises, davantage que dans les villes. Le Hawran represente la plus meriodionale des grandes provinces agricoles de la Syrie antique.

L'agriculture hauranaise repose sur trois piliers: la cerealiculture, la viticulture-arboriculture, l'elevage.

La production ceraliere est attestee par les sources arabes preislamiques indiquant que les Mekkois Viennent s'approvisionner en ble a Bostra (14). Un tel type de culture laisse peu de traces archeologiques en

10. *IGLS* XIII, 9129.

11. W.H. WDDINGTON, *I.Syrie*. Paris 1870, 2464.

12. Les seules fonctions apparaissant dans les textes sont religieuses: moines, diacres paramonaires, pretres, etc...

13. La source essentielle reste HAMZA AL-ISFAHANI, *Annales,* chap. VII; cf. Trois Etudes, p. 182-185; cf. aussi la liste des couvents monophysites de la *Lettre des Archimandrites d'Arabie,* ed. et trad. Th. J. LAMY, *Actes du XIIeme Congres International des Orientalistes,* Paris 1898, p. 117-137

14. IBN HISHAM, *Sira,* 911, 4, TABARI. Annales, 2, p. 371-372 (trad. E. ZOTENBERG) cf. H.l LAMMENS, La Mecque a la veille de l'Hegire, *MUSJ,* 1924, fasc. 9, p. 46; ID., Les Chretiens de La Mecque, dans *L'Arabie Occidentale avant l'Hegire,* Beyrouth, 1926, p. 22-23.

dehors des meules, tres nombreuses dans la region. Mais ces meules temoignent davantage de l'usage des grains que de leur production.

La tradition viticole a laisse davantage de traces dans les textes et dans le paysage. On ne peut guere se fonder sur les magnifiques decors de pampres des basiliques de Qanawat : le motif decoratif peut etre utilise pour lui-meme, sans que l'on cherche a illustrer une production majeure du pays. Mais les sources arabes preislamiques vantent les vins de la montagne de Bostra, c'est-a-dire du Dj- Druze, en-meme temps que ceux de la region d'Irbid-Bayt Ras (15). On trouve encore dans la plaine de Si'a des tours qui devaient servir a surveiller les vignes au moment ou le vin arrivait a maturite et l'equipe de J.-M. Dentzer a fouille au meme endroit un pressoir installe sur un edifice plus ancien (16).

Les vergers devaient tenir une certaine place autour des villages et sur les flancs du Dj. Druze. On ne connait guere par les textes anciens que les figues de Bostra, exportees en Palestine (17).

L'elevage tenait sans doute une place beaucoup plus importante que maintenant. En effet, on trouve des etables dans la plupart des villages antiques, reparties dans de tres nombreuses maisons. Ces etables ne sont pas davantage datees que les maions, mais on peut tenir comme acquis que les Hawran pratiquait l'elevage des bovins car ces etables ne peuvent avoir abrite des ovins ou des caprins : un simple enclos suffit a ceuxci et les mangeoires seraient trop hautes pour leur usage. Peut-etre a-t-on aussi eleve des chevaux mais les preuves formelles sont encore peu sûres.

L'artisanat n'est pas moins riche et varie. Les inscriptions du theatre de Bostra font connaitre pour les IIe-IIIeme siecles l'existence des batteurs de cuivre, des bijoutiers, des fabricants d'outres (18). Les textes arabes des VIe-VIIe siecles font etat, deux ou trois siecles plus tard, des memes activites. Bostra semble celebre en Arabie pour le travail des metaux: armes, cuirasses, cloches, clochettes. Les bijoutiers, groupes en association (19), sont assez riches pour faire reparer un edifice public a leurs frais. Il devait egalement se trouver a Bostra les artisans dont l'activite est indispensable

15. Cf. NABIGHA, Diwan, 26, 9-10; AL-MUQADDASI, *Ahsan at- Taqasim, f119 (trad. A. MIQUEL, Damas 1963); cf. H. LAMMENS, La cite de Taif a la veille de l'Hegire, MUSJ,* 8, 1922, p. 36.

16. Il s'agit du site nomme Sia VIII: J. M. et J. DENTZER, Les fouilles de Si et la phase hellenistique en Syrie du Sud, CRAI, *1981, p. 78-102, en particulier p. 82 et p. 93-95. Sur les tours dans les vignes: ISAIE, V, 1-2.*

17. Biccurim III, 3;, *Baba Mecia* II, 2.

18. *IGLS* XIII, 9156-9166.

19. *IGLS* XIII, 9129.

aux paysans, comme les forgerons, ainsi que ceux qui travaillaient pour les caravaniers: boureliers, selliers, fabricants d'outres (20). Sans compter les aubergistes et tous les commercants que l'on trouve habituellement dans une ville de passage.

Une agriculture prospere, un artisanat de qualite et varie, ce sont la les bases necessaires au developpement d'un commerce fructueux. De fait, le troisieme pilier de la richesse du Hawran byzantin repose sur un commerce actif avec le Hijaz.

Des Relations Privilegiees Avec Le Hijaz

Le Hawran se trouve au debouche d'une importante route caravaniere venant d'Arabie par le wadi Sirhan. Mais on ne sait si cette voie fut largement utilisee a l'epoque qui nous interesse ici, nos textes ne faisant guere etat que de relations avec le Hijaz proprement dit, ce qui implique l'usage de l'ancienne *Via Nova Traiana* puis des pistes vers Tabuk et al-Ula.

En tout cas, le Hawran est de loin la plus riche region agricole que l'on rencontre en venant du sud, la plus proche des grandes oasis du Hijaz, car on ne peut lui comparer les plateaux d'Edom ou de Moab. De fait, les textes attestent l'existence d'un important courant d'echanges entre le Hijaz et le Hawran, particulierement La Mekke.

Bostra joue dans ce trafic un rôle dominant, a la fois comme centre de production artisanale et comme entrepot des produits agricoles les plus divers: le vin dont les Mekkois sont de grands consommateurs (21), les cereales (c'est la famine qui a pousse Hashim, ancetre du prophete, a organiser la premiere caravane vers la Syrie (22). Les Mekkois amenaient sans doute en echange les produits qu'ils se procuraient en Arabic du Sud, epices, aromates. Bostra devait redistribuer ces produits vers les villes situees plus a l'Ouest et plus au Nord. Malheureusement aucun texte ne mentionne les termes de l'echange.

Il est non moins difficile de mesurer l'importance de ce courant d'echanges. S'agit-il d'un commerce occasionnel, portant sur des quantites negligeables? Faut-il au contraire voire sur l'antique *Via Traiana* "un defile incessant de caravane arabes" (23). La verite est sans doute a mi-chemin.

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20. *IGLS* XIII, 9158-9160.
21. Cf. ci-dessus n. 15.
22. TABARI; 2, p. 371-372.
23. IBN HISHAM, *Sira,* 115; H. LAMMENS; La Mecque, *MUSJ,* 1922, fasc. 9, p. 143.

On sait que des caravanes de 2500 chameaux peuvent être organisees (24), ce qui est considerable. D'autre part, nous ne connaissons que les caravanes envoyees par les Mekkois; rien n'interdit que d'autres villes du Hijaz aient fait de meme. En tout cas, il est certain que pour les Mekkois, ce commerce n'a rien de marginal et d'irregulier.

La venue des marchands qurayshites dans le Hawran a familiarise ceux-ci avec la region. Des relations se sont nouees entre marchands mekkois et hauranais. Lors de l'invasion perse en 614, les ennemis de Mahomet se rejouissent ouvertement de la defaite des Byzantins et declarent qu'ils vaincront les Musulmans comme leurs freres (perses) ont vaincu les "freres" des Mekkois dans le Hawran (25). La fraternite repose sans doute ici essentiellement sur l'attachement a un livre, mais on sait par ail-leurs que des Mekkois avaient noue des relations etroites avec des Ghassanides: ceux-ci ont ete honores du titre de halif par les Asadites, un clanqurayshite. (26). En 629, Mahomet envoya une ambassade aupres d'un phylarque romain, Harith b. Abu Shimr, ghassanide, dans l'espoir de le convertir, ce qui peut temoigner encore ne fois de bonnes relations entre Mekkois et Ghassanides (27).

Cette intimite parait bien illustree par la place qu'occupe Bostra dans l'imaginaire et la legende mekkoise. D'abord, Bostra apparait dans les textes preislamiques ou contemporains des debuts de l'Islam comme un point de repere essentiel. Bostra est le terminus de la grand voie caravaniere de la Mekke en Syrie et elle sert naturellement de point de depart pour le calcul des distances (28). La ville est decrite comme énorme et couverte de chateaux (20). Un poete, pour donner a ses auditeurs une idee de la puissance d'Omar, s'exclame: "Bostra et Gaza lui obeissent" (30).

Les legendes sur les origines islamiques reservent une place de choix a Bostra. C'est la que le prophete aurait vu pour la premiere fois reconnaitre

24. C'est la taille habituelle d'une caravane selon S.A.G. HUSAINI, *Arab Administration,* Lahore, 1959, p. 10-11, cite par A.N. SPARTOS, *Byzance au VIIeme siecle,* Neuchatel 1976, p. 257.

25. BAYDAWI, *Anwar al-tanzil wa asrar al-ta'wil,* ed. Istanbul 1296 H, t. 2, p. 240, cite par A.T. Khoury, *Les theologiens byzantins et l' Islam,* Louvain-Paris 1969, p. 18.

26. H.LAMENS, Les Chretiens de La Mecque, dans *L'Arabie Occindentale,* p. 37-38.

27. WAKIDI, *Muhammed in Medina,* trad. J. WELLHAUSEN, Berlin, 1882, p.309.

28. Cf. H. LAMMENS, *Sira,* 102, 106, cite par H.LAMMENS, *La Mecque,* p. 46-47.

29. IBN HISHAM, *Sira,* 102, 106, cite par LAMMENS, *La Mecque,* p.47.

30. HOTI'A, cite par H. LAMMENS, *La Mecque,* p.48

son destin par le moine Bahira (31). C'est a Bostra encore qu'aurait ete apporte le premier Coran en Syrie. Bostra est devenue tres töt un saint lieu musulman.

Or, les Mekkois n'auraient eu aucune raison de placer a Bostra de tels evenements s'ils n'avaient entretenu des liens privilegies avec la ville. A defaut de l'historicite des anecdotes rapportees, on peut tout de même admettre que le Hawran est familier aux Arabes du Hijaz bien avant 634-635, et que reciproquement les Hauranais connaissent bien ceux qui envahissent la : pays dans ces annees la.

Divisions et Faiblesses

Ce tableau trop idyllique doit être largement corrige sur certains points. Il serait etrange que le Hawran ait ete a l'abri des difficultes sans nombre qui s'abattirent sur le reste de la Syrie durant le Vleme : siecle et les débuts du Vlleme: invasions perses, epidemies, catastrophes naturelles, persécutions religieuses. Le Hawran n'echappe sans doute a aucun de ces fleaux mais il les subit de facon differente et, sans doute attenuee.

La prosperite du Hawran connait peut-etre au VIe siecle des accidents. Mais il ne peut etre question de definir des phases d'expansion et de recession, faute de documents appropries. Cependant, il est possible de faire quelques observations sur des phenomenes qui eurent une consequence nefaste sur l'economie hauranaise.

La peste des annees 544-547 a frappe l'Arabie byzantine comme tout l'Orient (32). On ne peut exclure *a priori* une depopulation partielle entrainant un recul de l'agriculture et des abandons de villages sur les franges les moins propices a la culture. Mais, a ma connaissance, nous n'avons aucun indice en ce sens, dans le Hawran, au contraire: la construction d'egliges dans les villages porte a croire que non seulement il n'y eut pas de'population, mais accroissement demographiquex, a moins d'admettre que toutes ces egliges sont votives! En revanche, la dépopulation peut avoir frappe les villes, dans lesquelles nous ne connaissons a peu pres aucune construction d'eglises apres la peste.

Plus serieusement, les troubles de la fin du VIe siecle et du debut de VIIe ont cause des destructions importantes. Il semble que Hawran proprement dit ait echappe a la plupart des incursions perses qui touchent la Syrie dans le courant du VIeme siecle (33). Mais la suppression du phylarchat

31. Cf. *EI*$_2$, s.v. Bahira.

32. BAR HEBRAEUS, *Chronologie*, §80.

33. La derniere en date est celle de 573 qui atteint les environs d'Antioches et ravage Apamee : P. GOUBERT, *Byzance avant l'Islam*, Paris, 1953, p.69.

ghassanide en 581 puis en 584 l'affecta directement. En 581, le phylarque Mundhir fut arrête puis exile en Sicile, le phylarchat dissous. Les tribus arabes se revofterent et pillerent la Syrie et l'Arabie, de l'Euphrate au Hawran (34). Peu importe ici les causes de la crise (35): le pillage de la region est assure. Bien que les textes soient souvent imprecis sur la localisation des villes pillees, Bostra est expressement mentionnee (36). La ville fut assiegee parce que c'etait la qu'etaient conserves les insignes du pouvoir du phylarque et le tresor qu'on lui avait confisque. Le siege se termina sans trop de dommage pour la ville elle-meme car les habitants firent pression sur le gouverneur pour qu'il donnât satisfaction aux Ghassanides. Mais le pays environnant fut pille et, même apres la levee du siége de Bostra, les fils de Mundhir continuerent "longtemps a piller et a ravager tout le pays alentour"(37).

La restauration d'un phylarchat general sous la pression des revoltes n'empecha pas sa suppression definitive des 584. Quels furent les effets de cette mesure? Les Ghassanides avaient, jusqu'alors, assure la defense de l'Arabie en empêchant les nomades de razzier les sedentaires, et en tenant les Lakhmides a distance. N'y avait-il pas un risque, desormais, que les uns et les autres trourenth la voie libre? Des tribus arabes resterent au service de Byzance: les Godamites controlent la zone frontiere entre le Hijaz et l'Empire (38); des Ghassanides sont encore installes entre Aila et Damas, et au-dela. Mais le morcellement de la puissance des phylarques risque de nuire a leur efficacite (39).

L'invasion perse de 610-611, qui atteint la Syrie du Sud en 613 ou 614 provoqua sans doute des destructions. Des combats eurent lieu entre Bostra et Adraha (40). Mais il est possible que les consequences aient ete bien moindres dans le Hawran que dans d'autres regions de Syrie. Ainsi, en Syrie du Nord et en Apamene, G. Tchalenko a fait remarquer que l'occupation perse de 610-611 avait provoque une desorganisation des economiques. La Syrie du Nord a besoin d'un acces a la Mediterranee pour

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34. P.GOUBERT, *ibid.*, p. 253; *Trois Etudes,* p.189-191.
35. Trois Etudes, p. 189-190.
36. JEAN D'ASIE, *Histoire ecclesiatique,* III, 42.
37. JEAN D'ASIE, *ibid.,* III, 42.
38. Cf. H.LAMMENS, L'ancienne frontiere entre la Syrie et le Higaz, dans *l'Arabie occidentale,* Beyrouth, 1926, p. 320.
39. *Trois Etudes,* p. 191-192.
40. BAYDAWI, cite n. 24.

son commerce, notamment pour ecouler son huile et son ble (41). L'occupation perse aurait provoque une interruption des exportations d'huile du Massif Calcaire et la descente des villageois des montagnes vers les plaines cerealieres, où ils pouvaient retrouver une activite qui leur permette de vivre (42).

A ces remarques concernant la vie des campagnes, J. Ch. Balty a ajoute quelques observations au sujet des villes, notamment Apamee (43). Les atteintes portees a l'economie urbaine durant le VIe siecle, la montee des violences religieuses, les invasions perses de 610 surtout, ont provoque une fuite des notables vers l'Ouest, l'Asie Mineure peutêtre mais surtout Rome et l'Occident (44). Parallelement, les villageois des environs occupent sans violence les grandes demeures urbaines abandonnees. La ruralisation des grandes cites hellenistiques et romaines commence (45).

La situation du Hawran risque d'etre assez differente. Nous igonorons l'importance de son commerce en direction de la Mediterranee. Toutes les indications relevees plus haut concernent le Sud, C'est-a-dire le Hijâz. Même si Bostra jouait un role dans la redistribution des produits d'Arabie en direction de la Palestine et de la Syrie, l'invasion perse n'avait aucune raison de porter atteinte a ce trafic. La conquête perse ne rompt ni l'unite du marché syro-palestinien, ni les liens avec l'Arabie; elle cherche seulement a briser les liens avec ce qui restait sous domination byzantine.

La question se posa naturellement de la même facon lors de l'invasion musulmane de 634-635. Les archeologues ont observe que cette conquête

41. G. TCHALENKO, *Villages antiques de la Syrie du Nord*, t.I, Paris, 1953, p. 429-430, note que les malheurs des villes , notemment ceux d'Antioche, n'affectent pas la prosperite du Massif Calcaire; preuve que sa prosperite reposait deja davantage sur les exportations lointaines par la Mediterranee que sur ses lines avec le bas pays tout proche.

42. On observe, selon G. TCHALENKO, *O.c.* p. 433, un arret brutal des constructions dans le Massif Calcaire a parir des annees 610. La cause n'en est pas due a un saccage du pays par les Perses mais a leur volonte de rompore tous les liens avec l'empire byzantin; d'ou l'effondrement du commerce (p.434-435), ce qui provoqua la descente des villageois vers les plaines (p. 437).

43. J.Ch. BALTY, Notes sur l'habitat romain, byzantin et arabe d'Apamee. Rapport de Synthese, dans *Colloque Apamee de Syrie, Bilan des recherches* archeologiques 1973-1979, Bruxelles 29-31 mai 1980, Bruxelles 1984, p. 497-501.

44. Cf. pour un point particulier J.M. SANTERRE, les moines grecs et orientaux a Rome aux epoques byzantines et carolingiennes (milieu du VIe s.-fin du IXe s.), Memoires de l'Academie royale de Belgique, Classe des Lettres, 66/1, Bruxelles 1983, p.17-21; plus general : S. BORSARI, Le migrazione d' all 'Oriente in Italia nel VII secolo, Parola del Passato, 6, 1951n p.138.

45. Cf. Ch. BALTY, *o.c.*, p. 500-501.

aggravait rapidement les perturbations causees par l'invasion perse dans l'economie agricole et commerciale du Nord et du Centre de la Syrie. Le Hawran ne peut souffrir des mêmes maux : sa tradition commerciale en direction du Hijaz ne peut que profiter du changement politique et de l'integration dans un ensemble groupant a la fois la Syrie et l'Arabie peninsulaire. Il est en tout cas peut-etre revelateur que l'on n'observe pas dans le Hawran l'arret des constructions signale par G. Tchalenko dans le Massif Calcaire des 609-610 (46).

Aux effets involontaires des invasions perses puis musulmanes s'ajoutent ceux de la crise religieuse qui affecte tout l'Orient syrien et egyptien. Depuis le retablissement des eveques chalcedoniens par Justin en 518, le clerge monophysite est generalement pourchasse, persecute, exile, malgré des periodes de repit (47). Pourtant, les fideles subsistent nombreux dans les campagnes. De ce point de vue, le Hawran ne differe pas du reste de la Syrie. Cependant les monophysites beneficient la de protecteurs puissants: les emirs ghassanides. Non seulement ceux-ci accordent leur aide aux nombreux monasteres monophysites du Hawran occidental (48), mais ils ont obtenu en 542 le retablissement d'une hierarchie episcopale, avec la consecration de Jacques Barradai et de Theodore, ce dernier exercant sa charge au camp meme des phylarques (49).

Malgre ce soutien officiel, il faut bien reconnaitre que rien, dans les inscriptions, ne permet de deceler l'influence du monophysisme : les consecrations d'eglises, les dedicaces de mosaiques, paraissent parfaitement orthodoxes (50). Le clerge chalcedonien, dont le chef est le metropolite de Bostra, n'est pas confine dans les villes episcopales : des eveques de Bostra consacrent des eglises a Imtan (51), a Kh.Samra (52) et Rihab (53).

46. G. TCHALENKO, *o.c.*, p. 433, n.4; l'observation vaut aussi pour la region basaltique a l'Est de Chalcis et pour l'Emesene.

47. Cf. H.I. MARROU et J. DANIELOU, *Nouvelle Histoire de l'Eglise*, Paris, 1963, p.2

48. Cf. La liste dans la *Lettre des Archimandrites d'Arabie*, ci-dessus, n. 13; carte des monasteres dans *Trois Etudes*, carte 5, *in fine*.

49. Cf. *Bostra*, p.; sur la question jacobite en genral, cf. H.I. MARROU et J. DANIELOU, *o.c.*, p.

50. Cf. M.Piccirillo, La Vie des eglises de Joranie revelees par des mosaiques; *MBible*, 35, 1984, p.6.

51. M. DUNAND, Nouvelles inscriptions grecques et latines du Hauran et du Djebel Druze, *RB*, 42, 1933, p.246-247, n 198.

52. Un archevêque de Bostra est mentionne sans precision a Samra par J.B. HUMBERT et A. DESREUMAUX, *M.Bible*, 35, 1984, p. 14.

53. Cf. M. PICCIRILLO, *Chiese*, p.89.

L'occupation perse des annees 614-629 s'est traduite par un triomphe des monophysites et une persecution des chalcedoniens (54), le cas le mieux connu etant celui de l'Egypt ou la population rurale reserva le meilleur accueil aux Perses (55).

On ne peut douter que l'accueil fut identique dans le Hawran et que les Perses durent chercher de la meme facon a delivrer le pays des representants de l'autorite imperiale, lorsqu'ils n'avaient pas fui par avance (56). Or, les textes de Rihab prouvent que l'archevêque de Bostra ne quitta pas le Hawran : Polyeuctos, deja en place en 594, consacre des eglises a Rihab en 620 (57) et en 623(58). A moins d'imaginer que Polyeuctos est un eveque monophysite installe a Rihab comme concurrent de l'eveque chalcedonien de Bostra, ou que chalcedonien, il est alors refugie a Rihab parce que les Perses ont installe un monophysite a sa place a Bostra, il faut admettre que l'archevêque de Bostra circule librement dans son diocese et continue a y consacrer des eglises. En tout cas, le formulaire employe dans les eglises de Rihab ne laisse pas entrevoir la moindre deviation par rapport a l'orthodoxie bien que l'on doive reconnaitre le caractere stereotype de certaines formules qui pouvaient faire l'accord des monophysites comme des chalcedoniens.

La liberte d'action dont jouit l'archeveque de Bostra, s'il est bien chalcedonien (59), tranche avec la situation de ses collegues de Syrie, de Palestine ou d'Egypte a la même epoque et laisse supposer une certaine paix religieuse dans le Hawran.

Les Arabes du Hawran rejoignirent sans difficulte les armees musulmanes lors de la conquete. Des Arabes chretiens avaient guide les premiers raids de 634 - (60). Lors de la bataille du Yarmouk, la cavalerie ghassanide de Djabala b. al-Ayyam changea de camp pour passer du cote

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54. Des eveques sont deportes; ainsi en Egypte et a Jerusalem.

55. A. BASILIEV, Histoire de l'Empire byzantin, Paris, 1932, p. 259; A.N. STRATOS, Byzance au VIIeme siecle, Neuchatel 1976, p. 111-114.

56. Ainsi a Alexandrie : A.N. STRATOS, *o.c.*, p. 113.

57. M. PICCIRILLO, *Chiese*, p. 73, n 3.

58. M. PICCIRILLO, *Chiese, p.80, n 7.*

59. *Comme Polyeuctos est deja en place en 659, on ne peut guere le considerer comme un monophysite installe par les Perses; de plus, depuis a moindrissement de la puissance ghassanide, il n'y a guere de raisons pour qu'un evêque monophysite ait pu s'installer impunement a Bostra.*

60. *Trois Etudes*, p. 197.

musulman (61). Faut-il invoquer des raisons politiques, ethniques, religieuses ou les trois a la fois? Les relations nouees depuis longtemps avec les Mekkois, les desillusions politiques et la degradations des rapports avec les autorites imperiales, l'attachement au monophysisme combattu officiellement, tout cela a dû contribuer au ralliement des Ghassanides commes d'autres Arabes du Hawran. Mais force est de constater qu'economiquement, l'integration du Hawran a l'Arabic nouvelle etait une realite depuis longtemps.

Conclusion

La situation du Hawran a la veille de la conquete islamique semble paradoxale par rapport a ce que l'on observe ailleurs en Syrie a la même epoque. Ni la crise religieuse, ni la crise economique n'y entrainent les consequences que l'on connait ailleurs. Parce que le monophysisme a joui d'une position privilegiee, quasi officielle, dans le Hawran, en raison de la protection des phylarques ghassanides, on s'attendrait a le voir triompher sans peine lors de l'invasion perse puis de la conquete musulmane : or c'est un archevêque chalcedonien que l'on voit a l'oeuvre, dans les annees 620 comme 635, consacrant de nouvelles eglises aux frontieres de son evêche. Sur le plan economique, on ne peut guere apprecier les consequences de l'invasion perse, ni celles de l'occupation musulmane. Mais force est de constater qu'une part importante, peut-etre même l'essentiel des echanges du Hawran se fait des la fin du VIe siecle en direction de l'Arabie : la rupture avec la Mediterranee ne peut donc avoir pour l'agriculture hauranaise les consequences irremediables observees en Syrie du Nord. Restait a apprecier l'importance de la fuite des notables, si grave ailleurs. Mais on remarquera que les notables hauranais comptent dans leurs rangs les phylarques arabes et que, d'une facon generale, l'onomastique revele une forte arabisation du Hawran depuis longtemps, bien avant le VIIé siecle (62). En dehors des fonctionnaires imperiaux, bien peu de gens avaient des raisons de fuir devant les nouveaux venus avec lesquels on entretenait depuis si longtemps de bons rapports.

61. THEOPHANES, *Chronographie*, p. 338.

62. Cf. *Bostra*,p. 141 - 148.

The Origins of the Qays-Yaman Dispute in Bilad al-Sham

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The long-running dispute between the tribal groups of Qays on one hand and Yaman on the other, is a major feature of the history of the Umayyad period, not just in *Bilad al-Sham,* where the conflict seems to have originated, but throughout the Isalmic world. It was one of the main reasons for the weakening and eventual collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate as different members of the ruling family took sides in the dispute and fought against each other. Yet the origins of this conflict remain something of a puzzle. There seems to be no evidence of hostility between Qays and Yaman in the period of the *Jahiliyya* or during the early Islamic conquests, but at Marj Rahit in 65/684 the two parties fought a savage battle which resulted in the defeat of Qays, with many casualties, and a feud which was to divide the Arabs of *Bilad al-Sham* for generations.

The Arabic sources describe the conflict in genealogical terms, assuming that it was the difference between the northern (Qays) Arabs and the southern (Yaman) Arabs, each descended from a common ancestor, which caused the hostility between the two groups. But this does not explain why this conflict suddenly developed during the Umayyad period and there is some evidence that the genealogical framework was elaborated to explain the conflict, rather than being the cause of it. Recently attempts have been made to provide a political explanation. M.A. Shaban has suggested that Qays and Yaman were more like political parties than tribal groups, Qays being those who supported the policies of the famous governor of Iraq, al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī, and Yaman being those who opposed them. The policies supported by Qays were the continued expansion of the Muslim empire and the exclusion of non-Arabs from positions of power while Yaman, Shaban argues, were in favour of halting the expansion and of integrating non Arab converts into the *umma* and allowing them the same rights as Arab Muslims. There is probably some truth in this point of view, at least as far as the later Umayyad period is concerned, but the conflict began before al-Hajjaj became governor so Shaban's explanation, by itself, will not explain the dispute. We have to accept that the division may have changed its character as it spread beyond the area of *Bilad al-Sham* first to Iraq and then to Khurāsān where new issues became important and local alliances and grievances determined the attitudes of various leaders.

This paper will concentrate on the formation of the Yaman party in *Bilad al-Sham* in the years before the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ and try to see what the members of this group had in common and why they fought

together against Qays. To discover the origins of the party, we have to look at the population of *Bilad al-Sham* before the Muslim conquest.

In many areas, *Bilad al-Sham* was already an Arab country before the Islamic conquests. Obviously this is not true for all districts; there were Greek speaking people in the cities and the coastal areas, Aramaic or Syriac speaking people in the villages and, according to the Arabic sources, a number of Persians who had remained behind after the Persian armies had retreated. Having said that, however, there can be no doubt that the century before the Muslim conquest, from about 540 onwards, had seen the Arabisation of many areas, including much of Palestine, the area of the modern kingdom of Jordan and the districts around Damascus, Chalcis (Qinnasrīn) and Aleppo (Ḥalab). These Arabs were mostly Christian and many of them were allied to the Byzantines and it is possible that as many Arabs fought for the Byzantines at the decisive battle of Yarmūk as fought for the Muslims. These native Arabs of *Bilad al-Sham* were determined to preserve their pastures and lands after the Muslim conquest and to play a part in the army and government of the country. We must begin our investigation by seeing who these native Arabs were and where they lived.

In the south of Palestine and Jordan lay the territories of the realted tribes of Judhām and Lakhm, although it seems that Judhām had largely absorbed the Lakhm of Palestine by this time. The attitudes of Judhām to the Muslim conquerors was divided; some of them like Qays b. Zayd seem to have allied with the invaders, others like the family of Rawḥ b. Zinbāʿ remained faithful to the Byzantine alliance. Farwa b. ʿAmr al-Judhāmī is said to have been Byzantine governor of the Maʿan area of Jordan before he was converted to Islam. It is probable however, that the bulk of the tribe supported the Byzantines; certainly they were among the Arabs who defeated the first Muslim expedition to *Bilad al-Sham* at Mu'ta and many of them fought in the Byzantine army at the battle of Yarmūk. It was probably only after the final withdrawal of the Byzantines from the area that Lakhm and Judhām accepted the authority of the Muslim state.

In the Balqā area were found the Balī, one of whom, Mālik b. b. Zāfila, was commander of the Arab contingent who fought for the Byzantines at Mu'ta, and there were members of the tribe in the Byzantine army on the Yarmūk. In the same area, slightly to the east, were the lands of the Ba'l-Qayn, another group which supplied contingents to the Byzantine army on the Yarmūk. Further to the north, in the lands north and south of Damascus, the Banu Ghassān were found. The position of the Ghassanid phylarchs who had guarded the desert frontier of Syria for the Byzantines in the sixth century had been undermined by the policies of the Emperors of the late sixth century and then by the Sassanian occupation, but the tribe remained numerous and the last Ghassanid chief from the old ruling house

of Jafna, Jabala b. Ayham was the leading Arab commander in the Byzantine army which fought on the Yarmūk.

To the east of these tribes lay the lands of Kalb, perhaps the most numerous and widely ranging of the tribes of *Bilad al-Sham*. They were found as far east as the borders of Iraq, and their territories stretched from the oasis of Dumat al-Jandal in the south to Palmyra (Tadmur) in the north. Associated with them, in the Dumat al-Jandal Oasis at least, were elements of the great scuth Arabian tribe of Kinda, notably the "king" of Dumat al-Jandal who came from the Kindi group of Sakūn. The relations of these tribes to the Byzantine Empire was much less close than that of Ghassān or Judhām. Nonetheless, as Professor Shahid has shown, the Byzantines had had diplomatic relations with Kinda in the sixth century and the Ghassanids had had alliances with Kalb. Elements of both these tribes, including leading families of both Kinda and Kalb, had been converted to Christianity, and while none of them seem to have been found among the Byzantine forces at the battle of Yarmuk, they did not join the Muslim army either, and played no part in the Islamic conquest of *Bilad al-Sham*.

Further to the north, around Qinnasrin and Ḥalab, there were many Arabs from Tanūkh, the oldest established of the Arab tribes in *Bilad al-Sham*. Many of them were settled by this time and they played only a minor part in the politics of the Umayyad period.

In general, then, there were many Arabs, both settled and nomadic, in *Bilad al-Sham* before the Islamic conquest. Many of these were allies of the Byzantines and actively opposed the Muslim invaders, while others seem to have been neutral; very few of them joined the Muslim armies during the wars of conquest. It was these Arabs who were to form the core of the Yaman party in Umayyad times.

The Islamic conquest of *Bilad al-Sham* meant that these indigenous Arabs lost power. The conquerors came from groups which were not previously settled in the country, like Ḥabīb b. Maslama al-Fihrī, al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays al-Fihrī and 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Khālid b. al-Walīd al-Makhzūmī, all from clans of Quraysh, or Abū'l-Awfar al-Sulamī and Simṭ b. al-Aswad al-Kindī, who had no known connection with *Bilad al-Sham* before the conquest. It was these men who became the closest advisers of Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān when he became first governor of Syria, and then Caliph, but he seems to have begun to win over the native Arab people. We can see this in the lists of commanders who supported Muʿāwiya at the battle of Siffīn in 37/657. Most of the leaders were men who had arrived with the conquest, but in the detailed lists of participants given by Naṣr b. Muzahim and Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ we find some representatives of the pre-conquest population of Syria, Ḥubaysh b. Dulja of Ba'l-Qayn, who commanded the men of al-Urdunn, Yazīd b. Abī'l-Nims and the Ghassān of

al-Urdunn and Nātil b. Qays al-Judhāmī over the Lakhmis and Judhāmīs of Palestine. Yazīd b. Abi'l-Nims did not come from the house of Jafna, which had been the pre-Islamic ruling house of Ghassan, but from the related clan of Kaʿb, which seems to have taken over t he leadership of the tribe when Jabala b. Ayham had gone over to the Byzantines. Natīl b. Qays was leader of the section of Judhām which supported the Muslims at the time of the conquest. The most important of these commanders, however, was Ḥassān b. Mālik b. Baḥdal al-Kalbī. As has already been mentioned, Kalb were one of the most powerful of the Arab tribes of *Bilad al-Sham* in pre-Islamic times, and the house of Baḥdal b. Unayf was one of its leading families. Bahdal, who was probably still alive at the time of Siffin, was a Christian, but Hassan was a Muslim. Baḥdal's daughter, Maysun, had married Muʿāwiya and this consolidated the political position of the family,-and the fact that she was the mother of the heir to the throne, Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya, put her relatives in a very strong position. All this was still in the future at the time of Siffīn, when the leadership was still in the hands of the conqueror.

Despite the fact that Muʿāwiya became Caliph and *Bilād al-Sham* the centre of government of the entire Muslim world, we know very little of the internal affairs of the country during his reign, because the Arab chroniclers gave most of their attention to affairs in Iraq and Knurasan. As far as we can tell, however, power rested largely with the descendents of the conquerors. The campaigns against the Byzantines, for example, were seldom led by indigenous Arab *ashrāf,* but rather by men like ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b.Khālid or Busr b. Arṭāt, both Qurashis who had arrived in the Muslim armies. One of the few exceptions was Mālik b. Hubayra al-Sakūnī. Sakūn were a branch of Kinda who were to become very influential in the Yaman party. How they achieved this position is not entirely clear. None of them seem to have taken part in the wars of conquest, but from the year 46/666 Mālik was to lead frequent expeditions against the Byzantines, and it seems that a woman from the clan married Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya and was the mother of the young prince Khālid b. Yazīd.

The most important change in the Arab population of *Bilad al-Sham* during Mu'awiya's reign was the arrival of large numbers of tribemen from the Hijaz and central Arabia, notably from the tribes of Sulaym, ʿUqayl and Kilāb. They settled in the Jazira at first, but soon moved west and began to dominate the area around Hims and Qinnasrin. By Yazīd's reign one of them, Zufar b. al-Ḥārith al-Kilābī, was appointed governor of Hims. These new arrivals threatened the position of the indigenous Arabs but until the death of Yazīd relations were peaceful.

We can get another glimpse of the composition of the elite of *Bilad al-Sham* in accounts of the mission sent by Yazīd to demand the oath of allegiance from Ibn al-Zubayr in Makka. Among them were the two rival

leaders of Judhām, Nātil b. Qays and Rawḥ b.Zinbāʿ, two Sakuni leaders, the veteran Mālik b. Ḥubayra and a newcomer, Ḥuṣayn b. Numayr, and Ziml b. ʿAmr from the ʿUdhra tribe of Jordan and the northern Hijaz. There was also Zufar b. al-Ḥārith al-Kilābī and the last surviving veteran of Muʿāwiya's early days, al-Daḥḥāk b. Qays of Quraysh, soon to be tragically caught up in the dispute between Qays and Kalb. It is interesting to note that neither at Ṣiffīn nor at this time does there seem to have been any hostility between those who were to form the Qays and Yaman parties, and they all seem to have cooperated in the service of the Umayyads and of *Bilad al-Sham*. Five years after the mission to Ibn al-Zubayr such cooperation would have been impossible, and the lost unity was never regained.

After these negotiations broke down, Ibn al-Zubayr sent an army commanded by Muslim b. ʿUqba against him, an army which defeated Ibn al-Zuabyr's supporters at the battle of Harra outside Madina, when many members of old Muslim families were killed. We know little of the composition of the Umayyad force, but it may have been recruited largely from the Arabs of al-Urdunn and Palestine, since Muslim appointed Ḥuṣayn b.Numayr al-Sakūnī as his successor and Rawḥ b. Zinbāʿ al-Judhāmī as his governor in Madina. This shows the growing importance of the Yamani tribes in the Umayyad forces, and the rights and wrongs of the expedition to Harra was one of the issues which divided the Yamanis from their opponents in the years to come.

Muʿāwiya II, the sickly and short lived son of the Caliph Yazīd, died in 64/683. The question of the succession to the Caliphate was open. The Umayyads and their supporters were in deep disarry, with no obvious candidate to turn to, while Ibn al-Zubayr had proclaimed himself Caliph in Makka. The events which followed are well known; how ʿUbayd Allah b. Ziyād, expelled from Basra, made his way to Syria and persuaded the Umayyads to stand firm, and how the senior Marwān b. al-Ḥakam, father of the great ʿAbd al-Malik, was eventually chosen as the Umayyad candidate. But ʿUbayd Allah himself had no body of supporters and the Umayyad cause was saved by Ḥassān b. Mālik b. Baḥdal. Ḥassān and his family had prospered under Yazīd's rule. He himself had been appointed governor of Palestine and al-Urdunn, his brother Saʿīd b.Mālik governor of Qinnasrīn, while his cousin Ḥumayd b. al-Ḥārith b. Baḥdal was in command of Yazīd's *shurṭa*. With Muʿāwiya b. Yazīd's death, he was faced by threats to this privileged position; in Palestine Nātil b. Qays arrived from Makka to take control of Judhām in the name of Ibn al-Zubayr; in Damascus the last of the old guard, al-Daḥḥāk b.Qays, came out, ratner hesitantly, in favour of Ibn al-Zubayr. What made al-Daḥḥāk's move especially dangerous was that he looked for support not to Ḥassān and his

followers but to others, notably the new governor of Qinnasrin, Zufar b. al-Ḥārith al-Kilābī.

Faced by these threats, Ḥassān established himself in the area in which he could count on most support, at Jābiya in the Jawlan, south-west of Damascus, the centre from which the Ghassanid *phylarchs* had organized the frontiers of the Byzantine empire in the previous century. Here he held a court, a *shūra,* to determine the future of the Caliphate. He was joined by the Sakūnī leaders, Mālik b. Hubayra and Ḥuṣayn b. Numayr, by the rival leader of Judhām, Rawḥ b. Zinbāʿ, and Ziml b. ʿAmr al-ʿUdhrī. Along with the *ashrāf* he was joined by many others, notably from Kalb and the people of Adhri'āt and al-Balqā who answered his call. Thus was the nucleus of the Yamani party formed.

Meanwhile in Damascus, too, divisions were appearing. Al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays conducted prayers in the name of Ibn al-Zubayr, but at a famous meeting in the mosque, known to history as the Yawm Jayrūn, a letter from Ḥassān b.Baḥdal extolling the claims of Marwān was read out and received some public support, from the Umayyad al-Walīd b. ʿUqba, the Ghassanid chief Yazīd b. Abi'l-Nims and the Kalbi Sufyān b. al-Abrad. Such was the strength of feeling that al-Dahhak b. Qays, according to one account, was prepared to go to Ḥassān at Jābiya and accept the Umayyad succession but was dissuaded by Thawr b. Maʿn al-Sulamī, who described Ḥassān contemptuously as an ʿArābī who simply wanted to appoint his nephew as Caliph.

In the event, al-Dahhak left the city for Marj Rāhiṭ, to await his supporters from the north of *Bilad al-Sham.* In doing so, he allowed the Ghassanid Ibn Abi'l-Nims to take over the city in the name of Marwan. In the battle which followed al-Ḍaḥḥāk and his followers were decisively defeated, and the division between the Yamanis and their enemies became established and, as it porved, irreconcilable.

The composition of the Yamani group in *Bilad al-Sham* at the time of the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ was roughly as follows : Kalb, Sakūn of Kinda, Ghassan, Lakhm and Judhām led by Rawḥ b. Zinbāʿ, and at least some elements of Ba'l-Qayn and Banu ʿUdhra (Ziml b. ʿAmr al-ʿUdhri attended the *shura* at Jabiya, Ḥubaysh b. Dalja al-Qaynī led four thousand men against Ibn al-Zubayr on Marwān's orders immediately after Marj Rāhiṭ).

What, then, united the members of this group? In the short term, they were all people who had benefitted from the Caliphate of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya and wished to retain the salaries and privileges they had acquired. In addition, Sakun also wanted permission to settle in the Balqā area. But there were more important long term factors as well. The first was geographical : the tribes who formed the Yaman group were all

established in the provinces of al-Urdunn and Palestine, mostly in the areas to the east of the Jordan and the Wadi ʿAraba, Adhriʾāt, al-Balqā, al-Sharāt and the extreme north of the Hijaz. The second unifying factor was that most of these groups had been in the area *before* the Muslim conquests; unlike the Qurashis who served Muʿāwiya, or the Qaysi tribes who had moved into the Jazira and the north of *Bilad al-Sham,* they were old established residents. The third factor was that none of these groups had joined the armies of the Muslim conquest; on thed contrary, many of them had served as allies of the Byzantines, both at Mu'ta and at the battle of the Yarmūk. Fourtnly, many of them had been at least partially converted to Christianity in Byzantine times. This does not mean that the Yamani party was pro-Christian or anti-Muslim in any way, since it would seem that all the leaders at least were Muslims by this stage; it did nowever, give them something in common.

In some ways, Ḥassān b. Mālik, when he gatnered his supporters at Jabiya was attempting to reconstruct the Ghassanid federation of the sixth century, not as a way of reversing the Muslim conquest, but to assert the rights of the indigenous Arab tribes of the southern part of *Bilad al Sham* against new-comers from Arabia.

The formation of the Yaman party has a wider significance for the history of *Bilad al-Sham.* It was an occasion on which the people of the area of modern Jordan decided the fate of the whole Islamic world. Without them, the Umayyad Caliphate would certainly have perished. It might also lead us to consider the archaeological evidence in a new light. Both the chrches of the Umayyad period, described by Father Piccirillo at the last session of this conference, and the architectural work emerging at such sites as Qasr Hallabat, Qastal and Amman, are a consequence of the power and prosperity of this area at this time, and should perhaps be ascribed, not to members of the Umayyad family, but rather to the great *ashrāf* of the area who came to form the Yaman party.

The Attitude of the Jews and Their Role Towards the Arab-Islamic Conquest of Bilad al-Sham

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It should not be surprising that a community with the status of a minority group under an imperial rule, regarded as oppressive will be delighted by the fact that their oppressors are attacked from outside and will try, at least partially, to ally themselves with the agressor in order to improve their own situation. Indeed it should be far more surprising if reports of such historical events fail to mention occurrences like this. Therefore you should not be surprised when I claim that the lack of direct evidence of the role of Palestinian Jewry during the Muslim conquest is not necessarily a sufficient reason for excluding any involvement on their part in the exciting events of those years. Hints, allusions and indirect indications in the sources provide us with a clearer picture.

The Jewish inhabitants of Palestine had already shown the political attitude described above towards the Persian invaders. Suffering from Emperor Phokos' attempts to compel the Jews to convert (Schafer 206), they had to see that their conditions under the new Emperor Heraclius (who came to power 610) would change for the better when, in the year 614, the Persians conquered Jerusalem, a massacre of the Christian population occurred. The Persians afterwards put the government of the city into the hands of Jews ((Sebeus, Kap. XXIV; Couret (1896) 29; the role of the Jews cf. Peeters (1920) 147)). Christian sources naturally emphasize the role of the Jews as ruthless persecuters of Christians ((Strategius aus Mar Saba, ed. Peeters 95ff)), whereas Jewish sources reflect the aspirations occasioned by the brief Jewish rule over Jerusalem. ((Schäfer 209)). As a matter of fact, the Persian conquest of Akko one year later would not have been possible without the help of its Jewish inhabitants.

In consequence, when Byzantine rule over Palestine was reestablished the Jews, accused of having helped the invaders, suffered heavy restrictions. The Jewish community of Jerusalem was expelled ((Theoph. 1/328)) and many were murdered ((Eutych. 3/1089-91)) without the intervention of the Byzantine authorities. The harsh venegeance of the Byzantine rulers for Jewish partiality was not only felt in Palestine. Similiar events are attested for Edessa ((Agap. 339.)) The Armenian chronicle ascribed to Sebeos ((p.94)) mentions the exodus of the Jews of Edessa. Emperor Heraclius also forced prominent families of the Syrian-Orthodox community, who were regarded as heretics and accused of

collaboration with the Persians, to leave their home town (Barhebr. 1/125f.). And in 632 Heraclius ordered the conversion of all Byzantine Jewry ((Michel 2/414)),a threat which was probably regarded as even more serious than expulsion.

Thus on the eve of the Muslim conquest of Palestine the Jews had reasons enough to yearn for salvation and to consider any weakening of the Byzantine Empire as a possible change for the better. The words that the converted Jew Ka'b addressed to Umar in Jerusalem, as reported by Raǧa ibn Ḥaiwa ((Tab 1/2409)), reflect this sentiment. Against this background the question quite naturally arises whether there was a Jewish engagement during the conquest or not. In the past the answer to this was withheld because the sources seemed too poor ((cf. Dubnow §55)). Crone and Cooke, in their recent attempt to re-interpret early Islamic history — on a very polemic foundation, — dealt mainly — what they call "the messianic aspect of the conquest" ((Hag. 6)). Contemporary Jewish historiography rejects the very idea of a relation between Muslim conquerors and Jewish inhabitants. Here we confine ourselves to the reconstruction of historical events, and in evaluating factual information geared from the sources we shall focus on three aspects :

I. Indications of a real and quantifiable help given by the Palestinian Jewry to the Muslim conquerors are very scarce. Balāḏurī furnishes us with the information ((Fut. 158)) that up to the time of Yazīd ibn Mu'āwiya the Samaritans had been exempted from paying poll-tax as a recompense for their help as spies ('Uyūn) und guides (adillā'). Also Balāḏurī tells us that it was a Jew who revealed to the Muslims a secret entry into the city of Caesarea ((Fut. 141)), which enabled them to end the long and tedious siege. Since this treachery is not mentioned elsewhere in the sources, it could be a topos of Arabic historical writing ((Noth 150)) rather than the report of a real historic event. However, Balāḏurī's report might find some confirmation in a Greek text which, although of a polemical, anti-Jewish character, — mentions the joy of Jews in Caesarea, when they heard about the Muslim's victory over the Byzantine general Sergius. ((Didaskalie 86; Sergius : cf. Caetani 3/13a.H. 54)).

II. With this last point we are already on much more fertile ground. Because apart from a vague reference to a messenger, who came to warn the Muslims against the approaching Roman army and who sent by "ahl Iliya"— pobably Christians, because the Jews had been expelled from Jerusalem —, we have no more reports about direct Jewish engagement ((Azdi 158)). We can say however, about the political attitude of those subject to the Byzantine rule. al-Azdi, who underlines in his Futuh the religious character of the conquest, implying the moral superiority of the conqerors, is the main testimony among Muslim Arab authors of the readiness to accept the new Arab power. The very different partiality of the

inhabitants of Bilad al-Sham is explained by the words of a converted Roman, who speaks about three kinds of subject (Azdi 150) : One kind (of subjects) were of the relegion of the Arabs and were with them; one kind were serious Christians, and were with us; one kind were less serious Christians who said : we don't want to fight against people of our religion and don't want to help the aliens (al- adjam) against our people either (qaum). It was probably, especially from this latter group, Syrian Monophysite Christians, that message were sent to the Muslims, always following al-Azdi ((p.97)), expressing the hope for Muslim justice and denouncing the Byzantine tyranny. A similiar attitude is reoported in the same source about "those who were not firm in their religion" i.e. in the Christian-Orthodox creed : as inhabitants of Syrian cities they did not comply with the request to fight the Muslim ivaders (Azdi 36)).

But more compelling than these reports, which might be influenced by al-Azdi's vision of an Islamic conquest, is the prudent behavior of the Muslims. Before they withdrew and retreated to the south in preparation for the decisive battle of Yarmouk, they restored the taxes that they had taken from the conquered Jewish cities in Syria. ((Bal. Fut. 137; Abu Yusuf, K. al-Kharadj 81)). The reaction was grateful, and the Jews of Ḥimṣ distinguished themselves by promising to prevent the Byzantines from reestablishing their rule over the city. Nevertheless Ibn al-ʿAtam ((1/229) reoports how the general of the Roman army, Māhān (Bāhān), reproaches the inhabitants of Ḥimṣ for their submissiveness to the Muslim conquerors. This seems to be included here merely to show how they could, in response, refer to the lack of protection by the Byzantine forces that were supported by their taxes. In this context should also be mentioned the notices that Baladuri and the anonymous Syrian Chronicle devote to the submissiveness of the inhabitants of the Syrian cities and the joy of the Damascene people at the return of the Muslims ((Bal. Fut. 131f.; Syr. Chr. 196)).

On the other hand, there are reports that cannot easily be dismissed as untrustworthy, about atrocities committed by the Muslim conquerors among the Christian population ((f.i. Chron.Min. 148)). The patriarch of Jerusalem, Sophronius describes the invading Muslims as horrible and cruel barbarians ((Analekta Hier. 5/167f.)). It might be due to this polemic spirit, that in the abovementioned Christian confession (Didaskalie) the Jews are said "to have mixed" with the Arabs. ((Didas. Iak. 86)). But the author was contemporary to the events ((F. Nau, Intr. 715)), which might point twoards a realistic rather than a fantastic view of their role. At any rate, this short survey make us aware of the wide gap between the views held by the representatives of Byzantine rule in Bilād al-Shām, and the varied interests of its population. This gap is the playground for partiality and activities favorable to the Muslim conquerors.

III. The third aspect of our inquiry into the position of the Jews during the events that changed the political landscape of Bilād al-Shām leads us right to the heart of Palestine and to the center of our question : Bait al-Muqaddas. When the Muslims finally entered the city they probably did not meet any Jews there. They had already been expelled (s. above). Now Ṭabarī's transmission includes a report, saying that ʿUmar's treaty with the people of Jerusalem assured them the amān and forbade the Jews to live in Jerusalem ((Tab. 1/2405)). The credibility of this report has been disputed by the - futile - argument that it is taken from Saif ibn 'Umar, who would have a special inclination for embellishment ((Gotein in E.I.s.v. Quds)). The Christian writers who also mention or repeat this notice ((Syr.Chron. 199; Michel Transl. 2/425; Agap. 382)) give this element of the treaty the sense of confirmation and continuation of a already existing regulation. In this sense consent to the demand of the Christians is very possible. But it seems that on the Muslim side this agreement was not understood as a definite regulation. On the contrary, I am inclined to believe the notices in some sources, that the Jewish population reestablished itself in Jerusalem under the protection of the Muslims. Sebeos even speaks of their plan to restore their temple ((p. 102-103; cf. Caetani 3/17a.H.§144)). He also states (p.103) that the Muslims appointed a Jewish governor over Jerusalem. But the author of this chronicle, ending with the year 661, obviously pursues the idea of a close cooperative relationship and between Jews and Muslim Arabs. If there was no confirmation by other authors, we could not rely on his version. But a short report by Michel the Syrian ((Transl. 2/431f.; c.f. Caetani 3/a.H.17 §145)) relates that when the Muslims undertook the construction of the "temple of Salomon", as he puts it, an accident occurred in the year 18 Higra; the Jews then told them to destroy the cross opposite the temple hill in order to be safe from further damage. Muslim authors state that Jewish servants were employed to clean the Muslim sanctuary ((Mudjīr ad-Dīn 1/249)). This is not simply a late reflection of the chiliastic spirit in Jerusalem during the first decades of Islamic rule, because he also reports ((1/250)) the tax-policy of 'Umar ibn Abdal'aziz vis—a—vis the Jews of Jerusalem. When al-Manṣūr, on the occasion of his visit to Jerusalem, ordered, that Jews and Christians to tattoo their names on their hands ((Theoph. 1/446; Mutahhar b. Tahir)), he did so because Christians, Jews and Muslims had so much integrated that tax collection had become difficult or impossible. The interdiction of the Jewish presence in Jerusalem was therefore not enforced.

Jerusalem, for the Muslims a city of particular veneration and — later, with the construction of the sanctuary, the symbol that Islam had taken over the inheritance of the older revelations of Judaism und Christianity, was it also a place of Muslim-Jewish brotherliness? No sources, evaluated critically, allow us to say so. The events in Hidjāz had shown that there was

no general pro-Jewish policy. The fate of Banū Nadhīr and Banu Qainuqa, on the other hand, could not cause an overwhelming fear or vindictiveness among the Jews of Palestine, because these events were primarily of local origin and significance. We only have proof of a convergence of interests, and single hints to an involvement of Jews on the side of the Muslim conquerors.

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
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الجامعة الأردنية

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بلاد الشام في صدر الإسلام

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

(كتاب رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم إلى هرقل)

تحرير

محمد عدنان البخيت

المجلد الأول عمان ١٩٨٧